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
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DEVIANT LOGICS FOR QUANTUM MECHANICS

' If, as one believes, all mathematics reduces to the mathematics of logic, and all physics reduces to mathematics, what alternative is there but for all physics, to reduce to the mathematics of logic ? '

Gravitation ; C. Misner, K. Thorne, and J. Wheeler.

1. Introduction : Birkoff and von Neumann [1] end their paper on ' The Logic of Quantum Mechanics ' by two questions, one of which is ' what experimental meaning can one attach to the meet and join of two given experimental propositions ? ' Since then a number of authors have followed the lead given by them and advanced the subject of quantum logic to a considerable extent. By now, as a result of this activity, quantum logic has attained a fair level of sophistication. But looking through the literature, we find that hardly anywhere one has tried to answer the above question within the scope of quantum mechanics, although attempts have been made to give operational meanings to the logical connectives. However, these attempts always seem to draw on the examples and experiences outside quantum mechanics, sometimes even outside physics. The notable contributions to the advance of quantum logic have been made, among others, by Feyerabend, Finkelstein, Giles, Putnam, Reichenbach, van Fraassen and von Weizsacker.

Till the time of Birkoff and von Neumann paper appeared, no one perhaps suspected that the advent of quantum mechanics as a science to deal with the microworld of molecules, atoms, nuclei

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and the like would bring about the change in the principles of classical logic. If one considers the laws to be consistent with the world of experience, one needs to conclude that the classical logic must be compatible with classical machanics which deals with the macroworld and indeed it is. Even though the rules of classical logic appear to have been laid down *a priori*, one strongly suspects that these rules were formulated by their authors with intuition based on everyday experience of the world around them. Hence, they seem to agree with classical physics, in general, with classical thought. The edifice of classical logic built by its authors is truly imposing. No one would have suspected that a crack would develop into this edifice as a result of the advent of quantum mechanics. Birkoff and von Neumann were the first to notice it. If the arrival of a new science required to study the microworld produced cracks in the edifice of (classical) logic, then the logic is not merely the 'creation of the human mind' as it must have been thought of, but that it is empirical. Logic is determined by the picture of the world, the classical logic by that of the macroworld and quantum logic by that of the microworld.

In this paper we have attempted to present the logic of quantum mechanics by examining the measurement processes in quantum mechanics to determine the meanings of the logical connectives and to find whether they retain the meanings assigned to them in classical logic or they acquired new meanings in the light of strange new features of the quantum mechanical measurement processes. Most authors of quantum logic, particularly Finkelstein[2] and Putnam[3] have emphasized the fact that connectives in quantum logic retain classical meanings on account of operational definitions, though quantum logic differs from classical logic in only one respect. It is the failure of the distributive law: $\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma) = (\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma)$ of the classical logic. We find in our investigations that in view of the peculiar nature of

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quantum mechanical measurements, the meanings of the logical connectives needed to conjoin simple experimental propositions to form compound statements need changes. It is seen that with the new meanings given to the logical connectives, this distributive law remains valid.

2. Experimental Propositions Of Quantum Mechanics : It is welknown that in classical mechanics the state of a mechanical system at any time is completely known if one specifies n generalized coordinates 'q' and n generalized momenta 'p' at that time, where n is the number of degrees of freedom of the mechanical system. These can be obtained by solving Hamilton's equations of motion with the initial conditions specified by the values of 'q' and 'p' at time t=o. Quantum mechanical state of microscopic systems is represented by a certain wave-function ψ (or a state vector $|x>$) which can be expanded as a linear combination of eigenfunctions u_i (or eigenvectors $|i>$) of an operator representing an observable. The wave-function ψ (or the state vector $|x>$) is obtained by solving a differential equation known as Schrodinger equation which is of first order in time, the initial condition being the value of ψ at time t=o. In what follows we accept quantum mechanics in its conventional form as the correct representation of the microworld and accordingly build up our formalism.

Let an observable in quantum mechanics be denoted by A with the corresponding Hermitian operator denoted by the same letter A for convenience. We know from quantum mechanics that A must possess sufficient number of eigenstates, often infinite, that any state vector whatever can be expanded in terms of the corresponding eigen-vectors. The spectrum of the corresponding eigenvalues may be discrete (finite or denumerably infinite, degenerate or non-degenerate) or continuous. For our analysis we shall assume that the eigenvalue spectra of all the opera-

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tors we shall introduce, be discrete, finite and non-degenerate. Let the eigenvectors of A be denoted by $|a_i\rangle$ where $i=1, 2 \ldots, n$ $(<\infty)$. If A represented an observable, then any arbitrary state vector $|x\rangle$ can be expanded as $|x\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\rangle\langle a_i|x\rangle$. If a_i denote the eigenvalues of A for the states $|a_i\rangle$, then $A|a_i\rangle = a_i|a_i\rangle$. The process of measurement in quantum mechanics consists of three successive stages : (1) A preparatory stage when the quantum mechanical system S is 'prepared' to be in an arbitrary state $|x\rangle$, considered as the initial state; (2) a working stage in which the 'prepared' system S interacts with the measuring apparatus (a macroscopic body), we shall call the analyzer and goes over to the superposition state $|x\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\rangle\langle a_i|x\rangle$ and (3) a registering stage in which the system S is registered in one of the eigenstates forming the superposition in the above expression (reduction of the wavepacket). Hence the process of measurement can be described as

$$\xrightarrow{(1)} |x\rangle \xrightarrow{2)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\rangle\langle a_i|x\rangle \xrightarrow{(3)} |a_i\rangle$$

Experimental Proposition (EP) is a statement of the form : "The result of a measurement on a system S in the state $|x\rangle$ and for the observable A is ". The completion of this sentence can be made in two ways. (1) " a real number a_i giving the value of the real dynamical variable (observable) A represented by the Hermitian operator A at time t" and (2)"...that the system, after the measurement is complete, is described by the state vector $|a_i\rangle$". If the statement is completed in the manner (1), we shall call that statement as the experimental propositon of the first kind (EP I) and denote by, say, α_i. If the statement is completed in the menner (2), we shall call that state-

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ment as the experimental proposition of the second kind (EP II) and denote it by α_i'. Thus (EP I) is of the form $M(S_{A|x>}) = a_i$ and (EP II) is of the form $M(S_{A|x>}) = |a_i>$. In the present paper, we shall concern ourselves with EP I's only and drop the suffixes I and II.

3. Experimental Meaning of Logical Connectives :

In this section we shall consider the problem of introducing compound statements involving two or more EP's of the type described in the previous section and giving experimental meaning to the logical connectives conjoining them. We first consider the case of an observable represented by the Hermitian operator A with the eigen-value spectrum $a_1, a_2 \ldots, a_n$. $|a_1>$, $|a_2>$, , $|an>$ are the eigenvectors of A belonging to these eigenvalues. We assume to make measurement on identical copies of the system S prepared to be in the same state $|x>$ to measure the observable A. We denote, as in section 2, the EP's $M(S_{A|x>}) = a_i$ as α_i. The aforementioned measurements will furnish the results a_1 or a_2 or a_3 or ..., not necessarily in that order, with probability measure associated with each of them. This means that a_1 or a_2 or ... are the possible (exclusive) results of the measurement process. If we put $n = 2$, then we may say that result of this measurement is either a_1 or a_2 but never both at the same time, when measurments are repeated on the identical samples in the same state. This measurement statement (for $n = 2$) can be translated into the logical language as $\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2$, where the connective '$\vee$' is used in the *exclusive* sense. Let B be another observable with the corresponding Hermitian operator B with the complete set of eigenvectors $|b_i>$. This observable may or may not be compatible with the observable A. The measuiements on identical copies of S in the state $|x>$ to measure A and B not simultaneously, but successively, should give the results as a_i's or b_i's occuring singly at a time. Such measurement results can be put into

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the logical language as $\alpha_i \vee \beta_i$, with '$\vee$' again in the exclusive sense where the EP β_i is $M(S_{B|x>}) = b_j$. The results of successive measurements of one or more observables on identical copies of a quantum mechanical system, all prepared to be in a given state, are expressible in terms of an exclusive disjunction given by the truth-table 1.

Truth–table 1.

Having given the experimental meaning to disjunction, we now turn to the connective '$\wedge$' symbolizing conjunction. Let L and M be Hermitian operators corresponding to two observables. Let the discrete eigenvectors of these operators be denoted by $|l_i>$ and $|m_j>$ and the corresponding eigenvalues to which they belong be l_i and m_j. The indices i and j run through discrete integral values. Obviously $|l_i>$ and $|m_j>$ form a complete set of eigenvectors. We want to give meaning to the problem of *simultaneous* measurement of two observables. Suppose an experiment to measure simultaneously the values of L and M is performed on a system S in an arbitrary state $|x>$, we shall consider the result as read on two guages – L–guage and M–guage – *simultaneously*. We imagine this as some kind of coincidence measurement technique used with L–guage and M–guage expected to respond at the same time. If we denote the EP $M(S_{L|x>}) = l_i$ as λ_i and $M(S_{M|x>}) = m_j$ as μ_j, then the L–guage reading l_i and M–guage reading m_j gives the experimental proposition 'the results of the simultaneous mesurement of L and M on S in the state $|x>$ are the real numbers l_i and m_j. This EP can be translated into the the logical language as $\lambda_i \wedge \mu_j$. Hence the measurement of *two* observables furnishes us with the EP which is a conjunction of two EP's.

In studying conjunction we must distinguish between two cases : (1) when the two operators commute i. e. the corresponding observables are compatible, and (2) when the two operators

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DEVIANT LOGICS FOR QUANTUM MECHANICS

' If, as one believes, all mathematics reduces to the mathematics of logic, and all physics reduces to mathematics, what alternative is there but for all physics, to reduce to the mathematics of logic ? '

Gravitation ; C. Misner, K. Thorne, and J. Wheeler.

1. Introduction : Birkoff and von Neumann [1] end their paper on ' The Logic of Quantum Mechanics ' by two questions, one of which is ' what experimental meaning can one attach to the meet and join of two given experimental propositions ? ' Since then a number of authors have followed the lead given by them and advanced the subject of quantum logic to a considerable extent. By now, as a result of this activity, quantum logic has attained a fair level of sophistication. But looking through the literature, we find that hardly anywhere one has tried to answer the above question within the scope of quantum mechanics, although attempts have been made to give operational meanings to the logical connectives. However, these attempts always seem to draw on the examples and experiences outside quantum mechanics, sometimes even outside physics. The notable contributions to the advance of quantum logic have been made, among others, by Feyerabend, Finkelstein, Giles, Putnam, Reichenbach, van Fraassen and von Weizsacker.

Till the time of Birkoff and von Neumann paper appeared, no one perhaps suspected that the advent of quantum mechanics as a science to deal with the microworld of molecules, atoms, nuclei

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and the like would bring about the change in the principles of classical logic. If one considers the laws to be consistent with the world of experience, one needs to conclude that the classical logic must be compatible with classical machanics which deals with the macroworld and indeed it is. Even though the rules of classical logic appear to have been laid down *a priori*, one strongly suspects that these rules were formulated by their authors with intuition based on everyday experience of the world around them. Hence, they seem to agree with classical physics, in general, with classical thought. The edifice of classical logic built by its authors is truly imposing. No one would have suspected that a crack would develop into this edifice as a result of the advent of quantum mechanics. Birkoff and von Neumann were the first to notice it. If the arrival of a new science required to study the microworld produced cracks in the edifice of (classical) logic, then the logic is not merely the 'creation of the human mind' as it must have been thought of, but that it is empirical. Logic is determined by the picture of the world, the classical logic by that of the macroworld and quantum logic by that of the microworld.

In this paper we have attempted to present the logic of quantum mechanics by examining the measurement processes in quantum mechanics to determine the meanings of the logical connectives and to find whether they retain the meanings assigned to them in classical logic or they acquired new meanings in the light of strange new features of the quantum mechanical measurement processes. Most authors of quantum logic, particularly Finkelstein[2] and Putnam[3] have emphasized the fact that connectives in quantum logic retain classical meanings on account of operational definitions, though quantum logic differs from classical logic in only one respect. It is the failure of the distributive law: $\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma) = (\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma)$ of the classical logic. We find in our investigations that in view of the peculiar nature of

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quantum mechanical measurements, the meanings of the logical connectives needed to conjoin simple experimental propositions to form compound statements need changes. It is seen that with the new meanings given to the logical connectives, this distributive law remains valid.

2. Experimental Propositions Of Quantum Mechanics : It is welknown that in classical mechanics the state of a mechanical system at any time is completely known if one specifies n generalized coordinates 'q' and n generalized momenta 'p' at that time, where n is the number of degrees of freedom of the mechanical system. These can be obtained by solving Hamilton's equations of motion with the initial conditions specified by the values of 'q' and 'p' at time t=o. Quantum mechanical state of microscopic systems is represented by a certain wave-function ψ (or a state vector $|x>$) which can be expanded as a linear combination of eigenfunctions u_i (or eigenvectors $|i>$) of an operator representing an observable. The wave-function ψ (or the state vector $|x>$) is obtained by solving a differential equation known as Schrodinger equation which is of first order in time, the initial condition being the value of ψ at time t=o. In what follows we accept quantum mechanics in its conventional form as the correct representation of the microworld and accordingly build up our formalism.

Let an observable in quantum mechanics be denoted by A with the corresponding Hermitian operator denoted by the same letter A for convenience. We know from quantum mechanics that A must possess sufficient number of eigenstates, often infinite, that any state vector whatever can be expanded in terms of the corresponding eigen-vectors. The spectrum of the corresponding eigenvalues may be discrete (finite or denumerably infinite, degenerate or non-degenerate) or continuous. For our analysis we shall assume that the eigenvalue spectra of all the opera-

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tors we shall introduce, be discrete, finite and non-degenerate. Let the eigenvectors of A be denoted by $|a_i\rangle$ where $i=1, 2 \ldots, n$ ($<\infty$). If A represented an observable, then any arbitrary state vector $|x\rangle$ can be expanded as $|x\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\rangle\langle a_i|x\rangle$. If a_i denote the eigenvalues of A for the states $|a_i\rangle$, then $A|a_i\rangle = a_i|a_i\rangle$. The process of measurement in quantum mechanics consists of three successive stages : (1) A preparatory stage when the quantum mechanical system S is 'prepared' to be in an arbitrary state $|x\rangle$, considered as the initial state; (2) a working stage in which the 'prepared' system S interacts with the measuring apparatus (a macroscopic body), we shall call the analyzer and goes over to the superposition state $|x\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\rangle\langle a_i|x\rangle$ and (3) a registering stage in which the system S is registered in one of the eigenstates forming the superposition in the above expression (reduction of the wavepacket). Hence the process of measurement can be described as

$$\ldots \xrightarrow{(1)} |x\rangle \xrightarrow{2)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\rangle\langle a_i|x\rangle \xrightarrow{(3)} |a_i\rangle$$

Experimental Proposition (EP) is a statement of the form : "The result of a measurement on a system S in the state $|x\rangle$ and for the observable A is ". The completion of this sentence can be made in two ways. (1) " a real number a_i giving the value of the real dynamical variable (observable) A represented by the Hermitian operator A at time t" and (2)"...that the system, after the measurement is complete, is described by the state vector $|a_i\rangle$". If the statement is completed in the manner (1), we shall call that statement as the experimental propositon of the first kind (EP I) and denote by, say, α_i. If the statement is completed in the menner (2), we shall call that state-

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ment as the experimental proposition of the second kind (EP II) and denote it by α_i'. Thus (EP I) is of the form $M(S_{A|x>}) = a_i$ and (EP II) is of the form $M(S_{A|x>}) = |a_i>$. In the present paper, we shall concern ourselves with EP I's only and drop the suffixes I and II.

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Truth-table 1.

Having given the experimental meaning to disjunction, we now turn to the connective '$\wedge$' symbolizing conjunction. Let L and M be Hermitian operators corresponding to two observables. Let the discrete eigenvectors of these operators be denoted by $|l_i>$ and $|m_i>$ and the corresponding eigenvalues to which they belong be l_i and m_j. The indices i and j run through discrete integral values. Obviously $|l_i>$ and $|m_j>$ form a complete set of eigenvectors. We want to give meaning to the problem of *simultaneous* measurement of two observables. Suppose an experiment to measure simultaneously the values of L and M is performed on a system S in an arbitrary state $|x>$, we shall consider the result as read on two guages – L-guage and M-guage – *simultaneously*. We imagine this as some kind of coincidence measurement technique used with L-guage and M-guage expected to respond at the same time. If we denote the EP $M(S_{L|x>}) = l_i$ as λ_i and $M(S_{M|x>}) = m_j$ as μ_j, then the L-guage reading l_i and M-guage reading m_j gives the experimental proposition 'the results of the simultaneous mesurement of L and M on S in the state $|x>$ are the real numbers l_i and m_j. This EP can be translated into the the logical language as $\lambda_i \wedge \mu_j$. Hence the measurement of *two* observables furnishes us with the EP which is a conjunction of two EP's.

In studying conjunction we must distinguish between two cases : (1) when the two operators commute i. e. the corresponding observables are compatible, and (2) when the two operators

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do not commute and the corresponding observables are incompatible.

Case (I) : Let the two commuting operators be denoted by A and B, they satify [A, B] = O. We know from a well–known theorem in quantum mechanics that A and B have a *common* complete set of eigenvectors, hence we put $|a_i\rangle = |b_i\rangle = |a_i\, b_i\rangle$, where we have indicated the common set of eigenvectors as $|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ in which the letters a_i and b_i with the same subscript 'i' are inserted within the ket symbol $|\ \rangle$ sigifying that the ket $|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ is an eigenket of both A and B. Since A and B are observables, we have $|x\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\, b_i\rangle\langle a_i\, b_i\, |\, x\rangle$. A simultaneous measurement of A and B on the system S in the state $|x\rangle$ will furnish some a_i as the reading of the A–guage and some b_i of the B–guage simultaneously, where $A\,|a_j\, b_i\rangle = a_i\,|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ and $B\,|a_i\, b_i\rangle = b_i\,|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ (reduction of the wave–packet) . In the logical language, this is $\alpha i \wedge \beta i$. We note that the index–set I, such that $i \in I$, is so arranged that the results of the above measurement are $a_i\ b_i$. This means that when A–guage reads a^i B–guage reads b_i . It never happens that the results are a^i and b_j with $i \neq j$, hence the statement $\alpha_i \wedge \beta j$ ($i \neq j$) is always false in this case. To construct the truth–table for conjunction '$\wedge$' in the case of compatible observables, we consider the experimental set–up with two coincidence guages to read the values of A and B. If the A–guage reads a_i and B–guage simultaneously reads b_i , then we assign the truth value T to both α_i and β_i and $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$ is also assigned the truth value T. If the A–guage registered reading a_i , but B–guage does not register anything, we shall assign the truth value T to α_i , F to β_i and F to $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$. The reason is that by the very nature of the coincidence technique, this may be considered as the apparatus malfunction and the corresponding reading is rejected. So also if we assign F to α_i, T to β_i, then $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$ has the truth value F.

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Lastly, if both guages fail to respond, we assign F to α_i, F to β_i, and F to $\alpha_i' \wedge \beta_i$ leading to the truth–table 2.

Truth–table 2

We see that the above truth-table coincides with that of classical logic.

Case (2) : Let the two non-commuting Hermitian operators be denoted by P and Q. These correspond to two incompatible observables. Let P and Q satisfy $[P, Q] = iR$, where R is also a Hermitian operator corresponding to an observable. We denote the EP "the result of the measurment of P on S in the state $|x>$ is p_i (a real eigenvalue) as φ_i" and the EP "the result of the measurement of Q on S in the state $|x>$ is q_j (a real eigenvalue) as ψ_j". In these EP's the results of measurements of P and Q are supposed to have the *sharp* values p_i and q_j with the standard deviations $\triangle p$ and $\triangle q$ equal to zero. According to the uncetainty principle, if P and Q are measured simultaneously, $\triangle p \triangle q \geqslant \frac{r}{2}$, where r is the expectation value of R in state $|x>$. From this we see that φ_i is true if $\triangle p = 0$ and ψ_j is true if $\triangle q = 0$, but φ_i is false if $\triangle p \neq 0$ and ψ_j is false if $\triangle q \neq 0$ †. From the uncertainty principle, it is clear that $\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j$ is false only in the case when both φ_i and ψ_j are true, but it is true otherwise, resulting in the truth-table 3.

Truth–table 3

For the purpose of extending the analysis to more than two EP's conjoined by the disjunction '$\vee$', let us consider a Hermitian operator A corresponding to some observable. An EP of

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† In fact, for clarity, one may say that φ_i is true if $\triangle p < \frac{r}{2\triangle q}$ and ψ_j is true if $\triangle q < \frac{r}{2\triangle p}$, but φ_i is false if $\triangle p \geqslant \frac{r}{2\triangle q}$ and ψ_j is false if $\triangle q \geqslant \frac{r}{2\triangle p}$.

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the form $M(S_{A|x}) = a_i$ is detoted by α_i, $i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots n(<\infty)$. We know from quantum mechanics that the system can be only in *one* state at a time. Hence at some time if $\alpha_i (1 \leqslant i \leqslant n)$ is true then all the other α_k's with $k \neq i$ are false at that time. We write $\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \vee \ldots \vee \alpha_n$ to mean that the system S has the property described by the observable A. Similarly for another Hermitian operatar B with the spectrum of eigenvalues $b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_m$ (in general $m \neq n$), an EP of the form $M[S_{B|x}] = b_j$ will be denoted by β_j. Using the same argument, we concider $\beta_1 \vee \beta_2 \vee \ldots \ldots, \vee \beta_m$ as an always true statement to mean that the system S has the property described by the observable B. Clearly in the above expressions, we see that the disjunction is true if only one disjunct is true and others are false at a time, the disjunction is false if two or more of the disjuncts are true at a time. This is the requirement of an exclusive disjunction we have introduced in our quantum logic.

Regarding the connective '$\wedge$' signifying conjunction, we cannot extend its meanings to a statement of the form $\alpha \wedge \beta \wedge \gamma \wedge \ldots$ of more than two EP'S as this statement cannot be given a meaning, particularly for incompatible observables, since it refers to the result of simultaneous measurement of more than two observables. Even in quantum mechanics such measurements are hardly required and discussed. As the connective '$\wedge$' conjoins two EP'S which express the result of simultaneous measurement of two observable on a system S in an arbitrary state, we consider a statement of the form $\alpha_i \wedge \alpha_j$ as always false, where α_i and α_j are the EP's corresponding to the *same* observable. This is due to the fact that if α_i is true, α_j is false and that an observable is compatible with itself which follows the truth-table 2. However, the statement "the system has the properties described by the observables A and B at the same time" will be described by the expression $(\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \vee \ldots \vee \alpha_n) \wedge (\beta_1 \vee \beta_2 \vee \ldots \vee \beta_m)$ according to the meaning given to the connective

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'$\wedge$'. If A and B are compatible observables, the expression $(\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \vee \cdots \vee \alpha_n) \wedge (\beta_1 \vee \beta_2 \vee \cdots \vee \beta_n)$, where we have put m=n, is an always true statement. If P and Q are incompatible observables with the corresponding EP's denoted by φ and ψ then the statements $(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \vee \quad \vee \varphi_n)$ and $(\psi_1 \vee \psi_2 \vee \cdots \vee \psi_m)$ are alwys true. but the statement

$$(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \vee \quad \varphi_n) \wedge (\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2 \vee \ldots \vee \psi_m)$$

where, in general, $m \neq n$, signifying that the system has the properties P and Q at the *same time*, is an always false staement. It is often implied that a quantum mechanical systm S simultaneously possesses properties described by the incompatible observables P and Q at all times and that it is the measurement process that introduces the uncertainty. This is evidently false as the above result shows.

4. *The Distributive Law :* In the classical logic, we have two different forms of the distributive law. We shall state each forms for the two cases below. The generalization is obvious. One form is

(I) $\alpha \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma) = (\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\alpha \vee \gamma)$ and

(I′) $(\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\gamma \wedge \delta) = (\alpha \vee \gamma) \wedge (\alpha \vee \delta) \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma) \wedge (\beta \vee \delta)$

The other form is

(II) $\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma) = (\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma)$ and

(II′) $(\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\gamma \vee \delta) = (\alpha \wedge \gamma) \vee (\alpha \wedge \delta) \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma) \vee (\beta \wedge \delta)$.

First, let us consider the form (I). We apply it to two observables A and B with a complete spectrum of only one eigenvalue and two eigenvalues respectively. Then (I) can be written as $\alpha \vee (\beta_1 \wedge \beta_2) = (\alpha \vee \beta_1) \wedge (\alpha \vee \beta_2)$. In this experssion we note, on the right hand side, there occur expression of the form $(\alpha \vee \beta_1)$ and $(\alpha \vee \beta_2)$ conjoined by the connective '$\wedge$'. These expressions are obtained by conjoining two EP's

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corresponding to observables which may themselves be incompatible with other, so that it is impossible to say whether the EP's that correspond to $(\alpha \vee \beta_1)$ and $(\alpha \vee \beta_2)$ are compatible or incomatible with each other. Therefore, within the scope of definition of the connective '$\wedge$' which has different truth-tables for compatible and incompatible observables, these EP's cannot be conjoined together by '$\wedge$'. This means that this form of the distributive law lies outside the ambit of our logical system. In any case, this form has not even been mentioned by Finkelstein and Putnam. Similarly in the expression $\alpha_1 \wedge \alpha_2) \vee (\beta_1 \wedge \beta_2) = (\alpha_1 \vee \beta_1) \wedge (\alpha_1 \vee \beta_2) \wedge (\alpha_2 \vee \beta_1) \wedge (\alpha_2 \vee \beta_2)$ the right hand side contains expressions $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_1)$, $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_2)$, conjoined by the connective '$\wedge$'. This expression involves more than two EP's conjoined by the connective '$\wedge$' to which it is not possible to give an empirical meaning. Besides the EP's $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_1)$, $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_2)$, may correspond to neither compatible nor incompatible observables and thus cannot be meaningfully conjoined together by the connective '$\wedge$'. Hence we shall speak no more about this form of the distributive law in this paper.

Secondly, we consider the form (II) which is the form admissible in our formalism of quantum logic. Here we shall distinguish between two cases : Case (1) : The two observables A and B are compatible and the corresponding operators commute.

Case (2) : The two observables P and Q are incompatible and the corresponding operators do not commute.

We first consider case (1). In this case, we shall show that the distributive law holds when (a) the operator A has the complete spectrum of one eigenvalue and operator B has two, (b) A has the spectrum of 2 eigenvalues, B also has two and (c) A has the spectrum of 3 eigenvalues and B also has three. We shall show this by means of appropriate truth-tables.

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(a) Let the EP : M ($S_{A|x>}$)=a be denoted by α and the EP : M ($S_{B|x>}$)=b_i by β_i, i=1, 2. In the case (a) we construct the following truth-table 4.

Truth – table 4

The truth values in the second and the seventh columns of the truth-table 4 show that the distributive law $\alpha \wedge (\beta_1 \vee \beta_2) = (\alpha \wedge \beta_1) \vee (\alpha \wedge \beta_2)$ holds.

We now consider the case (b), where the operator A has the spectrum of two eigenvalues and B has also two. In this case we denote the EP's corresponding to the observable A as α_1 and α_2 and the EP's corresponding to the observable B as β_1 and β_2. For this case, we have the following truth - table 5.

Truth–table 5

The truth values in the columns 4 and 12 in the truth-table 5 show that the distributive law holds. Finally, in the case (c) we denote the EP's corresponding to the observable A as α_1, α_2 and α_3 and the EP's corresponding to the observable B as β_1, β_2 and β_3. In this case we have the following truth-table 6.

Truth–table 6

The truth values in the columns 8 and 19 in the truth-table 6 show that the distributive law holds even in this case. It is possible to construct truth-tables for more complex cases involving more than three eigenvalues each and see that the distributive law holds in all these cases.

Secondly, we consider the other case of incompatible observable. Again, here we look into (a) P has only one eigenvalue and Q has two, (b) P has 2 eigenvalues, Q has also two and (c) P has 2 eigenvalues but Q has three. Let the EP : M($S_{P|x>}$) = p be denoted by φ and the EP : M($S_{Q|x>}$)= q

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by ψ. In the case (a) we denote EP corresponding to the observable P as φ and the EP's corresponding to the observable Q as ψ_1 and ψ_2. When we construct the truth-table 7 for this caes, we find that the truth-table has the following form.

Truth - table 7

Here we have a surprise ! The distributive law has failed ! But looking closer, we see that this is expected as the observable P, which has only one eigenvalue, is a constant like the electron charge. Hence the operator P corresponding to this observable is just a number which commutes with every other operator, that is, the observable P is compatible with every other observable. We make a mistake in the fiirst place in taking P with one eigenvalue incompatible with Q.

In the case (b) we denote the EP's corresponding to P as φ_1 and φ_2 and the EP's corresponding to Q as ψ_1 and ψ_2. In this case we are led to the following truth-table 8.

Truth-table 8

The truth valus in the columns 2 and 8 indicate that the distributive law holds. Finally, in the case (c) we denote the EP's corresponding to P as φ_1 and φ_2 and the EP's corresponding to Q as ψ_1, ψ_2 and ψ_3 (note that $m \neq n$ here). We construct the following truth-table 9.

Truth-table 9

In this case as well, we see that the distributive law holds. One can easily verify this for more complex cases. From the above truth-tables, we see that the distributive law holds for EP's both in the case of compatible and incompatible observables. The apparant failure of the law in the case (2a) is actually the confirmation of its validity.

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5. Connectives of Negation, Implication and Equivalence : It can be seen from the above analysis that the distributive law in the from

$(\lambda_1 \vee \lambda_2 \vee \ldots) \wedge (\mu_1 \vee \mu_2 \vee \ldots) = (\lambda_1 \wedge \mu_1) \vee (\lambda_1 \wedge \mu_2) \vee \ldots \vee (\lambda_i \wedge \mu_j) \vee \ldots$ holds for the EP's corresponding to both the compatible and incompatible observables. We have seen that this from, but not the other, is meaningful in our empirical logic within the scope of meaning we have assigned to the connectives of disjunction '$\vee$' and of conjunction '$\wedge$'. Another connective we have not mentioned so far and which has a basic function in further development of our logical system is negation '$\neg$'. If we denote the EP : $M\ (S_{LIx>}) = l_i$ as λ_i, then we shall denote the EP : $M\ (S_{LIx>}) = l_j$, $j \neq i$ as $\neg\lambda_i$. We see that the meaning given to the connective of negation is quasi-classical.

Now that we have given empirical meanings to the connectives '$\vee$', '$\wedge$' and '$\neg$' we set to define some additional connectives like those of implication and equivalence for both campatible and incompatible observables. Our definition of implication happens to provide the same truth-table for it, in these cases as in the classical case : a conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent is false. This requires that in the case of compatible observables we put $(\alpha \supset \beta) \equiv (\neg\alpha \vee \beta) \vee (\neg\alpha \wedge \beta)$ where α and β are the EP's corresonpding to the compatible observables A and B. We illustrate this by the following truth-table 10, which can easily be constructed using the above expression on the right.

Truth-table 10

In the case of incomptible observables, we have

$(\varphi \supset \psi) \equiv (\neg\varphi \vee \psi) \vee \neg(\neg\varphi \wedge \psi)$

where φ and ψ are the EP's corresponding to the incompatible observables P and Q. This also leads to the same truth-table 10

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given above. In the above two expressions we have already used the connective '$\equiv$' which is known as that of equivalence. The concept of equivalence in the sense that two EP's (occuring on either side of that connective) are materially equivalent when they have the same truth-value ought to be accepted in quantum logic regardless of the nature of EP's as to whether they correspond to compatibles. This requires that if λ and μ are two EP's corresponding to two observables either compatible or incompatible with each other, then we put the equivalence relation between them as $(\lambda \equiv \mu) \equiv (\lambda \supset \mu) \vee \neg(\mu \supset \lambda)$. This holds in both cases. However, in the case of compatible observables with the classical meaning of '$\wedge$', one may also put $(\alpha \equiv \beta) \equiv (\alpha \supset \beta) \wedge (\beta \supset \alpha)$.

Finally, we present a few consequences of the empirical meanings given to the set of connectives '$\vee$' '$\wedge$' and '$\neg$'. Since experimental meaning have already been assigned to these connectives, one need not strive to seek empirical meanings to other connectives defined in terms of these, such as implication and equivalence. Yet it is fruitful to briefly investigate the following questions : (1) For which pair of EP's λ and μ, the presence of one, say λ, entails the presence of the other? (2) For which pair of EP's λ and μ, the presence of one is entailed by the other? Both questions can be answered within the framework of our logical system, provided we distinguish between two cases of compatible and incompatible observables. (1) If α_i and β_i are the EP's corresponding to two compatible observables A and B, we assert that the presence of α_i (or β_i) entails $(\alpha_i \vee \beta_i) \vee (\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)$. Logically this means that $\alpha_i \supset [(\alpha_i \vee \beta_i) \vee (\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)]$ is a tautotogy which indeed it is. Empirically it would mean that if α_i is true (or if β_i is true) then $[(\alpha_i \vee \beta_i) \vee (\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)]$ is true also, but the converse is not true. This can be seen from the following truth-table 11.

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Truth-table 11

The above discussion shows that when α_i is true (or when β_i is true), then $\alpha_i \vee \beta_i$ (signifying *successive* measurements of A and B) and $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$ (which signifies *simultaneous* measurments of A and B) are two mutually exclusive EP's. Similarly if if φ_i and ψ_j are the EP's corresponding to two incompatible observables P and Q ,we assert that the presence of φ_i (or ψ_j) entails the presence of $(\varphi_i \vee \psi_j) \vee \neg (\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j)$. It is easy to verify that $\varphi_i \supset [(\varphi_i \vee \psi_j) \vee \neg (\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j)]$ is a tautology and that if φ_i is true (or if ψ_j is true), then $[(\varphi_i \vee \psi_j) \vee \neg (\varphi_i \wedge \psi_i)]$ is true also. Notice the presence of $\neg (\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j)$ in the case of incompatible observables instead of $(\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j)$. Hence when φ_i is true (or when ψ_j is true), then $\varphi_i \vee \psi_j$ (signifying *successive* measurements of P and Q) and $\neg (\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j)$ (signifying *simultaneous* measurement of P and Q) are two mutually exclusive EP's.

(2) For compatible observables, one easily verifies that α_i (Or β_i) is entailed by $(\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)$. This means that if $(\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)$ is true then α_i as well as β_i is true and that $(\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i) \supset \alpha_i$ (or β_i) is a tautology. In a similar fashion, one finds that φ_i (or ψ_j) is entailed by $\neg (\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j)$, where φ_i and ψ_j are the EP's for two incompatible observables.

6. Concluding remarks : We have shown in the paper that the basis of logical statements, as is often claimed, is not just *a priori*, but has to take into account empirical truths. A logic originated and developed during the classical period cannot but be at variance with empirical truths of quantum mechanics developed to explain the behaviour of the microworld. If logic is claimed to be empirical, is it merely dropping a well-known law of classical logic and nothing else ? We answer this question by saying that it is much more. If the logic is empirical, then one must investigate the empirical meanings of the

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do not commute and the corresponding observables are incompatible.

Case (1) : Let the two commuting operators be denoted by A and B, they satify [A, B] = O. We know from a well–known theorem in quantum mechanics that A and B have a *common* complete set of eigenvectors, hence we put $|a_i\rangle = |b_i\rangle = |a_i\, b_i\rangle$, where we have indicated the common set of eigenvectors as $|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ in which the letters a_i and b_i with the same subscript 'i' are inserted within the ket symbol $|\ \rangle$ sigifying that the ket $|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ is an eigenket of both A and B. Since A and B are observables, we have $|x\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} |a_i\, b_i\rangle \langle a_i\, b_i\, |\, x\rangle$. A simultaneous measurement of A and B on the system S in the state $|x\rangle$ will furnish some a_i as the reading of the A–guage and some b_i of the B–guage simultaneously, where $A\,|a_j\, b_i\rangle = a_i\,|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ and $B\,|a_i\, b_i\rangle = b_i\,|a_i\, b_i\rangle$ (reduction of the wave–packet) . In the logical language, this is $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$. We note that the index–set I, such that $i \in I$, is so arranged that the results of the above measurement are a_i b_i . This means that when A–guage reads a' B–guage reads b_i . It never happens that the results are a_i and b_j with $i \neq j$, hence the statement $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_j$ ($i \neq j$) is always false in this case. To construct the truth–table for conjunction '$\wedge$' in the case of compatible observables, we consider the experimental set–up with two coincidence guages to read the values of A and B. If the A–guage reads a_i and B–guage simultaneously reads b_i , then we assign the truth value T to both α_i and β_i and $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$ is also assigned the truth value T. If the A–guage registered reading a_i , but B–guage does not register anything, we shall assign the truth value T to α_i, F to β_i and F to $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$. The reason is that by the very nature of the coincidence technique, this may be ccnsidered as the apparatus malfunction and the corresponding reading is rejected. So also if we assign F to α_i, T to β_i, then $\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$ has the truth value F.

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Lastly, if both guages fail to respond, we assign F to α_i, F to β_i, and F to $\alpha_i^{\perp} \wedge \beta_i$ leading to the truth–table 2.

Truth–table 2

We see that the above truth-table coincides with that of classical logic.

Case (2) : Let the two non-commuting Hermitian operators be denoted by P and Q. These correspond to two incompatible observables. Let P and Q satisfy $[P, Q] = iR$, where R is also a Hermitian operator corresponding to an observable. We denote the EP "the result of the measurment of P on S in the state $|\times>$ is p_i (a real eigenvalue) as φ_i" and the EP "the result of the measurement of Q on S in the state $|\times>$ is q_j (a real eigenvalue) as ψ_j". In these EP's the results of measurements of P and Q are supposed to have the *sharp* values p_i and q_j with the standard deviations $\triangle p$ and $\triangle q$ equal to zero. According to the uncetainty principle, if P and Q are measured simultaneously, $\triangle p \, \triangle q \geqslant \frac{r}{2}$, where r is the expectation value of R in state $|\times>$. From this we see that φ_i is true if $\triangle p = 0$ and ψ_j is true if $\triangle q = 0$, but φ_i is false if $\triangle p \neq 0$ and ψ_j is false if $\triangle q \neq 0$ †. From the uncertainty principle, it is clear that $\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j$ is false only in the case when both φ_i and ψ_j are true, but it is true otherwise, resulting in the truth-table 3.

Truth–table 3

For the purpose of extending the analysis to more than two EP's conjoined by the disjunction '$\vee$', let us consider a Hermitian operator A corresponding to some observable. An EP of

† In fact, for clarity, one may say that φ_i is true if $\triangle p < \frac{r}{2\triangle q}$ and ψ_j is true if $\triangle q < \frac{r}{2\triangle p}$, but φ_i is false if $\triangle p \geqslant \frac{r}{2\triangle q}$ and ψ_j is false if $\triangle q \geqslant \frac{r}{2\triangle p}$.

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the form $M(S_{AIx}) = a_i$ is detoted by α_i, $i = 1, 2, 3, \ldots n(<\infty)$. We know from quantum mechanics that the system can be only in *one* state at a time. Hence at some time if $\alpha_i (1 \leqslant i \leqslant n)$ is true then all the other α_k's with $k \neq i$ are false at that time. We write $\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \vee \ldots \vee \alpha_n$ to mean that the system S has the property described by the observable A. Similarly for another Hermitian operatar B with the spectrum of eigenvalues $b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_m$ (in general $m \neq n$), an EP of the form $M[S_{BIx}] = b_j$ will be denoted by β_j. Using the same argument, we concider $\beta_1 \vee \beta_2 \vee \ldots \ldots, \vee \beta_m$ as an always true statement to mean that the system S has the property described by the observable B. Clearly in the above expressions, we see that the disjunction is true if only one disjunct is true and others are false at a time, the disjunction is false if two or more of the disjuncts are true at a time. This is the requirement of an exclusive disjunction we have introduced in our quantum logic.

Regarding the connective '$\wedge$' signifying conjunction, we cannot extend its meanings to a statement of the form $\alpha \wedge \beta \wedge \gamma \wedge \ldots$ of more than two EP'S as this statement cannot be given a meaning, particularly for incompatible observables, since it refers to the result of simultaneous measurement of more than two observables. Even in quantum mechanics such measurements are hardly required and discussed. As the connective '$\wedge$' conjoins two EP'S which express the result of simultaneous measurement of two observable on a system S in an arbitrary state, we consider a statement of the form $\alpha_i \wedge \alpha_j$ as always false, where α_i and α_j are the EP's corresponding to the *same* observable. This is due to the fact that if α_i is true, α_j is false and that an observable is compatible with itself which follows the truth-table 2. However, the statement "the system has the properties described by the observables A and B at the same time" will be described by the expression $(\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \vee \ldots \vee \alpha_n) \wedge (\beta_1 \vee \beta_2 \vee \ldots \vee \beta_m)$ according to the meaning given to the connective

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'$\wedge$'. If A and B are compatible observables, the expression $(\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \vee \cdots \vee \alpha_n) \wedge (\beta_1 \vee \beta_2 \vee \cdots \vee \beta_n)$, where we have put m=n, is an always true statement. If P and Q are incompatible observables with the corresponding EP's denoted by φ and ψ then the statements $(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \vee \quad \vee \varphi_n)$ and $(\psi_1 \vee \psi_2 \vee \cdots \vee \psi_m)$ are alwys true. but the statement

$$(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \vee \quad \varphi_n) \wedge (\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2 \vee \ldots \vee \psi_m)$$

where, in general, $m \neq n$, signifying that the system has the properties P and Q at the *same time,* is an always false staement. It is often implied that a quantum mechanical systm S simultaneously possesses properties described by the incompatible observables P and Q at all times and that it is the measurement process that introduces the uncertainty. This is evidently false as the above result shows.

4. *The Distributive Law :* In the classical logic, we have two different forms of the distributive law. We shall state each forms for the two cases below. The generalization is obvious. One form is

(I) $\alpha \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma) = (\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\alpha \vee \gamma)$ and

(I′) $(\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\gamma \wedge \delta) = (\alpha \vee \gamma) \wedge (\alpha \vee \delta) \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma) \wedge (\beta \vee \delta)$

The other form is

(II) $\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma) = (\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma)$ and

(II′) $(\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\gamma \vee \delta) = (\alpha \wedge \gamma) \vee (\alpha \wedge \delta) \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma) \vee (\beta \wedge \delta)$.

First, let us consider the form (I). We apply it to two observables A and B with a complete spectrum of only one eigenvalue and two eigenvalues respectively. Then (I) can be written as $\alpha \vee (\beta_1 \wedge \beta_2) = (\alpha \vee \beta_1) \wedge (\alpha \vee \beta_2)$. In this experssion we note, on the right hand side, there occur expression of the form $(\alpha \vee \beta_1)$ and $(\alpha \vee \beta_2)$ conjoined by the connective '$\wedge$'. These expressions are obtained by conjoining two EP's

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corresponding to observables which may themselves be incompatible with other, so that it is impossible to say whether the EP's that correspond to $(\alpha \vee \beta_1)$ and $(\alpha \vee \beta_2)$ are compatible or incomatible with each other. Therefore, within the scope of definition of the connective '$\wedge$' which has different truth-tables for compatible and incompatible observables, these EP's cannot be conjoined together by '$\wedge$'. This means that this form of the distributive law lies outside the ambit of our logical system. In any case, this form has not even been mentioned by Finkelstein and Putnam. Similarly in the expression $\alpha_1 \wedge \alpha_2) \vee (\beta_1 \wedge \beta_2) = (\alpha_1 \vee \beta_1) \wedge (\alpha_1 \vee \beta_2) \wedge (\alpha_2 \vee \beta_1) \wedge (\alpha_2 \vee \beta_2)$ the right hand side contains expressions $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_1)$, $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_2)$, . conjoined by the connective '$\wedge$'. This expression involves more than two EP's conjoined by the connective '$\wedge$' to which it is not possible to give an empirical meaning. Besides the EP's $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_1)$, $(\alpha_1 \vee \beta_2)$, may correspond to neither compatible nor incompatible observables and thus cannot be meaningfully conjoined together by the connective '$\wedge$'. Hence we shall speak no more about this form of the distributive law in this paper.

Secondly, we consider the form (II) which is the form admissible in our formalism of quantum logic. Here we shall distinguish between two cases : Case (1) : The two observables A and B are compatible and the corresponding operators commute.

Case (2) : The two observables P and Q are incompatible and the corresponding operators do not commute.

We first consider case (1). In this case, we shall show that the distributive law holds when (a) the operator A has the complete spectrum of one eigenvalue and operator B has two, (b) A has the spectrum of 2 eigenvalues, B also has two and (c) A has the spectrum of 3 eigenvalues and B also has three. We shall show this by means of appropriate truth-tables.

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(a) Let the EP : M ($S_{A|x>}$) = a be denoted by α and the EP : M ($S_{B|x>}$) = b_i by β_i, i = 1, 2. In the case (a) we construct the following truth-table 4.

Truth – table 4

The truth values in the second and the seventh columns of the truth-table 4 show that the distributive law $\alpha \wedge (\beta_1 \vee \beta_2) = (\alpha \wedge \beta_1) \vee (\alpha \wedge \beta_2)$ holds.

We now consider the case (b), where the operator A has the spectrum of two eigenvalues and B has also two. In this case we denote the EP's corresponding to the observable A as α_1 and α_2 and the EP's corresponding to the observable B as β_1 and β_2. For this case, we have the following truth - table 5.

Truth–table 5

The truth values in the columns 4 and 12 in the truth-table 5 show that the distributive law holds. Finally, in the case (c) we denote the EP's corresponding to the observable A as α_1, α_2 and α_3 and the EP's corresponding to the observable B as β_1, β_2 and β_3. In this case we have the following truth-table 6.

Truth–table 6

The truth values in the columns 8 and 19 in the truth-table 6 show that the distributive law holds even in this case. It is possible to construct truth-tables for more complex cases involving more than three eigenvalues each and see that the distributive law holds, in all these cases.

Secondly, we consider the other case of incompatible observable. Again, here we look into (a) P has only one eigenvalue and Q has two, (b) P has 2 eigenvalues, Q has also two and (c) P has 2 eigenvalues but Q has three. Let the EP : M($S_{P|x>}$) = p be denoted by φ and the EP : M($S_{Q|x>}$) = q

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by ψ. In the case (a) we denote EP corresponding to the observable P as φ and the EP's corresponding to the observable Q as ψ_1 and ψ_2. When we construct the truth-table 7 for this caes, we find that the truth-table has the following form.

Truth - table 7

Here we have a surprise ! The distributive law has failed ! But looking closer, we see that this is expected as the observable P, which has only one eigenvalue, is a constant like the electron charge. Hence the operator P corresponding to this observable is just a number which commutes with every other operator, that is, the observable P is compatible with every other observable. We make a mistake in the fiirst place in taking P with one eigenvalue incompatible with Q.

In the case (b) we denote the EP's corresponding to P as φ_1 and φ_2 and the EP's corresponding to Q as ψ_1 and ψ_2. In this case we are led to the following truth-table 8 .

Truth-table 8

The truth valus in the columns 2 and 8 indicate that the distributive law holds. Finally, in the case (c) we denote the EP's corresponding to P as φ_1 and φ_2 and the EP's corresponding to Q as ψ_1, ψ_2 and ψ_3 (note that $m \neq n$ here). We construct the following truth-table 9 ..

Truth-table 9

In this case as well, we see that the distributive law holds. One can easily verify this for more complex cases. From the above truth-tables, we see that the distributive law holds for EP's both in the case of compatible and incompatible observables. The apparant failure of the law in the case (2a) is actually the confirmation of its validity.

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Finally, we present a few consequences of the empirical meanings given to the set of connectives '$\vee$' '$\wedge$' and '$\neg$'. Since experimental meaning have already been assigned to these connectives, one need not strive to seek empirical meanings to other connectives defined in terms of these, such as implication and equivalence. Yet it is fruitful to briefly investigate the following questions : (1) For which pair of EP's λ and μ, the presence of one, say λ, entails the presence of the other? (2) For which pair of EP's λ and μ, the presence of one is entailed by the other ? Both questions can be answered within the framework of our logical system, provided we distinguish between two cases of compatible and incompatible observables. (1) If α_i and β_i are the EP's corresponding to two compatible observables A and B, we assert that the presence of α_i (or β_i) entails $(\alpha_i \vee \beta_i) \vee (\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)$. Logically this means that $\alpha_i \supset [(\alpha_i \vee \beta_i) \vee (\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)]$ is a tautotogy which indeed it is. Empirically it would mean that if α_i is true (or if β_i is true) then $[(\alpha_i \vee \beta_i) \vee (\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)]$ is true also, but the converse is not true. This can be seen from the following truth-table 11.

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6. Concluding remarks : We have shown in the paper that the basis of logical statements, as is often claimed, is not just *a priori*, but has to take into account empirical truths. A logic originated and developed during the classical period cannot but be at variance with empirical truths of quantum mechanics developed to explain the behaviour of the microworld. If logic is claimed to be empirical, is it merely dropping a well-known law of classical logic and nothing else ? We answer this question by saying that it is much more. If the logic is empirical, then one must investigate the empirical meanings of the

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basic connectives like those of disnjunction and conjuction in the light of new insights into measurement processes of the microworld. Do the classical meanings of these connectives, which have been time-tested in the classical context, remain unscathed when we look beyond the classical world and peep into the microworld of atoms, nuclei and elementary particles or do they undergo any change ? Our investigation has shown that we have to adopt the latter alternative. In this process we find that we have to distinguish between compatible and incompatible observables of quantum mechanics and adopt two different deviant logics for these cases.

APPENDIX I

In this appendix we present two truth-tables 12 and 13 for EP's corresponding to compatible and incompatible observables respectively and list the laws in formal logic which hold and which do not hold in our deviant logics.

Truth-table 12

In the above table, the disjunction '$\vee$' is an exclusive disjunction. The negation and conjuncion happen to coincide with their classical counterparts, so do the implication and equivalence. We have expressed the implication in terms of the above connectives of negation, disjunction and conjuction as $(\alpha \supset \beta) \equiv (\neg\alpha \vee \beta) \vee (\neg\alpha \wedge \beta)$. We express the eqivalence $(\alpha \equiv \beta)$ as either $(\alpha \supset \beta) \vee \neg (\beta \supset \alpha)$ or $(\alpha \supset \beta) \wedge (\beta \supset \alpha)$.

Using the above truth-table 12, one may easily verify the following :

(1) $(\alpha \vee \neg\alpha)$ is at autology, (2) $(\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha)$ is a contradiction, (3) Modus Ponens holds, (4) Modus Tollens holds, (5) Disjunctive Syllogism holds, (6) Hypothetical Syllogism holds, (7) Addition fails, (8) Simplification holds, (9) Conjunctiou

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holds, (10) Commutation holds, (11) Association holds, (12) De Morgan's Law fails and finally (13) Double Negation holds.

Truth-table 13

In the above table, negation is classical, disjunction is exclusive and conjunction happens to be the negation of the classical counterpart. The implication is expressed as $(\varphi \supset \psi) \equiv (\neg\varphi \vee \psi) \vee \neg(\neg\varphi \wedge \psi)$ and the equivalence is expressed as $(\varphi \supset \psi) \vee \neg(\psi \supset \varphi)$. Again using the above truth-table 13 one may verify the following : (1) $(\varphi \vee \neg\varphi)$ is a tautology, (2) $\neg(\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi)$ is a contradiction, (3) Modus Ponens holds, (4) Modus Tollens holds, (5) Disjunctive Syllogism holds, (6) Hypothectical Syllogism holds, (7) Addition fails, (8) Simplification fails, (9) Conjunction fails, (10) Commutation holds, (11) Association holds for '$\vee$' but fails for '$\wedge$' (12) De Morgans' Law fails, finally (13) Double Negation holds.

APPENDX II

Adequate System of Connectives : It is shown in the works on logic that the set of classical connectives : '$\neg$', '$\vee_{cl}$' and '$\wedge_{cl}$ is adequate to express any truth-function. Since the exclusive disjunction '$\vee$' we have introduced in our logical system can be expressed in terms of the above set, in the from

$(\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv (\alpha \vee_{cl} \beta) \wedge_{cl} \neg(\alpha \wedge_{cl} \beta)$, the set '$\neg$', '$\vee$' and '$\wedge$' of our deviant logic for compatible observables is adequate

In the case of incompatible observables as well, the set '$\neg$', '$\vee$' and '$\wedge$' is also adequate to express any truth-function in this case, as the conjunction '$\wedge$' used in our logical system is seen from the truth-tables 12 and 13 to be the negation of the classical conjunction '$\wedge_{cl}$'. Hence a well-formed formula (wff) of the type $\neg\varphi \vee (\psi \wedge x)$ for EP's corresponding to incompa-

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tible observables can be expressed in terms of '$\neg$', '$\vee_{cl}$' and '$\wedge_{cl}$' as follows :

$$\neg\varphi \vee (\psi \wedge x)$$
$$\equiv [\neg\varphi \vee_{cl} (\psi \wedge x)] \wedge_{cl} \neg [\neg\varphi \wedge_{cl} (\psi \wedge x)]$$
$$\equiv [\neg\varphi \vee_{cl} \neg (\psi \wedge_{cl} x)] \wedge_{cl} \neg [\neg\varphi \wedge_{cl} \neg (\psi \wedge_{cl} x)]$$

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TRUTH – TABLES

Truth–table 1

α	β	$\alpha \vee \beta$
T	T	F
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

Truth–table 2

α_i	β_i	$\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

Truth–table 3

φ_i	ψ_j	$\varphi_i \wedge \psi_j$
T	T	F
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	T

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Truth-table 4

α	$\wedge$	$(\beta_1$	$\vee$	$\beta_2)$	$(\alpha \wedge \beta_1)$	$\vee$	$\alpha \wedge \beta_2$
T	T	T	T	F	T	T	F
F	F	T	T	F	F	F	F
T	T	F	T	T	F	T	T
F	F	F	T	T	F	F	F

Truth-table 5

$(\alpha_1$	$\vee$	$\alpha_2)$	$\wedge$	$(\beta_1$	$\vee$	$\beta_2)$	$\alpha_1 \wedge \beta_1$	$\alpha_1 \wedge \beta_2$	$\alpha_2 \wedge \beta_1$	$\alpha_2 \wedge \beta_2$	$\vee$
T	T	F	T	T	T	F	T	F	F	F	T
T	T	F	T	F	T	T	F	T	F	F	T
F	T	T	T	T	T	F	F	F	T	F	T
F	T	T	T	F	T	T	F	F	F	T	T

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Truth – table 6

α_1	α_2	α_3	β_1	β_2	β_3	$\alpha_1 \vee \alpha_2 \vee \alpha_3$	$\wedge$	$\beta_1 \vee \beta_2 \vee \beta_3$	$\alpha_1 \wedge \beta_1$	$\alpha_1 \wedge \beta_2$
T	F	F	T	F	F	T	T	T	T	F
T	F	F	F	T	F	T	T	T	F	T
T	F	F	F	F	T	T	T	T	F	F
F	T	F	T	F	F	T	T	T	F	F
F	T	F	F	T	F	T	T	T	F	F
F	T	F	F	F	T	T	T	T	F	F
F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T	T	F	F
F	F	T	F	T	F	T	T	T	F	F
F	F	T	F	F	T	T	T	T	F	F

$\alpha_1 \wedge \beta_3$	$\alpha_2 \wedge \beta_1$	$\alpha_2 \wedge \beta_2$	$\alpha_2 \wedge \beta_3$	$\alpha_3 \wedge \beta_1$	$\alpha_3 \wedge \beta_2$	$\alpha_3 \wedge \beta_3$	$\vee$
F	F	F	F	F	F	F	T
F	F	F	F	F	F	F	T
T	F	F	F	F	F	F	T
F	T	F	F	F	F	F	T
F	F	T	F	F	F	F	T
F	F	F	T	T	F	F	T
F	F	F	F	F	T	F	T
F	F	F	F	F	F	T	T
F	F	F	F	F	F	F	T

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Truth – table 7

φ	$\wedge$	$(\psi_1$	$\wedge$	$\psi_2)$	$(\varphi \wedge \psi_1)$	$(\varphi \wedge \psi_2)$	$\vee$
T	F	T	T	F	F	T	T
F	T	T	T	F	T	T	F
T	F	F	T	T	T	F	T
F	T	F	T	T	T	T	F

Truth – table 8

$(\varphi_1$	$\vee$	$\varphi_2)$	$\wedge$	ψ_1	$\vee$	$\psi_2)$	$\varphi_1 \wedge \psi_1$	$\varphi_1 \wedge \psi_2$	$\varphi_2 \wedge \psi_1$	$\varphi_2 \wedge \psi_2$	$\vee$
T	T	F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T	T	F
T	T	F	F	F	T	T	T	F	T	T	F
F	T	T	F	T	T	F	T	T	F	T	F
F	T	T	F	F	T	T	T	T	T	F	F

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Truth–table 9

φ_1	φ_2	ψ_1	ψ_2	ψ_3	$\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$	$\psi_1 \vee \psi_2 \vee \psi_3$	$\wedge$	$\varphi_1 \wedge \psi_1$	$\varphi_1 \wedge \psi_2$	$\varphi_1 \wedge \psi_3$	$\varphi_2 \wedge \psi_1$	$\varphi_2 \wedge \psi_2$	$\varphi_2 \wedge \psi_3$	$\vee$
T	F	T	F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T	T	T	T	F
F	T	T	F	F	T	T	F	T	T	T	F	T	T	F
T	F	F	T	F	T	T	F	T	F	T	T	T	T	F
F	T	F	T	F	T	T	F	T	T	T	T	F	T	F
T	F	F	F	T	T	T	F	F	T	F	T	T	T	F
F	T	F	F	T	T	T	F	T	T	T	T	T	F	F

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Truth-table 10

α	β	$\alpha \supset \beta$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

Truth-table 11

α_i	β_i	$\alpha_i \vee \beta_i$	$\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i$	$(\alpha_i \vee \beta_i) \vee (\alpha_i \wedge \beta_i)$
T	T	F	T	T
T	F	T	F	T
F	T	T	F	T

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Truth-table 1 2

α'	β	$\neg\alpha$	$\neg\beta$	$\alpha \vee \beta$	$\alpha \wedge \beta$	$\alpha \supset \beta$	$\beta \supset \alpha$	$\alpha \equiv \beta$
T	T	F	F	T	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	T	F	F	T	F
F	T	T	F	T	F	T	F	F
F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T	T

Truth-table 13

ϕ	ψ	$\neg\phi$	$\neg\psi$	$\phi \vee \psi$	$\phi \wedge \psi$	$\phi \supset \psi$	$\psi \supset \phi$	$\phi \equiv \psi$
T	T	F	F	T	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	T	F	F	T	F
F	T	T	F	T	F	T	F	F
F	F	T	T	F	F	T	T	T

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EXISTENTIALISM IN SARTRE'S *NAUSEA*

Sartre's novel *Nausea*[1] was published in 1938. He has since described himself as having been an 'anarchistic individualist' until 1939,[2] and there is certainly a more 'individualist' cast to the existentialism of *Nausea* than can be found in any of his other major writings. In *Nausea*, the strong attitude of *resentment* that pervades his later outlook, although unmistakably present, is still largely latent; moreover, as never again, he is preoccupied with the problem of the meaning of life, tending to prefer not only individualism to collectivism, but also theory to practice, ideality to materiality, art to politics, and stoicism to revolt. What follows here is by no means an exhaustive interpretation of *Nausea*, but rather an attempt to highlight the novel's existentialist message through interpretative illumination of its key themes and figures.

The opening 'Undated Sheet' (9–11/11–14), which falls apart into two equal, contrastingly related halves, symbolizes a basic metaphysical cleft that obsesses Roquentin throughout the novel. In terms familiar from Sartre's later *Being and Nothingness* (1943), there are hints at a split between nothingness and being and, correspondingly, between anxiety and bad faith; but there are also suggestions of a split between things and words, flux and stability, existence and essence, object and subject—or, in short, between materiality and ideality. Aside from this concise introductory symbolism, the most important thing about the 'Undated Sheet' is the unfinished closing sentence: 'There's only one case in which it might be interesting to keep a diary: that would be f...' (11/14). What was Roquentin going to say here?

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At first, the initial words of the diary proper, namely, 'Something has happened to me : I can 't doubt that anymore ' (13/15), appear to answer this question, i. e., that it might be interesting to keep a diary if he were *not* really cured, and if something momentous had, in fact, happened to him. However, as he has just explicitly assumed that he *is* cured, and thus does not need to keep a diary, this apparent answer is not very persuasive. Instead, he was probably entertaining the possibility that keeping a diary might enable him to transform his life into what becomes known in the novel as an ' adventure ', i. e., a unified series of experiences and actions whose end imparts an overarching quality of meaningfulness to the period of time it unfolds in. Perhaps, he was probably thinking, his attempt to have an ersatz adventure by writing the history of the Marquis de Rollebon (8/9) was misguided, and perhaps he should try making a history of his *own* life by keeping a diary. More about all this will emerge later, so, for the moment, the point need not be elaborated.

The diary proper begins by resuming themes from the 'Undated Sheet ', but soon phases into problems of meaningfulness and of the relation between the self and others. Roquentin recalls how his earlier pursuit of adventure in Indo-China had suddenly become meaningless, leaving him 'empty' and confronted by ' a voluminous, insipid idea ' that sickened him (15/17). He wonders whether his research project on the Marquis could also suddenly become meaningless, leaving him ' exhausted, disappointed, in the midst of fresh ruins ' (15/18). Then he introduces the familiar existentialist theme of mass-man inauthenticity, describing the customers in the Cafe Mably as those who ' have to join with others ' in order to exist (16/19), and who find it important ' to think the same things all together ' (19/21). In contrast, he sees himself as one who lives alone (16/19), although sometimes still tempted to 'take refuge' in the midst of others (18/21),

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and as one whose detachment from society draws him increasingly towards experiencing reality as an unsettlingly amorphous flux of immediacy and concreteness (17, 19/19–20, 21). In other words he is caught between irreversible disillusionment with the everyday nonsensicalities of social convention and increasing apprehension at the unstructured senselessness of non-social existence. Yet improbable and significant things occasionally come his way, one of which he describes in the diary.

This is the accidental collision between the Negro and the little woman (18/20), which takes place in a 'station yard', under a 'fierycoloured sky', beneath a lantern, and alongside a fence that smells of 'wet wood'. The Negro is dressed in 'a cream-coloured raincoat, with yellow shoes and agreen hat', while the woman is 'blonde' and wears a 'sky-blue' coat. Symbolically construed, this scence seems to represent a fleetingly meaningful coalescence, at the human level, of the realms of materiality (the Negro and his 'earthily' coloured skin and garb) and ideality (the woman and her 'transcendently' coloured hair and coat). This symbolism is echoed, at the more basic, non-human level by the contrasts between the (earthily organic) wooden fence and the (transcendently light-casting) lantern, and, similarly, between the station yard and the fiery sky. Both the Negro and the woman are merry (whistling or laughing) before the collision and besides making Roquentin feel like laughing, their encounter strikes him as having a significance that was 'strong and even fierce, but pure'. Towards the end of the entry containing the description of this encounter, he reveals that he had always been fond of picking up discarded scraps of paper, but that he had recently been unable to pick one up, even though he had *wanted* to touch 'this fresh and tender pulp which would roll into grey balls' in his fingers (22/24). Bending down, he had read the words 'Dictation : The White Owl' on the paper, then had straightened up without having touched it, reflecting that he was no

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longer free to do what he wanted. For the moment, it suffices to note that the imagery here suggests a transition from life to death and that the 'White Owl' relates to the 'voluminous, insipid idea' that he was left with at the end of his attempted adventure in Indo-China (15/17).

Next, he records some observations about Lucie, the charwoman at the hotel (22-24/ 24-24) who seems to symbolize mass-man *suffering*, or miserable futility of most people's attempts to find meaning and security by merging themselves with others. Her husband is a good-looking, tubercular drunk whom she bought herself and with whom she lives in a condition of anguished frustration that she constantly, but unsuccessfully, tries to deny or to overcome. More about her will come up shortly.

In the subsequent entry, Roquentin realizes that the Marquis be Rollebon, as a *person*, is beginning to bore him, whereas the project of writing the *book* on the Marquis is becoming an ever-increasing compulsion. Correspondingly, he begins to conclude that the facts of the Marquis's life 'adapt themselves at a pinch to the order I wish to give them, but it remains outside of them'; and begins to suspect that his hisorical work is one of 'pure imagination', even though characters in a novel would be more realistic or amusing (26/28). All this suggests a cleft between the (increasingly uninteresting) material reality of the Marquis and the (increasingly interesting) ideal reality of the written history of his life. In the following entry, this cleft is widended when Roquentin researches *himself* in the mirror, watching helplessly as his whole human semblance dissolves into something 'far below the monkey, on the edge of the vegetable world, at the polyp level' (31/32). Just as the actual, material self of the Marquis disappears (upwards) into the imagined, ideal self of Roquentin's historical research, so Roquentin's actual, material face disappears (downwards) into a nauseously amorphous flux of sensory immediacy

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That night, the Nausea attacks Roquentin for the first time in a cefe, which used to serve him as a place of refuge because of being ' full of people and well lighted ' (32–33/34). Amidst the Nausea-suffused surroundings of the cafe, he asks the waitress to play a recording of old jazz song ' Some of These Days ', and his description of what happens as the song plays is one of the most important parts of the novel (36–40/38–41). In a way, the song takes hold of the slippery, formlessly oozing flow of *time*, shaping it into a meaningfully unfolding pattern that is both in time and yet timeless. Every note prepares the way for something and, in dying away, gives birth to something, with the whole succession of notes creating something strong and necessary, yet also fragile and transparent. As the song comes to its conclusion with an intensity that Roquentin calls almost painfully hard and bright, something happens the Nausea disappears.

Afterwards, he leves the cafe, and ventures into the boulevard Noir, or the ' black ' boulevard, which seems to symbolize the essential core to the *universe* (41–44/42–45). Symbols of Christianity appear in the guise of the three saw-works of the Soleil Brothers (three suggesting the Trinity, the saw-work suggesting Christ the carpenter, and the words ' Soleil ', or ' sun ' andi ' Brothers ' suggesting Christian hope and the brotherhood of the faithful), but these saw-works face *away* from the boulevard Noir, turning windowless backs upon it. Symbols of Hell also appear, first in the smoke and fire of the old station, then in the flickeringly lit cafes (particularly the Rendezvous des Chiminots, or ' Meetingplace of the Railway Workers '), and finally in a poster on a fence showing a satanic male head, images of blood, and a word suggesting ' pure fireplace ' *(puratre)*. Beyond these symbols lies the ' black hole ', i. e., the unlit depths of the boulevard Noir, where an icy wind blows, where there is nothing but stones and earth. which are hard and unmoving, and where,

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except for the ringing of the wind, all is dark and silent. This is the universe as ' being–in–itself ', and Roquentin plunges into it.

There he almost succeeds in merging with the impersonal coldness of the boulevard Noir, but as he walks, two shadows move towards him, which prove to be a man and a little woman quarrelling. The man tells the woman to shut her trap, pushes her away, and then disappears leaving her pleading for him to return and suffering the agonies of the abandoned. Coming closer, Roquentin recognizes her as Lucie, the charwoman, and thinks to himself: I dare not offer her my support, but she, must be able to demand it if need be' (44/46). As they pass he looks at her, and she stares in his direction, but apparently without *seeing* him. She has, in fact, become a petrified icon of pure suffering, all but fused with 'being-in-itself' at the very bottom of the black 'well' of the universe. Roquentin, having earlier judged her 'too set in her aways' to be capable of real despair (24/25), concludes that she is drawing her present strength from the bouleard Noir, and that her sufferings will revert to their usual level once she returns to the world of people and bright lights.

This part of the novel warrants fairly extended commentary. Although the chance encounter between Roquentin and Lucie obviously parallels the earlier encounter symbolized a happy, meaningful coalescence of the realms of materiality and ideality whereas the present encounter symbolizes precisely the reverse. In terms from *Being and Nothingness,* Roquentin represents the nothingness of pure consciousness, or the 'being-for-itself' side of reality, and the boulevard Noir represents pure objectness, or the 'being-in-itself' side of reality, while Lucie represents the inauthentic struggle between these two sides of reality that is the lot of normal humankind. Roquentin, then, is the authentically despairing 'existentialist' who is slowly learning to face

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up to his own nothingness, while Lucie is the inauthentic average person who remains trapped in a futile pursuit of being in order to flee her basic nothingness (and vice versa). Common to both of them is the fate of *suffering*, but Roquentin's suffering takes the negative form of emptiness and meaniglessness, while Lucie's takes the positive form of repeatedly frustrated desires, strivings and hopes. Again, it seems clear that Roquentin represents the Sartrean 'Look', while Lucie and the man, Charles, represent the Sartrean sadism-masochism opposition, with Charles's attitude being largely sadistic, and Lucie's largely masochistic. Roquentin looks at Lucie, thereby turning her into an object, and even though she stares back at him, she does not even seem to see him which leaves her a mere object, incapable of countering Roquentin's Look with a Look of her own. Simultaenousey, the words that she calls after Charles – 'Charles, please, you know what I told you? Charles, come back, I've had enough, i'm too miserable! (44/45) — reflect a desperate masochistic attempt to make herself the repentantly compliant object that she thinks Charles wants her to be. At the moment of her near-fusion with the realm of 'being-in-itself', then, Lucie is impaled at the 'object' end of a Look-relation (to Roquentin) and a sadism-masochism relation (to Charles), and is thus doubly entrapped in objectness. Finaley, it is worth asking why Roquentin, although prepared to give Lucie support if she *asked* for it, did not dare to *offer* her any. Her plight seems to symbolize the all–too–frequent situations in life where helpful intervention seems called for yet where all possible forms of intervention would only make the situation worse. Probably, Roquentin thought it best to leave Lucie alone with the two last vestiges of human freedom that remained to her, namely, freedom to choose for herself whether she needed to be helped and freedom to demonstrate precisely by bearing up under

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her suffering, that she could not be turned into a complete object. In the end, then, the boulevard Noir scene conveys a well-known existentialist message: at the very heart of the universe, installed more deeply than earthly or religious hells, at the bottom of a well in the stony realm of being itself one finds the intractable reality of suffering.

After the boulevard Noir scence, the novel settles down into a succession of observations and reflections whose main theme is the problem of *adventures,* which haunts Roquentin because his life is tottering closer and closer to collapse into total meaninglessness. His thoughts on adventures are partly occasioned by the Autodidact, or self-taught man, who is engaged in reading through all the great books in alphabetical order of their authors' name (48-49/50), and who plays a centrally important symbolical role in this novel. Roquentin admires the Autodidact's *will-power* in doggedly pursuing a plan of such scale, but is clearly contemptuous of the superficial, merely external structure of the plan, which reflects no internal principle according to which the accumulated items of knowledge could be meaningfully interrelated. Just before the Autodidact visits him, Roquentin ruminates on his own past, concluding that his memories are uncertain and empty, or (like the pieces of paper he was fond of picking up at random) mere 'scraps' that are difficult to 'retrieve' (52/53), that he is no longer the same person who experienced the past, and that he is abandoned to an airy present, unable to rejoin his past or to escaps from himself. During the Autodidact's visit, he is forced to admit to himself that he has never had any adventures, and that he does not 'even know what the word means anymore'. Overcome by the same feeling of discouragement that he felt after his attemped adventure in Indo-China, he finds himself confronted anew by the 'idea', or 'big white mass' that disgusted him then (57/58).

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Later on, he realizes that it was not simply adventures that he longed for so much, but rather a certain way of happening of an adventure—a way that bestowed a 'rare and precious quality' upon certain moments, that somehow depended upon the presence of 'order', and that was intimated to him at times when he listened to music in cafes (58/59). Then he decides that this special way of happening of an adventure can only occur in *books*, not in real life. A proper adventure must have a definite beginning, and come to a definite end (like a 'death', which, he notes, may also be his own), and the end must be already implicit in the beginning, so as to hover over the whole unfolding process of adventure as a meaningful, organizing principle. When such an adventure is over, the beginning and end fuse into a 'golden spot' that fades into timelessness. All of this recalls Roquentin's earlier comments on how the song 'Some of These Days' dispelled his Nausea, and he refers now to that song, saying 'What summits would I not reach if my *own life* were the subject of the melody'. Then the 'Idea' rebukes him with the blunt observation that he has not only never had a real adventure, but that he will also never have one (59-60 / 60-61).

In the next entry, he continues thinking about adventures, concluding that anything can become an adventure if only one begins recounting it, but that there is an irreconcilable opposition between *living* and *recounting* (again, between materiality and ideality), and that one must choose between the two (by implication, between a real life that is not meaningful and a meaningful life that is not real). Further, he concludes that there are no *true* stories, since in the very act of recounting something, the recounted series of events is made significant by the implicit presence of the *end* throughout the whole story, whereas this implicit presence does not exist in real-life events, which are just a jumbled, continuous flow, with no clear

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beginnings or endings (61–61/ 62–64), At this point, there is a long, boring entry for Sunday, in which mass-man is observed engaging in various rituals through which he pretends that life, or at least Sunday life, is an adventure; and at the end of the day, Roquentin himself falls victim to the illusion that he is having an adventure. The next day, he regrets his foolishness, and returns to thinking about adventures. Now he decides that the feeling of adventure comes not from events, but rather from the way that moments are linked together, or from the feeling of the irreversibility of time. He recalls that his former companion Anny, who left him long ago, was an expert at managing time. Once, when they had only twenty-four hours together, she spent the first twenty-three quarrelling with him, then organized the last sixty minutes into an unforgettable adventure at a cinema. The adveture ended with the projection of a completely *white picture* on the screen (86/86).

Turning again to his historical research, he notes that he is developing an increasing sense of irritation and ill-will towards the Marquis de Rollebon; he even conjectures that he should, perhaps, be writing a *novel* about the Marquis rather than an histriocal work (88/88). Then he describes two recent dreams of his, in which sadistic-masochistic imagery predominates, and after which he receives a letter from Anny (88-90/ 89-90). The main literary purpose of dreams is to invite reflection on the sadistic-masochistic opposition regarding Roquentin's relation to both the Marquis and Anny. In modelling himself on the Marquis, and in pursuing the largely passive attempt to conform his research to the facts of the Marquis's life, he was, in a sense, adopting the masochistic strategy of making himself what the Marquis wanted him to be. On the other hand, in calling the Marquis a 'lying little fop' (87/87), and in toying with the idea of writing an imaginatively–based novel about him,

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he was, in a sense, adopting the sadistic strategy of making the the Marquis become what he wanted him to be. Similarly, his recollections of Anny, after receiving her letter, show that he had taken an equally ambivalent attitude towards her constant attempts to make him become what she wanted him to be (90–94/90–94).

Receipt of Anny's letter leads his thoughts back to the problem of the relation between past and present. When he and Anny were together, they somehow managed to keep all the aspects of their common past alive and integrated with their present; but when they separated, all of these aspects 'collapsed into the past', leaving Roquentin 'empty' amidst a renewed 'flowing' of time (95/95). A bit later, he reflects on Doctor Roge, who symbolizes the self-confident, conventionally successful type of mass-man who imagines that he can 'keep and use his past' by distilling it into progressively increasing 'experience' and 'wisdom'. Just as Roge is a 'professional' in experience, most people are at least 'amateurs' in playing a similar role, pretending that their past isn't wasted, that their memories have been condensed and gently transformed into Wisdom' (100-102/99-102). In reality, however, this belief in experience and wisdom is just a defensive reaction to the foreknowledge of death, whose presence Roquentin notes in Roge's decaying features (103-104/102-103) As is shown by the brief Wednesday entry— *'I must not be frightened* (104/104) — and the long episode about Monsieur Fasquelle's possible death (108-115/108-114), Roquentin himself is still not immune to dread of death.

Throughout the novel so far, Roquentin has repeatedly returned to problems of meaningfulness, time, and death in a way that strongly suggests the influence of Heidegger's thought on the Sartre of *Nausea*. Further, if Roquentin increasingly doubts the possibility that a human life could be lived as a meaningful

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whole that is meaningfully concluded by death, he is still somewhat ambivalent about this. On the one hand, there is that mysterious thing that he calls the 'Idea', or the big white mass that had rolled up in front of him and denied the possibility of his ever having an adventure (57, 60/58, 61). This symbolizes death in its meaning-threatening role, as the final blankness that puts an absurd end to all the concrete colours of which life is composed. On the other hand, there is the fact that Anny had organized a kind of adventure one night at the cinema, which had come to a completely *white* picture on the screen (86/86). This white picture symbolizes death in its meaning-favouring role, as providing the possibility for a culminating end to a unified life-adventure. All of this is foreshadowed early in the novel when Roquentin finds that he cannot pick up the scrap of paper with words 'Dictation : The White Owl' on it (22/24). Is life's (or the owl's) final wisdom the blank nothingness of death, and is life itself fated to be nothing but a meaningless succession of picking up random scraps of illusionary adventures?

Still in the grip of his panic about Monsier Fasquelle's possible death, Roquentin decides to try reading something at the library. On the way, he comes across a scene in the park between an adult male exhibitionist and a little girl with a rat-like face, who were 'riveted to each other by the obscure power of their desires' (117/116). In the library, he reads for a while, but keeps falling out of the world of the novel into the world of reality. At closing time, the Corsican librarian sends him, along with other readers who seem reluctant to leave, out of the library and into the night (117-119 / 116-118). As will emerge shortly, both the scene in the park and the Corsican librarian are symbolically important.

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Next, there is a long entry recording Roquentin's reactions to a visit to the Bouville Museum, where he muses disrespectfully on all the solid citizens from Bouville's past whose portraits hang there. He considers them nothing but over-privileged fools or rascals whose lives have been dishonestly glorified in the portraits, and comments cynically that 'the power of art is truly remarkable' (136/134). Just as he previously mocked the notion that individuals might live meaningfully by condensing their personal pasts into experience or wisdom, he now mocks the notion that societies might condense their pasts into meaningful tradition. In the processs, he touches on the leader-phenomenon and its associated charismatic power, implying that leaders effectively dominate and manipulate the wills of the masses in a way that makes socio-political existence inevitably inauthentic (127/125).

Not surprisingly, Roquentin next becomes irrevocably disillusioned with his historical research on the Marquis de Rollebon. He abandons the project completely, asks what he is now to do with his life, and proclaims not only that the past does not exist, but also that the present, which does exist, is nothing *more* than mere existence (138–140/135–137). Before long, he is overcome by an attack, not of Nausea, but of existence; he describes this attack in chaotically surrealistic terms, including mention of a 'permanent pool of whitish water in his mouth (143/141), which symbolizes the permanent imminence of death that people carry round in themselves. The images of existence that stream through his mind give rise to hatred and disgust, and his act of stabbing his own hand with a knife (145/143) seems to suggest some deep sadistic-masochistic cruelty at the heart of existence. Then he goes outside, grabs a newspaper, and reads the sensational report that little Lucienne's body has been found, raped and strangled. As these increasingly nauseous ima-

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ges of existence blend in his mind with feelings of cruelty and anxiety, he goes into the unsavoury Bar de la Marine, where he hears a song that affects him in the same way that he was earlier affected by the song 'Some of These Days'. He notes that *he* cannot but exist, whereas the *song* somehow transcends existence, fascinating him with its youth, mercilessness, serenity, and rigour (146–149 / 143–147).

This part of the novel, culminating in the sensational repe- murder of little Lucienne and then closing suddenly with a song about 'when the yellow moon begins to beam' and about 'dreaming one's little dream', needs fairly detailed commentary. First, the murdered child's name, Lucienne, establishes a symbolic link between her and Lucie the charwoman, whom Roquentin encountered in the boulevard Noir. Second, Lucienne's fate represents a radicalization of the same fate represented earlier by Lucie. The Look has become intensified a thousand-fold as swarms of sensation-hungry readers scan the newspaper report of the murder; and the sadistic-masochistic relation between Lucienne and her murderer could hardly be more obvious or more extreme. Third, Lucienne's fate is symbolically linked to the earlier scene when Roquentin, roaming the streets in distraction because of his fear of death, came upon the exhibitionist and the little girl in the park; perhaps the exhibitionist was even the murder of little Lucienne. Fourth, in addition to linking all these scenes together, Lucienne's fate is intended to foreshadow the catastrophe that befalls the Autodidact at the close of the novel. Finally, Lucienne's fate provides a realistic, if gruesome, comment on the nature of the human situation that should still re-echo in the reader's mind when the Autodidact begins espousing his starry-eye, empty-headed humanism to Roquentin in the restaurant scene.

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This scene, one of the key parts of the whole novel, begins with an admission by the Autodidact that he is having some sort of trouble with the Corsican librarian; but he quickly brushes aside this unpleasant topic (154/151). Eventually, when the subject of art and aesthetic pleasure comes up, the Autodidact says that, although he possesses a certain amount of knowledge, he has never experienced aesthetic pleasure. Further, this bothers him not so much because he misses the pleasure as because works of art have been made by human beings, yet he, a human being himself, cannot understand the aesthetic dimension of human activity (157/154). Then he reads out something he has written in his notebook : ' Nobody believes any longer what the eighteenth century considered to be true. Why should we be expected to go on taking pleasure in the works which it considered to be beautiful ?'. When Roquentin recollects that Renan had written something similar, the Autodidact is over joyed to think that he has managed to have the same thought as Renan (158-159/155-156). Ironically, he fails to notice that Renan had the thought back in the nineteenth century, so by the standards of the maxim itself, the thought should be no longer true in the Autodidact's twentieth century.

Now, there is reason to assume that the Autodidact is intended to be a symbolical representative of the *modern intelligentsia,* or of that kind of person who all too often controls modern intellectual life in general, and modern universities in particular. These people, as implied by the name ' Autodidact ', are self-taught in roughly the same sense that the modern new-rich of the business and professional world are called self-made. With the rapid expansion and bureaucratization of the educational and cultural spheres in modern society, large numbers of people with no real cultural understanding at all, but with a over-practical respect for mathematical efficiency, utilitarian morality, and socio-political Darwinism, have been installed in positions

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of educational and cultural authority. Like the Autodidact, they have read in books that culture is an important part of being human, so they have made an effort to teach themselves what culture is. But, like him, they are completely lacking in *aesthetic* sensitivity, without which they can never really understand culture; consequently, the most that they glean from their attempts to learn about culture is a vague sense that the cultured are supposed to be concerned about human *suffering,* and that there is some sort of link between culture and morality. On top of their metallic, technologico-bureaucratic mentalities, they therefore paint an organic, woody coloured veneer of moral concern for suffering. This concern is typically quite as shallow as the Autodidact's humanism, and it rests on a barbarically sentimental conception of suffering as a bothersome practical problem, existing mainly at the material level of reality, and being quite *correctable,* i. e., by scientific-technological engineering of material progress or poeitical-technological engineering of social progress (or, more recently, by both at once). Earlier, Roquentin had diseovered the Autodidact's ridiculously external plan for mastering the great books of the world, and had found nothing to admire in this but the Autodidact's will-power. This symbolizes the modern intellectual's barbaric elevation of the will to primacy over knowledge and reason, as well as the modern intellectual's barbarically piecemeal pursuit of knowledge as an amorphous accumulation of more and more facts for facts' sake. Again, the Autodidact earlier confessed himself to be utterly incapabte of aesthetic pleasure, and presented himself in unnoticed self-contradiction on thc question of the historical relativity of truth and taste. This symbolizes two of the most central absurdities in the outlook of the modern intelligentsia: first, they claim to love humanity and to have a great concern for its welfare, but they cannot even understand one of humanity's most universal pursuits, namely, art; and second, they

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constantly claim that all truth is merely relative, yet they continually contradict themselves on this point by assuming the objective truth of everything they say to support that claim.

The next thing that the Autodidact comes up with is the opinion that pessimism about life is not very respectable, and that what is needed is deliberate optimism (of the 'Life is worth Living' sort), in which the aim is to immerse oneself in this or that concrete activity without worrying about whether it is meaningful or not. Roquentin comments to himself that this is 'precisely the sort of lie that the commercial traveller, the two young people, and the white-haired gentleman keep on telling themselves'. Then the Autodidact announces that there is a goal to life, namely: 'There are people' (162/ 159–160). When Roquentin counters that the Autodidact does not seem to worry too much about people, but is always alone with his nose in a book, the Autodidact seizes the opportunity to tell how he became a Socialist as a result of being squeezed into a wooden shed with two hundred others while in a war-time internment camp. After that, he tells of his fondness for going to Mass on Sundays although not a believer, because the real mystery of the Mass, is the 'communion of souls' (164–166/ 161–163).

Meanwhile, something ambiguous happens to Roquentin. He feels within him a terrible rage, which he thinks must be a sick man's rage, whose cause seems to be both the coldness of his chicken and the coldness of his soul. He also thinks that the rage might be an effort by his conscience to overcome that coldness. But it is unclear whether he would like to be angry at the Autodidact's collectivism, at his own lack of sympathy for that collectivism, or at the absurdity of the whole situation he is in at the restaurant. Apparently, he does not really care about collectivism or anti-collectivism, but would like to be able to express real anger at the hypocrisy behind the Autodidact's

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views and behind his own consent to dine with the Autodidact (165–166/ 162–163). In any case, when the Autodidact proclaims that he is proud and happy to be a Socialist, and to have arranged his life in such a perfect way, Roquentin describes the Autocidact's bodily posture in almost exactly the same way he described the suffering Lucie's posture in the boulevard Noir scene, namely, looking as if he were about to receive the stigmata' (167/164). This suggests that, for Roqunentin, there is the same inauthentic, object-like suffering behind the Autodidact's Socialilist illusions as there was behind Lucie's marital illusions. In his mind, he runs through all of the stereotyped varieties of humanism that he is familiar with, and concludes: 'They all hate one another: as *individuals,* of course, not as men. But the Autodidact doesn't know it: he has locked them up inside him like cats in a leather bag and 'they are tearing one another to pieces without his noticing it' (168–169/ 165–166). From this point on, his lack of sympathy for collectivist humanism becomes increasingly explicit, and his conversation with the Autodidact draws to a close in an atmosphere of mutual misunderstanding and irritation. Throughout the whole episode, Sartre has made the point that the Autodidact's Socialism is psychologically inauthentic and philosophically unrealistic, i.e,, that the Autodidact, like the modern intelligentsia he symbolizes, is grossly deceived about his own motives and about the nature of reality, including human nature in particular.

When the Autodidact's claim that people are admirable and that people must be loved finally evokes a powerful attack of Nausea in Roquentin (175–176/ 172), he loves the restaurant to embark upon another strange, surrealistic series of experiences in which he becomes aware of the true nature of existence, or of the being of the world as it really is beneath the surfaces of everyday appearance. From a philosophical viewpoint, one of the most important passages here is: 'Things have broken free from

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their names. They are there, grotesque stubborn, gigantic, and it seems ridiculous to ... say anything at all about them: *I* am in the midst of Things, which cannot be given names' (180/177). Another philosophically important passage (strongly reminiscent of the way Heidegger discusses Being) is: 'Never ... had I suspected what it meant to "exist". ... I used to say : "The sea *is* green; that white up there *is* a seagull", but I didn't feel that it existed...; usually existence hides itself' (182/179). Again, there is a passage in which it seems that there are *two worlds*: 'The world of explanations and reasons is not that of existence. A circle is not absurd, it is clearly explicable by the rotation of a segment of a straight line around one of its extremities. But a circle doesn't exist either. That root...existed in so far that I could not explain it' (185–186 / 182). Finally, it seems that existence is pervaded by the quality of superfluousness—there is no reason for it, it is all somehow 'left over', it could all be totally otherwise—in short, existence is absurd (184–185/181). However, at the end of all these experiences in the park, something interesting happens. The park *smiles* at Roquentin, hinting at the presence of some implicit meaning in the realm of existence, which seems like a half–forgotten or half–articulated *thought* that things are trying to have of themselves, but that Roquentin feels he will never be able to *understnnd* (193/190). Once again, there seems to be both a potential meaningful connection and an actual absurd severance between the realms of materiality and ideality.

Not surprisingly, the long scene between Anny and Roquentin forms the climax of the novel (which, up to that point, has revolved round the problem of meaninglessness, both of human relations and of existence itself). In general, the scene presents two former lovers, who had come to find their relationship meaningless, now meeting each other once again, discovering

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that they have since come to find existence itself meaningless, and discussing things relevant to this unfortunate fate. The two characters are doubtless intended to be symbolic, and in a largely *contrasting* way, although the contrasts are anchored in some basic similarities. Both, for example, represent an unusual, and potentially more authentic, kind of person than was represented by Lucie (in contrast to Roquentin) in the boulevard Noir scene. Further, the phenomena of *history* and *art* have played an obvious role in the way that both have searched for meaning in their lives. Again, both tend to hold the other responsible for the breakdown of their previous relationship, although this applies more strongly to Anny than to Roquentin. On the whole, however, the two are symbolically opposed, since Anny represents *practical* man, allied to sadism, passion, action, and optimism; while Roquentin represents *theoretical* man allied to masochism, intellect, contemplation, and pessimism.

Now, of the two, Anny is in the more hopeless position, and is thus presented as being existentially dead. She appears in a black dress (194/191), confesses that she is outliving herself (216/212). mentions that she has changed down to the whites of her eyes (white being a symbol of death in this novel) (205/201), and discloses the face of an 'old woman', pale, drawn, and horrible (219/215), In fact it seems that the meeting with Roquentin, which *she* caused to come about, just as it was *she* who left Roquentin, and not vice versa (17/19), is a last attempt on her part to organize a 'little tragedy' (204/200), namely, a kind of *funeral* for her own existential death. She may continue to play at transforming her memories into 'spiritual exercises', in what she admits is an unsatisfying way (219/215), but for the most part, she seems intent on giving herself over to the only form of meaning left for a mere body, namely, the pursuit of sensual pleasure in the form of sex, travel, and luxury (218–221/214–217). But what was the cause of her existential death ?

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Early in the scene, it becomes clear that Anny had a basically *practical* strategy for trying to make life meaningful. Everywhere she went, she took along a huge collection of personal bric-a-brac, with which she tried to transform her hotel room into something with the 'personality' that she wanted it to have (195/192). If the hotel room can symbolize existence in general Anny's basic strategy was to make existence meaningful by forcing it to be what she wanted it to be, i.e., by acting to change existence in accordance with her wishes. Roquentin was clearly quite accustomed to having Anny practise this strategy on him: he recalls that he could never find the words that she expected, and he asks himself uneasily now: 'What does she want ? I can't guess' (196/193; see also 90, 93–94/ 90, 93–94).

Next, Anny and Roquentin begin discussing whether either of them has changed, and this aspect of the scene is imporant but confusing. On the surface, both seem to have changed and to have remained the same; but closer examination reveals that Roquentin has remained largely the same on the outside, yet changed quite a bit on the inside, while Anny has changed quite a bit on the outside, yet remained (almost) the same on the inside (see 90/90). In a relevant comment, Roquentin observes: ' he has kept all her old opinions, prejudices, and spites fully alive. For me, on the contrary, everything is steeped in a vague poetic atmosphere; I am prepared to make any sort of concessions ' (199/195). Further, although Anny has changed in *one* important respect on the inside. that one change– namely, her realization that ' one can't be a man of action ' (215/211) — has sufficed to kill her existentially. Behind the life–orientation of the practical man, then, in the inner sphere of the mind, there is an unchanging rigidity, or an attempt to imagine oneself as a fixed, stable thing; while the opposite is the case with the theoretical man, who is open to the poetic ambience of reality

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and is always ready to change his mind and self, or as Roquentin puts it, 'to make concessions' to what things show themselves to be.

Anny soon divulges that she has completely abandoned her life–long quest for 'perfect moments', which corresponds roughly to Roquentin's quest for adventures, and that she has lost the ability to feel passion anymore (204, 207/200-201, 203). She blames Roquentin for never having understood her attempts to organize perfect moments (see 93–94/93-94), but he points out that she had never bothered to explain to him what perfect moments were all about, even though he had asked her to explain a hundred times. She retorts that he had only 'condescended to inquire' in a 'kindly, absent–minded way', and that he may well be the person that she has *hated* most in her life (208/204). This at least suggests practical man's typical hatred of theoretical man, and betrays the anxiety that underlies that hatred, i. e., an anxiety that clear, theoretical inquiry into practical man's assumptions, aims, and passions may reveal them to be foolish and illusory.

When Anny at last tries to explain what she meant by privileged situations and perfect moments, she succeeds only vaguely. She cannot say, for example, whether they depended on some subjective passion in her or on some objectively meaningful quality in the situation, although she suspects it was both together (211/207). Still, she tells of how she formed an idea of privileged situatians from certain pictures in a work on French history that, as a child, she was fond of reading in the attic (higher leval of reality) of her house. Interestingly enough, these pictures impressed her by their harmony aud strict unity, which are things usually regarded as characteristic virtues of *art works*; however, her inspirations for *history,* unlike Roquentin's admiration for the Marquis de Rollebon, were based not on great

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personalities or characters, but on elevated sorts of practical life–situation (209–211/205–207). In other words, as practical man, Anny is sure that her *self* is inspiring enough as it already is, but that what needs to have its deficiencies remedied through inspiring models is external reality, or existence. Finally, she suggests that the trouble with privileged situations in real life was that they always depended on other people, who spoiled them by not acting in the required way (211, 214 / 207, 210). Again, this betrayas a typical tendency of self-satisfied practical man to blame others for the failures he encounters in his unrealistic attempts to force reality to be what he wants it to be.

Still, at one point in the discussion, Anny's and Roquentin's minds slip into a momentary meaningful coalescence (similar to the earlier–noted accidental collision between the Negro and the blonde woman). This happens when she has managed to convey some idea of the meaning of perfect moments, which he then summarizes as follows : " In each privileged situation, there are certain acts which have to be performed, certain attitudes which have to be assumed, certain words which have to be said— and other attitudes, other words are strictly prohibited ". Then he utters the most important sentence in the novel, namely, ' In other words, the situation is the raw material : it has to be treated '. She agrees, and adds : ' First you had to be plunged into something exceptional and feel you were putting it in order '. He then says : ' In fact, it was a sort of work of art '; and she replies : ' No : it was ... a duty. You *had* to transform privileged situations into perfect moments. It was a moral question. You can laugh if you like : a moral question '. Roquentin notes in the diary, with pointed terseness, that he was not laughing at all (211–212 / 207–208).

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At this stage, Roquentin becomes almost hopefully enthused, spontaneously declaring that he never really understood her, and implying that the two of them are perhaps *closer* than they realize. But she immediately extinguishes his incipient enthusiasm by going on to explain why she now no longer believes in perfect moments. She admits that she had never tried to explain them to him earlier, and that there was always something that rang false about potential perfect moments in life. Although this had confused her, she thought that she had always done everything possible to help the perfect moments to come about. She gives some examples dealing with the theme of *suffering*, and these suggest that being moral often involves a refusal to complain about, or even to feel, one's own suffering in the interests of realizing the requirements of some particular situation. However, the fatal problem with perfect moments was not so much that other people always failed to play their parts properly — although this was a serious flaw that she would have had to resign herself to — but that there *are* no privileged situations in the first place. They would only be possible if things like hate, love, or death could really exist, and descend on one in a way that lifted existence up above itself; but she sees now that such things are just illusory aspects of the *self*, which she describes as really but a mass of monotonous dough. In view of this, she wonders how people ever got the idea of inventing *names* and making *distinctions* (212–214/ 208–210).

This last thought obviously echoes Roquentin's experience of the nature of existence, and he now observes that the two of them have arrived at the same point from different directions: or, symbolically construed, that Nausea and meaninglessness are the ultimate facts for both the honest practical man and the honest theoretical man. Anny at first denies that they have come to the same point, maintaining that *he* expects reality to arrange itself meaningfully around him without his having to *do* anything, whereas

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she wanted to *do* things. But now she knows that one cannot be a man of action. She suggests that there are other reasons for this conclusion, mentioning that action depends on the belief that how one acts would have fatal consequences, which she no longer finds credible, Still, she finally asks, if they really *have* both come to the same point, what can they *do*? (214–215/ 210–212).

Roquentin suggests, in the diary, that her despair was worse than his because she (naively optimistic practical man) had expected more from life than he had; but that *he* was content simply to be 'astonished at this life' that was given him for nothing—a remark strongly evocative of the traditional link between philosophy (or theoretical man) and a sense of *wonder* at reality and existence. He cannot give any immediate, clear answer to her impatient, practical demand to know what they can *do*, but he thinks of his meaningful experience with the song 'Some of These Days', and hesitantly begins to tell her about this, suggesting that something might be found 'in that direction'. But she has no interest in this, explicitly scoffing that pictures and statues cannot be *used* (practical man's obsession with 'use'). Instead of listening further, she pushes on with bringing this, the last of her self–directed little tragedies, in which her own existential funeral is the central plot, to its proper close, almost ruthlessly cutting Roquentin short when he mentions the book he tried to write (216–217/212–213). If there was a failure of communication between practical man and theoretical man all along in this relationship, the fault, in the last instance, seems to lie with practical man.

After Anny's departure, Roquentin feels that he has been left as existentially dead as Anny : 'My past is dead, Monsieur de Rollebon is dead, Anny came back only to take all hope away from me. I am alone in this white street lined with

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gardens. Alone and free. But this freedom is rather like death'. Regarding his past life, he finds little to say about it except that 'It's a lost game, that's all'; furthermore, he has learnt 'that you always lose', and he thus resolves to 'outlive' himself, like Anny (223/219). As theoretical man, he also feels himself alone on a 'hill', belonging to another species from that of the people in the town below (224-225/220). Still, he cannot totally shake off a longing for the company of someone else who sees things as he does: 'Is there nowhere another Cassandra on the top of a hill, looking down at a town engulfed in the depths of Nature? But what does it matter to me? What could I possibly tell her?' (227/223).

The final major episode, based on the Autodidact's misadventure in the library, is quite important symbolically. As suggested earlier, the Autodidact symbolizes the modern intelligentsia, well-meaning in a sense, but incapable of understanding art or knowledge, and holding to a doctrinaire, 'humanistic' collectivism that is both inauthentic and naive. But in this final episode, the point is taken a bit further, namely, the modern intelligentsia is exposed as a perverted lover of mankind, and particularly of future mankind in the form of youth.

For one thing, the library scene seems intended to evoke the fact that, at the beginning of the Western intellectual tradition, Socrates was put to death by mass-man for allegedly corrupting the youth with his *philosophy;* and to suggest that now, at the end of the Western intellectual tradition, a lot of autodidactic intellectual perverts really *are* corrupting the youth with their *anti-philosophy;* but that they, too, will ultimately meet death at the hands of a new, more terrible form of mass-man. This new form of mass-man is symbolized by the bureaucratic, brutally authoritarian Corsican, whose more concrete symbolical identity Roquentin hints at when he notes that the bloodstain on the

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library threshold was shaped like a star — in other words, a red star (239/235). Further, the library scene suggests that the blame for the modern cor ruption of youth lies not only with the Autodidact's perversion, but also with the youth themselves, or with human nature. The two boys were obviously ambivalently *fascinated* by the prospect of baiting the Autodidact (232–234/ 228–230), just as the little girl in the scene with the exhibitionist in the park was ambivalently fascinated by what was going on before her eyes (116–117/ 115–116). In both cases, the fascination exists as fear and aversion combined with vulgar curiosity and excitement (just as can be found beneath the modern fascination for anti-heroics anb self-destructive revolutionizing).

At a more general level, however, the library scene appears to symbolize mass–man's existential fear of anyone who is not *normal*, regardless of whether that abnormality is something pathological or something superior. Choosing a pathological individual, the Autodidact, as the object of mass–man persecution here seems intended to point up the fact that individualism, as a *soctal* philosophy, is by no means free of defects and dangers. Given the fact that human nature is irredeemably flawed, caught between mass–man inauthenticity and the sadistic–masochistic circle of suffering symbolized by Lucie, characters like the Autodidact will be around no matter what; however, they will be much more in *evidence* in an individualistic society than in a collectivist one (where anyone suspected of being 'abnormal' will be expeditiously removed from the scene). In short, there is something necessarily unsatisfactory about both individualism and collectivism as social philosophies, but for the existentialist, individualism is clearly the lesser of the two evils.

As the novel draws to a close, Ruquentin has been disillusioned with the Marquis de Rollebon, the Bouville city fathers, Anny, and the Autodidact; which means, symbolically construed,

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with great historical individuals, with social tradition, with practical activism, and with the modern intelligentsia, as well as with love and friendship. He muses that nobody on earth is likely to be thinking of him, and yet he exists. But his self has become pale and abrtract, and at one moment even seems to go out like a candle-flame. He seems left, then, with a self as pure, empty consciousness (240–241/236–237). In fact, however, his consciousness is not really empty, since thoughts and images keep rushing through it. He thinks of the smashed and tormented Autodidact, suffering as he roams the streets; then he thinks of fat old Anny, suffering through the boredom of outliving herself; and finally he thinks of the song 'Some of These Days', in which *pure* suffering occurs, forgotten yet not forgetting itself, with 'nobody there to suffer and wring his hands and take pity on himself' (243/238). In a sense, this song, to whose idea his thoughts have ascended from the level of the Autodidact's suffering through the level of Anny's suffering, is the real hero of the novel.

Basically, the novel takes place against the implicit backdrop of Platonic view of reality, which is also largely the view taken by Western philosophy from Plato to Hegel. According to this view, reality is both material and ideal, and human existence stands with one foot in each of these two realms. Further, the material realm is chaotic and meaningless in itself, but becomes orderly and meaningful to the extent that it can be pulled up out of itself in the direction of the ideal realm, which consists of 'essences' that the mind can grasp in thought and can name and communicate in words. On this traditional view, there was no real problem of meaning in life, since life had the obvious goal of knowing as clearly as possible the realm of ideal essences and of guiding itself in the material world both by and towards that knowledge. To have attained adequately full knowledge of

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ideal reality by the time of one's death was to have realized oneself as a single, unified life-adventure. In *Nausea,* however, several crises have occurred regarding that traditional world-view. First, severe doubt has arisen about the very *reality* of the ideal realm, with the material realm asserting itself ever more strongly as the only reality. Accordingly, a kind of metaphysical collapse has begun, in which material reality breaks free from the ties to the ideal realm that previously pulled it up out of itself, and starts sinking into its own nauseous, arbitrary, radically 'concrete' absurdity. Second, insofar as this severe doubt has not yet become total—as it still has not in Roquentin's case—, severe uncertainty has arisen about the possibility of *uniting* the material and ideal realms in a meaningful way within any individual person's existence. Not only is there usually a totally unbridgeable gap between materiality and ideality at any time in one's life, but also, even if the two occasionally come together, such conjunctions are meaningful only as long as they last, and cannot impart meaningfulness to the entire course of a life that keeps shedding its past towards an ever-emptied present that one day ends in death. Throughout the novel then, Roquentin is besieged by experiences that seem to confirm the notion that reality is solely material, that the ideal realm is a 'subjective' invention of the human mind, and that the true nature of a 'self' is the nothingness of pure consciousness. Unlike Anny, however, who has utterly capitulated under a similar siege, he remains open to the possibility of somehow uniting the material and the ideal within his existence. As a result of his experiences with the song 'Some of These Days', he begins to see *art* as offering the possible solution to his problem. (Behind all this, Sartre seems to be reflecting on Nietzsche's claim that it is only as an *aesthetic* phenomenon that life is justified, as well as orienting himself on Heidegger's notion of a personal life-project that

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culminates meaningfully in death and Hegel's notion of materiality as something that remains fleetingly unreal until it has been transformed by human thought into intelligible ideality.)

Thus, at the close of the novel, Roquentin considers the possibility of writing a book. But it will not be a *history* book, because 'history talks about what has existed — an existent can never justify the existence of another existent' (252/247). That remark applies not only to his experience with the Marquis but also to that with Anny, since the main mistake that he and Anny made was trying to justify each other through each other. Here it is worth noting how the atmosphere of their last meeting changes, with conflict and tension phasing into a friendly harmony, as soon as they stop concentrating on each other and start pursuing the problem of just what 'perfect moments' might be. If they had stopped looking for meaning in each other, and started looking for meaning together, as Roquentin seemed willing to try, there might even have been some hope for them. But as practical man, Anny could not avoid the mistake of continually trying to force the ideal realm directly onto the realm of existence. Here, Roquentin sees more deeply into the inevitable gulf between the two realms, and realizes that any workable unification has to enable the gulf to remain somehow, yet to be bridged somehow. Anny, on the other hand, sees more deeply than he that existence is 'raw material' that needs to be 'treated' in some way. His characteristic mistake, in contrast to Anny's, is to assume existence will somehow bring forth the ideal of itself, without any appropriative effort on his part. So his story ends with the possibility that he will try writing a *novel,* in which he will actively 'treat' the raw material of his existence in an aesthetic way, just as the Jew and the Negress treated the miserable raw material of their existence in order to produce self-transcendence in to meaningful ideality through

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the song 'Some of These Days' (251/246). Concretely, what he envisages is: 'Another kind of book... — you would have to guess, behind the printed words, behind the pages, something which didn't exist, which was above existence. The sort of story, for example, that could never happen, an advaeture. It would have to be beautiful and hard as steel and make people ashamed of their existence' (252/247).

Unfortunately, Sartre never worte such a novel. Not long after publishing *Nausea,* and in circumstances ironically like those in which the Autodidact became a Socialist (164–165/161–162), his war-time experiences taught him 'the societal',[3] and he turned back towards what he had earlier diagnosed as the existential dead-ends represented by Anny and the Autodidact. But insofar as existentialism is to be understood in the spirit of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, and the late Camus, the Sartre of *Nausea* was more profoundly existentialist than he was ever to be again. Although hardly a great book, *Nausea* deserves to be numbered among the true classics of existentialism achieving a provocative disparagement of many fond illusions and a memorable poeticization of many right questions.

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NOTES

1. Page references to this work are given doubly (in parentheses) in the following text, first to Robert Baldick's translation of *Nausea* (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1965), and second to the original *La nausee* (Paris : Editions Gallimard, 1938).
2. Leo Fretz, 'An Interview with Jeen-Paul Sartre', in : H. J. Silverman and F. A. Ellison (eds.), *Jean-Paul Sartre : Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy* (Pittsburgh : Duquesne Universilty Press, 1980), p. 239.
3. Ibid., p. 239.

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OF HUMILITY : A STUDY IN MARCEL AND GANDHI

1. *Introduction*

The subject I have chosen may seem a rather odd coupling. Gandhi is, in the main, a man of religion. But Marcel is known for his philosophic and literary ability. Yet, no one can miss the religious in Marcel. What, however, I wish to emphasize is their agreement in respect of what humility essentially is; and I may begin by citing Marcel and Gandhi's views on humility :

> " (Humility) ... consists ... in the recognition of *our own nothingness.* At the root of humility lies the more or less unexpressed assertion, ' By myself, I am nothing and I can do nothing except ; in so far as I am not only helped but promoted in my being by Him who is everything and is all powerful ".[1] (Marcel)

> " Humility should make the possessor realize that he *is as nothing.* Directly one imagines oneself to be something, there is egotism ... To feel that we are something is to set up a barrier between God and ourselves. To cease feeling that we are something is to become one with God.[2] ... a man is only God's tool or instrument ".[3] (Gandhi)

Let us now see what the two thinkers here really say :

To begin with, neither regards humility as merely secular.[4]

It is here a matter of one's being related to God.[5] Further, we are told, humility is the realization that bereft of His help one

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can neither be nor do anything. What is more, in so far as it pertains to being, humility is a pervasive quality of one's entire life–of even its most subjective recesses, rather than a merely episodic feature. Thus, for Marcel, humility means that even the initiation of an action is here felt as an impulse from Him; and, for Gandhi, it forbids even the minimal sense of egoity. It is easy to see how close these two emphases are. For, if I attribute even the beginning of an activity to Him, it is obvious that I do not at all regard myself as a self–conscious agent. Humility, I repeat, is here a property of the general way a man regards himself as related to God. It is, for both Marcel and Gandhi, an attitude, and not an act, technique or vow.

2. Some Distinctions

It is, however, a distinctive attitude; and so both take pains to mark it off from others with which is may be confused. Thus, Marcel points out that true humility is not 'a sadistic craving for mortification...nor even a taste for self–humiliation'.[6]

> Gandhi says similarly :
> "...there is no room (in humility) for self-pitying... self-pity comes when you do a thing for which you expect recognition from others".[7]

Further, whereas Gandhi thinks it needful to separate humility from mere outer refinement as follows :

> "Humility must not be here confounded with mere manners or etiquette. One man will sometimes prostrate himself before another, although his heart is full of bitterness against him A man may chant Rāmanāma, or tell his beads all day long and move in society like a sage; but if he is selfish at heart, he is not meek but only hypocritical"[8]

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Marcel distinguishies humility from modesty :

> "... the truth (is) that the difference between humility and modesty lies precisely in this that the latter, and the latter only, can be just a natural or profane habitus, whereas humility properly so called presupposes a certain affirmation of the sacred; that humility is in the most radical opposition to hybris which one may describe as essentially sacrilegious".[9]

It is thus obvious that whereas Gandhi emphasizes the inwardness of true humility, Marcel highlights its Godwardness. This difference, however, cannot be said to characterize their overall views on the matter. For, Marcel too is duly aware of the inwardness of true humility. This, in fact, is partly why he distinguishes humility from technique. In view of its importance, this distinction may be brought out at some length.

Technique "claims to function over the whole range of human activities."[10] In so far as it doubtless makes for successful activity in many fields, technique easily gets intoxicated with an exaggerated sense of its own power, whereupon it becomes technocracy or technomania. When this happens, Marcel would add, we mistakenly begin applying technique to many such things as are quite beyond its bounds, such as prayer.[11] In fact, however, technique applies only to the region of activity and not to the deeper needs of being such as love, ontological hope and fidelity. Concern with mere technological competence in fact leads to impoverishment of being, or, as Marcel would say, to 'empty' rather than 'full' being.

It is true that technique also involves a kind of humility, a restraining of merely subjective elements from entering into, and colouring our concern with objective fact. But this humility is

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just " a collection of methodological precautions "[12] it springs from the fear of error. And this fear, Marcel adds, has nothing to do with true humility. Here, what is to be feared is rather the claim which consists " in believing that we are, or have the power to make ourselves dependent only on ourselves ".[13] Methodological humility which technique calls for ' enforces a realist attitude'[14] true humility, on the other hand, is for Marcel, (and for Gandhi) frankly metaphysical.

3. Humility and the Good Life

This should not, however, be taken to suggest that humility has nothing to do with everyday activity. Such a relation is in fact implicit in the very way Marcel difines humility. If, as he insists, humility consists in the realization that I can do nothing except in so far as 'I am ... helped (and) promoted in my being by Him', it follows that a life of humility will, in all its actions, be underrun by a sense af dependence on God. We may note that Marcel speaks of prayer itself as a kind of activity, as making 'one's way into the intersubjective sphere' [15]. "Prayer," he believes "is possible only when intersubjectivity... is operative".[16]

For Gandhi, too, humility is the essential condition of all irghteous endeavour. He is convinced that no vow can be practised without humility. Yet, he takes pains to distinguish humility from a vow, though not from technique in the way of Marcel.

A vow is a way of life that makes for self-discipline, Technique, we may add, is indifferent to the morality of the end; and one who employs it may not achieve any growth in goodness. Vows are carefully chosen ways to become morally better. Self-improvement, however, requires self-criticism. This is why Gandhi regards humility as the pre-condition [17] of the proper observance of every vow.

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Yet, he adds, humility itself may not be taken as a vow. Every vow enjoins a course of action. Thus, the observance of Truth requires us to speak truly and *ahimsa* bids us to avoid hurting others. Humility, on the other hand, does not directly require us to do anything definite. Therefore, one cannot directly decide to become humble.[18] If a man takes such a decision he may begin by trying to appear humble in his actions. But this would often be mere hypocrisy, not genuine humility. Humility is, in fact, a matter of being, not of appearing; and it accrues to a man only when he puts service above self, and practises *ahimsa* not merely in action and speech, but in thought.

4, An Oddity (?) in Gandhi

Here, however, we may reckon with an oddity. On the one hand, Gandhi reiterates his desire – nay, his decision—to reduce himself to zero; but, on the other hand, he insists that humility is not an independent vow. How, if at all, do these two sides square ? The following will perhaps do as an answer :

Man has certainly to seek the value of meekness. Gandhi himself does so. And one must indeed decide to be humble. But he cannot directly aim at becoming humble. The reason for saying so is not that if one decides and tries to become humble, his sense of self-importance will only be heightened, negating the very purpose of his effort; for, a man can try to become humble by carefully living a life of self-effacing service which does in fact make for humility, rather than for self-importance. The reason is (we repeat) that one cannot *directly* meet the requirement of humility.

I at once do what truth demands by not telling a lie even in conditions that tempt me to deviate from truth. But I cannot meet the requirement of humility straightway eschewing arroga-

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nce, or undue self-assertiveness; such avoidance is possible only if I have genuine love and respect for the others. So, humility can be cultivated only indirectly or through the practice of *ahimsa*. Indeed, though it is mainly inward, humility cannot develop except in and through action. A man can be humble only in dealing with others; or, as Gandhi would say, through self-effacing service.[19] Faith is, for men of religion, a great aid to such service.

5. *Marcel and the Fabric of Meekness*

Gandhi and Marcel are, of course, not unmindful of humility as non-religious. But they wish to emphasize that the religious sense is foundational. Humility, they believe, is a whole fabric of attitudes, — of faith, self-effacement and surrender. This has, however, to be brought out.

What makes humility significant is that we incur it of our own free will; it is no imposition from without. This is obviously quite different from the state of being pressurized into servility by some malevolent power or means.[20] Subservience to an 'unauthentic transcendance' is, in Marcel's words.

> " . the very heart of ignominy, precisaly because consciousness (here) abdicates in favour of what we should call a pseudo or an infra-consciousness. There is no common measure shared by such a situation and that in which the human creature turns humbly and freely towards Him from whom it holds its very being."[21]

Here, however, we must notice a difficulty. On the one hand Marcel insists that what makes humility significant is its being freely incurred; and on the other hand, he asserts that we can turn to Him only under (the stress of) His grace. How can

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both these positions be maintained? An answer may emerge if we reflect as follows :

Consider, to begin with, the question of freedom. Am I free? Marcel insists that the question has to be asked :

> "...in the first person, because after all it is a question which can only be asked by me of myself. No outside answer will satisfy me, unless it coincides with my own answer, unless ultimately it is my answer".[22]

The quesrion, 'Am I free', cannot, however, be answerd, says Marcel, unless we first determine what freedom means. It does not mean the ability to do whatever we desire to do. Nor does it consist in merely being able to prove somehow that Man is free from all determination;[23] for, it may not succeed in making one *feel* free. Further, if–as commonly agreed–Man is free to the extent to which he succeeds in using his will in overpowering the seductions his desires expose him to[24], freedom is to be regarded as lying, in the main, in a decision[25] to be free.

The actual awareness of being free is, however, not merely one's own doing. It may even be highlighted by what others expect of us: and this in two ways.[26] First, in so far as they merely expect something of us and do not command us to do or give it, it is left entirely to us to do as expected. Secondly, the expectation, if expressed (we may add) in a setting of love and trust, may well inspire us to stretch our ability to help and may thereby give us a heightened sense of freedom or inner expansion. In any case, freedom as realized cannot be regarded as a readymade fact, say, as our very essence.[27] Man does not have freedon; he grows into it. Freedom is not a finding, but a becoming.

...5

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Its logic is purposeful action for ever fuller growth.[28] Here, however, a note of caution must be sounded. Marcel does say that 'the free act is essentially a significant act'[29] but this does not mean, he warns, that purposeful action is pursuance of or determination by an inexorable and unchanging ideal; for such subservience may easily make for ideological tyranny which is the very negation of freedom.[30] The ideal itself has got to be vivified or may be even radically altered in the process of growth. This is partly why Marcel opposes freedom not to determinism, but to *fanaticism*. Besides being unkind to others, the fanatic makes his own growth impossible, and is quite weaned away from what alone nourishes the spirit, that is, inter-subjectivity.[31]

Genuine freedom is not a shutting out, but an inner opening up. This brings us to see, with Marcel, the relation of freedom to grace. Grace is a gift,[32] and what makes a gift truly of value is that it is 'in some way a giving of oneself'[33] the thing offered being only a symbol of the inner-giving. How is this self-giving to be known? What are its marks? Marcel answers that, fiirst, it is quite motiveless, so that the giver expects nothing in return, not even the beneficiary's gratitude;[34] that secondly - what follows from the first - no condition is laid down as to how the gift is to be used;[35] and that, thirdly, in so fas as generosity of spirit is always quite manifest, the self-giving is here at once a felt assurance to the recipient that the gift is now really his own,[36] and that it lays no constraint on him at all.

True generosity is no mere spilling of compassion; it is no effervescence.[37] It does not make a show of itself, and this is why it does not at all hurt the ego of the man who receives the gift. Yet, such is its nature, it is at once manifest to others even like a light.[38] Yet, though motiveless, the making of a (generous) gift has at once a backwash of value. It is necessarily to experience a feeling of self-expansion.[39]

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This feeling is, however, quite different from that of being self-complacent on contemplating the good one is doing. The former (or the felt self-expnasion) is merely the concomitant of a wholly outgoing movement. The latter (or self-complacency) is a turning back on the ego, a conscious relish of the joy of giving,[40] a heightened sense of self-importance which vitiates generosity at its very root which is humility. Generosity is like a light in so far as both temper or tranacend mere separateness.[41] Things only seem bathed in light, not opposed to one another. Even so, giving that is truly generous is participation (in love), not the condenscending transfer of a thing from a donor to a receiver, the very manner of heightening the unlikeness of the two. All our growth in spirit is through the joy of self–giving, and Marcel rightly insists that :

> " If we begin by defining human being in a way which excludes the possibility of conceiving this light or radiance, we may be certain that our definition is false ".[42]

Generosity, however, is not merely what makes a gift significant; it may itself be regarded as one because of its motiveless quality. The recipient of a gift who fails to see this may wonder and even feel resentful at being helped. Similarly, the man who fails to see that life itself is a gift, a symptom of His grace, is often seen to put a fretful question. Why has life been inflicted on me ? It is only in a state of free and humble turning to God in fervent prayer that a man is enabled to see and cherish life as a gift. Values like freedom and meekness of spirit are meaningless if one is not God-oriented. The moment a man realizes that life is a gift from God he is impelled to take and treat it as a sacred trust. The commitment to purposeful living is here inwardly affirmed. It is snch an attitude that makes a man deal with every life-situation with due care and sacredness, and in a way that makes for his own continual re-shaping.

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Such an open commitment alone provides for true freedom. If, on the other hand, a man seeks merely to live by an abstract ideal–say, that of becoming a consummate scholar or top-class athlete, his very dedication to this goal may make him averse to situations that ask for human sympathy–and could have helped him grow in genuine goodness–in case they are seen to collide with devotion to his chosen objective. Here, the very pursuit of the goal bars the way to growth in goodness. Marcel's words may here be cited with advantage :

> " I should be sadly decived if I were to imagine that I am acting freely when I am struggling to realize a certain coherence. When cohernce is a goal which I set before myself, there is a risk that it will come between me and myself and in that case it keeps a certain mechanical character ".[43]

It would here be of help to summarize Marcel's view of the inter-relation of humility intersubjectivity and prayer before we turn to Gandhi :

Prayer not merely makes for the recognition of life as a gift, but itself gains in inwardness from this awareness. For, prayer is not so much the transmission of a message to God as getting properly disposed towards Him, and the conviction that one is for ever under His wing, – a faith that recalcitrates both pride and despair.[44] And of such a disposition it is easy to see, a basic requirement is gratitude which wells up the moment we see that a gift seeks or claims nothing in return and is but a visible sign of utter generosity. Such an awareness at once quickens the spirit. It cancels our concern with the self; makes us open up, pray for others;[45] and freely realize, and revel in inter-subjectivity by cultivating love of God.[46]

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6. *Transition to Gandhi*

In the thought and and life of Gandhi, on the other hand, humility is related not so much to the concepts of inter subjectivity, gift and grace, as to the observance of vows and faith, which ultimately make for God-realization. This is implicit in his very conception of ideal humility.

Consummate humility is ontological; the realization of the truth that (as against God) one is as nothing.[47] It is, Gandhi agrees with the Gītā, *amānitvam*, complete egolessness. Here, the devotee comes to see not only that he cannot do anything without God's help, but that God alone is the all-controlling force and the sole source of sustenance. He, therefore, disclaims even a minimal sense of self-existence and becomes a mere instrument of His will :

> "Truth (as God) is not to be found by anybody who has not got an abundant sense of humility. If you would swim on the bossom of the ocean of Truth you must reduce yourself to a zero".[48]

The ideal here projected can of course be atained only through life-long godward endeavour.[49] Such an endeavour proceeds through the observance of *yamas* and *niyamas*.[50] They make for goodness and thus bring one closer to God, the Good supreme. Of all these vows, however, *Ahiṁsā* is (in Gandhi's view) the most important. Truth is of course the first in Gandhi's list of vows. But in so far as Thruth (or God) is in his view also the *end* of human endeavour, and further because a vow is commonly regarded as a means to the end of, say, self-purification, *ahiṁsā* may be rightly regarded as the most important vow. But the improving cultivation of *ahiṁsā* is possible only if one prays to God in utter humility for freedom from the very tendency to

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hate people. The cultivation of the other vows, too, cannot progress unless one is self-critical and in that sense humble. Humility in fact underruns the good life generally, for the man who lacks the capacity for self-criticism, self-correction and self-restraint, cannot function as His 'instrument'.

It is worth noting here that the merely moral person tends to regard the self as a fixed point or centre of all self-effort and activity. To the religious man, however, this spatial imagery does not apply. For he is not merely morally good, but also strives to maintain a delicate balance between continual self-effort on the one hand, and the evergrowing consciousness that it is only His Grace that makes the self-effort possible, on the other. Thus, instead of self-effort emanating from a 'solidified self', the 'I' or self will be dissipated with every attempt at self-effort.

Gandhi's attitude to the *Īśopaniṣad* provides further insight into the metaphysical ground of his understanding of humility, and its necessary corollary: his theory of trusteeship. Says, Gandhi :

> "In the first *śloka* (of this *Upaniṣad*) ... one is asked to dedicate *everything* to God and then use it to the required extent. The principal condition laid dawn is that one must not cover what belongs to another. These two maxims contain the quintessence of the Hindu religion". [51]

Gandhi is here drawn to the following conclusions :

First, the recognition of humility is no mere intellectual cognition or a single attribute of the religious, but a pervasive manner of their being and doing.

Secondly, the man who aspires to see 'God face to face' (as Gandhi does) must live an active life.

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Hence, every moment of the devotee's life will be permeated by the realization that God alone is the source of everything in the world. Such a sensitivity cannot but lead to his conduct being governed by the twin attitudes of renunciation and dedication. He will regard not only his material possession but also his mental qualities as 'given' by his Maker and so never identify himself with them, nor become boastful about them. He will simply use his talents and wealth as a trust and in a spirit of thanks giving. Only such a ceaseless offering of oneself[52] to God can pave the way to realization of humility in the highest sense.

The image of a devotee striving to become a mere tool of God may make us suspect that he is seized with slothness and indifference to duty. But such a suspicion would be quite ill-founded. The lives of those who have dedicated their all to God and performed every action with a diminishing sense of egoity, have been all very dynamic. The idea of doing all work as 'God's will' did not make them inactive; it rather led them to ever better performance of even humdrum tasks, because of the faith that these were all assigned to them by God.

Neither do persons who endeavour to 'reduce themselves to a zero' and function as a mere tool of God, feel in any way unhappy at being subservient to His Will. On the contrary the more they are able to subdue their selves, the more energy is released diffusing their work with a sense of mission and joy. They do not *want* to be free from their Maker's tutelage.[53] And they develop an endless potential for overcoming obstacles, enduring criticism and achieving their goals.

How they are yet able to keep humble may be brought out thus. It is always in a spirit of prayer and faith that they undertake and pursue important tasks.[54] Hence, they attribute all

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success to His Grace and accept failture as His overriding (yet benevolent) will.[55]

The devotee is humble not merely because he does not question His will, but also because he puts an intentional curb on the mind's natural tendency to probe the mysterious working of the Divine mind. Thus, when Gandhi, the apostle of non-violence, has to suffer the agony of being a witness to rampant communal fury, he first wonders if God wishes him to pass away and to realize His will through a better instrument; but then he promptly disowns this excess of trying to read the mind of God :

> "This is all speculation. Nobody has the capacity to judge God ". [56]

Such seeming discordance in thought need not here disturb us. For, that which determines the life of God is not so much the requirement of logical consistency as concern for ever deeper faith.

As restraint in thinking about God, humility is also seen in the following words of Gandhi :

> " Let no one ask what is prayer and where and who is God. Both prayer and belief in God are supremely acts of faith ". [57]

Consummate humility being a state of complete self-effacement is immeasurable. No amount of suffering[58] can revoke the devotee's complete, willing and joyous[59] surrender to His Will. Where the ordinary man may be tempted to revolt, the devotee positively welcomes the trial as a test of faith and an opportunity to come closer to Him. His surrender is not negative resignation to but joyful acceptance of His Will. Says Gandhi :

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> 'God is the hardest taskmaster I have known on this earth, and He tries you through and through...
> and
> "Dark though the path appears, God will light it and guide my steps, if I have faith in His guidance and humility enough to acknowledge my helplessness without that infallible guidance".[60]

This consummate humility is Gandhi's sole source of courage and resilience :

> "I am an irrepressible optimist... That sounds very arrogant... But I say from the depths of humility. I believe in the supreme power of God".[61]

In other words, Gandhi never loses hope only because he feels himself grounded in or sustained by God.

Consummate humility can never itself be a vow nor even the pre-condition of the vows, for it 'does not lend itself to be deliberately practised'. Though it is the aim of the devotee, he cannot directly practise it. Says Gandhi :

> "...Humility would cease to be humility the moment it became a matter of vow. The true connotation of humility is self-effacement. Self-effacement is *mokṣa* and whilst it cannot by itself, be an observance, there may be other observances necessary for its attainment. If the acts of an aspirant after *mokṣa* or a servant have no humility or selflessness about them, there is no longing for *mokṣa* or service. Service without humility is selfishness and egotism".[62]

To sum up :

> "One can— nay, one is required to— aim at the state of consummate humility. One can work for it, pray for it. But

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one cannot directly practise it. For it is man's religious destiny, and no mere excellence of moral endeavour".[63]

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SUMAN KHANNA

NOTES

1. G. Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* Second Vol. of *The Mystery of Being,* Gateway Edition, 1960, pp, 95–96. My italics.
2. Gandhi : *Service Before Self,* (ed. by A. T. Higorani) Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, pp. 76-77, My italics.
3. Gandhi ; *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,* The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, (hereafter referred to as C.W.), Vol. XLIX, p. 33.
4. Also see : "... humility properly so called presupposes a certain affirmation of the sacred ".
   G. Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* p. 96. And : " God demands complete self-surrender..."
   R. K. Prabhu and U. R. Rao (ed); *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi,* Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1969, p. 90
5. And as a necessary consequence (we shall see) a man-man relation.
6. G. Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* p. 95.
7. *op cit, The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi,* p. 120
8. Shriman Narayan (ed) : *The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,* Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, Vol. VI, pp. 141-42. Hereafter, these volumes will be referred to as : *Selected Works.*

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9. Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* p. 96.
10. *Ibid,* p. 96.
11. See here Marcel's following words :
"We have in reality no right to make any categorical pronouncements about the forms that (prayer) must take".
Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* p. 107
12. *Ibid,* p. 97.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.* Cf. Gandhi's view that :
"Inertia must not be mistaken for humility, as has been in Hinduism".
15. G. Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* p. 120.
16. *Ibid,* p. 119.
17. (Humility) is "certainly as essential as, and perhaps more essential than, any of (the vows)".
Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 245
18. "Humility .. does not lend itself to being deliberately practised".
Ibid.
19. "...most strenuous and constant endeavour entirely directed towards the service of humanity".
The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 247
20. Marcel shows how this exactly was the position of victims of post-war trials in East European countries. Here, the individual was pressurized into feelings of guilt and self-condemnation which led him to make the "desired admissions" before the judges.
Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* pp. 98–99
21. *Ibid,* p. 99
22. Marcel : *Faith and Reality,* p. 123
23. *Ibid.,* pp. 123, 126.

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24. "Do I not chiefly, if not exclusively, seem to myself to be free only when I succeed in using my will in opposition to my own desire ?"
Ibid.. p.124.
25. *Ibid,* p. 126.
26. *Ibid,* p. 127.
27. "... Freedom can in no way be thought of as a predicate which somehow belongs to man considered in his essence".
Ibid, p. 127.
28. *Ibid,* p. 128.
29. *Ibid,* p. 130.
30. *Ibid.*
31, "... fanaticism is the born enemy of freedom. Not only does it kill freedom in the man in which it dwells, but it has the furthar tendency to surround itself with a depopulated zone, a no-man's land".
Ibid, p. 129.
32. *Ibid,* p, 132.
33. *Ibid.*
34. "... to give with a predetermined end in view.. as using the beneficiary's gratitude to secure a hold over him, is not giving. To give is not to seduce".
Ibid, pp. 123-33
35. "... the gift has certain character of unconditionalness.
Ibid, p. 132.
36. "If I am to be certain that something has been given to me and not simply lent, I need a formal assurance; and looked at in this way, the word, whether written or not, may appear as constituting the gift as such". *Ibid,* p. 136
37. "... It (is not) the overflow of something that is too full".
Ibid, p. 133
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*

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40. "If generosity enjoys its own self it degenerates into complacent self-satisfaction. This enjoyment of self is not joy, for joy is not a satisfaction but an exaltation. It is only in so far as it is introverted that joy becomes enjoyment". *Ibid,* pp. 133–43
41. "The property peculiar to light is that of being illuminating — it goes beyond the boundaries which contemporary philosophy attempts to fix or lay down between the *for self* and the *for the other*. *Ibid,* p. 133.
42. *Ibid,* p. 134
43. Marcel; *Faith and Reality,* p. 131
44. "... the rejection of a temptation; and the temptation would consist in being shut in on oneself in pride or despair, two things which are closely connected." *Ibid,* p. 177
45. "... my love is the more authentic according as I love less for my own sake, that is, for what I can hope to obtain from another, and more for the sake of the other". *Ibid,* p. 109.
46. Prayer "presupposes ... the active recognition, in God and through God, of the bond which constitutes real love. *Ibid,* p. 109
47. *In Search of the Supreme,* compiled and edited by V. B. Kher, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1961, Vol. II, p. 127.

    Cf. "Humility is the refusal to exist outside God"

    S. Weil : *Gravity and Grace,* p. 35

    This, incidentally, is also the Christian view. Thus see the following :

    "Christian humility .. should be understood ontologically ... We must discern the centre of being in God, not in ourselves, and then everything falls into its proper place ..."

    Berdyaev : *Christian Existentialism, op. cit.,* pp. 257–258

    Selected and translated by Donald. A Lowrie, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1965, pp. 257–258

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48. *Ibid,* Vol. I., p. 13.
49. "Realization is the final fruit of constant effort (towards seeing God)". *Ibid,* Vol. II. p. 72
50. "We should never doubt the necessity of vows for the purpose of self purification and self-realization". *Ibid,* p. 5
51. *The Mind of Manatma Gandhi,* p. 88.
52. "Not until we have reduced ourselves to nothingness can we conquer the evil in us. God demands nothing less than complete self-surrender as the price for the only real freedom that is worth having. And when a man thus loses himself, he immediately finds himself in the service of all that lives".
    In Search of the Supreme, Vol. I. p. 168.
53. The reference here is to the Prayers of St. Francis of Assisi and Mother Tereza; 'Lord make me an instrument of Thy peace . '
54. 'No act of mine is done without prayer'.
    The Mind of Mahtama Gandhi, p. 84
55. 'I can recall several occasions when almost the last penny had been spent for my public activities. Money then came in from the most unexpected quarters. These responses have made me humble and filled me with a faith in God and His goodness that will stand the strain of utter distress if it ever becomes my lot in life'.
    In Search of the Supreme, Vol. II, p. 146
56. *The Last Phase,* p. 461
57. *C. W.* Vol. XXXII, p. 87.
58. 'I have never found him lacking in response. i have found Him nearest at hand when the horizon seemed darkest'.
    The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 86
59. 'The greater the surreder to Him, the greater has been my joy". *Ibid,* p. 33.

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60. *Ibid,* p. 65
61. Ibid, p. 16.
62. C. W., Vol. XXXIX, p. 315.
63. S. K. Saxena ; " Gandhi and Humility : An Essay in Understanding ", in the *Gandhi Marg Journal* of the Gandhi Peace Foundation, Nov., 1982, p. 711.

I am grateful to Dr. S. K. Saxena (Prof. of Philosophy, South Delhi Campus, University of Delhi) for discussing the essay with me at great length.

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PATANJALI'S 'PRAJNA' AND BHARTRHARI'S PRATIBHA : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

In this paper I intend to undertake a comparative study of Patañjali's concept of *Prajñā* and Bhartṛhari's concept of *Pratibhā* and bring out some of their implications.

The word *prājña* occurs in 3 *sūtras*[1] in the 1st *pāda*, in one *sūtra*[2] in the 2nd *pāda*, in one *sūtra*[3] in the 3rd *pāda* and in no *sūtra* in the 4th pāda of the *Yogasūtras*. This means that Patañjali has used the word *prajñā* in only five *sūtras* in the entire work of about 195 *sūtras*. If one were to deduce the importance of *prajñā* from the number of times the word is used in the *sūtras* then of course the answer is obvious. But the answer is also not correct because the entire system of *Rājayoga* hinges on the concept of *prajñā*.

For an aspirant of yoga (*sādhaka*) *prajñā* is the last link in the path to *kaivalya*. Though one talks of *saṁprajñāta samādhi* as the stepping stone to *asaṁprajñāta samādhi*,[4] in truth, it is the last stage of *saṁprajñāta* which culminates in the highest stage of *prajñā* that truly leads to *asaṁprajñāta*. This raises the question of *saṁprajñāta samādhi* and its different stages which culminate in *prajñā*.

The first mention of the various types of *saṁprajñāta* is found early in the *Samādhipāda*.[5] Here the four types of *saṁprajñāta* are distinguished as (a) that accompanied by deliberation (*savitarka*); (b) that accompanied by reflection (*savicāra*);

...6

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(c) that accompanied by bliss (*sānanda*); (d) that accompanied by the 'sense-of-I' (*sāsmita*). Further on, in the same *pāda*, Patañjali gives a detailed analysis of the four stages.[6] From these *sūtras* it appears as if, the later kind of *saṁprajñāta* comes only after the earlier stage, which is supported by the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *sūtras* dealing with *sāsmita-saṁprajñāta*.[7] And thus the *prajñā* which leads to liberation should logically come in the fourth stage. But this is not clearly supported by the later *sūtras* in the *Samādhipāda* itself. This seems to have troubled the later commentators as well and is clearly seen when *Vijñānabhikṣu* includes the *sānanda-saṁprajñāta* under the *savicāra* stage and quotes the *Mokṣadharma* text in support of his statement.[8]

In the *sūtra* 47 of the *Samādhipāda* Patañjali states that there is purity of the highest order in the *nirvicāra* state.[9] This only meansthat in the perfection of *nirvicāra samādhi prajñā* comes into being. Therefore, the other two, *sānand* and *sāsmita*, can only be variations of the same state – the one emphasising the feeling of bliss and the other the sense of 'I'. The stage, then, when true *prajñā* comes into being. can be the *nirvicāra* stage.

In the *sūtra* 20[10] of the first *pāda, prajñā* occurs for the first time, wherein it is stated that *asaṁprajñāta samādhi* is preceded by *śraddhā vīrya, smṛti, samādhi* and *prajñā*. Vyāsa explains *prajñā* here as 'that which reveals the object as it truly is' and also that it gives rise to superior detachment and *asaṁprajñāta sāmadhi*[11]. What is stressed here is not the nature of *prajñā* but the power which it confers, which is the power to see the object as it truly is and gives rise to superior detachment which will lead to *kaivalya*. That the object, as known in the ordinary commonsense way, is not the true object as it is, has been the conclusion of almost all philosophers. Thus, a higher philosophical insight is what makes one understand the object as it is in truth and this insight is *prajñā*.

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Prajñā, then, is a divine vision which comes into being in the last retined stage of *nirvicāra;* it is a clear flash of insight and does not follow the usual process of experience,[12] and deals with an object which is different from that arising from the scriptures and inference.[13]

If *prajñā* reveals the truth, as it truly is, (*ṛtaṁbharā prajñā*) then theoretically when *saṁyama*[14] is practised together with it on one object, there shoud be *prajñā* with regard to that object.[15] In other words, one could say that *prajñā* arises in all the different *saṁprajñāta yogas* but it is only the *prajñā* in the *nirvicāra* stage that reveals the ultimate truth regarding *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Therefore, the doubt as to whether *ṛtaṁbharā* can be applied to *prajñā* in the other *sabīja samādhis* can be answered by saying that, since only the 'generic class of *ṛtaṁbharā* is meant here the others are also included in *ṛtaṁbharā*.' But keeping in mind that *ṛtaṁbharā prajñā* gives rise to superior detachment (*parāvairāgya*), which is *vairāgya* even towards *prajñā* itself, and thus paves the way for *kaivalya*, and also that there is *avidyā* present in the earlier 3 stages (*savitarka, nirvitarka* and *savicāra*) one understands that the *prajñā* that comes about in the last stage of *nirvicāra samādhi* is what is really meant by *ṛtaṁbharā prajñā*. This alone gives rise to *mokṣa* or *kaivalya* later.

Thus *prajñā* is all comprehensive and it can mean the following :

a) It conveys the truth of the immediate object of attention.

b) It conveys the ultimate truth (finally) i.e. *kaivalya.*

c) It reveals *ṛta* or the cosmic order of truth.

In the second *pāda* another division of *prajñā* as of seven kinds has been mentioned. These seven kinds are only divisions

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of *prajñā* itself, though one could also interpret it as seven kinds of *prajñā* of the yogi. Though *prajñā* arises at every stage of *samādhi* it has to be purified by constant practice before leading to *kaivalya* through *asaṁprajñāta* and these various stages are given as seven by Patañjali. Vyāsa attempts a classification of these seven as (a) based on effort, (b) freedom from mind (or effort).[16] The mind plays a large part in the first four stages where, through a conscious effort, discernment of the difference between the *sattva–intellect* and *Puruṣa* is realized and also the means of attaining this is understood.[17] The next three stages are free of mind activity which comes about on the realization that there is nothing more to be served by the intellect, Therefore, its activities will cease and finally *Puruṣa* will be revealed in its purity.[18] So, there is no contradiction between the seven-fold division of *prajñā* and the earlier description based on *nirvicāra samādhi*. The only point to remember regarding *ṛtaṁbharā prajñā* is that, but for it, there can be no 'superior detachment' giving rise to *kaivalya* and, therefore, the whole system of Patañjali hinges on this important concept.

If we now turn to the concept of *pratibhā* in Patañjali's *Yogasūtras*, we find that it occurs for the first time in the *Vibhūtipāda, sūtra* 33.[19] Even here it is mainly used to describe the knowledge (*jñāna*) which arises from *pratibhā*. The *sūtra* mentions that 'Due to *prātibhajñāna* the *yogi* knows all'. Vyāsa states this is prior to the dawn of *viveka* or discriminate-discernment between the '*sattva* intellect' and *Puruṣa*.[20] Thus, *pratibhā* is not the highest state of *prajñā* which gives rise to *kaivalya* later. When one studies this *sūtra* 33 along with the *sūtras* III. 35 and III, 36,[21] it seems that Patañjali is describing *pratibhā–jñāna* as a stage when *viveka* has just dawned. In III. 33 *pratibhā* is just prior to the dawn of *viveka* according to Vyāsa, but in *sūtra* 36 we see that *pratibhā* is already a state

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when *viveka* has dawned. *Sūtra* 35 describes the rise of *prajñā* and *sūtra* 36 mentions that 'from that arise *pratibhā*, *śravaṇa*, *vedanā*, *ādarśa*, *āsvāda* and *vārtā*. In the very next *sūtra* (III. 37) we are told that these various powers (*pratibhā*, *śravaṇa* etc.) belong to the lower stage. Thus, 'All these powers are obstructions in *samādhi* whereas they are *siddhis* in the active state of mind'.[22] Thus, one is at a loss to understand from these three *sūtras* coming together, whether *pratibhā* is superior to *prajñā*, which gives rise to it or inferior to *prajñā* which will ultimately lead to *kaivalya*. Is one to conclude that Patañjali himself was not sure about the relative merits of *prajñā* and *pratibhā*? That obviously cannot be the right answer. If one takes a clue from the *sūtras* dealing with *Īśvara* in the *Samādhipāda*, one finds that *Īśvara* is first introduced in I. 23,[23] and then is described in the following *sūtras* I. 24–27. Similarly, Patañjali introduces *pratibhā* in III. 33 and then goes on to describe that 'it is a state as soon as *prajñā* dawns'. What Patañjali perhaps means is that *pratibhā* is a divine state co-existent with *viveka* or *prajñā*, arising at the moment when realization of the difference between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* (intellect) arises as a flash of understanding. Since *pratibhā* cannot exist without *prajñā* which gives rise to it, *prajñā* must be a higher state. Moreover, *prajñā* will finally achieve *kaivalya* which is described in great detail in *sūtras* I. 50 and 51.[24] The fact that *pratibhā* only occurs in the *Vibhūtipāda* and not in the *Samādhi* or *Kaivalyapāda* also proves the fact that it is only a *siddhi* which, though a power in the active state, is an obstruction in the path towards *kaivalya*.

Further on, in *sūtra* III. 54 *pratibhā* is supposed to yield knowledge of all. In III. 54 he mentions that 'knowledge arising from *viveka* is a deliverer, it has all things as its sphere of action (all comprehensive), it has all times as its object, and

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it is without a sense of sequence (*akarma*)'.[25] Though Patañjali does not use the word *tāraka* for *prātibhajñāna* here the description of both as a state when everything is known makes it clear that they are synonyms.

Tāraka is something 'that relieves'. What this knowledge relieves one from is rebirth, as the commentators mention.[26] But it is not by itself that it relieves – it ushers in or indicates that the stage is set for the last stage of *prajñā* to dawn. It is like the dawn which ushers in the day. So. now we have an idea of what *prātibhajñāna* stands for – (1) it is a state when the *yogī* knows everything; (2) it is born immediately after discriminate-discernment is achieved or is an immediate by-product of *viveka* which is co-existent with it; (3) it is a state when the *yogī* knows all things and all times and has no sense of sequence. It is here that *prātibhajñāna* comes close to the *pratibhā* of the *Vākyapadīya*.

In the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari uses the expression *pratibhā* in a comprehensive manner equating it to instinctive nature at one end of the scale and to the special insight or divine knowledge of *ṛṣis* and sages at the other end.[27] In all, Bhartṛhari has mentioned six kinds of *pratibhā*. What is common to all of them is a flash of understanding and the difficulty in analysing this process of understanding. The standard example he gives is the understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence from understanding the meaning of the words of a sentence.[28] Since one knows that this flash of understanding arises and since it is not easy to explain how it arises, Bhartṛhari mentions that it is due to *pratibhā*. Similarly, the instinctive activity of birds and animals, as also the spontaneous response to any situation by all living creatures is due to *pratibhā*.[29]

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Bhartṛhari, thus, uses the word *pratibhā* to mean many things such as instinct, intuition, conscience, spontaneous activity without deliberation, an intelligence and understanding due to the continued study of the scriptures, a yogic power which arises because of practice of *yoga*, the power which is due to *adṛṣṭa* and *pratibhā* which results due to the grace of a special person.

Though Bhartṛhari, uses *pratibhā* in many senses he traces the source of *pratibhā* in most cases to *śābdībhāvanā* or the 'latent impressions' of the use of words uttered by others and the scriptures. Under yogic vision or *pratibhā* that is due to *yoga*, Bhartṛhari cites only the capacity to read other people's minds as an example. In the *Yogasūtras* this *siddhi* comes by practising *saṁyama* on 'ideas'.[30] Various other divine powers and the capacity to know 'all' through *pratibhā*, which is described in the *Yogasūtras*, also finds an echo in Bhartṛhari when he credits the *pratibhā* of *ṛṣis* and *śiṣtas* to be able to visualise things ordinarily beyond our senses.[31] These *ṛṣis* have acquired this *pratibhā* through leading a pure life, strictly following the instructions (*āgama*), and it is due to the burning of their impurities that they have acquired a divine vision.[32] The method by which they acquire this vision or *pratibhā* is constant practice of a pure life and thus is not different from yogic method of getting rid of the *kleśas* through a pure life in the ultimate pursuit of *kaivalya*. Thus, there is a close resemblance in the method of attaining *pratibhā* in both the *Yogasūtras* and the *Vākyapadīya*.

It is in this connection that the attainment of *Brahman* or *śabda-tattva* by the method of *śabdapūrvayoga*[33] is significant. This is also connected with the manifestation of *pratibhā*. Just how all these can be related in Bhartṛhari's system is as fallows:

In the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* one of the descriptions of *mokṣa* is 'the attainment of *Brahman*', transcending

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the limitations of 'I' and 'mine'.[34] Though the understanding and use of correct words will result in *dharma*[35] this, according to Bhartṛhari, is only the first step in the ascent of becoming one with *Brahman* i. e. union with the 'inner, eternal, undifferentiated non-sequential word'.[36] This greater goal is attained by yogic process called *śabdapūrvayoga*. When one practises this '*yoga* of the word' or when one practises *saṁyama*[37] on the 'word', the *siddhi* one acquires is the state of omniscience, where everything is known 'without any sequence'. The different stages an aspirant goes through before becoming one with *śabdabrahman* is described by Sri K. A. Subramania Iyer in his book *Bhartṛhari*.[38] The first step is to understand and use the correct word which will lead to *dharma*. In the second stage one goes beyond the senses and the mind and then the aspirant reaches *pratibhā* or, in other words, *pratibhā* comes to him which is the source of all 'differentiation'. This stage is also called *prakṛti* and *paśyanti*. The last stage is *parā-prakṛti* which is the ultimate source of the 'phenomenal world'. This ultimate result can only come through the practice of *śabdāpūrvayogā*. Sometimes this *parāprakṛti* is also identified with *pratibhā*.

From this discussion on *pratibhā* in the *Vākyapadīya* it is possible to see its very close resemblance to the *prātibhajñāna* discussed earlier under *prajña* in the *Yogasūtras* Just as *prātibhajñāna* in the *Yogasūtras* stresses the non-sequential nature of knowledge, *pratibhā* in the *Vākyapadīya* also is a stage of 'non-sequential' knowledge of the one, indivisible word, which can also stand for *sphota*. Thus, it seems that *pratibhā* resembles that stage in *prajñā* when it is a *siddhi*, which entails knowledge of all things and all times and is without any sequence. Moreover, as a *siddhi*, *prajñā* has to be transcended in order to achieve *Kaivalya*. Thus, one could conclude that the *pratibhā* of Bhartṛhari can make known the

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'non-sequential *śabdatattva*' which is at best only a *siddhi* whereas Patañjali's *prajñā* gives rise to *Kaivalya* which is a state which is beyond the *siddhis*.

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NOTES

1. *YS*, I. 20, 48, 49.
2. *YS*, II. 27.
3. *YS*, III. 5.
4. *YV*, on Vy. Bh no *YS*, I. 1.
5. *YS*, I. 17.
6. *YS*, I. 41-44.
7. *Caturthastadvikalomśitāmātra prathamaścatuṣṭayānugataḥ samādhiḥ savitarkaḥ.*
8. Rukmani, *YV of Vijñānabhikṣu*, Vol. I, Delhi 1981, p. 110, n. 1.
9. *Nirvicāra vaiśāradye' dhyātmaprasādaḥ – YS*, I. 47.
10. *Sraddhāvīryasmṛtisamādhiprajñāpūrvaka itareṣām–YS*, I. 20
11. *Samādhitacittasya prajñāvivekaḥ upāvartate yena yathārtham vastu jānāti tadabhyāsāttadviṣayācca vairāgyadasaṁprajñātaḥ samādhirbhavati.* VY *Bh.* under *YS*, I. 20.
12. *Kramānanurodhī sphutaḥ prajñālokaḥ–Vy, Bh.* on *YS*, I. 47.
13. *YS*, I. 49.
14. *Dhāranā, dhyāna* and *samādhi* on one object is *saṁyama–YS*, III. 4.
15. Rukmani, *ibid*, p. 245.
16. *Vy, Bh.* on *YS*, II. 27.
17. *Eṣā catuṣtayī kāryā vimuktiḥ prajñāyāḥ, ibid.*
18. *Vy. Bh.* on *YS*, II. 27.
19. *Pratibhādvā sarvam, YS*, III. 33.
20. *Tadvivekajasya jñānasya pūrvarūpam. Vy. Bh.* on *YS*, III. 33.

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21. *Sattvapuruṣayoratyantāsaṁkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśeṣo bhogaḥ parārthātsvārthasaṁyamātpuruṣajñānam–YS,* III. 35.
22. *Tataḥ pratibhāśravanavedanādarśāsvādavartā jāyante, YS,* III. 36.
22. *Te samādhayupasargā vyutthāne siddhayaḥ, YS,* III. 37.
23. *Īśvarapraṇtdhānādvā – YS,* I. 23,
24. *Tajjaḥ saṁskāro' nyasaṁskārapratibandhi – tasyāpi nirodhe sarvanirodhānnirbījaḥ samādhih. YS,* I. 50, 51
25. *Tārakam sarvavisayam sarvathāvisayamākramam ceti vivekajam jñānam – YS,* III. 54.
26. *Saṁsāra sāgarāttārayatīti tārakam – TV,* on *Vy, Bh.* on *YS,* III. 54 *Ataḥ sarvatra dosasākṣatkāreṇoktavairāgyadvārā saṁsāratāraka bhavatītyarthaḥ – YV* on *Vy. Bh.* on *YS,* III 54.
27. Iyer Subramania K. A., *Bhartṛhari,* Poona 1969, pp. 87 ff.
28. *Vak,* II. 143.
29. *Ibid.* II. 149, 118, 147.
30. *YS,* III. 19.
31. *Vṛtti* on *Vāk,* II. 152.
32. *Vāk,* I. 30, 37–38 and *Vṛiti* on *Vāk,* I. 38, Iyer Subramania K. A.; *ibid,* pp. 92 ff.
33. Iyer Subramania; *ibid,* pp. 142 ff.
34. *Vṛtti* on *Vāk,* I. 5,
35. *Vṛtti* on *Vāk,* I. 1.
36. *Vāk,* I. 20.
37. *YS,* III. 4.
38. Iyer Subramania K. A., *Ibid,* pp. 142 ff.

Abbreviations

1. TV – *Tattvavaiśāradi* of Vācaspati Miśra.
2. Vāk. – *Vākyapadīa* of Bhartṛhari.
3. Vy. Bh. – *Vyāsabhāṣya* of the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali.
4. Ys. – *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali.
5. YV. – *Yogavārttika* of Vijñānabhiksu.

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PRATYAKSA PRAMA IN ADVAITA VEDANTA

The primary objective of my treatment of the problem of perception here is to examine the possibility of formulating a realistic criterion of perceptibility and of percept acceptable to the Advaitins. But this requires a detail examination of various definitions or amendments to the definitions of perception suggested by them in the literature on Advaita Vedānta. I have addressed myself to this secondary task first in this paper.

Customarily, perception is defined in terms of sense-functioning. Commonsense view interprets perception as stimulation of senses. The Advaita-Vedāntins make a departure from this common usage in their definition of perception. According to Advaitins, perception as a source of knowledge is the instrumental cause of perception as a form of veridical cognition. That is, the sense-organs constitute the instrumental cause of perceptual congnition. The resulting state of perception is said to be immediate and such an immediate knowledge is held to be the self itself. For, in the self there is pure immediacy of knowledge. The senses are the *kāraṇa* of perception, as immediate knowledge, in so for as the mental modification (*antaḥ-karaṇa vṛtti*), which reveals it (consciousness), is the result of the operation of senses. The *antaḥkaraṇa* or the *manas* is said to be going out through the senses which are in contact with the present perceptible object and is modified in such a way as to assume the shape of the object itself. Sine *manas* is material in nature, it is possible for it to move and attain the dimension of the object of perception. Perception is the immediate cognition in which the mental

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modification is identical with the object and is lit up by the self's light.

At the outset, let me point out that the Advaitins refuse to admit that perception is a cognition resulting from sense-object-contact. For, this will entail a difficulty, according to them, in case of inferential cognition and memory. Both *anumiti* and *smṛti* are also said to result from (an inner) sense like *manas*, and hence would have te be considered to be the cases of perception. To avoid this difficulty, one may suggest that in mental perception *manas* is the limiting case of the 'fact of being sense', while in cases of inferential cognition and memory *manas* is the cause more on account of 'its being *manas*' (*manastvs*) rather than due to its being a sense. But although in this way *Ativyāpti* could be avoided, *Avyāpti*, nonetheless continues to demand one's attention. This difficulty flows from the fact that Vedāntins do not consider *manas* to be a sense. According to them, the so-called internal mental perceptions like happiness, sorrow etc. depend on *manas*, but not on any (external or internal) sense for their emergence. Secondly, if such so-called perceptions are to be taken as cases of *pratyakṣa sāmānya*, then there should be no objection to the enumeration of God's perception as well under it. This latter move, however, would attract the charge of *Avyāpti*, for, God has no sense-organ of any kind. Hence, it is improper to claim that perception is a cognition due to sense-object contact.

Now let us turn to formulate the definition of perception from another point of view.

Generally, it is understood that a knowledge owes its perceptual character both to object and to its cognition. The statement 'I have seen the jar' points to the fact that the jar is perceived. Again, we say 'I have perceptual cognition relating to the object

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jar'. Hence, perceptuality may mean either perceptuality of object or of cognitlon.[2] So, if one desires to fotmulate a definition of perception, both the cases of perception must be covered by it. Generally, all the philosophers accept perceptuality of these two varieties. In Advaita-Vedānta, separate defining marks have been provided for both the types. But as any special defining mark depends on general definition, so the definition of perception in general will be our first concern. At the outset, we tried to show the difficulties involved in formulating the definition of perception in terms of sense-object contact.

Now we shall make an attempt to show the difficulties involved in formulating definition of *pratyakṣa* in terms of its object (*viṣaya*).[3] According to the Advaitins, though in case of cognition emerging through any other source (*pramāṇa*) its object (*viṣaya*) is admitted to be its cause, the role of object in perceptual cognition is more dominant than that in any other cognition. That is, perceptual cognition does not emerge except through immediate contact of sense-organ with its object. But this does not happen in cases of mediate knowledge. For, in mediate knowledge there occurs no perceptual contact with knowable objects. Still it will not be solely relevant to say that a knowledge owes its perceptual character to its being caused by the object. For, in that case an inferential cognition, where *manas* is substantively involved, will be a case of perception. The argument in support of this contention is : *manas* is a sense-organ (*indriya*) since it is the instrument of perceptual cognition like the eye.[4] But, unfortunately, this argument considers *manas* both as subject (*pakṣa*) of this inference and as object (*sādhya*), Now the *pakṣa* of an inference, could certainly be an object of inferential knowledg (the *manas* here) and hence be as much an object of inferential cognition as the *sādhya*. But they are not so to be held with reference to the same

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inference. Forgetting this, if every occurrent cognition is somehow held to be caused by its object, whatever it may be, or, if inferential knowledge is held to be caused by its *pakṣa,* then such an inferential knowledge has *manas* as one of its causes. In that case inferential knowledge would become perceptual in the sense of a cognition caused by its *viṣaya*. This shows that the proposed definition of perception as *viṣaya – janya – jñāna* is too wide (*ativyāpta*). Further, if one suggests that perceptual character of knowledge consists in its being a cognition caused by an object then the definition would come to suffer from the defect of *avyāpti* as well, as it would omit the cases of happiness, sorrow etc. For, once cognition of happiness and the resultant mental modification in the form of happiness are accepted to be simultaneous[5] the latter atleast cannot be said to be caused by the object of happiness. In addition, since happiness and the resultant mental modification arise simultaneously. one of them cannot also be the cause of the other.[6] Therefore, the definition under consideration also remains ridden with the fallacy of *avyāpti*.

But what could be meant by saying that the object is the cause of perceptual knowledge ? This is significant if it means that perceptuality of a knowledge depends on its having been determined by an object. In other words, to be significant it should mean that there is a mutual determination between resultant perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa jñāna vṛtti kāryatā*) and its determinative *viṣaya (viṣayaniṣtha kāryatā)*. But there cannot be determination unless there is a determining property. Now the question is : what is that determining property, which determines the causative or determining character of the *viṣaya* relative to the resultant *pratyakṣa jñāna* ? If an object *qua* object is the cause or the determiner, then the property of being object *(viṣayatva)* (itself) must be the determining property of it. Thus understood, we can define perception as a knowledge caused by

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its *viṣaya* (object), provided the property of being an object resident in it, causatively determines the character of the object under consideration, relative to the resultant perceptual cognition.

This definition, however, is not free from its own difficulties. For the property of being an object is present even in those things that do not cause perceptual knowledge. Hence, the property of being an object cannot be held to be the determining property of the resultant perceptual cognition relative to it. Therefore, we cannot say that *viṣaya qua viṣaya* causes preeeption in any significant sense. Nor can we, therefore, define perception as knowledge produced by an on object.

Those who believe that a knowledge owes its perceptual character to its being caused by an object *(viṣaya)* are under an obligation to tell us how this truth could be established or known ? Certainly, this could be established or known by a knowledge. But, then, there are two alternative possibilities. A perception, besides disclosing its object, should also disclose that it is produced, by the object. This, however, cannot be said. For, like every other knowledge perception reveals its object only, and since, 'having been produced by *viṣaya* ' is not its object, perception cannot reveal it. The other alternative is that some subsequent cognition reveals that the previous perceptual cognition was produced by an object. This alternative cannot be accepted either. So we see that the causal relationship between perception and its object cannot be determined in this way. A source of knowledge *(pramāṇa)* can determine its object only and nothing else. Failure, in this way, to determine causal relationship between perception and its object would amount to be a disproof of the view that knowledge owes its perceptual character to its being caused by an object.

A knowledge may, nonetheless, be held to owe its perceptual character to its being caused by an abject *(viṣaya)*, since there

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is an agreement in presence and difference between an object and its cognition.[7] The rule of concomitance between two entities implies that one is the effect of the other. We know that the relation between fire and smoke conforms to this rule of agreement in presence and difference and so smoke is said to be the effect of fire. Likewise, the proponents of the above-mentioned view mean to say wherever there is the fact of being caused by an object *(arthajanyatva)*,[8] there is perception, and 'wherever there is the absence of it, there is the absence of perception'. They perhaps overlook some other facthr involved in it. If they exclusively rely upon the principle of agreement in presence and difference, other difficulties will not leave us. For instance, illusory perception has the claim to be a perception where we do not see the real objcct There, some other object instead is represented before us. Hence the principle of the opponent that there is agreement in presence and difference between 'the fact of being caused by an object' and 'perception' is ruled out for it suffers from the defect of *avyāpti*. The inference under consideration also suffers from the defect of *svarūpāsiddha*,[9] meaning absence of *hetu* in the *paksa*, since the said *hetu 'arthānya–vyatirekānuvidhāyit-tva'* is absent in the object of illusory perception. The defender may plead here, further, that only 'veredical preception' is under consideration here and so the charge of *svarūpāsiddhi* could very well be circumvented. Nonetheless, mere fulfilment of the condition of the principle of agreement in presence and difference is not enough. For, the genesis of veredical perception additionally requires some other factors. namely light, manifested colour, largeness of an object, conjunction with *manas* etc. apart from '*artha*'. So we can safely say that the 'presence of an object' does not automatically guarantee 'emergence of perception'. Thus, the thrust of the opponent's argument that perceptual character of knowledge is determined by its object (*viṣaya*) appears to be unfounded.

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We attempted to sketch above the definition of perception where its object is a predominant factor in perception. We also considered the definition of perception as caused by its object, but found it to be beset with different difficulties. So let us, now, try to examine how some philosophers tried to qualify this definition giving greater stress on cognition. The definition, they offered, runs thus ... Perception is a cognition emerging not through the active agency of any other cognition.[10] The instrument of inferential cognition (*anumāna*) is the knowledge of the rule of concomitance, the instrument of comparison (*upamāna*) is the knowledge of similarity, the instrument of verbal comprehension is the cognition induced through words, the instrument of *anupalabdhi* is the knowledge of counter-positive etc. etc. So we note that from the six ways of knowing admitted by Vedāntin perception does not result through the active agency of any other cognition. In other words, perception does not result through the instrumentality of any other cognition.[11] But this defination, too, appears to be unacceptable since it is too wide (*ativyāpta*) covering the case of memory which does not emerge from any cognition. The instrument of *smṛti* is memory disposition which is not knowledge.

Some persons hold that perception is '*jñānājanyajñānatvam sākṣātvam*'.[12] Its meaing is very clear. It means that perception does not need any antecedent cognition for its genesis. It arises only if sense-object contact occurs and in the absence of any hindrance for its emergence. But further analysis will reveal that this definition, too, is not proper since it attracts the charge of *avyāpti* in the case of the perceptual cognition of 'the man witn a stick' (*Daṇḍi Puruṣah*). For it is a synthetic cognition where 'the stick' characterises 'the man'. In such a case, the adjectival property is held to be determiner of our perceptual cognition of the man. To avoid such determination to say that our perce-

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ptual cognition of a man should result in the absence of the cognition of a stick is sheer nonsense. Hence, to escape from this puzzling situation, the opponents may plead to replace the definition by *jñānākaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*'. In that case the 'cognition of stick' required necessarily for the emergence of synthetic cognition under consideration will be a general cause and not the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*), since the contact of sense with object is said to be the instrumetal cause of perception.[13] But this definition, too, suffers from the defect of *ativyāpti* (for it covers the case of recognition). So we see the definition cannot be rescued satisfactorily since any attempt to qualify it runs into difficulty. In fact, it is a difficult task to formulate a completely satisfactory definition of perception. For this reason, Dharmarāja Dhvarīndra gave an independent definition. In the commentary *Sikhāmaṇi* it is echoed : *Tataśca pratyakṣa pramāṇam durnirūpamityaśamkyaḥ (pratyakṣa pramā cātra caitanyameva).*[15] Perceptual cognition is consciousness itself. According to the śruti Brahman is *sat, jñāna* and *ananta*. Brahman is *jñāna* i. e., the fact of being cognition as residing in cognition (*jñānaniṣtha jñānatva*) can provide us with the criterion of perceptuality of cognition.

Although we attempted to present the definition of perception in terms of *jñāna* yet perceptual cognition never arises without revealing its object. Perceptuality of jar etc., would be consciousness limited by the mental mode of jar etc., which are novel and uncontradicted. The text that ' Brahman i. e., direct and immediate ',[16] is an evidence towards that effect. What it means is that : Brahman becomes immediate without any sense contact. It is not *aparokṣa*, being pervaded by mental mode *vṛtti*) as it happens in the case of ordinary objects like jar, cloth etc.

One important thing which we cannot but lay much stress on is the fact that the words *prtyakṣa* and *aparokṣa* though are

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normally taken synonymously, according to the Advaitins it is not reasonable to accept them in identical sense. For, the derivative meaning of the word *pratyakṣa* is a cognition resulting from sense-object contact. But *aparokṣa jñāna* (immediate cognition) does not emerge that way. The moment the veil of ne-science disappears, self-manifesting consciousness of Brahman as the substratum of all, appears as immediate cognition. So we note, immediate cognition is not born from sense-object contact. For this reason, in the Advaita system, the immediate cognition of *nirviśeṣa Brahman* is held not to be a case of perception.

Now we shall look at the problem from realist's point of view. We do not know that the Naiyāyikas ever made any distinction between perceptuality of cognition and of percept in the manner of the Advaitins. Still, the realists cannot but accept what is the fact of experience, namely, the distinction under reference. That we have an experience of the form 'knowledge of perception (*pratyakṣa jñānam*) and also of the form 'object is a percept' (*pratyakṣa ghataḥ*), we will try to show from our realist's insight of the problem and will accept our apprehension in these forms as preached by the Advaitins. According to the Naiyāylkas, a knowledge owes its perceptual character to sense-object which causes it and perceptuality of a thing consists in its being an object of cognition which has perceptuality in the above sense. No other criterion for the perceptuality of a thing was deemed necessary by the Naiyāyikas. However, the Naiyāyikas believe perceptual cognition as the *viṣayī* (knowing consciousness) and the object like pitcher, cloth etc., are the objects of that cognition (*viṣaya* – objects of knowing). The cognition resulting from sense-object contact emerges in the self by the relation of inherence and it emerges in the object-content in the relation of *viṣayatā* (objectness). Hence we can try to formulate the perceptuality of a thing following the tenets of the Naiyāyikas in this way :

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A thing has perceptuality provided a perceptual cognition is related to it by way of *viṣayatā* which is said to be a relation which a knowledge bears to its object.

Further, according to the Advaitins, knowledge is eternal, meaning unborn and imperishable and self is of the nature of *jñāna*. But the Naiyāyikas differ fundamentally from them in this respect. In the Nyāya ontology *jñāna* is the property of self and not its essence and self is a substance. So *jñāna* has the status of a *guṇa* [17] and every *guṇa* of a self, in accordance with the definition of *guṇa*, rests in a substance which is none other than the self. Further, *jñāna* is a product arising out of a collocation of causal conditions. And like all products, it is an occurrent i. e., arises in time. According to the Vedānta view, *jñāna* is a modification of a substance called *buddhi* or *antaḥkaraṇa* which assumes the shape and the form of the object. Not so in the Nyāya, *jñāna* is without any parts and does not assume any form or shape (*ākāra*).

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NOTES

1. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* of Dharmarājā Dhvarīndra is an original and most elementary text. No clear conception about the Vedāntic conception of *pramā* can emerge without the text.
2. Of course, the Advaitins believe that perceptuality can be applied to the source (*pramāṇa*), cognition (*jñāna*) and object (*viṣaya*).

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3. The object-content of knowledge is designated as '*visaya*'. For terminological clarification, we can say the logico-epistemic character of being a *viṣaya* is designated as *viṣayatā*. Knowledge in relation to its object is called *viṣaya* and so its logico-epistemic character of being a *viṣaya* is called *viṣayatā*.

4. *Manaḥ indriyam pratyakṣa jñānakaraṇatvāt caksurādivat.*

5. *Ekadā sukhāditadākara vṛttyerabhyupagamāt pratyakṣa-lakṣanasya sukhādi pratyakṣa vṛttitvābhāvena vyāpteśca. Maṇiprabhā*, pp. 34.

6. The Philosophers admitted the fact that in case of two things produced simultaneously one cannot be the cause of the other. The two horns of a cow or of a buffalo etc., are examples towards this effect.

7. *Pratyakṣamarthajanyamarthānvyatirekānuvidhāyitvāt.*

8. Of course, we have to understand *arthajanyatva* as *artha-janyajñānatva*. This is exactly like the Buddhist's (Vasubandhu) theory of *artha saṁvitpratrakṣatva.*

9. *Svarūpāsiddha Hetu* would be a *hetu* which does not exist in the *pakṣa*. Now the absence of a *hetu* in the *pakṣa* means the absence of *pakṣa-dharmatā* and in the absence of a kuowledge of *pakṣadharmatā*, it is not possible to have *parāmarśa*. This type of faulty *hetu* serves to impede the emergence of a correct inferential cognition.

10. *Jñānākaraṇa janya jñānatvam sākṣāttvam : Sikhāmaṇi*, pp. 34.

11. Exception is found in case of *savikalpa pratyakṣa* which reuslts from its prior cognition of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa.*

12. *Sikhāmaṇi*, pp.34.

13. It is according to the Naiyāyikas but the Advaitins accepted mental modification as the instrument.

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14. *śikhāmaṇi*, p. 35.
15. *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, p. 35.
16. *Bṛ. Up.* 3.4.1.
17. *Guṇa* can be rendered into 'quality' only at the risk of a grave misunderstanding. In the Nyāya ontology, every *guṇa* of self, in accordance with the definition of a *guṇa* rests in a substance which is none other than the self.

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BOOK REVIEW

Thomas Pantham and Kenneth Deutch, (eds)
Political Thought in Modern India, New Delhi / London,
Sage Publications, 1986, Rs. 175–00.

Indian nationalism that asserted itself as reaction to colonialism was a highly complex phenomenon. This complexity found its manifestation in diverse movements and intellectual tendencies. Several thinkers and leaders of modern India attempted to isolate certain elements of it as primary and tried to establish a consensus around them as the basis of Indian nationalism. These attempts towards a consensus called for an active opposition to colonialism and reconstituting Indian nationalism on a new basis. But quite often what was conceived as opposition to colonialism turned out to be another attempt to shroud it in a new garb. It was like the proverbial demon whose head when chopped off another reappeared on the very same foundations. Further, what was nationalism to some appeared to others as an intricate tool to perpetuate age–old or contemporary forms of domination and subjugation. Post–independent India was to inherit this ideological legacy without resolving its conflicting and contradictory dimensions in one way or another decisively. The rhetoric of nation–building and development did not succeed in carpetting over such basic disagreements for long. In fact, they have reasserted themselves, again and again, with great force and fury, albeit, in different forms.

While there have been certain brilliant attempts to probe into certain dimensions of this complex array of thought, most of

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them have concentrated on elaborating certain facets of it or have confined themselves to individual thinkers or specific trends. On the other hand the majority of the general attempts to treat this subject matter as a whole, can be accused of methodological laxity, lack of rigour and focus. inability to situate ideological development in India in a global focus or simply, as wishing away the complexity of the ideological make of modern India. Political Thought of modern India, therefore, still remains, one of the sadly neglected area of study.

The book under review, edited by two noted political scientists, one Indian and the other American, is an attempt to cover the whole canvass of political thought in modern India by attempting to avoid the above pitfalls. While it brings together the major dimensions of this body of thought in twenty essays, contributed by Indian and foreign scholars, some of these essays, by focussing on mehtodological issues open up the possiblity for more creative works in this field in the future.

In the introduction Dr. Pantham refers to the very modest as well as to the very ambitious objectives of this work. It aims to offer 'a consistently high level treatment of its subject matter' with a view on the university curricula; it attempts to locate the interface of political thought with its socio-historical context; it wants to bring out the 'global dimensions' to which political thought in India is addressed and its capacity to provide alternatives to 'Westcentred paradigms'.

All the contributions in this book, however, cannot be said to be infused with these objectives. Some contributions are plainly meant as critical summaries of the activity and thought of certain prominent thinkers of modern India, which have clearly the the university students as their audience. A feew essays primarily deal with methodological issues with little attention paid to

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cover exhaustively the various dimensions of a thinker. In fact the latter assume significant acquaintence of the reader with such thought. Among the alternatives that are proposed, the one around the Gandhian paradigm has stood out for special consideration. Gandhi is seen as proposing not merely an alternative to industrial, liberal democracy but also the mainstream of marxist thought. He is not merely a dead hero eulogised but seen as representing mankind's future hope.

If we take together the book as a whole it makes clear certain distinct trends in which a critique of colonialism and the alternatives to it, in terms of specific conceptions of nationalism, were posed in India. A major trend saw the socio–political state of India as the primary reason for the success of colonialism in India and thereby saw the coloniser in an exalted position. According to this trend, the regimentation of Indian society in terms of castes and traditions, the consequent lack of freedom and mobility, the widespread prevalence of superstitions and the lack of scientific spirit, reason and rationality, *Karma* and fatalism of the dominant belief–systems, political division and rivalry in Indian society and the severance of the relation between the masses and the native regimes were seen as the basic reasons for the success of the British in India. On the other hand the coloniser was seen as not to have been affected by these defects or as to have extricated himself from such undesirables in the distant past. This trend, while it sought self–rule, thought it foolhardly to press for it immediately. The protagonists of this trend waited for certificates to be awarded by their colonial masters with respect to political maturity and often used colonial criteria to adjudge relations and institutions in India. While this trend was critical of the new forms of exploitation that colonialism engendered and denounced its infidelity to its own ideals, it welcomed whole–heartedly western education

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modern science, reason and ratiouality and the political innovations brought into being by the colonial power. It understood nationalism as self-rule plus all the positive features mentioned above. But as the state of political society is indissolubly bound with that of civil society this trend called for the transformation of the latter as a necessary condition for the former.

While the first trend pointed out at the social inadequacies of India for political self-rule, a second trend saw in India a distinctive cultural identity which was threatened by colonialism or was not allowed to express itself and come on its own. *Swarāj*, therefore, became the indispensable precondition for the cultural expression and effervescence. In this struggle between two distinctive cultures, one western and the other eastern, all the elements of Indian society were seen as allies opposed to that of colonialism. The question of reforms, if any, of Indian society should be a task of the post-colonial society. In the process of defining culure, this trend was not necessarily against western science, technology and industry but the latter were seen in the service of culture.

When nationalism was defined as the second trend did, it opened veritable floodgates. The problem was to define what was culturally characteristic of India that can rally the Indian masses together against colonialism. A majority stream identified this culture with the predominant Hindu tradition and proposed up symbols, myths and histories to depict it. However, powerful minority streams did not find such interpretation as inclusive of themselves and often saw themselves in opposition. Some saw in the attempt to define a cultural identity nothing but an attempt to superimpose the domination of a segment of Indian society on others. The dominant strands of Muslim, Dalit and Tribal thinking, thereby, parted ways with the majority stream. In the South the non-Brahmin and the Dravidian movement

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was to see in the defence of this cultural identity a powerful reassertion of Brahmin and Aryan supremacy. In pushing these currents, although they distorted social perception, were rooted in the Indian social context.

Given the problem of wielding a cultural identity encompassing the whole nation, the protagonists of this trend had to often resort to expressions and symbols which were vague, vacuous or simply religious. Thereby they failed to reflect in anyway the real relations in which people lived and reproduced their social existence. In fact, the cultural identity that this trend asserted was a contemporary creation fused by drawing certain elements from a complex historical tradition.

The communists attempted to bypass this entire debate by attempting to pose questions around the economic relations in India, the world-wide development of capitalism and its supersession and the class character of nationalist leadership While they attempted to pose the question of Indian nationalism from the perspective of workers, peasantry and the broad masses they failed to establish the necessary interconnections between agrarian revolution and nationalist struggle on the one hand and culture, social reforms and social classes on the other. Methodologically they often transferred readymade schemas to perceive social reality and evolve a strategy for India.

Gandhi's great merit consists in the fact that in this fragmented and often counterposed notions of nationalism he attempted to negotiate a unified notion of nationalism by showing elements from mass culture and folk traditions and in the process radically altering the hitherto dominant notions of nationalism. Upholding a non-violent, democratic and humanist perspective Gandhi became not merely a trenchent critic

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of colonialism, dominant west-centred paradigms but also of those terms in which nationalist debates in India were carried out. Several essays in this book argue that drawing from authentic Indian traditlon, but not exclusively, Gandhi posed an alternative which was not merely nationalistic but civilizational. A defence of the Gandhian paradigm remains the central thurst of a couple of major essay of this book.

Coming to the individual contributions. While certain essays concentrate on the critical appraisal of the whole or part of the thought of a mainstream thinker, others deal with certain ideological strands in modern India. The first essay by Bhikhu Parekh on 'Some reflection on the Hindu Tradition of Political Thought' is supposed to be a connecting link between modern political thought with earlier thought. Thomas Pantham claims in the introduction that there is an essential continuity between the ancient and modern thought in India (p. 16). This essay is probably meant to justify it. Bhikhu Parekh's analysis however, if far from substantiating this claim. On the contrary, the latter finds the Hindu Tradition basically 'inegalitarian', 'pluralist in orientation', 'uncritical and apologetic of the established order, which justified the caste system and other inegalitarian features, He finds that it did not take into account 'social conflict', remained 'didactic and practical and not theoretical'. He concludes : "it would not be inaccurate to say that the Hindus did not develop a tradition of political philosophy' (p 30). Pantham is far from locating the 'essential continuity' in what Parekh identifies as the basic characteristics of Hindu political tradition and what the subsequent essays argue for modern Indian political thought. But Parekh can be easily accused of adopting a narrow delimitation of the 'political' and for his reliance on commentaries whose methodology is faulty and the material they draw from is highly selective.

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In fact, there are other essays which make more serious attempts to establish a continuity between the early and modern thought. Noteworthy among them is Indira Rothermund's 'Gandhi's Satyāgraha and Hindu Thought' and to some extent Ashis Nandy's 'Oppression and Human Libreration : Towards a post-Gandhian Utopia'. The problem with Rothermund, however, is the way she attempts to link up Gandhi's conceptual framework with the early Hindu Tradition. Probing into categories like *Rta, Sat, Dharma* etc she finds that they formed the basic core of Gandhi's philosophical and moral universe and these categories in their 'essential meaning' were available to Gandhi through the living folk tradition of Hinduism. Due to this, Gandhi 'intuitively grasped the existential content of the *Vdase* as well as later achievements of Hindu Thought' (p.298). But a question can be asked : should Gandhi be approached reductively or as a thinker and leader who framed concepts and categories to meet the contemporaneous moral and political demands by drawing in elements from popular Hinduism but not exclusively from it ? Further, was there a comphrehensive and continuous religions folk tradition in India or a highly fragmented, diverse, discontinuous tradition ?

The essay by Thomas Pantham on ' The socio-religious and political thought of Rammohan Roy ' attempts to project Roy as avoiding the twin pitfalls of being an Anglophile on the one hand and the defender of Hindu Orthodoxy on the other. While he admits that Roy was not sufficiently sensitive to the contradiction between nationalism and colonalism he sees in him the merit of entertaining a vision, however faint it was, of a post-imperialist order and making an important contribution 'to the formation of a transnational culture' on a 'humanistic basis'. Apparently, Pantham takes this synthesis at the face value. Could a serious synthesis of cultures be contemplated at all

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without placing primacy on decolonisation which the author admits Roy did not do ?

The essay by B. R. Purohit on ' The social and political ideas of Swami Dayanand Saraswati ' brings out clearly the basis of Indian nationalism that Swami Dayananda Saraswati attempted to lay down through a reformed Hinduism. Such an attempt introduced racial overtones – ' the superiority of Aryans – and emergence of Hindu revivalism and an exclusive conception of nationalism '. While Purohit admits it, at the same time he argues that ' Dayanand raised a banner of revolt and protest against the divisive forces and cumbersome customs of Hindu Society ' (p. 65). But can we not say that the way Dayanand attempted to forge a basis for Hinduism and thereby for Indian nationalism he came to exclude all those traditions which departed from his ' pure Hinduism ' leading to greater disunity. Exclusivism at one end bred exclusivism at the other. Can we exonerate Dayanand fully from the responsibility for the emergence of sikh fundamentalism later and the doctrinaire stand of muslim and non–brahmin movements earlier in India.

The contributions of Prabha Dixit on 'The Ideology of Hindu Nationalism' and Moin Shakir on 'Dynamics of Muslim Political Thought' throw some light on these queries. According to Prabha Dixit, the ideology of Hindu nationalism was constituted by the middle class at the end of the nineteenth century as a political tool in defence of its material interests. As these interests differed from time to time and from place to place depending upon the preception of the enemy, different elements of this ideology were emphasised at different times even at the risk of proposing ' diametrically oppsed solutions '. Hindu nationalism was attempted to be countered by a section of muslims by proposing an ideology of Muslim nationalism. Colonialism found such a development handy to pit one section of the population againts

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the other. It is able to thrive even today on account of the confidence of numbers and the phobia it can generate about the minorities. Moin Shakir shows clearly the vast diversity and divergences of political thought among muslims prior to indepen-dece. There is nothing like a mainstream of muslims thought. Different strata of Muslims, depending upon their interests, responded to colonialism and nationalism differently although the forms of these responses may often be shrouded in ideolo-gies which may be misconstrued. The upper classes claimed Islam to serve their interests while the lower classes in the absence of an alternative explanation, explained their current misery as due to the departuture from Islam and thereby sought a purified Islam. But the form of these responses itself was to prove advan-tageous at a particular point of time to those who argued for Muslim nationalism. Both the upper classes and lower classes used a language and an idiom of politics which became more and more Islamised (p. 152) although they understood different things by it. Both the above essays show how the ideologies of religious revival in India were highly fragmentory weaving different ideological elements within an overarching semblance of unity. A critique of Hindu and Muslim nationalism remains, therefore, a critique of the mainstream nationalism in India demonstrating the inability of the latter to negotiate itself among the masses with sufficient appeal whereby the former remained isolated.

Rajendra Vora and N. R. Inamdar throw light on the differ-ing stands that Ranade, Phule and Tilak adopted with regard to nationalism. Their perception of Indian society and British colonialism was sufficiently distinct as to introduce differing strands of nationalism in India. Vora's treatment of Mahatma Phule, however, is too brief compared to that of Ranade. It was Phule who pioneered a stream of radicalism both in ideology and socio-political practice which while did not merge in the

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communist movement, still represented a broad spectrum of mass politics in India. Kenneth Deutch in 'Sri Aurobindo and the search for political and spiritual freedom' shows how for Aurobindo *Swarāj* was both a condition and the goal for achieving full spiritual perfection and the fulfilment of the ancient life of India under modern conditions. Deutch finds parallel between Aurobindo and the French mystic and paleontologist, Teilhard de Chardin. Both of them draw attention to the phenomenon of man as the highest and qualitatively different stage of evolutionary progress placing man on the threshold of the spiritual. For Aurobindo, *Swarāj* must concretely aim at this objective. Deutch, however, rightly points out that 'Aurobindo's yogic surrender shows the proclivity to underplay specific socio–political obligations in the the face of specific human needs and specific historical circumstances' (p. 207).

Eleanor Zelliot, Radharaman Chakrabarti and R. C. Pillai discuss the basic positions of B. R. Ambedkar, Tagore and Nehru respectively and point out at their specific emphases. While Ambedkar struggled against mainstream Indian nationalism from becoming the expression of upper castes and upper classes of Indian society, Tagore tried to steer Indian nationalism from being exclusive and inward looking and closed to the reception of other cultures. For Nehru nationalism basically connoted a secular, rational and scientific spirit with an international outlook.

Manoranjan Mohanty goes into the dynamics of communist ideology and movement in India as it interacted with its own ideological presuppositions, the environment in which it functioned and the international developments. He finds that the communists in India failed to combine the agrarian revolution with anti–colonial struggle. In post–independence India they

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have not been able to develop an effective response to the Indian state and appreciate the import of the national question. The communist movement has witnessed split after split and every split has justified itself by establishing ideological defences.

Dennis Dalton finds a consistent ideological tradition in Modern India running through Vivekanand, Aurobindo, Tagore, Gandhi, Vinoba, and Jayaprakash Narayan which sees the state basically as an evil. For this tradition politics and power are everywhere suspect and takes centralization and bureacratization to task. The alternative this tradition seeks is in mass participation and a sound body of individual ethics. Ronald J. Terchek locates Gandhi in the theoretical tradition of democracy and shows how Gandhi not merely called for full and free participation in public affairs and the removal of all dependancy relations but also tried to establish the necessary human and social foundation for the same.

In his seminal essay on 'Culture and power in the thought of Bankimchandra' Partha Chatterjee goes into the investigation of two crucial elements of Bankim's thought : power and culture. For Bankim the lack of power in India is not a physical shortage but due to cultural one. His project is to initiate 'progress' by transforming the backward culture of his nation. But while attempting to initiate such a project Bankim was increasingly confronted with the possibility of throwing out the baby along with the water in the bath-tub. In the process of inculcating values conducive to power one might lose the very culture itself. The author feels that although Bankim did not confront this possibility comprehensively he increasingly sought a solution in Hinduism in which he saw dimensions superior to Christianity or western culture. Due to this tension between power and culture, the 'modern' and the 'National' remained

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distinct and opposed in Bankinm. The author's principal investigation is the logic of Bankim's thought. In this logic Bankim is not able to extricate himself from a mode of reasoning whose essential categories are positivistic and culture-bound in a colonial sense. The key to the contradiction in Bankim's thought, therefore, lies in his methodological and conceptual presuppositions.

Sudipta Kaviraj's essay on 'The Heteronomous Radicalism of M. N. Roy', like that of Partha Chatterjee, is an attempt to probe into the methodological and conceptual weaknesses of M. N, Roy's thought. These weaknesses led M. N. Roy to perceive the development of capitalism, nationalism and social revolution in India in the model of countries of late capitalism such as Russia and Eastern Europe. The distinctions that Lenin made between the various stages and phases of the development of capitalism and the specific class relations they gave rise to simply escaped Roy. This was because Roy's framework of reasoning and historical vision was stamped with a 'subtle Eurocentricity' that too of a particular type of eighteenth century rationalism (p. 234). Marxism in the hands of M. N. Roy remained a completed system to be applied rather than a method to investigate. M. N. Roy's radicalism, therefore, remained one more variant of the colonial mode of thinking. This is a remarkable essay suggesting a number of new directions of enquiry including the methodological bases of Indian Communist movement.

While the above two contributions demonstrate the limitations and failures of certain alternatives as they were woven in their very fabric with a heteronomous mode of thinking, Ashis Nandy in 'Oppression and Human Liberation : Towards a post-Gandhian utopia' and Thomas Pantham in 'Beyond Liberal Democracy : Thinking with Mahatma Gandhi' discuss the

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strengths of the alternative that Gandhi proposed to Indian nationalism, Ashis Nandy argues that the oppressor and the oppressed cannot be perceived in simple dichotomous terms as the Cartesian rationality proposes. Such conceptualisation leads to the belief that if the oppressor is vanquished then oppression necessarily results in liberation. Oppression not merely dehumanises the oppressed but also the oppressor. Often the oppressed conceive their liberation as simply exchanging places with the oppressor. Gandhi recognised it well. Therefore, the alternative that he proposed was not in the terms of the oppressor but the transformation of an entire situation of oppression wherein not merely the oppressed transform themselves but in the process transform the oppressor too by posing new terms for social and human existence. The way Gandhi proposed the terms of his alternative recaptured an essential dimension of Indian civilizations because unlike the west 'Many of the Eastern civilizations' have not drawn a clear line between the victor and the defeated, the oppressor and the oppressed and the rulers and the ruled' (p. 352). Ashis Nandy's call is very clear: If there can be an authentic civilizational response from India and the Third World against oppression and towards human liberation the point of departure can only be the premises that Gandhi proposed.

Like Ashis Nandy, Thomas Pantham explores the Gandhian alternative from another direction. Pantham argues that the Gandhian project was aimed at resolving fundamental contradiction in the theory and practice of liberal democracy i. e., the contradiction between the affirmation of the freedom of the individual in the so called private sphere and its curtailment in the public political sphere (p.326). Further, Gandhi was far from a romantic or idealistic visionary. He realistically grasped the contradictions of capitalism and the exploitation it engendered. The result of these contradictions is that the public/politi-

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cal sphere continuously suffers a legitimation crisis. While Habermas outlines the causes and consequences of this crisis in terms of advanced capitalism Gandhi was to perceive it in his analysis of liberal or socialist democracy as alternatives to colonialism. The alternative that Gandhi proposes is in terms of his concept of *Swarāj*. While it undermines the need for a centralised, coercive state, it accords with individual freedom and full, participatory democracy. Social relations in the realm of *Swarāj* are not going to be regulated by force but on the basis of the 'reign' of self-imposed law of moral restraint. Only on such a foundation can an uncoerced, consensual and communitarian organisation of society be founded.

As already said in the beginning, this book is a major attempt to come to terms with the various stands of political thought in modern India with their strengths and shortcomings and the alternatives that they propose not merely to Indian Nationalism but to certain global issues that political theory has addressed itself to. It proposes new dimensions of enquiry in the search for an authentic political identity which takes freedom and justice seriously without being parochial and sectarian.

However, while there is a strong emphasis on the Gandhian perspective, its strengths and weaknesses with respect to the other nationalist traditions, especially the Nehruian one, is scarcely explored. In fact the Nehruian alternative is not seriously probed at all considering its importance in independent India. It was around this alternative that major strands of nationalist thought were pitted in post–independence India. Further there is little in the book about those traditions which reflect regional and subnational issues, in terms of national–cultural dimensions. The ideologies of the non–Brahmin movement and the tribal movement are not explored at all. The strength of the alternatives that Mahatma Phule and Ambedkar

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proposed remains unasculated in this book. There is no single political thinker from the south that finds a mention. These limitations, however, do not lessen the importance of the book as bringing to the fore the complex and creative dimensions of political thought in India and in the process raising plenty of questions.

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BENTHAM'S PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

This essay is an interpretive study of a fragment of Bentham's thought. It is concerned with one of his fundamental doctrines, the principle of utility. Its aim is to repudiate two recent interpretations of this principle advanced by Anthony Quinton and David Lyons respectively and to vindicate an interpretation of it I propose. I have tried to show not only that the textual evidence offered by these scholars fails to support their interpretations but also that there is evidence which goes against their claims. I have also tried to reinterpret Bentham's principle of utility by locating and removing the shortcomings of the two interpretations.

I

The first interpretation I take up for criticism is advanced by Anthony Quinton [1]. He attributes the following principle to Bentham : "the rightness of an action is determined by its contribution to the happiness of everyone affected by it." [2] According to him this formula is a 'fair account' of what Bentham held to be his fundamental doctrine.[3] Clarifying the principle attributed to Bentham, Quinton says, "Bentham in effect asserts .. ... ūtilitarianism which states that men ought to aim at the general happiness, ..." [4] Interpreted in this way Bentham's principle of utility is 'universalistic', requiring that the happiness of all persons affected by it be taken into account on an equal basis, when an action is evaluated. In this view the principle tells us who the persons are whose interest has to be taken into account for the evaluation of an action, they are all the persons affected by it.

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Let us look at the passages on which Quinton relies for his interpretation, to find out how far these passages support Quinton's views. The passage quoted says, "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question."[5] The first point to be noted about this passage is that Bentham is not evaluating the action in terms of the happiness of the persons who are affected by it, rather he talks in terms of 'the happiness of the party whose interest is in question'. Whose interest is in question? To look for an answer of this question Quintom relies on the following two passages. I reproduce the passages as quoted by Quinton. "An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility.... when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it."[6,7] "The interest of the community then is what? – the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it."[8] These two passages quoted by Quinton give an impression that the party whose interest is in question is always the same and it is 'the community' and since 'the interest of the community' is nothing but the interest of all the persons of the community, Quinton arrives at his interpretation. But Quinton succeeds in arriving at his interpretation by quoting these two passages out of context and by ommitting a vital phrase glven in the parentheses in the first of the above two passages. The phrase in parentheses is 'meaning with respect to the community at large'. The passage without ommission is as follows, "An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it."[9] The context makes it clear that in this passage Bentham is talking only about those actions where the

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interest of the community is in question. He is not talking of *all* actions here. So the interest of the community is the end of all actions is not a correct reading of the passage. Bentham is rather explicit about the point that 'the party whose interest is in question' is not always 'the community'. He writes, "By utility is meant that property in any object whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness... or ... to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered : if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community, if a particular individual then the happiness of that individual." [10]

Bentham is not committed to the view that the happiness of the community should be the end of all actions as attributed to him by Quinton. For Bentham 'the party whose interest is in question' may be anything from a single individual to the whole community. But once the question of 'whose interest is in question' is settled then Bentnam's principle says what one should do or ought to do. Again nowhere Bentham says explicitly or implicitly that the party whose interest is in question' is the same as 'the persons whose interest is affected by the action contemplated', i. e., there is no evidence in Bentham's writing to show that an action is to be evaluated in terms of the happiness of persons who are affected by it. One more passage may be quoted in favour of Quinton's interpretation although he does not quote it. According to this passage the principle of utility may be taken as "that principle which states that the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper and only right and proper and universally desirable end of human action : of human action in every situation".[11] But even on this passage Quinton's interpretation is indefensible. The principle does not tell us who 'all those whose interest is in question' are. The emphasis of the principle is on the produ-

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ction of the 'greatest happiness' of whomsoever it may be under the circumstances.

Lastly, it may be noted that Bentham takes 'extent' as one of the dimensions of happiness to be taken into account in determination of the amount of happiness. If Quinton's interpretation of Bentham's principle of utility is accepted then mention of the 'extent' as dimension of happiness is redundant. Since according to Quinton's understanding the principle of utility itself urges us to produce greatest happiness of the largest number of persons affected by our actions.

II

David Lyons has given an interesting interpretation of Bentham's principle of utility.[12] He tries to show "that Bentham has a *dual* standard, with community interest the criterion of right and wrong in public or political affairs and personal interest the proper standard for 'private ethics'".[13] He further argues that Bentham has a still more basic principle, "which could be glossed as the idea that government should serve the interests of those who are governed."[14]

Lyons rests his interpretation of Bentham's principle of utility on Bentham's explicit and determinate account 'of his principle and the definition and bipartition of ethics'[15]. While discussing Quinton's interpretation we have seen that the principle of utility is stated by Bentham in terms of 'the party whose interest is in question' and he admits the possibility that 'the party' may be 'a particular individual' or 'the community'. There he does not tell us for which action or what type of action happiness of a particular individual is the proper end and for which action the happiness of the community is the right end. The explicit and determinate account of the principle by itself cannot support Lyons's interpretation. Now let us see if the definition

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and the bipartition of ethics as given by Bentham support Lyons's interpretation of Bentham's utilitarianism. According to Bentham " Ethics at large may be defined, the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view." [16] It should be noted that ethics is defined in terms of 'directing men's actions', towards a certain end 'the greatest happiness' for persons 'whose interest is in view'. The definition does not specify who those persons are 'whose interest is in view'. Lyons looks for an answer to the question : who are those persons 'whose interest is in view' in Bentham's partition of ethics. [17] The partition of ethics is presented as follows, " what then are the actions which it can be in a man's power to direct ? They must be either his own actions or those of other agents. Ethics, as far as it is the art of directing a man's own actions, may be styled as the *art of self government,* or private ethics.... As to other human beings the art of directing their actions to the above end (this means, apparently, towards their own happiness) is what we mean, or at least the only thing which, upon the principle of utility, we *ought* to mean, by the art of government ". [18] Thus Bentham divides ethics into 'the art of self–government', or 'private ethics' on the one hand and 'the art of government' on the other. We can see from this passage that the sphere of private and public ethics is in terms of the persons whose actions are directed and not in terms of whose interest is in question. For, the purpose of the art of directing one's own actions is not mentioned, whether for the production of happiness of others or for the production of happiness of oneself. For whose happiness one's own action is directed, is not settled. Those persons may be themselves or others. In these passages, it should be noted that he has not categorically said that the art of government is the art of directing others actions towards their own happiness. Rather he

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says, *apparently,* towards their own happiness. So Lyons' conclusion from his passage " we are virtually told that the art of government is the art of 'directing' person towards their own happiness "[19] is quite misleading. And the inference, " under the art of self government, however, only the interests of the single, *self* – directing agent who is concerned are to be promoted, by himself "[20] is quite illegitimate and indefensible.

One may wonder, why should Bentham say for public ethics that it is the art of direction of the action of others apparently for their own happiness i. e. The happiness of the community, while, in these passages it is not mentioned for whose happiness self direction, in private ethics, is ? The reason is that Bentham assumes independently of utilitarianism that the only proper concern of government is the interest of the community. This is argued for independently but it is assumed or taken for granted, here. So naturally the public ethics is the art of directing others' actions which is the art of government, for the production of their happiness. This point will be taken up again later in this essay.

So far Lyons' evidence fails to support his claim that " Bentham accordingly embraces two distinct standards, one for each branch of ethics. In political affairs the happiness of all members of the community should be served while in private matters one should serve his own best interest. "[21] It appears extravagant 'on his part to claim " That Bentham embraces a dual standard–at least in the *Introduction* – is made clear not just in the prominent passages which we have already examined but also by his summary at the end of that first section of chapter XVII, where the definition and division of ethics have been given. "[22] I have already shown what support the so–called 'prominent' passages give to Lyons claim. Now let me examine the summary referred to by Lyons. The relevant sentence of the summary says, " Private ethics teaches how each man may

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dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness by means of such motives as offer of themselves : the art of legislation which may be considered as one branch of the science of jurisprudence teaches how a multitude of men, composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which upon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness of the whole community "[23]. In this passage the use of the word 'may' while describing private and public ethics must be noted. The use of the word 'may' brings out that private ethics as defined is not necessarily concerned with person's own happiness. Similarly public ethics as defined does not entail that government action *ought* to produce the happiness of the community. Public ethics as defined leaves it an open question whose interest ought to be the concern of government action. But it is argued independently of the definition of public ethics that government ought to be concerned with the happiness of the community as it will be shown later in this essay. Lyons is aware of the failure of his evidence to establish his claim. For he writes " Evidence like this is not, of course, absolutely conclusive, but it weighs quite strongly in favour of the account proposed, and it cannot be ignored "[24].

So far I was concerned with Lyons' strong evidence for his dual standard interpretation of Bentham's principle of utility. Now let us see how he accounts for the passages which do not fit his interpretation.

Consider the passage " There is no case in which a private man ought not to direct his own conduct to the production of his own happiness, and of that of his fellow creatures : ..... Every act which promises to be beneficial on the whole to the community (himself, included) each individual ought to perform of himself... Every act which promises to be pernicious upon the whole to the community (himself included) each individual

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ought to abstain from of himself .." [25] How does Lyons account for this passage which goes against his dual standard interpretation? By attributing the assumption of natural harmony of interest to Bentham. What is the argument for attributing this assumption to Bentham? "Otherwise this passage would be incoherent." [26] Surely the passage will be incoherent if his interpretation is accepted but we have been offered no conclusive evidence so far to accept his interpretation. Lyons' has failed to notice that his argument is now moving in a circle.

Let us consider some further controversial evidence on dual standard interpretation. Bentham writes, "An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility, or, for sportness sake, to utility (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it." [27] According to the dual standard interpretation the acts in question refer to the conduct within the scope of public ethics, which are nothing but 'government actions'. But in the very next paragraph Bentham says: "A measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it." [25] Bentham says the same thing, once about 'actions' then about 'measures of government'. On Lyons' interpretation 'actions' of the earlier paragraph are 'government action'. Hence we have Bentham repeating himself. Lyons saves Bentham from the charge of redundancy by making a distinction between political act in general (the subject of former paragraph) and measure of government (the subject of later paiagraph). [29] But no textual evidence is given to attribute this distinction. Rather he is "prepared to grant that this reading of paragraph 6 appears forced." [30]

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What I have been arguing so far is that David Lyons fails to make a case for the dual standard interpretation of Bentham's principle of utility. Lyons is aware of this. He writes "after all these factors have been listed one should still remain dissatisfied. For the dual standard seems an intuitively implausible position."[31] He is even aware that there cannot be any evidence in Bentham's writing for his interpretation for as he himself says. "The new interpretation of Bentham's utilitarianism was originally meant to be refuted."[32] I fail to see what made him change his opinion about this interpretation and made him believe it as a correct account of Bentham's utilitarianism.

Let me close my criticism of Lyons' interpretation by pointing out certain difficulties in the principle that government should serve the interest of those who are governed. Firstly, the persons whose actions the government directs need not always be identical with the interest government considers. For, government is concerned with the interest of the community, but the persons whose action is directed may be foreigners residing in the country. For Lyons this type of cases is a "special case. a detail that Bentham might well have overlooked"[33]. Well, this is too easy a way out of a difficulty to be taken seriously. Another difficulty is that people direct the actions of their servants. Lyons will have Bentham say that the people should direct the actions of their servants for the happiness of servants themselves and not for their own happiness. Could this be an oversight on the part of Bentham? He could not possibly have been oblivious of this type of cases had he accepted the principle attributed to him. Lyons himself points out another problematic case. There are 'punitary' laws which tell judges how to deal with convicted offenders. Should we accept, on Lyons' interpretation, that such laws should serve the interests of the judges? How can Lyons save his interpretation? By attributing the

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fiction, "Even when the government *actively* directs only some persons by addressing laws in effect to them, it is exercising its control over the entire community...."[34] So much for Lyons interpretation of Bentham's principle of utility.

III

From my argument it must have become clear by now where the mistake lies in Quinton's and Lyons' interpretation of Bentham's principle of utility. Both the interpretations err in trying to build up a formula for the determination of the persons whose intesest is to be considered in Bentham's principle of utility. That is to say, both the interpretations go wrong in their attempt to specify who the persons whose interest is in question are. Quinton says, the persons 'whose interest is in question are all persons affected' by the action. Lyons says the party 'whose interest is in question is the individual himself' or 'the community' depending on whether the action directed is his own or that of others. Both of them are wrong. They go wrong not because they give an incorrect determination of the party whose interest is in question but because they give any determination of the party whose interest is in question. "The principle of utility" of Bentham is "that *principle* which states that the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable end of human action : of human action in every situation, and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionary exercising the powers of Government".[35] The principle does not say anything more or anything less. The specification of 'who all those whose interest is in question are' is not to be looked for in the principle of utility itself. It will depend upon the context and is to be determined prior to the application of the principle of utility for the evaluation of any action. For every time Bentham explicitly states the principle of

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utility he uses phrases like 'happiness of all those whose interest is in question' the 'happiness of the party whose interest is in question' etc. The places where the 'party whose interest is in question' is determinate like 'the community' it is determined by the context and does not follow from the principle itself For example in para 6 of chapter I of the IPML while talking of the action 'conformable to the principle of utility' he talks in terms of the happiness of 'the community'. Here the specification of the party takes place not because it follows from the principle of utility but because it is determined by the context. For in the previous paragraphs he is concerned with explaining the meaning of the 'happiness of the community' and he is specifically talking in respect of community in the 6th para is made clear by the phrase in the parentheses, If we agree that the principle of utility as stated by Bentham specifies the party whose interest is in question, say, 'all who are affected by it' then in the list of principles adverse to that of utility we should expect to find with the principle of asceticism (the principle which advocates an end, i.e. pain contrary to the end specified by she principle of utility, i. e. happiness) and the principle of caprice (the principle which fails to specify any end contrary to the principle of utility, which specifies an end i. e., happiness) another type of principle which asks to pursue happiness of the party other than the one specified in the principle of utility. But Bentham recognizes no such category of principle. Not only that, the principle of asceticism is, also, stated in terms of 'the party whose interest is in question'.[36] Now, when an author repeatedly uses such phrases like 'the party whose interest in question' in his fundamental principle, I think he intends the phrase to be taken seriously and literally. Let us not forget that Bentham was a lawyer and he knows the principle must be stated in unambiguous terms, still he uses the phrase 'the party whose interest is in question' without specifying

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explicitey who the party whose interest is in question is, then it is wrong to force a determination of the party in his principle.

I had mentioned earlier that in Bentham's writing it is argued independently of the principle of utility and the definition of public ethics that the proper end of government action is the happiness of the community. The argument opens with the statement " the right and proper end of government in every political community is the greatest happiness of all the individuals of which it is composed." [37] One may think that it is a statement of the principle of utility in special condition because of the occurrence of the phrase the ' greatest happiness '. But here the point made is not that happiness be greatest but whose happiness it is. Then why talk in terms of greatest happiness ? Because, as Lyon recognizes, Bentham is a committed utilitarian. He never adopts a ' morally neutral attitude '. That Bentham is writing from a utilitarian point of view to find out whose interest Government ought to consider becomes clear from the following passage, when it is contrasted with the previous one, " The *actual* end of government is, in every community, the greatest happiness of those, whether one or many, by whom the powers of government are exercised." [38] Bentham disapproves of this not because the act of actual government fails to conform to utility, for it produces the greatest happiness of the party under consideration (it certainly does not fail under the principle adverse to that of utility of any category), that party actually being those, by whom the powers of government are exercised, but because it is not the proper party whose interest should be considered by Government. Why? Bentham says " In saying, as above, the proper end of a government is the greatest happiness of all, or in case of competition the greatest happiness of the greatest number, it seems to me that I have made a declaration of peace and good will to all men."

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"On the other hand, were I say, the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of someone, naming him, or of some few, naming them, it seems to me that I should be making a declaration of war 'against all men, with exception of that one, or those few." [39]

The commitment to utilitarianism is prominent for the phrases 'greatest happiness' occurs again and again, but that is not required by the argument. What the argument shows is why the happiness of all is to be considered in government action and not the happiness of few only. Another argument is also given to make this point "the end of conduct which a sovereign ought to observe relative to his own subjects, the end of the internal laws of a society ought to be the greatest happiness of the society concerned. This is the end which individuals will unite in approving if they approve of any".[40] Thcse passages show that Bentham has independent arguments to show that 'the party whose interest is in question' in the context of government action is the 'community' and these arguments are not based on the principle of utility or the definition of public ethics. Therefore, the happiness of the community is the proper end of action under the direction of ethics cannot be read into the principle of utility as advanced by Bentham.

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NOTES

1. 'Utilitarian Ethics' in *New Studies in Ethics*, Vol. 2. Ed. W. D. Hudson (Macmillan, London, 1974), pp. 1–115.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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5. Bentham, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, I. P. M. L.. Ch. I, para 2.
6. *New Studies in Ethics*, Vol. 2, pp. 3-4.
7. *I. P. M. L.*. Ch. I, para 6.
8. *Ibid.*, Ch. I, para 4.
9. *Ibid.*, Ch. I. para 6.
10. *Ibid.*, Ch· I, para 3.
11. *Ibid.*, Ch. I, para 1, note 1.
12. *In the Interest of the Governed : A Study in Bentham's Philosophy of Utility and Law*, Clarendon Press : Oxford, 1973.
13. *Ibid.*, Preface, p. vii; see also pp. 20 and 32.
14. *Ibid.*, Preface, p. vii; see also pp. 220 and 32.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
16. *I. P. M. L.*, Ch. XVII. para 2.
17. *In the Interst of the Governed.*, p. 30.
18. *I. P. M. L.*, Ch. XVII, para 3-4.
19. *In the Interest of the Governed.*, p. 31.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
23. *I. P. M. L.*, Ch. XVII, para, 20.
24. *In the Interest of the Governed.*, p. 33.
25. *I. P. M. L.*, Ch. XVII, para 8.
26. *In the Interest of the Governed.*, p. 54.
27. *I. P. M. L.*, Ch. I, para 6.
28. *Ibid.*, Ch. I, para 7.
29. *In the Interest of the Governed.*, p. 77.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
32. *Ibid.*, Preface, p. viii.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
35. *I. P. M. L.*, Ch. I, para 1, note 1.
36. *Ibid.*, Ch. II, para 3.
37. *The Works of Jeremy Bentham* sub. John Bowring (Edinburgh : wm. Tait, 1838-43), Vol. IX. p. 5.
Reprinted, New York : Russell and Russell, 1962.
38. *Ibid.*, Vol. IX, p. 5.
39. *Ibid.*, Vol. IX. p. 5.
40. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 537.

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LOCKE'S THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION

Locke's theory of signification has in itself some lack of clarity, and consequently some critics make mistake in their interpretations. One such wrong interpretation is that Locke's theory of signification has only one thesis. An attempt will be made in this paper to give an analysis of the facts which underlie Locke's theory of signification, and to suggest that if this analysis is correct then there must to be two theses in Locke's theory. At the same time a few mistaken characterisations of Locke's theory will be pointed out.

Lock starts his discussion of signification with his views about the origin of words. Locke thinks : " God, having designed man for a sociable creature, ... furnished him also with language, waich was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words ".[1] On the other hand, man " should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others ..".[2] This gives an account of the nature of the necessity of words and a glimpse of the basic nature of them. In this connection it may be interesting to see more about the origin of them. Locke's view about this is that :

> ...it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others, For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or

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> quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how *words,* which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea.[3]

Thus, according to Locke, particular words are derived by the *voluntary imposition* of sound for the ideas of mind. This account of the origin of words also gives us a certain view of the *relation between words and ideas.* This relation, as evident from the above quoted passage, is *voluntarily imposed arbitrary relation;* and this is quite true about the origin of particular words and particular languages; and this is clear from Locke's use of the word " particular " in discussing the connection of articulate sound and certain ideas. And thus as the mark of the idea of *book,* we use " book " in English and " das Buch " in German and " livre " in French; and accordingly there are different languages. This is why Locke thinks that there is no " one language amongst all men ". However, there is a common ground of the origin of *words and languages as such* and a common relationship between *words and ideas as such.* This common relationship is, however, non-voluntary, non-arbitrary and natural. This natural relationship will be true for any word in any language. This natural relationship for Locke is that of " *stand for* " or " *signification* "; and words are the " sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they *stand for* are their proper and immediate *signification.* "[4] This relationship can be explained as that of the semantic connection between the linguistic units like words, and ideas in mind. Locke uses different words and

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phrases to express this relation, and as clear from the above, they are " marks of ", " stand for ", " signs of ", " signification " and so on. Accordingly Locke defines his theory of signification as : " words, in their primary and immediate signification, for nothing but *the ideas in the mind of him that uses them* ".[5]

In this way the next important question that may be raised regarding Locke's semantic theory is : *do these different semantic connectives express the same relationship between words and ideas ?* Locke's position is not very clear on this question, and this has been the cause of confusion and mistaken interpretation of his position. Locke does not clearly say anything about the number of such relationship between words and ideas. And Norman Kretzmann thinks that all these semantic connectives express the one and same relation, and he makes a generalization among them. About the different statements and the different connectives, Kretzmann says :

> [there are] various similar statements in the *Essay* – statements in which Locke, without intending to draw any semantic distinctions, can be found saying, for example, that words are signs of, or are marks of, or are names of, or signify, or mark, or correspond to, or are annexed to ideas. The uncovering of a single, explanatory, Lockean sense for Locke's many semantic connectives is, I think, one of the results of the present investigation; but in conducting it I am going to shut out this terminological noise by adopting the neutral verb ' signify '.[6]

This generalization of Locke's uses of different semantic connectives between words and ideas is wrong. As a means to the clear understanding of Locke's position, we may see how this is wrong and how another mistaken view follows from this.

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Since Kretzmann substitutes ' signify ' for all similar semantic connectives under consideration, he would say that the theses that " words stand for ideas " and " words signify ideas " are same. And as an extension of the generalization of these semantic connectives, Kretzmann arrives at the view that there is only one main thesis in Locke's view. Kretzmann says : "I propose to take the following close paraphrase as a standard version of the main thesis of Locke's semantic theory. *Words in their primary or immediate signification signify nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses* them ".[7]

This generalization of Kretzmann's may be shown to be wrong by pointing out the two-fold uses of words, and by showing that the signification of words vary accordingly. Locke is not very clear on this point and failed to differentiate between the two-fold uses of words.

From the above quotations (2) and (3), it is clear that words are used to express what one has in mind as " invisible ideas ", so that " they might be made known to others. " Thus, the consequence of the use of words is the expression of one's invisible ideas; and secondly the consequence is that they become known or may become known to others. This second consequence sometimes may not take place, for someone may talk to himself when he is alone, or someone's writings may remain undisclosed for ever. And sometimes this second consequence may take place long after the use of the words, as in the case of written or recorded words. Thus, there may be : *(i) the use of words* and *(ii) the use of the used words.* Words may be used to express the invisible ideas of the user's mind, which use may be said to be *the semantic use*; and they may be used to make the expressed ideas known (immediately or remotely) to others, which use may be said to be *the communicative use.* But the relation between the words and ideas which they ex-

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press will be different in the two cases. This may be made clear by an example.

In writing a book, an author may use a word which *signified* what the author had in mind in using that word. But in the use of the *reader,* the word cannot signify what immediately was in the author's mind, but can *stand for* that (this will hold in the case of tape-recorded words and listeners as well). The author might have passed away long before; and in the reader's use of the word there will be nothing to be signified as the immediate idea of the author's mind, which is non-existent at present. Apart from this attempt to make this clear by this example, it can also be affirmed by Locke's own statement; and that will be applicable in all cases whether or not it is a written word and whether or not it is immediately communicated. Locke says about all words that : " they are all within his [the user's] own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear ".[8] Thus words can signify ideas ouly in the case of the person who uses them; but in the case of communication to other, they cannot signify anything because what is to be signified is hidden. In that case, words can only *stand for* the hidden ideas.

It ts now clear that Kretzmann is generalizing both the semantic connectives and the semantic theses. Like Kretzmann J. Bennett is also wrong in making the generalization of the semantic connectives. Bennett does not differentiate between the meanings of " signify " and " stand for " but adopts the latter one. For Bennett : " To attach meaning to an utterence, then, is to make it ' *stand as mark* ' for one or more ' internal conceptions ' or ' ideas ' in one's own mind ".[9] Bennett also is not making clear the number of theses in Locke's theory.

More recently C. Landesman has also missed this point of the two theses of Locke's theory. This is clear when he says

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that : " I shall use the following brief formulation of Locke's theory : Words immediately signify ideas in the mind of the speaker ".[10] Landesman does not make any clear distinction between " signify " and " stand for " or between the implications of the semantic use and the communicative use of words.

I may conclude this paper by saying ; (i) that words have two uses, the semantic use for expression of the hidden ideas of the user's mind, and the communicative use for letting others know the expressed ideas; (ii) and that there *must* be two corresponding theses in Locke's theory. In Locke's writing, both these theses are present when he says that words *signify* ideas, and that words also *stand for* ideas. Locke does not make clear the distinction between them, and a few critics wrongly interpret him.[11]

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10. Landesman, C., " Locke's Theory of Meaning ", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 14 (1976), p. 24
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THE CONCEPT OF METAPHILOSOPHY

The Word 'metaphilosophy' was coined by Morris Lazerowitz. Understood in a general way, 'metaphilosophy' means, philosophy of philosophy, that is to say, the body of sentences embodying philosophical reflection on the various problems about philosophy itself, e. g., 'What is philosophy?' 'What is the method of philosophy?', 'Do philosophical sentences have truth–values?', and so on. Metaphilosophy in this wide sense, that is as a concern with philosophy in general, had originated, in some form, one may say, in Pythagoras, who is said to have coined the word 'philosophy'. Subsequently, it was made a stable part of philosophy by Plato and, much later, by a number of modern philosophers, especially, Descartes, Kant, Hume and others. However, thanks to the acutely self–conscious twentieth century philosophers, it now forms, as everybody knows, a large and significant part of philosophy.

Lazerowitz has no particular objection against applying the word 'metaphilosophy' to describe this branch of philosophical enquiry. But in his own actual use and philosophical practice, the word 'metaphilosophy' assumes a narrow sense. It is intended to designate only a limited field of philosophical investigation. In his *The Language of Philosophy,* he describes it as a new field of

> ... investigation of philosophical utterances with the special aim of reaching a satisfactory understanding of what in their nature, permits intractable disagreements which invariably attach to them.[1]

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During discussions also, he maintains the same position when he says, " Metaphilosophy is just the investigation of philosophical problems with the aim of describing what there is about them that makes them irresolvable. " [2]

Thus, metaphilosophy, as defined by Lazerowitz, may well be said to be a characteristic part or variant of the metaphilosophy in the wider sense; and Lazerowitz. as we have said, has no particular objection to this description of his own metaphilosophy [3], even though, he prefers to confine the application of the name " metophilosophy " to his restricted area of enquiry.

We have no serious objection to Lazerowitz's characteristic use of the name ' metaphilosophy '. But we sense one danger in it. The enquiry instituted by Lazerowitz and named ' metaphilosophy ' is designed to explain one notorious and apparently disturbing peculiarity of philosophical utterances. But philosophical utterances may have more peculiarities which are equally notorious and have an equal claim to an explanation. Cannot the body of sentences containing such explanation, one may ask, make a claim to the name ' metaphilosophy ' ? Will it not amount to following a double standard to deny the name to it ?

Anyway the question arises : Is metaphilosophy in general and, for that matter, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy which is a characteristic variant of it, a part of philosophy ? We know of philosophers who are inclined to liken philosophy too closely to science, and for that matter, metaphilosophy to metascience. For such philosophers, metaphilosophy will not normally count as a part of philosophy at all, just as metascience does not count as a part of science.

But the position which tends to go so far as to expel metaphilosophy from the domain of philosophy, need not, we think,

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be taken too seriously. Philosophy may indeed resemble science, even very closely. Yet it would seem to go too far to suppose that the same resemblance holds also between metascience and metaphilosophy, and to argue, on that basis, that since metascience is not science, metaphilosophy, likewise, is not philosophy. For, the relation that holds between metaphilosophy and philosophy differs in certain fundamental ways from that which holds between metascience and science. Metascience is not in actuality claimed to be a science, and for that, there is a good reason. The reason is primarily that metascientific problems, e. g., 'What is science?', 'What is the method of science?', etc. do not respond to the same method of approach as qnestions of science, e. g., 'How does mercury react to heat?', 'What are the effects of carbon monaxide on the human organism?', etc. Our ways of finding answers to the latter are observation, experiment and the like, but these do not apply to the former.

The picture, on the other hand, is totally different when we look at the relation that holds between metaphilosophy and philosophy. Our methods of dealing with problems is the same in both cases. Take for example, the philosophical questions, 'What is the nature of ultimate reality?', 'Do Universals exist?', and compare them with the metaphilosophical questions, e. g., 'What is philosophy?', 'What is the method of philosophy?' The way philosophers deal with the latter is not different from the way they deal with the former, and philosophers are not aware of any alternatie way which might prove more suitable for metaphilosophical problems.

Interestingly, however, one thing may be noted at this poit. To his students, Lazerowitz is never known to be one among those philosophers who are prone to liken philosophy to science or even place science and philosophy in the same category.

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> ... philosophy is not a demonstrative science and ..... we cannot expect from it what we expect from a demonstrative science.[4]

> ... the philosophical theories, unlike those of the natural sciences and mathematics, are not open to proof or disproof.[5]

Also,

> ... a moment's reflection will tend to throw doubt on the comfortable idea that philosophy is a kind of science.[6]

Yet, at certain place he sounds like someone subscribing to the position that metaphilosophy is not philosophy, at least not necessarily. He says :

> ... It seems plainly possible to make statements about philosophy (metaphilosophical statements)[7] which are not themselves philosophical statements.[8]

But on what is this grounded ? The only sighted ground, as far as we can see, is obtained introspectively in Humean style. It is, in Lazerowitz's own words,

> ... to speak for myself, I sometimes mention philosophical problems without finding philosophical thoughts accompanying them.[9]

An introspective or inductive ground has a characteristic weakness of its own, which we need not elaborate. No philosophical proposition, by its very nature, is amenable to factual or inductive coroboration. But this is not our main objection against Lazerowitz on this particular point. What we would especially like to call attention to, is a feeling we have that Lazerowitz in an unguarded moment lost sight of the distinction that exists between *mentioning* philosophy and *talking about*

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philosophy (producing a metaphilosophical statement). The former is not a philosophical activity. And no one perhaps will say that it is. But talking about philosophy is doing philosophy. It is producing, fundamentally, the same kind of sentences in which philosophy consists. As a matter of fact, this is one recognised singularity which distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines, in that when we talk about science or art we do not necessarily produce science or art.

So we have good reason to look upon metaphilosophy as philosophy. But the question arises : In what precise way is it so ? Is it a part of philosophy in the sense in which such branches of philosophy as, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc. are ? We seem to have genuine difficulties in thinking of metaphilosophy that way. Metaphilosophy, even though a part of philosophy, cannot be assigned the same kind of status or position as metaphysics, epistemology, etc. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between them. The difference in fact goes so far as to make them philosophies of a differen kind.

Let us illustrate this point.

No two things, say A and B can be assigned to the same class, say, C, if their logical relations to C are different. This follows from the fact that every two members of a particular class stand in the same logical relation to the class as a whole. (For, otherwise, the class–name could not have been applicable to both in the same sense.) [10]

Now, one could have indeed maintained that metaphilosophy is philosophy of a kind with metaphysics or epistemology, if it were the case that the metaphilosophical problems and the problems of metaphysics, epistemology, etc., could be said to stand in the same relation to the class of philosophical problems to

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which the latter belong. But this does not in fact turn out to be the case.

Take for example, the metaphysical question, 'What is the nature of ultimate reality?' Needless to say, it presupposes besides itself, such other questions as 'Is there anything to be called ultimate reality?', 'Is it knowable?', and so on, together with relevant answers to them. But never will it or any other such question presuppose the entire class of questions of its kind together with their answers. And this holds also good of every other particular philosophical question, whether metaphysical, or epistemological, or ethical, etc.

And, it is precisely in this important respect that metaphilosophy as a branch of philosophy differs from metaphysics, epistemology, etc.,. Take the metaphilosophical question 'What is philosophy?' Obviously, it presupposes pnilosophy, and in doing so it naturally presupposes the *entire* range of what constitutes philosophy, i. e., the *entire* range of philosophical questions together with their possible answers. Needless to say, the range includes all metaphysical, epistemological questions etc. and also metaphilosophical questions.

Thus, it is not correct to suppose that metaphilosophy is not philosophy at all. Nor is it correct to think that it is philosophy along with metaphpsics, epistemology, etc. But how, then, may we, place metaphilosophy or Lazerowitz's chaiacteristic version of it in the map of philosophy? The most appropriate way, according to us, is to conceive it, as a philosophical activity of the second order, as distinguished, from metaphysics, epistemology, and the like which may well be colled philosophical activity of the first order.[11] So, in being a kind of metaphilosophy, Lezarowitz's metaphilosophy may be called a species of second order philosophy.

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In introducing such notions as first order, second order to characterise philosophy, we would appear to be introducing a hierarchy in philosophy which may never end. For, someone who investigates the nature of metaphilosophy will produce a third order philosophy and the process will go on endlessly.

This notion of an endless hierarchy appears repellant to some. But what is there to be frightened of? It follows naturally and inevitably from the nature of man as incurably self-conscious. Besides, it also accords with the nature of knowledge as endless.

Lazerowitz, however, as far as we know, has not said anything which can be understood as an acceptance of our characterisation of metaphilosophy. But that is because of the unfortunate fact that the philosopher, so remarkably conscious of the first order philosophy, has not carried forward his self-consciousness a step further to reflect on his own metaphilosophisings, that is to say, to be sufficiently inquisitive about what it is that he is doing or how to characterise it. Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy covers a lot; contrarily, his philosophy of metaphilosophy covers little.

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3. *Vide* his letter to M. Chakravarty.
4. *Vide* his *Philosophy and Illusion*, (George Allen and Unwin, London 1968) p. 82
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6. ' The Fly Bottle : Wittgenstein and Bowsma ', *Reports on Philosophy*, 5, (1981) p. 34
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8. ' On Talking About Philosophy ', *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 8, Nos. 2 & 3, (1977) p. 253
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11. *Ibid.*, See pp. 17–20 (For elaboration)

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CAN ONE WILL ONE'S THOUGHTS ?

Suppose someone said : "I shall have thought T_1 at time T_1," then we should imagine that this person had at his disposal a variety of thoughts – perhaps, T_0, T_1, T_2, ..., T_n – and that he could choose to have T_1 at any time convenient to him. We would also imagine that in this person's world his statement would be described as being a correct statement if at time t_1 he actually had thought T_1 and no other tnought. If thought T_2, or some thought other than T_1 occured to him at time t_1, a future moment in time, then our thinker's claim would fail to qualify as a true statement.

A statement such as the one just mentioned forces us to accept that at any given time an array of thoughts is available for selection. While we must admit that many people have thought about many things and have, in fact, expressed their thinking, this does not mean that all thinking has reached a point of finality. Thinking would have reached its points of finality when what needs to be said has been said so completely, so indisputably, so perfectly and with such univeral validity that no new contribution would be possible, no new interpretation conceivable, no new application forseeable, no infinitesimal change necessary. For this state to prevail it is not necessary that any restrictions be placed on the number of systems that can exist, that is to say, that it is possible to have any number of subsets within an universe that encloses all possible areas of enunciation. Now, a system (or a subset of enunciative possibilities) would be an area within which thoughts of a certain nature can be included.

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However, certain restrictions must be imposed if thinking is to be at a standstill. First, all permissible systems mnst be mutually exclusive. Second, each system must be independent in the sense that no mapping or transformation be possible between any two systems. To these restrictions two more stringent conditions must be added : Each system can contain only one proposition at most; and no modification of this proposition (like negations or qualifications, for instance), no matter how strong or week, are admissible. Thus, one could imagine that in this situation certain disciplines would be demarcated, say, as physics, chemistry, mathematics and economics. The subset of economics could be seen as being composed of demand theory, production theory, etc.. etc. However, a proposition that falls under the domain of demand theory would have to be self-evident and self-sufficient, free from the potentiality of being compared with another theory, improved or explicated by propositions from another subset or system, like mathematics; applied in another system, like agriculture; or extended to develop other subsets included within the subset of economics, for instance, to derive theorems in production theory. Quite simply, in order to obtain a world where the dialectical progress of knowledge is arrested we would have to impose many rigid conditions and assume that the first propositions that did occur were arrived at in some mysterious fashion, destined not to recur in a similarly mysterious fashion again.

But a world where thinking is robbed of its ability to participate in the dialectical process need not be the only world where one can will one's thoughts and boldly proclaim : " I shall have thought T_1 at time t_1. " It is equally possible that although thinking proceeds on its onward movement, there may be some thinkers who might prefer to reconstruct already available thoughts.[1] In that case, time t_1 will refer to some time period

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in the future, whereas thought T_1 would refer to a thought which had already been formulated, but with no constraint on the growth of thinking. This would mean that as new thoughts are developing and as others can be expected to arise in time, thinkers are free, as mentioned earlier, to reconstruct something that had been previously thought out *as if* it were being conceived for the first time. One method in this direction would be to recreate history for oneself. This demanding procedure would require that before consciously arriving at a once-thought-out thought, the thinker would have to reeover the conditions which motivated the genesis of the selected thought or line of thinking. This would entail living in the extant social mileu that was associated with the predetermined thought, engaging in intellectual debates that surrounded the predetermined thought; this would also entail forgetting about the existent social mileu in which the thinker lives, forgetting the economic conditions that are contemporaneous and forgetting on-going intellectual debates. In essence, this method would strive to return the enthusiastic thinker to the complex flow of events from which the intended thought sprouted. The difficulty with this exercise would be the impossibility of reversing time. With no known technique for temporal regression this method fails because it is logically trapped by the attempt to reverse a phenomenon (time) which by nature is irreversible. An escape route from this dilemma would be to *be* the thinker who had originally discovered the thought that is presently being re-sought. The difficulty here, aside from the obvious one of coming to terms with a person who is no longer alive, would be the difficulty of knowing what goes on in another person's mind. Again, it is not easy to prescribe how one could get *into* another person's mind, a problem compounded when one has to get into the mind of a dead person. In the usual course of events we would judge what a person does (speaks, writes, behaves) to be some

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extension of what goes on 'within' a person. Observing the way a person salivates, talks about food, opens his eyes wide at the mention of a particular item on a menu, we may say : " I believe this man likes boiled eggs. " It must be granted that what we know about this person's likes or dislikes, fondnesses and aversions, is limited by what he lets us know and by how much we can guess about him. What we are confronted with when challenged to be another person requires us to forgo our *belifes* and forces us (or rather our peculiar thinker) to *know* another person's mind, which amounts to *seeing* inside the " soul " of another. We are left in a spot, quite unable to accept or dismiss processes and entities that we can neither falsify nor validify, subjects about which there can be no description, discussion or cognisance (as we normally understand the term). We can only reply politely : " I 'm sorry, I don't know what you're talking about, " when someone declares : " I' m going to get into Cervantes' soul to have his thoughts on Don Quixote. " Our apparent escape route really turns out to be a blind alley, and a bad one at that since it defies our ordinary language and asks to be spoken about, if one chooses to speak about this path, in a language unique to the speaker.

Undeniably, one could rediscover for oneself what one's predecessor had discovered. This can happen; but not in any self-conscious way. To lay claim to the ability to will one's thoughts, that is, to be able to decide upon one's choice of thoughts, stating in advance one's predetermind thought just wipes out any room for rediscovery. A rediscovery, like a discovery, cannot be intentional. Even the prospector for oil cannot decide that he would find his oil at this-and-this particular place. If he announces, " I will find oil at this-and-this place," one can only take it as an expression of his confidence and belief. The prospector, after all, is guided by geological surveys

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and findings which point to the probabilities of finding oil in particular locations. The element of uncertainity – and anxiety – is a crucial component of any discovery process. Otherwise, one would be merely uncovering, what one all along knew was covered somewhere. A rediscovery, for a thinker, cannot properly be said to occur if he is not "carried along by the inertias of language and invention,"[2] since the "collaboration of chance"[3] tempers a discovery, or a rediscovery, for that matter. The essence of a rediscovery lies in the fact that the 'rediscoverer', unaware of the processes, methods or arguments of his predecessor, retraces his (the predecessor's) steps. The thoughts that result in a rediscovery would be new to the individual thinker who figured them out, not to the world, which had already witnessed this movement. What is a rediscovery according to recorded history would be a discovery, in all respects, to the individual concerned. As with a discovery, so with a rediscovery, it makes no sense to speak in advance and with certainity of the thoughts one *will* have.

It makes equally little sense to declare in advance that one will have a particular dream (D_1) at time t_3. We would accept such a remark without any discomfort from a person who is known to be mentally unsound, otherwise a prediction of this type though expressed as a perfectly grammatical sentence is bound to be greeted with a start. It will be a different thing if this dreamer told us that this dream D_1 had been occuring to him without fail every night, for the past three weeks, and that he would not be surprised if this dream recurred. Our dreamer's statement would then take on a new sense; it would mean something unlike his original statement. While his original statement "I shall have dream D_1 at time t_3" – would convey that he had control over his dreams, this statement when supported by data

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on his dream trends would probably serve to convey his anxiety over the continual recurrence of dream D_1, an entirely different impression, since his remark now indicates a lack of any control over this dream which seems to have a will of its own in its insistence on troubling him; having troubled our dreamer for so long he now expects the dream to trouble him for a further night.

It is unlikely that we make any mistake in imagining it possible to will our dreams because we know that dreaming really belongs to the realm of the unconscious. Whatever role the conscious mind has is limited to feeding the unconscious 'layer' of the mind with experiences which would then appear in some particular manner depending upon the personality of the dreamer. Roughly speaking, the unconscious mind has complete control over how waking experiences are to be 'processed' and 'presented' as dreams. Dreaming would not be dreaming if we could choose our dreams.

We could, however, choose what move to mke in a game of chess. A player bent over a chessboard could say to himself: "I shall move the king pawn...." He need not say this; he need only move a particular piece. In moving a piece, or in telling himself that he will move a particular piece, the player demonstrates to us, or to himself, that he had this thought to move this piece. But one would be unreasonable if one insisted on saying: "I shall have a particular thought only: the thought to move the king pawn...." The foolishness in holding this view is blatantly obvious: one could announce the decision to have the thought only after the thought had occured to one's mind. To say: "I shall have a particular thought only – the thought to move the king pawn ," is as nonsensical as saying, "I shall have dream D_1." But we have greater freedom with chess games, because after a thought has occured to us we can choose

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whether or not to execute, develop or reject this thought; we have no such choice with dreams. As far as dreams are concerned we cannot say : " I now have this dream," unless this observation lies within the dream itself; but in games of chess and in other activities we engage in while awake we can say : " I now have this thought," or : " I now have this move in mind," or : " I now have this view." Thus thoughts that occur during dreams are subject to the rules of dreaming, but thoughts that occur during a game of chess, besides following the rules of chess playing, also exhibit a great deal in common with activities that call for thinking.

The chess player, like the physicist or the economist, is a thinker in that it is his aim to study the position of the various pieces and to decide the strongest possible move that could be made. Here, the player, having learnt how the various pieces can be moved, must judge how best he can assert his strength. The extent of a chess player's knowledge of the rules that govern the game of chess and his keenness in thinking about the interrelations between the various pieces are expressed by the strength of his move; to the extent that his move is good he is a good thinker. The chess player looks at the pieces on the board and ' thinks ', his thinking being directed towards understanding how the pieces are interrelated. Then, on the basis of his thinking, he makes his move, and the effectiveness of his move reflects the keenness of his thinking. While looking at the pieces on the board certain processes characteristic of thinking occur to the chess player, and then he has a thought (– experienced as understanding, knowing, realizing, discovering an insight). We know that the chess player has had a specific thought if he so expresses himself, perhaps by giving verbal expression to that thought, by writing it down in the form of chess notation, or by executing a move that corresponds to that thought. If the chess

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player does none of this then we cannot know about that thought. Thoughts are not facts, not even when they are expressed tangibly. When thoughts are expressed then we can say: "So-and-so said this," "So-and-so thought this-and-this," "I see the sense of so-and-so's thoughts," "I understand this man's thinking." It may be true that the black pawn is in front of the white queen: that is, indeed, a fact; it is observable; the *thought* of this state of affairs would not, however, be a fact. It is not within normal human powers to see the colour of the black pawn that is referred to, and possible to hear someone say that the black queen and the white queen stand in a particular relation. The facticity of the relative positions of the pawn and the queen would remain so long as the relative positions of these pieces were not disturbed. This facticity would nevertheless give rise to thoughts pertaining to the configuration in sight. The thoughts that arise within people's minds with regard to this arrangement would nlways escape us in that they are neither observable (no one has ever seen a tnought) nor are they amenable to rearrangement the way chess pieces are, or stones and bricks are. One can point to some things, but one cannot think about them for someone else.

Similarly, one cannot lead someone to a thought; just as truly, one cannot lead oneself to a thought. It would be correct to hold that, "I'm going to town," because a 'town' is a thing we are all capable of witnessing. We can also witness the road that leads to a town and, in fact, witness people driving or walking to town. None of this can be said if someone told us: "I'm going to have thought T_1." This statement sounds as nonsensical as the utterance: "I'm going to have presence of mind." A person's 'presence of mind' is unlike the pair of shoes he would like to buy, something he could show us if we accompanied him to a shoe store. We can say; "He had a pair of shoes," if we

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see him wear them, or carry such a pair with him. But we could say: "He had presence of mind," if on several occassions at moments of pressure this man 'displays' clear thinking. At best the statement, "I'm going to have presence of mind," is a statement of hope, intent, something that can be verified only after this virtue is exhibited, since we cannot see anyone travel along a road towards 'presence of mind.' On the other hand, one could decide to think *about* something or other. It is possible to exercise one's will here because one does not commit oneself to a resultant set of thoughts. The choice in this matter is a choice between looking either at one set of facts or another set of facts, rather one can choose to think about pawns or about the money people have in their pockets.

The crucial problem about willing one's thoughts can be resolved if one understands 'will' to be exhibited by choosing something over another, that is, the power to accept one thing and reject another. This necessitates foreknowledge of alternatives. A decision or a choice, while being an expression of one's will necessitates the presence of a 'thought' as the basis for action. So, willing a thought is to have *the* thought to have *a* thought. In our experience, the 'a' thought (the resultant of one's brain-processes) must precede the 'the' thought (the decision to will) if one can talk at all about the 'a' thought, or the thought that one wishes to favour. Given the nature of thoughts and thinking this seems a meaningless endeavour.

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NOTES

1. See "Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*" in Jorge Luis Borges, "*Labyrinths; Selected Stories and Other Writings,*" ed. by Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby, Harmondsworth, Middlesex : 1970 pp. 62-71
2. *Ibid*, p. 68.
3. *Ibid*, p. 67.
4. Cf. "A thinker is very much like a draughtsman whose aim it is to represent all the interrelations between things." Ludwig Wittgenstein, "*Culture and Value,*" ed. by G. H. Von Wright, tr. by Peter Winch, Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 12 e.

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TOWARDS A LIVING CULTURE—A NOTE ON K. C. BHATTACHARYA'S "SVARAJ IN IDEAS"

Invaders invade and conquer. But this conquest by force—this political conquest might be of a short duration unless an attempt is made to perpetuate it. There are many ways in which political conquest is perpetuated. Cultural invasion is one of them.

By cultural invasion the conquerors try to destroy the culture of the conquered people and by doing it they make an attempt to destroy the very identity of the people conquered The culture of the conquerors is posed in such a manner that the conquered people would feel that it is a superior culture and the people a superior people. Pecuniary benefits are at the back of the propagation of such views and the invaded people fall a prey to such propaganda and in the end they find themselves castrated,—impotent to such an extent that they look at themselves through the eyes of the invaders. At such a point the internalization of the so-called superior culture and, consequently, the feeling of inferiority complex are complete in the colonized people. Thus, cultural invasion is more insidious than mere political invasion.

More or less the same thing happened to the Indian people during the British rule. The British colonialists tried to destroy the Indian culture and make the people impotent culturally and otherwise. Before the process came to a successful end, some of the thoughtful people of India became alive to the process itself and the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the beginning of the first attempt to throw off the British domination.

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Krishnachandra Bhattacharya's attempt in his "Svaraj in Ideas"* is such an attempt to emancipate the minds of Indian people from the domination of Western culture and to inculcate in them a love for Indian culture and traditions. In the heyday of British colonialism and also of British oppression, KCB's call shows on his part a great amount of boldness and patriotism. In this regard Prof. Rajendra Prasad says, "[KCB's] entire approach in the paper may seem to be very patriotic. and perhaps its patriotic appearance is its main charm even to-day."[1] And Prof. Dharmendra Goel says, "I fully uphold this principle of the dignity of the colonized and I am glad to see that an academic philosopher of British India had the vision and courage to voice it. His thought was articulated not out of any morbid dogmatism but as a self–conscious stance of a cultural critique which was capable of remaining unswayed by the prevailing disparagement of our enslaved people and their civilization."[2] Historically the paper is quite valuable, but one has to see how far it is philosophically so.

We may distinguish between two varieties of patriotism–patriotism in colonial India and patriotism in free India. The patriotism that was needed to fight against an alien rule, and an alien culture as a tool for perpetuating an alien rule is no longer needed now. What is needed is the patriotism to fight against cultural injusticee--indigeneous or foreign, to free oneself from the bondage of an unjust culture. This needs even more courage than what was needed to fight foreign rule, for in our fight against the foreign rule our own people were at our side, but in our endeavour to free ourselves from the bondage of an unjust culture we may have to fight against our own people in the form of counterposing a just culture against an unjust one. However, the qualitative nature of the fight might be completely different here, for here the struggle would be at the level of

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understanding, to understand the nature of a just culture—what I would like to call a *living culture*. So from the perspective of a living culture I would like to discuss KCB's "Svaraj in Ideas".

KCB's paper contains 26 paragraphs. No man with self-respect can deny the first paragraph. No Indian with self-respect can deny the second. On the basis of these two non-denials KCB exhorts us in the subsequent 24 paragraphs to issue a blank cheque. This was my impression on the first reading of KCB's paper. In the meantime my discussions with others and my re-reading of the paper have not helped me to change this first impression. This is because I perceive that the paper is basically weak on many counts. However, my objective is not to dwell upon these weak points, for three philosophers of India—Prof. Rajendra Prasad, Dharmendra Goel and Roop Rekha Verma [3]—have done the job in their respective ways one thousand and one times better than what I could have done with my poor abilities. So I shall confine myself to a more fundamental problem concerning the relation between culture and what we call knowledge.

Slogans rend the air: "We must preserve our culture", "We must keep our culture intact", "Our culture must remain pure", "We must honour our past", etc. When I hear such slogans even from academics I feel a sufficient amount of attention is not given to the thought behind such slogans. Let us take up a hypothetical example.

X hails from a culture in which religion occupies a central place. In almost all religions the theory of creation of the world and of man is there in one form or another. It is there in his religion too. Bnt so for as his education is concerned he comes across the theory of evolution of the Solar system and the theory of the evolution of life and of man. So in his life two theories are

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counterposed—the theory of creation and the theory of evolution. Which one is he to accept ? If, on the one hand, he is told to hold fast to his culture, then he has every right to charge his parents that they spend a lot of thir money and they kill a lot of his own time by sending him to an educational institution which imparts some falsehoods in the name of knowledge. If, on the other hand, he is told that he should uphold whatever he learns in the educational institution, then his culture receives a shocking blow and in order to withstand it there must be consequent changes in the culture itself. But this means that the culture cannot remain intact, pure, etc.

This controversy is a controversy between religion and science. In a religion God occupies the central place and any change is explained as an act emanating from the will of God. No such supernatural entity is entertained in scientific explanations.

A culture cannot keep itself free from the controversy between science and religion. It cannot keep its eyes closed. As a culture is claimed to be a system of ideas and also as a store-house of truths, it cannot have within itself two contending theories—such as the theory of creation and the theory of evolution—as truths. The tension that exists here between science and religion will cause tension in the cultural system.

But now the question is : Are we always alive to such cultural tensions ? This question leads me to divide cultures into three kinds : (1) Dead Culture, (2) Living Culture and (3) Stupefied Culture. (1) A dead culture is a culture which was in practice sometime in the past. Now there are no people who claim its inheritance as a matter of cultural praxis. Here the paradigms would be the culture of Ancient Egypt and that of Mesopotamia. (2) A living culure is a culture which takes into account the latest developments in knowledge and makes

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internal changes and necessary adjustments such that the cultural praxis of a people is in conformity with what the people claim to know. There is nothing dogmatic in what is claimed to be a living culture. Again, a living culture is a cultural praxis in which reflection and practice go hand in hand, such that reflection provides the truth-based rationality for a cultural practice and the latter on its part keeps reflection within the bounds of what we know and the values based on such knowledge. Thus, one helping the other, reflection and practice generate a cultural praxis which keeps the dead-wood out.—There is no place for dogmatism, superstition, etc., in a living culture. (3) A stupefied culture is a culture which does not, as a matter of necessity and rational activity, take into account the developments in knowledge. The culture is said to be inherited from the past and unchallenged reverence is demanded for it. It is said that the preservation of the sanctity of a culture is the duty of the people upholding the culture. We must hold fast to our culture. Any looseness in it is a danger to the culture itself. The men of the past who contributed to the culture we inherit now are unchallengeable. Thus, all that we inherit in the form of a culture contains a large number of unchallengeable statements of the pastmasters. As they are not rationally examined they are dogmatically accepted. Moreover, here the doors of the culture are closed to science and scientific developments. And this makes the culture the more dogmatic. It appears to say : Let science go its own way, but let our culture be pure. This insensitiveness to the developments in science makes a culture a stupefied culture. From this it appears that most of us live in stupefied cultures. It may be noted here of what KCB says of the Indian mind ; " That Indian mind has simply lapsed in most cases for our educated men, and has subsided below the conscious level of culture. It operates still in the persisting routine of their family life and in some of their social and religious practices

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which have no longer, however, any vital meaning for them. It neither welcomes nor resists the ideas received through the new education. It dares not exert itself in the cultural sphere."[4] Here we are alive neither to culture nor to science. In our lives both the streams run without interacting with each other. Such a living is nothing but stupefied living.

But here one may raise a question : Why should a culture conform to the scientific developments when the propositions of science are themselves doubtful ? KCB expresses such a view when he says," ··· Even here there may be some doubt..."[5] We can agree that the propositions of culture and those of science are doubted. But what we would like to distinguish is that how the doubts are met with. Whenever a scientific proposition is doubted, the scientist offers justifications for holding the proposition to be true and always such justifications are public in the sense that any scientist in any part of the world can verify the proposition. But whenever a proposition of a culture is doubted the person holding the proposition almost always refers to the authority of a pastmaster or says that it is a matter of belief or that the justification for such propositions is confined to the personal experiences of the pastmasters who enunciated the propositions or even exhorts us to believe that doubting the propositions of our culture is to doubt the veracity of our own ancestors and to defile the past in which they lived. Thus, we are urged upon to believe in the veracity of a culture and not to honour anything whatsoever that challenges the culure or puts it into doubt.

It is true that the propositions of science are not certain for there is no circle of certainty within which science moves. All the certainty science has is the certainty within the circle of probability i. e., the certainty depends on the fulfilment of certain conditions. Logically, empirical propositions of the general type

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cannot be certain, for it demands the putting together of past, present and future into a single present which is impossible. Even if that is possible it is empirically impossible to verify a proposition like "All men are mortal". Suppose we can bring the past into the present by granting that there is not a single man who has overlived the normal span of life of a few generations, i. e. men who could be over, say, two hundred years are not there. They could live only the normal span of life and not beyond that. We can bring the future into the present by deciding that in order to enable me to verify the proposition "All men are mortal" we, the human beings, one and all, will die. Accordingly, human beings begin one after another (including my near and dear ones) to die, but so long as I am living the proposition is not verified and the moment I am dead there is no one to see whether it is verified or not. Thus, it may be empirically impossible to verify a proposition. Moreover, a hypothetical decision like the one to die cannot be taken in case of other general propositions.

The position of science that the certainty of science moves within the cirele of probability makes science rational and keeps it out of the fold of dogmatism. Moreover, it makes science open-ended. It does not keep its doors closed. Science is a human activity and so long as humanity continues to live there will be development of science, growth of knowledge. There is no finality of human knowledge. The end of humanity is the end of knowledge, but not the finality of knowledge. The finality of human knowledge is an impossibility. Thus, in course of the development of scientific knowledge new facts may come to light and these new facts may necessitate the modification or rejection of some of the propositions so far held to be true. So in science nothing is sacrosanct and so a past howsoever glorious is not sacrosanct. Here lies the rationality of science. But so far as

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culture is concerned the situation is not so. We have to revere the past, keep the culture chaste and sanctified. Thus, the dogmatic elements thrive in a culure. The call for a living culture is a call to throw off these dogmatic elements and in order to do so, science must play a pivotal role in building up a living culture.

But here the question is : How can a culture assimilate scientific knowledge into its fold, and change and modify itself if necessitated ? It is a question of assimilation. *Rk Veda* says, *"Āno bhadrāḥ kratavo yantu viśvataḥ."* (let the noble thoughts come to us from everyside) Here the questions are : Can the noble thoughts of all cultures be assimilated into a single culture without any tension or inconsistency in the culture ?—i. e. can a culure assimilate all that is noble in other cultures without any tension or inconsistency ? Can something noble and something obler cause any tension or inconsistency in a culture ? If theren is any such tension or incosistency how is it to be re-solved ? Can KCB offer some answers to these questions ? KCB is not against the assimilation of an alien culture. He says, "Then assimilation need not be an evil; it may be positively necessary for healthy progress and in any case it does not mean a lapse of freedom."[6] We can assimilate a part or the whole of an alien culture only "after a full and open–eyed struggle had been allowed to develop"[7] between it and our indigeneous culture. This is fair enough a position to be upheld by anyone who has an open–mind and firmly believes in : "Let the noble thoughts come to us from everyside". But KCB does not stop at that. He gradually introduces one condition after another such that slowly the eye–lids close—the doors of mind are closed. Let us note how. Whatever element of the alien culture is 'assimilited' into our culture "it has not generally been assimilated by us in an open–eyed way *with our old-world Indian mind."*[8] "There is room

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indeed for an adjustment and synthesis, *within limits of different cultures and cultural ideals.*"[9] The introduction or presence of limiting concepts in a culture may stand in the way of proper adjustment and synthesis. Moreover, KCB makes a distinction between secular life and spiritual life. So far as the secular life is concerned, it has to adjust itself to the times and so for as the spiritual life is concernd the times have to adjust to the spiritual life. He says, "Life means adaptation to varying times and to varying ideals. But we are not always clear about the method of this adaptation. As we have to live, we have to accept facts and *adapt our secular life and secular ideas to the times. We have to alter ourselves here to suit the situation.* In spiriutual life, however, there is *no demand for compromising* our ideals in order to have a smooth sailing with the times. Here, if possible and so far as lies in our power, *the times have to be adapted to our life and not our life to the times.*"[10] Can we rationally live through these two lives and be at peace ? Life cannot be divided into two separate and water-tight compartments—secular and spiritual. Even if such a distinction can be made, definitely there will be interaction between secular and spiritual life and between secular and spiritual ideas. And in the procees of this interaction a clash of ideas cannot be overruled. As he does not favour any compromise and by implicatlon he holds that the spiritnal life is of primary importance, how can the secular life be unaffected ? It must adapt itself to the spiritual life. But KCB does not say so.

Even in case of assimilation of alien ideals he says, " What is universal is only the spirit, the loyalty to our own ideals and the openness to other ideals, the determination *not to reject them if they are found within our ideals and not to accept them till they are so found.* The only way to appraise a new ideal is *to view it through our actual ideal* ... "[11] So the criterion of assimilation is not the nobility of the ideas but conforming to

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our indigeneous framework. Further, he says, " A synthesis of our ideals with western ideals is not demanded in every ease. Where it is demanded, *the foreign ideals is to be assimilated to our ideal and not the other way. There is no demand for the surrender of our individuality in any case : Svadharme nidhanam śreyaḥ paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ,* " [12] Though KCB talks of conflict proper in which there can be a fair comparison and competition of ideas (so that if the foreign idea is found to be nobler, it can be inducted or assimilated into the native culture), here only one way of adaptation i. e. conforming to our own cultural ideas, is permitted. So again the emphasis is on the primacy of the framework, not the nobility of the ideas. This is how the open-eyedness and open-mindedness vanish into thin air. Moreover, KCB's position does not enable us to get answers to the questions we raised after quoting the *Rk Vedic* statement : " Let the noble thoughts come to us from everyside. " Nor does it enable us to answer the question : How can a culture assimilate scientific knowledge into its fold, and change and modify itself if necessitated ?

In order to answer these questions we have to understand how the concepts ' culture ', ' science ', ' truth ' and ' value ' are interrelated. Though culture is said to be a store-house of values—values might or might not be related to and based on truths. The question : *" Is value truth-based or not " ?* is an important question. For if we say it is, then we thrive in a living culture, but if we say it is not, then we live and sink in a stupefied culture. Suppose we have a cultural system in which values are based on truths and another in which they are not so based. Again, suppose in the latter system we have the theory of creation. God created the world. He created man in His own image. As man is the crown of His creation, God created the world for the benefit of man. With these notions how do we look at the world ? How do we behave with it ? Our attitude

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towards the world is that it is there for the benefit of man. The more we exploit it the better the benefits for man. In case of any imbalance, that will be looked after by God, for He looks after His creation. In the worst case we shall say that we are only fulfilling the will of God. This is how we behave with the world at present. How would we look at and behave with the world in a cultural system in which values are related to and based on truths? If we have the theory of evolution as a basis of our cultural system, then the attitude that we shall have towards the world will be completely different. We will not look at the world as an object of exploitation for the benefit of man. We shall look at it as a place for the continuance of human race. Keeping the future of human race in mind we shall use the nature in a planned manner-- not exploit it. Any kind of ecological imbalance will be considered a threat to the continuance of makind. In this cultural system in case of any imbalance threatening mankind we shall not be saying that we are fulfilling the will of any God, but we shall hold ourselves responsible for the doom of mankind. And our behavior towards nature will be irresponsible and suicidal.

So we have to consider how values can be truth-bassed. Sometimes we misconceive that values are objective.—As objective as the facts that are there in the world. Such a view leads one to say and, in fact, KCB says, "The way to know facts is not the way to know values."[13] Is it on par with : The way to know facts is not the way to know mathematics"? Values are not objects of knowledge, for they are not as objective as the facts are. Values are given and thus they are human creations. They are created by human interest to meet human needs. But sometimes the creation of such values are grounded in some kind of metaphysics.--Sometimes God is said to be the source of all values.

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This latter position urges upon us to discuss the relationship between growth of knowledge and dependence on God. In general we can say that growth of knowledge and dependence on God are inversely related—the more we know the less dependent we are on God. Our forefathers knew less and depended on God more and we know more and depend on God less. In the case of breaking out of cholera and small-pox our ancestors went to the temples to appease the local godesses, but we go to the doctors.

Our ancestors knew very little about the stars and planets. They found the stars to be relatively fixed, but observed the planets to have relatively free movement. This led them to believe that the planets had free will. As a result, they were personified and thought to be endowed with powers—powers to influence human fate. Consequently, the so-called science of Astrology developed. But now no astronomer believes in such personification and power. It appears that the relationship between growth of knowledge and dependence on God is such that one can say : The more we know the less we depend on God. The growth of knowledge influences and changes our attitude towards God.

All natural phenomena which were incomprehensible were also personified and were thought to be endowed with powers to produce the natural phenomena. These personified gods were appeased by men in times of crisis. This leads me to say that *God is nothing but the ignorance of man rationalized.*

Here one may ask : Can science explain all that happens in the world ? We may readily concede that at any point of time science may not be able to explain all that happens in the world. For we have already said that there is no finality of knowledge. Knowledge is a growing process till the end of humanity. The

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end of humanity is the end of knowledge, not the finality of knowledge. This implies that so long as humanity continues at any point of time there will be something which at the moment science will be unable to explain.—There will be something that can be said to be unknown. But this does not mean that the scientist will take refuge in the so-called supernatural power in order to explain such phenomena. Being true to the scientific spirit he will say that at the present moment the phenomena are not explainable by science but at a future date science may be able to explain them.

The unknown phenomena may not cause any problem for the scientists. But for the common man they may cause some problems, for the unknown is awful. Let us take an example. Death is unknown. What is death? What happens after death? What is death and what happens after death can never be known. Though death occurs in human race, it never occurs in an individual's life, for death is the negation of life—the very negation of the knowing process. Death as an unknown phenomenon may cause some emotional imbalance in the man who thinks about it. He may feel insecure. Now suppose God (whatever He might be or not be) gives him courage to meet death and keeps him emotionally balanced. As a result, he feels secure in this " strange " world. Here God is a personal need. In such a case the thought will be in accordance with the personal need and the behaviour in accordance with the thought That means there will be *no difference between saying and showing*.

The socialization of God kills God.—In the institution of religion God is lost.[14] One may not have that personal need, still he participates in the religious practices as a matter of social life. A gulf is created between *saying* and *showing*. There

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are people for whom religious behaviour is a part of social behaviour and there is no personal need; and there are others whose discourses are religious, but their intercourses with other people are irreligious. There are very few people in whose life God is a personal need and in whom word and deed coincide. In most cases the religious function is just a matter of course function—just a social function. We must not be suprised to see people who appear to be religious, but are engaged in the most exploitative and vicious activities.

We have said that God is nothing but the ignorance of man rationalized. If that is so, it implies a cultural system in which there is no God as the metaphysical ground of all cultural values. In that case one may raise a question : What will be the basis of our morality ? Or who will judge upon our activities to be moral or immoral ? Or who will reward or punish us for our activities ? We raise such questions because of our cultural bondage in that way. We cannot imagine moral values without tracing their source to God or any other supernatural power. But the values of human life must be grounded in the human life itself and that would be more effective than if it is grounded in some supernatural power, because in most cases the supernatural agency is used as a tool in the exploitation of other human beings—in the explanation of socio-economic disparities, human suffering, etc. The internalization of this God–oriented culture is so deep in us that it has blunted the sharp edges of reason and we are unable to see what is what. I know a man who strongly believes in the idea that whatever we do or whatever is done to us is done by God and we are merely the means through whom God fulfils his will. And combined with this idea are the ideas of rebirth and our past *karmas*. He is not prepared to give up such thoughts. His sons regularly misbehave with him. And when he complained to me about the misbehaviour of his sons, I told him that he need not feel sorry, for by such

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behaviour God's will is being fulfilled. He is being punished for his past *karmas* and his sons are mere means in the fulfilment of God's will and are in no way responsible for their misbehaviour. He was mum but I could see the uneasiness in his eyes.

We have said that the values of human life must be grounded in human life itself. Human values arise because of the rationality of man, because of his memory, because of his apprehensiveness of the future. Man does not live in an ever present world, he has roots in the past and spreads branches into the future. Man must create values in relation to human life as living through past, present and future. Man must found human values in this fact, and such human values would be more effective than the values founded on supernatural or metaphysical entities. I am a human being and as such I have a relation to myself, I have a relation to my family, I have a relation to the human race and I have a relation to nature. Thus, a man has a four-fold relation to :

(1) himself;
(2) his family;
(3) human race; and
(4) nature.

And a man's morality should be founded on this four-fold relationship.

(1) A man has a responsibility towards himself in preserving his own life, in bringing about his own physical, moral and intellectual development.

(2) A man has responsibilities towards his family. Here the word 'family' is used in an extended sense to include the parents. The parents are responsible for the very life a man has, they looked after him and imparted to him the rudimentnry knowledge that was necessary in his early childhood. So a man

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has moral obligations towards his parents. As a result of biological process and to meet the needs of the preservation of human race and to fulfil his emotional need, a man begets children. He has a responsibility towards them too. He has an obligation to contribute towards their physical, moral and intellectual development.

(3) Similary, a man has responsibilities towards the entire race. Whatever a man claims to know, could not have known all by himself, nor could his parents have helped him to know all that. All the comforts he gets he could not have provided himself all by himself, nor could his parents have helped him in this matter. So his responsibility towards the human race lies in contributing his mite to its well-being—material as well as intellectual.

(4) We have a responsibility towards nature. Our interest in nature should not be from the point of view of purely *our* interest such that we can exploit it to *our* maximum benefit. *Our* interest in nature should be from the interest of the human race and *our* utilization of nature should conform to the needs of the human race. Nature is the cradle of humanity. And man should see that this cradle is not destroyed. By maintaining an ecological balance man's relation to nature is balanced.

I do not wish to deny Jesus Christ and Gautama the Buddha their right to be called men. As human beings they had their love and concern for man. If we infuse into our hearts Christ's love for humanity and Buddha's concern for man, we can have a better society and better social relationships than what we have to-day. Having grounded the moral values of human life in the human life itself, we can say, *" We have loved God enough, let us now turn our eyes towards the children of God ".*

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KCB's paper is a battle-cry against universalism in culture. He exhorts us to defend and revere our particular culture—to maintain our cultural individuality. If a culture is a set of ideas, then it can be analysed into a sub-set of core ideas and a sub-set of peripheral ideas. All the adjustment, synthesis, assimilation may be made in the peripheral sphere of ideas, but not in the centre. But can we really do that without bringing in some kind of disharmony and inconsistency into the system of culture, for what is there in the periphery may be logically related to what is there in the cente. Strictly speaking if *our framework* is the criterion of assimilation then no assimilation is possible. There is no point in saying that a cultural value p of an alien culture is equivalent to value q of our culture and so we assimilate it into our culture, for in that case either p or q as a separate entity will be a redundant element in our culture. What is needed is the assimilation of new cultural values, but if such values go against the framework they will not be assimilated. This is because our criterion of assimilation is the framework not the nobility of the ideas, i. e., to say the same thing in other words, our march is towards particularism not towards universalism. Particular cultures have to transcend this particularism and the people upholding such cultures must transcend the particular basic attitude they have towards the world and man. The cultures and people by themselves are helpless and they cannot transcend the narrow particularism. Science can help them in this matter. As science is universal, a culture which is based on science will be universal, and science as an in–built mechanism can safeguard the culture from the dangers of dogmatism and narrow particularism. Thus, science can help us to bring about this attitudinal change. The effect will be universal fraternity. Humanity can be saved from the irrational destruction of human lives in the name of *our* culture.

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We must note here that this universal culture is not another science consisting of scientific truths, but it is a system of science-oriented values. Such a culture can enable us to assimilate what is nobler in the so-called alien culture, for here nobility of a value is the criterion of assimilation, not mere framework. And here again particular cultures will be pseudo-pasticulars, in essence they are universal. Being science-oriented, they have become truth-based and being truth-based, they have become living cultures. Let us struggle for such cultures for a better world. In our struggle we shall lose nothing but our superstitions, narrow-mindedness and dogmatism. Our gains are tremendous.—We march into a glorious future.

Some people may consider my views about science and science-based values as too optimistic and may even go so far as to say that my optimism is short-sighted and dogmatic and the result of (1) a deliberate refusal to look at the scars on the face of science and (2) a failure to see the truth that values cannot be derived from the facts of science.[15] First, my whole contention is that there are no scars on the face of science. Rather, the face of science is fair and beautiful, for I make a distinction between science as a knowing process and consisting of the results obtained through this process, on the one hand, and the applications of scientific knowledge, on the other. It is the applications of the scientific knowledge which may be good or bad—may be beneficial or harmful to humanity. Science by itself is not harmful. There are no scars, so how can I see the scars which are not there? Second, by saying "science-oriented values", I do not mean to say that the values can be *deduced* from the truths of science. Values are given to the facts of the world—not that they follow from them. Since we have said that the values of human life must be grounded in the human life itself and not in some supernatural power and as we find

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that science is inextricably a part of human life, our value system must be developed by our scientific attitude such that value system would not be inconsistent with our scientific knowledge.— Our value system and our science will be at peace with each other. It might seem difficult to develop such a value system, but an attempt should be made and the sooner the better. Morality as a value can be secular, for it is not possible for a man to be religious without being moral, but it is always possible for a man to be moral without being religious. *A good man does not become bad, only because he does not believe in a god.*

Now, so far as the harmful applications of scientific knowledge is concerned, it is my belief that our humanistic value system in a living culture should and will be in a position to control the applications of scientific knowledge for the benefit of man, because our conception of a living culture is a conception of a universal culture, not the conception of a particular culture as opposed to other culture. Our conception of a living culture is a conception of a universal culture which is based on truth, not the conception of a particular culture based on dogmas and as oppesed to other particular cultures. This universal, living culture would stand in the way of harmful application of scientific knowledge which is associated with one form or the other of exploitation, for a living culture would be opposed to any form of exploitation.

Whatever I have said above should not be understood to mean that I am urging upon the people to give up what we have as cultural heritage. What I urge upon the people is to winnow our heritage to gather the grains for a living culture.

Most of what I have said above have gone against most of what KCB says in his paper " Svaraj in Ideas ". By that I do not mean to diminish the historical value of the paper. But

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about the philosophical value of the paper it is left to the readers to draw their own conclusions.

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NOTES

* Bhattacharya, Krishnachandra, "Swaraj in Ideas". The discourse contained in the paper was given at a meeting of the students of the Hooghly College during 1929-30. The paper was found among the unpublished writing of Prof. Bhattacharya and it was subsequently published in the *Visva Bharati Journal*, Vol. XX, 1954, pp. 103-114. *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* had brought out a Special Number (Vol. XI, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1984.) on this paper. It is reprinted in the number of the *IPQ* under considesation, pp. 383-393. This Special Number of the *IPQ* also contains the critical reflections of some of the eminent thinkers of India on KCB's "Svaraj in Ideas". All my references are to this volume of the *IPQ*. I have referred to KCB's paper by paragraphs and of others by pages. All references in this paper are to the Special Number under consideration.

1. Prasad, Rajendra, "Svaraj, Reverence, and Creativity" in the *IPQ*, p. 491.
2. Goel, Dharmendra, "K. C. Bhattacharya's Svaraj in Ideas : Some Reflections" in the *IPQ*. p. 429.
3. Prasad, Rajendra, *op. cit.*, pp. 485-512; Goel Dharmendra, *op. cit.*, pp. 423-436; and Verma, Roop Rekha, "Comments and Communications", *IPQ*, pp. 545-549.
4. Bhattacharys, K. C., *op. cit.*, para 3.
5. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 25.
6. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 1.
7. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 2.
8. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 3 (emphasis added).
9. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 13 (emphasis added).

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10. — — —, *ibid.*, (emphasis added)
11. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 20 (emphasis added).
12. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 16 (emphasis added)
13. — — —, *op. cit.*, para 20.
14. And for any particular religion one may have the schema : In the institution of ——,—— is lost. In case of Christianity e. g. one can fill in the schema thus : *In the institution of Christianity Christ is lost.* And for other religions one can fill in the schema *mutatis mutandis.*
15. It can be said here that though it is not possible to have a strict logical derivation of the *ideal* from the *actual* —— or *Ought* from *Is*, still it can be said that the ideal and the actual are related in the sense that a concrete social reality may prompt a particular set of moral ideals and a changed social reality may prompt a different one. Though there is no strict logical implication between *Ought* and *Is*, still in the background of *Is* the *Ought* takes a definite form.

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RATIONALITY AS A CRITERION FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF *ṚGVEDA**

I

Exactly sixty years ago in 1923, Karl Friedrich Geldner writing the preface of his German translation of the *Ṛgveda* pointed out :

> 'Nevertheless the *Ṛgveda* remains the oldest monument of the Indian literature, the book of books, in which the broad stream of the political, intellectual and religious evolution of India can be traced backwards to its last sources. For the linguistic and religious researcher it has not lost anything of any great significance in spite of the masterly method. Its research should always lie at the heart of Indologists now as before. Here in order to enliven and fructify this research a new translation has been undertaken although for the time being such an attempt may appear daring. An ideal translation of *Ṛgveda* should not only fully exhaust the meaning of the original text but also preserve the original venre measure, in order to bring the character of the poem to express in the form .. what I have strived for is also a faithful philological translation'. [1]

The importance of *Ṛgveda* remains unchanged, so is our understanding of it. Despite its unique position at the source of a long literary tradition covering at least three and half millennia, the present understanding of *Ṛgveda* is not complete. The modern researches have tried to penetrate into its secret, but to what

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extent they have succeeded is attested by the following summary :

> 'The Vedic literature is imaginative or primarily concerned with *religious ritual* .. It mentions many tribes, places, and rivers which are probably *historical* but for the most part they cannot be satisfactorily identified or located'... 'The *dividing line* between events on earth and *mythology* is not clearly maintained in these poems (i. e. *Ṛgveda*) and was probably *not* even *logically conceived* [2]

The position between Geldner's translation and in 1967 when Crossland wrote the above has not radically changed. *Ṛgveda* has not yielded its significance or rather its secret. The problems are four. Despite modern methods of research which are described by Geldner as 'masterly' these compositions brought together in *Ṛgveda* are still considered basically religious.

They pertain to religious ritual. This necessarily gives a framework to their interpretation and understanding. This is problem one. The social and geographical details mentioned in these poems appear to belong to this earth and therefore create historical bias. The temptation to verify these cannot be avoided but still evades a firm grasp. A historical framework was not found useful to further the understanding of *Ṛgveda* and hence not above suspicion about its very existence. This is problem number two. The reason for this is the mixing up of the two levels earthly and mythological which cannot be separated from each other. At least so far it has not been possible to do so. And therefore Crossland finally expresses the doubt that probably these compositions are 'not logically conceived'. In this last problem of the logical conception we really come to the criterion of rationality. *Ṛgveda* is known to contain mythology and mysticism. Having been considered a religous work all along, history or historical interpretation and with it the

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necessary verification of facts, agents, events and such other details necessary in a historical reconstruction and a documentation to establish their having been a part of earthly life with the criterion of rationality and every day logic has probably been not seriously considered. Despite Geldner's efforts to give a faithful philological translation many times he heavily depends upon Sāyaṇa's commentary. Establishing historical sequence of events will not be possible without a rigorous rational interpretation of the Ṛgvedic compositions. If this is to be done we have to rescue the compositions from the twin grip of mythopoeic and mystic interpretation and for doing this the source or the springs of mythopoeic thought have to be discovered. This touches upon ' the dividing line between events on earth and mythology '. Thus the problems of Ṛgvedic interpretation outlined above are not separate but corrollaries of one and the same problem and that is the failure to establish the source of the mythopoeic.

Moreover establishing rationality of Ṛgvedic narratives cannot be a criterion for their historicity. In order to establish the historicity, yet another verificatory source is necessary which may be found in contemporary or pre-Ṛgvedic records or archaeological material. [3]

It is true the criterion of rationality assumes that Ṛgvedic compositions contain a logic or rationality which has evaded us so far. In assuming this we are not blundering because for the larger part the Ṛgvedic language and conceptions do not differ much from our own experience of every day reality and that embodied in Ṛgveda. [4] And therefore it is possible that mythology found in Ṛgveda is a later day creation which was not in the minds of or expressions and their meaning used by the Ṛgvedic poets.

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II

In making rationality a criterion we shall not be doing anything absolutely novel. The history of Ṛgvedic phonetic, etymological and grammatical studies have for more than two millennia tried to preserve Ṛgvedic text and understand it and in the process has evolved the long tradition of linguistic and grammatical studies. Amongst such works may be mentioned *Prātiśākhya* texts, the *Nighaṇṭu* and *Nirukta* of Yāska. The former has three branches : The *saṁhitā-pātha*, the *pada-pātha* and the *krama-pātha*, which assist in understanding the text of *Ṛgveda* and other vedas. These have been of use even to modern scholars. This shows that through these linguistic works the ancients also tried to arrive at interpretations and which means it was an attempt to understand *Ṛgveda* logically, rationally by a detailed study of language.

Yāska's is the first known attempt to interpret etymologically the Vedic texts in his *Nirukta* which itself was removed in age and linguistic state from the *saṁhitās*, which is apparent from his remarks about the language of the Vedas and the language of intercourse current in his own time.[5] It is also apparent that even in his days the meaningfulness of the Ṛgvedic verses was already doubted. He refers to this controversy. He puts forth a stout defence for interpreting the Ṛgvedic verses through grammatical forms and accentuation.[6] Evidently already during Yāska's days the meaning of the verses had become obscure. This may have happened even earlier as the list of words called *Neghaṇṭu* which forms the basis of *Nirukta* were handed down traditionally on which he comments. According to Roth, the plan of interpretation of Indian commentators like Yāska was not traditional. It was in reality a grammatical and etymological one. Roth thinks that the scholastic ideas were introduced at an early period but not until the hymns had already become the

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subject of learned study, and the religious views.[7] Yāska belonged to a tradition of etymological interpretation of *Ṛgveda* which he refers to as the *nairuktāḥ*, the school of etymologists. However, an important passage from the 12th section of 1st *pariśiṣta* of *Nirukta* speaks about the method of interpretation :

> 'This reflective deduction of the sense of the hymns is effected by the help of sacred tradition and reasoning. The texts are not to be interpreted as isolated, but according to their context. For a person who is not a *ṛṣi* or a devotee has no intuitive insight into their meaning. We have said before that among those men who are versed in tradition, he who is most learned deserves especial commendation. When the *ṛṣis* were ascendidg, men inquired of the gods 'Who shall be our *ṛṣis* ?' The gods gave them a *ṛṣi* for the science of reasoning, the art of deducing by reflection the sense of the hymns. Therefore, whatever meaning any learned man deduces by reasoning that possesses authority equal to to *ṛṣi's*.' [8]

This passage, cosidered by some to be of a later date establishes reason as a factor in the ascertainment of religious truth. They also had an idea that inductive method of interpretation follows from this.

Next to Yāska, Sāyaṇa is considered to have contributed greatly to Vedic exegesis. To him *Ṛgveda* was a sacred book, a source of all wisdom. Although he has a method of interpretation, it can by no stretch of imagination be called rational, his explanations of Vedic narratives being based on from *puṛāṇas* containing the mythopoeic accretions accumulated down the ages. However Sāyaṇa sometimes uses some unknown sources of tradition and knowledge which are more accessible to us and this is perhaps the use of Sāyaṇa.

...5

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R. Roth occupies a unique position in the history of Vedic studies in as much as he is the founder of the inductive and historical method in this field.

III

Thus were laid the foundations of the rational interpretation of *Ṛgveda,* of which Geldner's translation is probably the most philological of such works, in attempting to make it rational. However, despite this we have seen above the difficulties faced in rendering *Ṛgveda* logical.

This state of affairs, it seems to us, is mainly due to the fact that despite the sincerest attempts the Vedic interpretation has not been able to make a clean break with the mythopoeic and sacrificial interpretation so lavishly imposed by Sāyaṇa. Moreover it seems to be considered an integral element of Ṛgvedic hymns so that a thoroughly rational interpretation of the hymns is no more considered a possibility and in fact the rational interpretation is even considered ludicrous ! It is forgotten that however impossible a hypothesis might look, the research method requires that the evidence cited and the reasoning advanced to reach certain conclusions, must be thoroughly examined before it is rejected or accepted. In any case as a scientific pursuit it must get a fair trial.

In order to bring about a clean break with the earlier interpretative technique, we have to attack the very foundations of the earlier method. The paradigm of traditional interpretation consists in the (linguistic) phenomenon by which certain words are interpreted in two (or more) ways, one in the context of gods (the *devas*) and the other in the context of *asuras* (the adversaries of *devas*). As an example we may quote the word '*asura*' itself when it is used in the context of the so called

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devas it has good sense; when it is used in the context of the adversaries of Indra, as in *asura* Namuci, *asura* Araru, etc. it means an evil being. Besides this, in *Ṛv* X. 177 it also signifies a god–head i. e. a name of a god.

In a scientific and inductive methodology all uses of the word may be examined and an attempt to establish a logical link between all three should be made. What is most important is to examine the basis for the ' good ' and ' bad ' contexts.

However this has never been done, as a result of which the interpretation of *Ṛgveda* could not get rid of the mythopoeic element in interpretation and reach the true rational foundations. One instance of how mythopoeic can be eliminated by questioning this paradigm is given here :

Amongst the Asuras destroyed by Indra is one Araru. There are two references in *Ṛv* to Indra–Araru episode. The narrative by itself is significant for two reasons. It illustrates the general trend of *devāsura* conflict in a particularised manner. Secondly, it illustrates the close connection between Ṛgvedic verses and the *brāhmaṇa* narratives and rites as symbolic enactment of certain events.

In *Ṛgveda,* Araru is mentioned only twice. First in I. 129.3 he is given one line of a three–lined verse, 2. Whereas in X. 99.10 he appears only in the fourth *pāda.* In the first case, Sāyaṇa has interpreted Araru as a cloud and the whole line is commented upon to fit in this context. Geldner has translated the name Araru but has followed Sāyaṇa's interpretation. His translation is as follows : "O brave one, protect every inimical mortal, while you pass over the mortal...". The line reads as : *dasmo hi ṣmā vṛṣaṇam pinvasi tvacaṁ. kaṁ cidvāvirararum śūra martyam parivṛṇakṣi martyam.* The crucial words in this

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line are *' vṛṣaṇam tvacaṁ ' 'yāvīh'* and *parivṛṇakṣi'*. The first, *vṛṣaṇam tvacam'* is a straight forward expression and refers to Arartu and Indra's treament of him.

Araru is the bull-like man, the *naravṛśabha* which in later days is the title of a strong, verile he–man. This Araru was fettered by Indra which is sarcastically referred to as ' Indra allowed him to feed himself well'. *'Yāvīh* may be derived from $\sqrt{yu}$, to ward off, *'Parivṛṇakṣi'* is derived from *pari*+$\sqrt{vṛj}$, to keep off, remove, i. e. similar to *'yu'*. Thus, now the translation of the above line may be : " O you accomplisher of wonderful deeds, you fatten the skin of the bull (like man). O brave one, some mortal Araru you have warded off, you have indeed removed the mortal." The adjective *martya,* mortal applied to Araru is to be noted as it brings him down from the mythopoeic level to the human and terrestrial !

The second reference to Araru in *Ṛv* X. 99.10 is short but meanigful. The verse is in praise of Indra. Only the relevant fourth *pāda* is examined here : *amimītārarum yaścatuṣpāta.* The epithet, *catuṣpāt* is glossed upon by Sāyaṇa as *pādacatuṣtayopeta*[h] one endowed with four feet. Geldner has followed Sāyana's gloss. The *padapātha* writes it as *catuḥ pāt,* i. e. treats it as two separate words. Thus *pāt* when treated as a separate word is the present partciple of $\sqrt{pā}$, to watch, keep, preserve, defend against, to protect etc. Thus the verse may now be translated as : 'He who measured Araru, preserving (him) four times.'

The *Saṁhitā* and *Brāhmaṇa* version support this interpretation. *Vājasaneyī-Saṁhithā* (VS) I.26, *śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* (SB) I 2.4.15–21 and *Taitirīya-brāhmaṇa* (TB) III.2.9.4–6 supply most of the information. VS I–26 cites the *mantras,* the accompanying actions being explained in the SB psssage. TB

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III. 2. 2. 4–6 run as follows : There was an *asura* called Araru. He lay concealed (?) on the earth. So the *devas* said : Araru has been killed by the earth and therefore killed him by earth. Araru was an enemy... They thought : If unrestrained, he will fly to *div*. Therefore, in order that he should not run away to *div*, they surrounded the *div*. So they drove (him) away the second (time). (He was) beaten away from *antarikṣa*. That was the third driving away. They beat him (saying) this is the *div* They drive away fourth (time) silently. They drive him from the *aparimita*, the infinite. He was the chief of the *asuras*.

SB narrative is the most detailed account and probably a faithful represntation of events which appear to be realistic enough to have taken place. We cite below SB 1. 2. 4. 14–26 from Eggeling's translation : 14. And whoever has evil design upon the sacrifice and hates him, him he put down by means of these (three) worlds and what fourth world there is beyond these. And in putting him down with these three worlds and what fourth world there is beyond these, he flings everything away from this (earth), for on it all these worlds rest....

15. Thereupon after putting the grass–bush between he flings (the wooden sword at it). 'Lest I should injure the earth with this sharp thunderbolt !' Thus (he thinks) for that reason he flings after putting the grass bush between.

16. He flings it, with the text: 'O earth, thou affordest the place for making offerings to the gods ! May I not injure the root of thy plant !' He thereby makes her as if it were with roots remaining in her. Whilst he takes up (the earth dug by the sword), he thus addresses her : May I not injure the roots of thy (plant) and in further saying, 'Go to the fold, the abode of the cows !' when he is about to throw it away (on the heap of rubbish), he causes it not to forsake him : for that which is

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within the fold does not forsake him : for that reason he says, ' Go to the fold, the abode of the cows ! '... ' Tie him down, O divine Savitṛ, to the furthest end of the earth ! ' he says (whilst throwing on the heap of rubbish the soil dug up): he thus says to the divine savitṛ : ' Tie him down to blind darkness ! ' When he says to the furthest end of the earth '–' with a hundred fetters ! ' by this he means to say, ' so that he cannot free himself '.–' Him who hates us and whom we hate do not release from there ! '... (17) He then throws (the wooden sword) a second time : ' May I drive Araru away from the earth, the place of offerings ! ' Araru, namely, was an Asura and Rakṣas. Him the gods drive away from this (earth) and in the same way he (the *Adhvaryu*) thereby drives him away from this (earth). He adds (whilst repeating the several corresponding acts): ' Go to fold ... ditto ... release him from there ! (18) The *Āgnidhra* presses it down (on the heap of rubbish) with the text : O Araru ! Thou shalt not fly up to heaven ! For when the gods drove away Araru, the Asura–Rakṣas he wished to fly up to heaven Agni pressed him down, saying ' O Araru, thou shalt not fly up to heaven ! ' and he did not fly up to heaven. In the same way the *Adhvaryu* thereby cuts him off from this world, and the *Āgnidhra* from the side of heaven. That is the reason why he does this. He adds : ' Go to the fold etc. (19) He then throws (the wooden sword) a third time with the text ... (2) Three times he throws it with the sacrificial formula, for three are these worlds and with these worlds, he thereby puts him down (21). Silently he throws a fourth time. What fourth world there may or may not be beyond these (three) by that one he thereby drives away the spiteful enemy ... [9]

The symbolism used is : The blade of grass is Araru. The *Āgnidhra*, the text explains, is virtually *agni* himself, *Adhvaryu* enacts the actions performed by the *devas* themseslves i. e. he

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shuts the *asuras* in from his side. In that battle which is the theme of para 8-10 the *devas* set fire from the northern side so that the *asuras* should not be able to escape.

To summarise the incident : Perhaps Araru, an *Asura,* an enemy of Indra fell into his hands and was kept in captivity in a cow-shed with Savitā as the guard. He was not killed mimediately, though it was thought of. This vacillation is explained by the change of mind of *Adhvaryu.* He first thinks of throwing away the blade of grass on the heap of rubbish, but instead decides to preserve it in the cowshed because whatever is within the shed does not forsake him. So he preserved it. But obviously Araru tried to escape to *Div*, but did not succeed as the fire had blocked his way. Therefore the text says, *āgnidhra,* the virtual *agni*, presses him down. The attempt to flee roused the wrath of the *devas* who killed him. He dies with the fourth stroke. The four strokes represent the three attempts to escape and the fourth one during which he was killed and virtually the three worlds and the fourth one beyond this universe i. e. after death. Thus *catuṣpāt* of the *ṚV* veresion refers to four as being the number of times he has been saved or preserved by the devas after having been taken into captivity.

We see here clearly the process of creating the mythique in an originally realistic event, a man trying to escape from a forced captivity four times after which he was killed. Araru is called 'motal' and had nothing demoniac about him. As soon as we know the correct meaning of *catuṣpāt* for which *padapāṭha* and also the *Brāhmaṇas* furnish the evidence, the mythic element disappears which means this was the original meaning meant to be conveyed by the poet.

We have attributed this change to a self-conscious external interference. This was introduced at a later date. In order to

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determine the timing of this change, it is sufficient to point out that as the above narrative demonstrates it did not exist during the days of the *Brāhmaṇas*. In this particular instance we may hold Sāyaṇa or pre-Sāyaṇa commentators no more available to us, to be responsible for the change of meaning of *catuṣpāt*. But the general change of the *asuras* and their allies being represented as the evil forces and the *devas* as representing good may have been introduced at the time when the *Ṛgveda* was made basis for a ritualistic religion. This change is a cultural change which according to anthropologists must 'inevitably result, sooner or later, in changes in all other aspects.'[10] The new religion was created by the change of roles which was effected by the change of meaning of certain crucial words, like *asura, Vṛtra, purohita, dāsa, dasyu, paṇi, śipiviṣṭa, dasra,* etc, or through the use of transparent symbolism as in the case of Viṣṇu-narrative. This means that a cultural change was effected through semantic change which in turn may have set in motion through chain reaction wider linguistic change which is yet to be studied.

Thus it is possible to account for the mythopoeic element in *Ṛgveda* which should help us to establish the realistic and rational meaning of *Ṛgveda*, the meaning primarily meant to be conveyed by the poets. And perhaps this is the true significance of the *Ṛgveda* which Geldner hoped the researcher will discover.

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NOTES

* This papes was read at the 31st CISHAAN held at Tokyo-Kyto, Aug 31–Sept. 7, 1983.

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RATIONALITY, RATIONALIZATION AND JUSTIFICATION

If a worth-while discussion of any topic, philosophical or non-philosophical, has to be rational, then the one about rationality should also obviously be But then in discussing rationally what one considers to be the nature of rationality, the discussant would perhaps unavoidably be also *using*, in the discussion, his notion or understanding of rationality. Perhaps on this account, though not *only* on this account, some circularity is very likely to creep in his discussion. I shall not, therefore, be surprised if someone accuses the reasoning presented in this paper of being circular, though the reason of my saying all this is not to procure an anticipatory bail.

Perhaps some kind of circularity is bound to creep in the logical analysis of any basic concept. This is not a misfortune to be lamented over because reasoning in a circle is unilluminating only if the circle is really very small. Just as we do cover distance when we move in a big spatial circle and may not come back in our life-time to the point we started from, we can make philosophical progress if the conceptual circle we move in is not too small.

Though rationality is talked about mostly by philosophers, it does not seem to be a peculiarly philosophical concept in the sense that it is copiously used or referred to by common people in their normal transactions. Using my intuitions about, or understanding of, the meaning of rationality as ordinarily or commonsensically understood, I shall first try to characterize the condi-

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tions which, when fulfilled by a person, would entitle him to be called a rational person. I would do this and not discuss the notion of rationality abstractly because this procedure seems to be a better way to handle even the abstract notion of rationality. But even if that is not true, I prefer it because it offers me the hope of serving the interests of this paper better than the latter.

To be rational, one must, it seems to me, have the concept of rationality. To have or possess a concept is to have the ability to conceptually behave in a certain manner in an appropriate situation. The latter does not necessarily mean the ability to analyse the concept, rather the exhibition of the ability to use the concept provides the data which a sound analysis has to take into account or against which it has to be checked. Philosophers analyse the concept of rationality but it is not that they alone possess it, nor that all those who possess it are philosophers.

To possess the concept of rationality is to be able to recognise (a) when something is a reason for something else and (b) what are one's conceptual or logical liabilities or responsibilities when he admits or acknowledges that something is a reason for something else.

(a) Evrything is not a reason for everything else and everything may not have a reason. But there are things for which reasons exist. That I like strong coffee may be a reason for my going to a restaurant where it is available and not any reason for my going to the restaurant with a fur cap on my head, and there may be no reason for my wearing a fur cap while going to the restaurant for a strong cup of coffee. To have the concept of rationality is to have the ability to distinguish between reasons and non-reasons in one's own as well as in others' cases, and also to be able to distinguish between weak and strong, worse and better, reasons. There may be a situation in which he himself is

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not able to provide a reason, but he must be able to identify whether or not the one offered by another person is, or whether it is better or worse reason that another offered by someone else or available to him from his own resources.

(b) To recognise or admit that R is a reason for A is not a blank admission in the sense that one cannot remain unaffected by the admission. Suppose R is a good reason for A and A is a proposition or a factual claim. Then by admitting that there is a good reason for A one incurs the liability or responsibility to accept or believe that A. Not to do so would make him irrational and would entitle us to call him irrational. In fact, if we do not call him irrational, then we would become irrational. It is irrational not to call a man irrational who does not accept as true the proposition that A while admitting that there is a good reason R certifying that A is true

Whether or not one accepts A to be true, when he accepts that there is a good reason for its being true, is independent of his interests as well as of the effects of accepting that A. A rational person would accept that A even if doing that adversely affects any of his interests or is likely to have some favourable or adverse effect for someone else. Similarly, a rational spectator would call him irrational (or rational, as the case may be) without caring for the effects of his doing so. If a person does not arouse a feeling of trust in me, I would not call him trustworthy, but if he admits as true what he has a reason to, I would call him rational without caring for the feeling his doing that, or my calling him rational, is or is not likely to arouse in me. In this sense rationality is a rational, cognitive, non-subjective, concept.

To say that a rational person accepts as true what he has a reason to does not mean or imply that he never does the contrary. It simply means, as already said, that he has the liability or responsibility to do that. Just as one may fail to

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fulfil some of his responsibilities in other walks of life, he may fail to fulfil some of his responsibilities as a rational person. This is only to say that one may sometimes be irrational, and when he is, it is irrational to treat it as a miracle. But all this does not mean that one can nonchalantly *choose* to be rational by accepting that A or irrational by rejecting it. The admission that there is a good reason for A exercises a coercive influence in the sense that one feels committed to accept that A; it becomes one of his responsiblities to aecept that A. If, on the other hand, he does not feel the coercive influence, he would be rationally obtuse and not just irrational. But if he feels it but due to some non-rational factor does not do what as a rational person he should have done,he is irrational.

If A is an action and R a good reason for doing it or deciding to do it, then again to accept that R is a good reason and not to do A would be irrational. Here also one incurs a liability or responsibility to do A by admitting there is a good reason for doing it. But the passage from one's admitting or acknowledging that there is a good reason for (deciding to do A or) doing A to doing A is not without any gap. The time for doing A may not have arrived, or some internal or external factor may stand in the way of his doing it, etc. But the rational person must feel inclined or prepared to do A; otherwise either his acknowledgment rhat there is a good reason for doing A, or his rationality, is not genuine. A rational person may, therefore, have a good reason to do A and still may not do it without becoming irrational, but he must be prepared or inclined to do it. However, if there is no hindrance, internal or external, to his doing it, then he cannot remain rational if he does not do A at an appropriate time and place while still admitting that there is a good reason for doing it.

To acknowledge that one has a reason for accepting that A is a proposition, is to have, thus, a pro-attitude towards accepting

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its truth. It is this attitude which can properly be called a propositional attitude. Similarly, if A is an action, to admit there is a reason for doing it is to have a pro-attitude towards doing it. As any attitude is a disposition, it need not be actualised, i. e, find expression in actual action of the relevant kind if all or some of the necessary conditions of its actualisation have not been satisfied. But it seems to me that one who admits the existence of a reason for doing A and also denies having any pro-attitude or inclination towards doing it cannot be said to have the concept of rationality in a full-blooded sense; that is, we cannot call him a rational person. He, in fact, does not know what does it mean to admit or aknowledge the existence of a reason for doing something.

A reason for an action may be conceived as indepenendently intelligible as well as intelligible only in relation to the agent of action. In the former sense it is simply a reason for the action. For example, one may say that M's obedience to the leader of his party is the reason for his having been chosen by the leader as the party's candidate for the election, or that leader's belief that M is obedient to him is the reason of his having been chosen. Since an action is always an agent's action, meaning by the agent an individual or a group of individuals, the concept of the agent's reason seems to be primary concept and that of the indpendently intelligible reason a derivative from it. A reason for an action, in its natural sense, is the reason of the agent of that action for doing it, and when we find that a certain reason is generally or normally the reason of serveral agents, or one which we also consider to be the reason, we speak of it as an independently intelligible one.

Sometimes one feels like saying tnat something is a reason for doing A though it is not the reason of a particular agent for his doing A. For example, he may say, one's dedication to social

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service is the only reason for being chosen as his party's candidate, but the leader of no party considers it to be so. But here also the concept of reason is not agent-neutral. One who makes the above assertion is in fact saying that had he been the leader of a party, one's dedication to social service would have been his reason, or that if a leader functions the way he ought to, his reason for choosing candidate would be the latter's dedication to social service. A reference to the agent, thus seems to be essentially involved in the concept of a reason for an action.

The concept of an agent's reason tautologically involves the agent's acceptance, admission, or acknowledgment that it is a reason. It may be a belief, an intention, or acknowledgment of something as a duty or an obligation. We can say that L's reason for chosing M as his party's candidate is his *belief* that N is dedicated to him when he intends to select one who is so dedicated, or his *intention* to make him so dedicated believing that his making him the party's candidate will do that, or his *acknowledgment of his being obligated* to choose him because of a past promise. But in either case the reason becomes the agent's reason because of its relationship with him, because it is *his* belief, *his* intention, or *his* acknowledgment of obligation.

But to see the rationality of his behaviour does not mean that we accept his reason as the right reason. Reasons are as much amenable to assessment or evaluation as are actions. A leader who selects his party's candidate because of his dedication to himself has as much a reason for his selection as his opponent who selects his party's because of his dedictation to social service. After knowing their reasons we know the rationality of their selections and both the selections become equally intelligible, and in a sense rational to us, but without entailing that the two reasons have equal weight.

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We grade reasons on so many grounds, moral, political, strategic, etc. For example, one may say that dedication to social service is a better reason than dedication to the leader of the party for selecting a party's candidate. The grading of reasons has its effect also on the grading of actions. For example, an action done for a better reason is graded as better than another done for a worse one. The *choice* of a candidate on account of his dedication to social service may therefore be said to be a better choice than the one made on account of his dedication to the leader. But any action for which the agent has a reason to do is a rational action.

The agent's reason explains his oction or makes it ntelligible in the sense that after knowing the reason we know *why* he did it. But does it mean that anything whatsoever the agent *can* offer and we *can* accept as his reason ? Suppose the leader of the party, when asked why did he select M as the party's candidate, mentions as his reason the fact he was born on a Monday. We know now *his* reason but still we may say that in a sense our puzzlement about his choice remains unmitigated. But in fact the puzzlement has now shifted to his acceptance of M's being born on a Monday as a reason for selecting him. But suppose he says that the voters have a strong liking for people born on a Monday and among the applicants for the party's ticket he was the only one born on a Monday. With this explanation, our puzzlement vanishes or at least becomes very much lessened. We now see the (believed) causal link between his being born on a Monday and his chances of being elected. His being born on a Monday is now accepted as a reason by us because of its causal link with the expected result of his selection : he is selected because he is expected to win the election and he is expected to win because he was

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born on a Monday. Therefore, an agent's reason is a relevant reason if it is causally related, directly or indirectly, with what the action is intended or expected to achieve, though it is not the cause of the action.

The above is a good example of means-end of prudential rationality. Quite a few philosophers maintain that to be rational is to select what one considers to be the best means to what he desires or intends to have or achieve. B's gifting a rare book, which he very much needs for his own research, to C can be called a rational action, or B a rational agent, if we find that he *wants* to resuscitate his fading friendship with C and believes that his gifting the book would (or is very much likely to) produce the desired result. It is rational to select or use what one considers to be the best means to his end and irrational not to do that. But to be entitled to be called a rational agent, one must be able to see that the reason for doing something, which is a means to some end of his, is the fact that it is a means to the latter. That is, he must have the concept of rationality, the ability to understand what it is to be a reason and to feel the force of importance of the relationship that exists between a reason and that for which it is a reason. It is obvious that reference to both, a desire and a relevant belief, is necessary to explicate the notion of means-end rationality.

It is not necessary that whatever a rational person does is rational. For example, he may pick up a book from his shelf and start reading it for no specific reason. There may not be any reason for his picking up a book as against, say, picking up his violin and any for picking up the book he actually picked up rather than any other one within his reach He might have picked up the book because he had nothing else to do, but that he had nothing else to do cannot be said to be the reason for his picking up the book, because it is not a reason for doing any-

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thing. But suppose after turning idly a few pages he comes across a page which gives some statistics he very much needed and therefore starts perusing the book very seriously. His perusal then becomes a rational action though his picking up the book is not.

To say, therefore, that to be rational is to possess the concept of rationality is not to say that whatever the rational man does is rational. It only means that whenever one does something rational, or whenever we consider someone a rational agent, the rationality of the action or of the agent can be explicated in terms of the agent's having the concept of rationality.

The concept of means-end, or desire–belief, rationality, cannot be applicable to moral rationality, i.e, to cases where the reason for doing something is a moral reason, whereas the model presented here seems to be applicable to means-end as well as moral rationality. Moral rationality can be reduced to means-end rationality only if moral reasons are considered to be hypothetical reasons, i.e., reasons involving desires and beliefs, as Mrs. Philippa Foot does in several of her writings viz maintaining that moral judgments are hypothetical imperatives. I shall not try in this paper to criticize Mrs. Foot or participate in the controversy which her writings have given rise to, as I propose to take up this subject elsewhere. But I do hope to show how the model of rationality presented here can take care of moral rationality without reducing it to prudential rationality, while explaining the latter as well.

Every reason for an action need not be causally related to the intended or expected result of the action and every action need not be done intending or expecting it to have something as its outcome. This seems to be obviously true of a moral reason. A moral reason is generated by one's acknowledgement

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of an obligation, or we can even say that one's acknowledgement itself of the obligation to do x is a reason, or rather a conclusive reason, for doing it. Suppose L, the leader of a political party, admits or acknowledges his obligation to select a candidate only if he is whole-heartedly dedicated to the cause of non-violence. Then, if he finds that M is so dedicated and does not have any countervailing vice, he has a moral reason to select M. Whether or not he wants to select M on some other ground as well, or wants his selection to produce a certain result, would in this case be immaterial, as far as the rationality of his selecting M is concerned. His act of selecting M is a rational act since he has a reason, or what he considers to be a reason, for doing it.

I can say, in reply to the question why did he select M, that he did that because of M's dedication to the cause of non-violence, or beeause he was obligated to do that (on account of M's dedication. ...). The latter expresses the former in a more explicit form. M's dedication becomes a moral reason for L to select M because L has accepted the moral principle that one ought to select a candidate only if he is dedicated to the cause of non-violence, and it is therefore that his acknowledgement that he ought to select M is *his*, the agent's, reason for his action. M's dedication will not be L's moral reason for selecting M unless and until L feels or acknowledges that he is obligated to select one who is so dedicated.

One's acknowledgement that he is obligated to do x is a reason for his doing it because, after knowing that he is so obligated, we cannot ask him to supply a further reason, nor can he ask for one after admitting that he ought to do it. And, his acknowledgment of obligation, though a reason, or rather a conclusive reason, is not causally related to the action or any intended or expected outcome of it.

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Davidson says that the explanation of an action in terms of the agent's reason for doing it is a rationalization.[1] He does not, I think, use 'rationalization' in the psychoanalytic sense. Rather he seems to mean that to offer a rationalization of an action is to exhibit the rationality of the action. In this sense, which seems to me a fair interpretation of Davidson's intention, knowing the agent's reason does make his action appear rational, though we still retain our option to assess the acceptability of his reason in terms of our norms about what could be or should be the reason for an action of the kind his action is. But to offer a rationalization, for Davidson, is not to offer a real justification. It is only in an aneamic sense that the rationalization of an action justifies it, since it only shows that "from the agent's point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action.'[2]

Referring to a non-moral example, he says that the agent's reason justifies his action if it is true (of course, if it is something which could be true or false). My belief that it will soothe your nerves explains and thus rationalizes why I pour you a shot, but it will justify my pouring you a shot only if it is true.[3]

To justify my act of pouring you a shot the belief that doing so will soothe your nerves must be *my* belief and it must be a true belief. Unless it is my belief it cannot be my reason and unless it is true it cannot justify the action for which it is claimed to be a reason. This seems to be Davidson's thinking. But if it is true that pouring one a shot soothes his nerves, it cannot justify my pouring you a shot if I do not believe that it does. And, if I believe that it does, it will justify to me my pouring you the shot. Similarly, *to another person,* an evaluator of my action, my reason, i e., my belief, will justify my action if he also holds the belief as I do. To hold the belief for me, as well

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as for him, is to hold it as true, as to hold any belief for any person is to hold it as true. But that is another story because it is involved in the concept of belief and not in the concept of justification.

A belief, offered as the agent's reason for an action of his will thus justify his action to him and to another person who also holds it as the agent does. Therefore, to say that, in addition to its being held, the belief must also be true, to justify the action, is not an accurate description of the justificatory role of the agent's reason, since the fact as such referred to by the belief or the truth *per se* of the belief, does not by itself play any justificatory role. What justifies the action from the agent's point of view is *his* (the spectator's) holding the same belief. If the latter does not hold it, it does not justify the action from his point of view. If he says that it does not justify even from the agent's point of view, it can be intelligible only if it is taken to mean that from his point of view, the agent's point of view, which considers it to be the justifier of his (the agent's) action, is mistaken. But this only means that it does not justify from his, the spectator's, point of view. The agent's questioning the spectator's account of justification can also be given a similar interpretation from the side of the spectator.

I conclude, therefore, that the agent's reason not only rationalizes but also justifies his action from his point of view and the spectator's acceptance of the agent's reason rationalizes and justifies it from the spectator's point of view. The obvious implication of this position is that an action can be justified only from somebody's, the agent's or the spectator's, point of view and not without involving any reference to anybody's point of view.

It may be objected that the above analysis also implies that he same action may be both justified from the agent's and un-

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justified from the spectator's point of view, or *vice versa*. Of course, it does, but that does not mean that the same action is justified and unjustified. Nor does it mean that the agent's and the spectator's points of view have to be at variance with each other A spectator may accept the agent's reason and the agent also may, after having reflected over the spectator's criticism of his rationalization or justification, agree with the spectator that what he considered to be a good reason for his action was not a good reason, or that he made a mistake in identifying his reason.

Referring to my earlier example, the spectator S may agree with L that L's belief that M is dedicated to the cause of non-violence justifies his selecting M, or as a result of S's criticism L may agree with him that he should not have considered it to be a good reason for selecting a candidate, or even that it was not his real reason. He may do the latter if, for example, as a result of S's probings, he does some serious self-analysis and then finds that he really selected M because of her charming looks and manners and not because of her dedication to non-violence.

To understand properly the agent's reason and its rationality or justifying power in relation to the particular action, whose reason it is claimed to be by the agent, is not exactly like understanding the relationship between a proposition and its logical implication. If I know what the proposition means and certain linguistic or logical rules, I would know whether or not it implies what it is claimed to imply. But to understand properly the reason-giving role of an alleged reason for an action I have to be well acquainted with the non-linguistic, pragmatic context in which the action is done, the agent's or his society's relevant world-view or ideology, etc. For example, the social-political climate prevailing in a country and the prospects, ideology or

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world-view of a political party, or of every political party, may be such that one's dedication to the leader of his party is a better reason than his dedication to non-violence. A critic of the agent's reason may not accept his world-view and, therefore, may not accept his reason as a good reason, but then his quarrel with the agent is really about the latter's world-view and consequentially about his reason.

It is not too much to assume that a rational critic, who properly understands a rational agent's world-view or the particular sector of it which is relevant to the action concerned, would agree with him about the justfying power his reason has from his point of view. In case he shares the latter's world view, he would also consider it justifying from his own point of view. The universality built into the concept of rationality, and, therefore, into that of rationalization or jusification, can thus be interpreted as follows : If one rational person sees the world as another one does, he would agree with the latter's judgment about the rationality and consequently justifiability of an action of his explained in terms of his (the agent's) reason. It does not mean that two rational persons can never disagree about the rationality of an action, and it would be irrational or foolish to prescribe that what eyeryone considers to be rational alone should be called rational.

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NOTES

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A PROBLEM CONCERNING NYAYA THEORY OF NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKSA

I

'There is no substitute for this thing' this type of usage is very common in language of advertisement of an object. From this it is understood that the necessity of this particular object cannot be met by some other objects. That is, there are some essential features (of this object) that are not common in others. The term 'essential' implies its inherent uncommon properties which can be expressed as 'essence'. If thers is any opportunity to express the salient features of an object by language etc., it is *Savikalpaka* (or determinate). There are two types of awareness : the perceptual awareness being purely private cannot be communicated to others and perceptual awareness though not wholly manifested to us cannot be denied totally. In other words, there is an awareness, which is not capable of being expressed with the help of any word. Such a type of knowledge is technically known as *Avyapadeśys*. Though there is an awareness yet it cannot be expressed in as much as the nature of it is not wholly manifested to one. If it is asked the reason for it, the answer is that there is no substitute *(Vikalpa)*. The 'concept' (in the sense of mental construction) of an object becomes a substitute for expressing it. The mental constructions that are borne by 'pure object' are called concepts. Names, colours, universals etc, are borne by an object and, hence, they are called 'concepts' *(Dhāraṇā)*. The 'pure objeet' is called substratum *(ādhāra)* while the 'concepts' are called superstrata *(ādheya)*. The concepts serve as substitutes for expressing that 'pure object'. The

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knowledge having substitute is called *Savikalpaka* while the knowledge bearing no substitute is called *Nirvikalpaka*. The Naiyāyikas accept such type of *Niryikalpaka Pratyakṣa*. The present paper deals with a problem arising out of the *Prāmāṇya* of such type of perception and its probable solution that could have been forwarded from the, Nyāya point of view.

II

The Naiyāyikas accept the theory of extrinsic truth (*Parataḥ Prāmāṇya*) of knowledge According to them, the truth of our knowledge is determined through the successful inclination *(Saphala Saṁvādipravṛtti janakatva)* of the knowledge. If our knowledge leads us to the successful inclination, it is to be taken as acceptable. There, the argument that is involved can be expressed as follows : " The perceptual cognition is acceptable if it leads us to the successful inclination *(Praiyakṣānubhūtiḥ Pramā Saphalpravṛttijanakatvāt)*.[1] The knowledge of water would be taken as tenable if it really quenches our thirst. In the like manner, the untenability of our knowledge is determined by the unsuccessful inclination of the same *(asaphala Visaṁvādipravṛttijanakatvāt)*. If the knowledge of water does not quench our thirst, it is taken to be untenable. In this way, the truth of each and every knowledge is determined.

Now the problem is how the *Prāmāṇya* (tenability or truth) of *Nirvikalpaka* knowledge can be determined. It is true that inderterminate knowledge is a kind of sensation having no name, universal etc., and hence, there is no relation between qualifier and qualificand. These is no means through which the tenability of such type of knowledge can be determined as the two criteria, viz, *Saphalapravṛttijanakatva* and *Visaṁvādipvavṛttijanakatva* of determining *Prāmāṇya* are not applicable here. The knowledge which does not cognise the characteristic features of an object is

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empty and hence the search for its empirical necessity or otherwise does not arise at all.

It may be argued how an object can exist without being endowed with its characteristic features. What is the proof for the existence of such a type of object? In reply it can be said that as indeterminate knowledge is a knowledge, it must have some object, since there is no knowledge which does not have an object (*aviṣayaka*). As it is said that indeterminate knowledge is knowledge, it is already accepted that it has some object. According to some Naiyāyikas the object of knowledge is threefold : *Prakāratā, Viṣayatā* and *Saṁsargatā*. In the case of *Nirvikalpakajñāna* (indeterminate knowledge) there is a special type of *Viṣayatā* called *Turīyaviṣayatā* (i. e., fourth *Viṣayatā*) which is inexplicable in nature.[2] Hence a problem arises how the extrinsic truth of the object can be determined. Keeping this problem in view perhaps, Viśvanātha does not admit the perceptuality of the indeterminate knowledge. The perceptuality of an object having no relation with qualificand and qualifier is, as observed by Viśvanātha, not possible at all.[3]

If it is argued that the indeterminate perception may be taken as self-evidently true (*Svataḥ Pramāṇa*) just as the truth of the truth of the injunctions like ' *Svargakāmo yajeta* ' (i.e., one should perform sacrifice as a means to attain heaven) are taken as self–evidently true, it would go against the *Naiyāyikas* ' position since they do not believe in this type of truth. *Naiyāyikas* have accepted the existence of the indeterminate perception, but they have not given any solution of the problem which lies in determinate perception.

III

One solution of this problem, I think, can be given from the *Nyāya* stand point if all of their views are critically reviewed.

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They have pointed out that a man's action is of three types. When one forsakes some object, it is due to one's desire of rejection *(Hānabuddhi)*. In the case of the acceptance of something, it is the result of his desire of acceptance (*upādānabuddhi*). An action existing between acceptance and rejection comes into being due to the result of the desire of being indifferent *(upekṣābuddhi)*[4]. Let us try to spell it out. The knowledge of the conduciveness of an object (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*) generates the desire of acceptance. The knowledge in the form 'The orange is good for health ' is known as the knowledge of the conduciveness of the desired object. If the attainment of good health is desired, the observation of an orange will give rise to the knowledge in the form : ' This is conducive to its being desired' (*idaṁ madiṣṭasādhanam*). So the knowledge of the conduciveness of being desired gives rise to the knowledge of acceptance from which effort comes into being. That which does not seem to be conducive to my being desired is rejected. This rejection occurs due to the desire for the same.

The above view is put forth by the traditional Nyāya philosophers. In the case of acceptance and rejection I accept their view. So far as *upekṣā-buddhi* is concerned, I beg to differ from them. An object, I think, is either accepted or rejected but there is no scope for being indifferent. The indifferent state of mind which is claimed as *upekṣābuddhi* would fall under the category of rejection. That is to say, 'being indifferent' is also a kind of rejection in as much as this phenomenon also depends on the knowledge of the non-conducivenss of the object. In favour of this argument the following form of *Tarka* (Reductio-ad-absurdum) may be put forward : 'If it would have been conducive to us, it would be accepted. As it seems to us to be non-conducive, it may be ignored, which is also a kind of rejection.

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That in the case of *upekṣābuddhi* there is a sense of rejection is evidenced by the fact that a snake is rejected due to having the sense of *Aniṣṭasādhana* (i.e., which is capable of doing harm). It may be argued that *Aniṣṭasādhanatājñāna* is of two types: the knowledge of an object which is capale of doing harm and the knowledge of the absence of the usefulness of an object. In the case of the former, the *Naiyāyikas* have accepted the knowledge of *Hāna* (rejection) but in the latter case there is *upekṣābuddhi* as the object does not serve our purpose nor does it any harm to us.

The above-mentioned notion of *upekṣābuddhi*, I think, is not at all *upekṣā* in as much as it is in our awareness that the object does not serve our purpose and hence it may be ignored. This ignorance (in the sense of indifference) is not at all *upekṣā* in the true sense of the term, but it is also rejection as it is done keeping the knowledge of the absense of its conduciveness in view. *upekṣā*, in the true sense of the term, is possible in the case of an object if there is absolute negation of the sense of conduciveness or non-conduciveness. If an individual be indifferent towards an object as it does not suit him, it is a rejection (which is put in the name of *upekṣā*). The real *upekṣā* emerges when we have no consideration of such *iṣṭa* or *aniṣṭa* which is determined in terms of our attachment. To a seer the whole world is not at all the object of attachment and hence he becomes indifferent. Moreover, an object is not manifested as such to a seer, but it is manifested as the Divine. The true nature of the object is beyond his awareness as his mind is connected (*yukta*) with the Divine on account of which the indifferent state is possible. This indifferent attitude is *upekṣā* in the true sense of the term in as much as this state does not arise out of the sense of *Laukika iṣṭasādhana* (conducive to the desire for an ordinary object.)

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From the above discussion it is concluded that there is no scope for *upekṣābuddhi* without having the knowledge of the absence of *iṣṭasādhanatā*. How did the *Naiyāyikas* insert it as one of the three types of *Buddhi ?* What is the exact state of mind when there is *upekṣābuddhi ?* In response to this one solution can be given in the following manner. It may be said that when an object is not endowed with name, universal, definition etc., there does not arise any question of accepting or rejecting it. In this situation alone, *upekṣābuddhi* arises. The acceptibility or rejectibility of a particular object is not determined due to the lack of its determinator i.e., knowledge of conduciveness or otherwise which depends on the *Savikalpaka* knowledge of it. At this stage *upekṣābudhhi* comes into being. This type of knowledge which is known as *Avyapadcśya* or *Nirvikalpaka* is the producer of *upekṣābuddhi.*

Another argument may be forwarded in favour of the acceptability or tenability of *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that an object, just after its coming into being remains attributeless and actionless for a moment. If substance (*Dravya*) and attribute (*Guṇa*) are produced simultaneously, substance cannot be antecedent and hence, it cannot be inherent cause (*Samavāyī Kāraṇa*) of the attribute (*Gnṇa*). That is why, attribute and action are accepted to be produced just after a moment of the origination of *Dravya*. Let us see whether the indifferent attitutde towards an object is possible for a moment. It is true that an object may remain without attribute and action. An object may be described as effect (*Kārya*) by virtne of the fact that it is produced. That which is *Kārya* must exist in as much as on Nyāya view object is produced means the prior-absence (*Prāgabhāva*) of it is lost and hence, it becomes a counterpositive of its prior-absence (*Prāgabhāvapratiyogī*).

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So it is shown that an object exists, but due to its attributelessness it does not come to our direct awareness and hence, it cannot be rejected or accepted.

In this context it would not be irrelevant to point out that each and every object is recognised through the impression of the previous experience. In order to recognise an object at least one moment is essential. In order to recognise a jar as such the previous experience of it is to be recollected. The recollection needs at least one moment and through this a jar is recognised or known as such. During one moment the jar is not known as such and hence, it remains indeterminate to us. As the object is indeterminate only for this small period of time, the *upekṣābuddhi* towards this object arises. Through the experience of *upekṣābuddhi* the tenability of indeterminate perception can be determined and this is the extrinsic way of determining its truth (*Parataḥ prāmāṇya*). The form of the argument leading to it would be as follows : 'The indeterminate perceptual knowledge is tenable as it can produce the indifferent knowledge towards it' (*Nirvikalpakapratyakṣānubhūtiḥ pramā upekṣābuddhijanakatvāt*). Here the *Sādhya* i.e., the acceptability of indeterminate perceptual knowledge is inferred on the strength of the *Hetu* i.e., being the producer of *upkeṣābuddhi (Upekṣābuddhijanakatva).*

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NOTES

1. *Siddhāntamuktāvali* on verse No. 133.
2. "*Nanu trividhā ceha jñānaviṣayatāprakārtāviseṣyatāsaṁsargatābhedāt. Tatra jñānamātrasya svaviṣayakatvenanirvikalpakepi kāścid viṣayatāpekṣiteticet. Turiyaviṣayatāyā eva tatrābhyupagamāt*". Siddhantamuktavali, (Edited by Pt. Pancanan Bhattacharya), p. 280.
3. "*Tathā ca prathamato ghataghatatvayorvaisiṣṭyānavagāhyeva jñānaṁ jāyate tadeva nirvikalpakaṁ. Tacca na pratyakṣaṁ. Tathā hi vaiṣiṣṭyānavagāhijñānasya pratyakṣaṁ na bhavati.* Siddhanatamuktavali on Verse No. 58.
4. "*Yadā jñānaṁ tadā hānopadānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalaṁ.*" *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* on *vyāyasutras* 1.1.3.
5. "*Dravyasya guṇakriyā samavāyikāraṇatvāt guṇakriyāyorutpatteḥ prāk tatsattvaṁ. Ata evotpannaṁ dravyaṁ kṣaṇamaguṇaṁ tiṣṭhatiti niyamaḥ*", Siddhantamuktavali on Verse No. 14.

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DISCUSSION

THE NECESSITY OF THE MATERIAL CONDITIONAL

Dr. Mullatti's paper, 'The Necessity of the Material Conditional', (IPQ, 1983. pp. 329–340), is indeed a stout defence of the concept of the material conditional. It goes a long way to ward off deviant suggestions of the thinkers haunted by the spectre of the paradoxes. Yet, I believe that the paper leaves scope for discussion.

It appears to me that Dr. Mullatti, by holding, "Our intuition regarding negation – that the negation of a true statement is false, and that the negation of a false statement is true – is clear enough and is accepted on all hands" (p. 331), has taken too much for granted. This intuition claimed to be 'clear enough' does neither appear to be *enough clear* nor *an intuition.* Dr. Mullatti's intuition is possibly based on his acceptance of the Principle of Bivalence (PB) without question. But opposition to PB comes from a number of quarters. The intuition of the intuitionists like Brouwer, Heyting and others is opposed not only to PB but also to the Law of Excluded, Middle (LEM). Aristotle looked upon PB with an eye of suspicion, though he had nothing against LEM. It is well-known that Aristotle was in favour of a truth–value–gap between truth and falsity such that the negation of a true statement could not always be false, nor that of a false statement could always be true. The statement, 'There shall be a naval battle tomorrow', was neither true nor false for Aristotle. His argument, almost, verbatim, has been

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revived by Lukaseiwickz in modern times to rule out PB. Strawson has come to be known as provoking opposition to PB. I am sure Dr. Mullatti is well–aware of all these. What surprises me is that the learned scholar has ignored all these oppositions simply on the ground of a 'clear intuition'. What awaits and demands Dr. Mullatti's acceptance is that the verdict of our intuition is of doubtful value.

Similarly, the way conjunction is being used in truth–functional logic has also been objected to. Everett J. Nelson went so far as to propose a ban on simplification of conjoined elements. According to him, the simplification principle '$pq \supset p$' and the addition principle '$p \supset p \vee q$' are at the root of what is known as 'Paradoxes of Implication'. He declares, 'Needless to say, it is to '$pq \supset p$' and '$p \supset p \vee q$' that the so–called Paradoxes of Implication are due." (Vide E. J. Nelson : 'Intensional Relations', – *Mind,* 1930, p. 448). Nelson adds, "... in view of the fact that a conjunction must function as a unity, it cannot be asserted that the conjuction of p and q entails p, for q may be totally irrelevant to and independent of p, in which case p and q do not entail p, but it is only p, that entails p". This shows that Nelson hos an intuition opposite to that of Dr. Mullatti. Threfore, Dr. Mullatti's acceptance of the classical notion of conjunction on intuitive ground alone loses plausibility. I, for myself, never think that the position of Nelson is impervious. What I think is only that mere testimony of intuition is less than enough to restore confidendce in the impugned principles.

What is more important is that one may not like to accept the 'logical truth' claimed under (5) of his paper. All those who claim there must be a connection C between the antecedent and the consequent in all forms of conditionals will suggest a modification of (5) to (5′) :

$$5'. \quad (p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow [(p \,\&\, -q) \vee -C]$$

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This calls for a modification of (6) to (6′) :

$$6'. \quad (p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow - [(p \,\&\, - q) \vee - C]$$
$$\leftrightarrow [- (p \,\&\, - q) \,\&\, C]$$

['C' stands for 'Connection between the antecedent and the consequent']

We cannot, therefore, hold, "... a conditional is false *if and only if* its antecedent is true and its consequent is false", as claimed by Dr. Mullatti in his paper. (Vide p. 331). Critics may demand replacement of *'if and only if'* by *'if'*.

What even the critics of the notion of material implication are obliged to accept is :

$$5''. \quad (p \,\&\, - q) \rightarrow - (p \rightarrow q)$$

or,

$$6''. \quad (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow - (p \,\&\, - q),$$

not the equivalence laid down in (5) or (6) of Dr. Mullatti's paper. Thus, the critics may accept :

$$7'. \quad - (p \,\&\, - q) \leftrightarrow (- p \vee q) \ldots \ldots$$ By De Morgan's Law and reject :

$$7. \quad (p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow (- p \vee q)$$

for, according to them :

$$7''. \quad (p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow [(- p \vee q) \wedge C]$$

and

$$7'''. \quad (- p \vee q) \leftrightarrow [(- p \vee q) \wedge C].$$

It is felt that Dr. Mullatti could have avoided this controversy had he not set out with a notion of negation, or conjuction, or with the logical truth laid down under (5), each of which is already a topic of lively controversy and battered by hostile attacks.

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To cut the long story short, I hold that the unassailability of the notion of the material conditional is a direct consequence of the following that are likely to be acceptable to all :

(a) There are uses of conditionals of ordinary language of communication in which the antecedent and the consequent. the two consitituents, bear no connection between themselves other than that of truth-value.

Example : ' If John passes the examination, the stars will stop their movement.'

These conditionals communicate well. In this sense :

$$(\text{If p, than q}) \leftrightarrow \sim (p \,\&\, \sim q)$$

(b) All genuiue conditionals are contraposable hypotheticals of the form : ' If..., then...', as distinct fron theticals which are non-contraposable sentences of the same form. Austinian ' If '-sentences like :

' There are biscuits in the cupboard, if you want. ' are really examples of theticals, not of genuine conditionals. (Vide, John A. Barker : ' Hypotheticals : Conditionals and Theticals ' – *The Philosopical Quarterly,* October – 1973, vol. 23, no. 93, pp. 335-345).

(c) The type of conditionals mentioned in (a) above is built only on the common element of all genuine conditionals that are not theticals. The common element of all genuine conditionals is an assertion that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false is not the case.

(d) It is only the common element of all genuine conditionls described in (c) above that is termed ' Material Conditional ' represented by :

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$$`p \supset q'$$

or,

$$`p \rightarrow q'$$

(e) Points (a)——(d) justify the equivalence :

$$(p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow - (p \,\&\, - q)$$

or.

$$(p \rightarrow q) \leftrightarrow (- p \vee q).$$

This notion of the material conditional is a part of our neat language of truth–functional logic. An instance of this form may or may not serve the purpose of ordinary communication which often contains elemenls that are non–truth–functional. It does serve the purpose of logic well. It gives elegance to the language of logic. I only uphold what Dr. Mullatti means by the concluding line of his paper :

'As such it is to be heartily welcomed, not demurred'

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BOOK-EV IEW

The Riddte of Existence : An Essay in Idealistic Metaphysics

Nicholas Rescher; Lanham, MD : University Press of America, 1984. Pp. vi, 99. $ 12.25

This relatively brief essay has set out for itself an ambitious project, namely, of addressing the problem of why anything exists, or as we might say, simply, where it all came from, perhaps secretly hoping once and for all to close the explanation gap. As Heidegger has already made us aware, the problem of why there is something in the universe rather than nothing is indeed and also has been one of the most fundamental questions which metaphysicians have had to face. In the present essay the author in general looks for an explanation of the existence of thinges, not in the productive operation of efficient causes, but in an account of the world's law framework in terms of a 'teleology of value' which amounts to an evaluative axiology without, he himself is careful to explain, taking into account a teleology of purpose. Rescher attempts to develop a naturalistic approach to an idealistic metaphysics in the tradition of Plato, a metaphysics later furthered, it is claimed, by Leibniz and his followers. It is hypothesized that by admitting an evolutionary naturalism an emergent intelligence should be able to understand and explain its own existence in the conceptual terms of reference that have evolved with it such that we as intelligent human creatures are now able to come to cognitive grips with reality on our own mind-reflective terms.

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In his introductory chapter Rescher proceeds to dismiss some of the many responses that have been put forward in attempting to explain what has been heretofore for the most part inexplicable. For example, necessitarianism, mysticism and all theological solutions are summarily ruled out of court since it is the author's avowed purpose to proceed exclusively along naturalistic lines. His declared option is a nomological approach invoking fundamental laws or 'protolaws' of nature comprising an overarching 'hylarchic' value principle in order to provide the basic conditions for all existence. It is assumed at the outset that there are always reasons why things in the world are as they are such that we are fully justified in doing battle with the problem of existence through the powers of rational inquiry alone.

Rescher argues for a domain of real possibility, a 'receptacle' after the fashion of Plato's *Timaeus* composed solely of protolaws which would furnish basic lawful principles for existence and wherein all actual existence must find its accommodation. He attempts to show that any such principle is a feature that the existing world must necessarily possess. His reasoing is simply that the real world must possess some feature suggestive of a superior value principle in lawfulness because the world must have it necessarily, and the world has to have it necessarily because all worlds actually are found to have it. This piece of week inductive reasoning is obviously an appeal to instances in fact alone. A transcendent protolaw is invoked to explain the world of existing things, yet it is never spelled out precisely how this principle originates beyond the fact that it is grounded in the nature of all the 'really' possible worlds to be found in nature An even closer look at Rescher's pivotal argument shows that he wishes to prove a theory for the whole of existence, a theory which should stand apart, if need be, from the existence of individual things. Yet the theory depends implicitly for its proof

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upon the circumstances of real possibilities in the actual world, possibilities that are nevertheless authorized by the supreme protolaws. We must have existent things, it is said in order to have the required explanatory principle, and we must have a value-supported principle in order to provide the authority for things in existence. Indeed the argument spins in place, for in establishing a highest axiological principle to formally sanction the existence of things the theory has deliberately drawn upon premises which state the existence of all the observables in nature. The theory wants at the same time to be transcendent and empirical, one foot in each camp, so to speak, although it can hardly pretend to reside in both.

In the second chapter the author further considers his concept of protolaw as a precondition for all that exists, including all ordinary first-level laws of nature. The high-level or protoprinciple will be value optimizing and must take the form of a Principle of Axiology, yet it must be neither anthropocentric nor unscientific. Rescher purports to provide a metaphysical justification for all the laws of nature, a truly global pattern in explanation of the real possibility of all laws. To accomplish this a normative evaluative order is required in the mode of a final causality, a Principle of Axiology that will enhance all lesser values maximally, one that will embrace simplicity and elegance and all the desirable features of the laws we have already set out for ourselves in the natural realm. Even the ordinary laws of nature are declared to be what they are only when it is felt they fulfil a teleological necessity. In brief, Rescher means to say that only the axiological value principle is of ultimate worth as a principle because of its own inherent value to itself, a conclusion which on the face of it appears somewhat less than conclusive. The problem would reside in how to demonstrate a final proof for this very final principle.

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Yet it is insisted that intrinsic value as such is self-explanatory since it is seen to possess ultimate worth in itself, an unobservable ideal in which may be found the one principle possessing a kind of unique and all-encompassing value. Rescher adds that a supreme value principle has the select power it does have because such is for the best, and it is largely on the strength of this assertion that the Principle of Axiology is seen to rest. The principle is thus affirmed to be self-substantiated and self-referential because it is in and through itself value-referential. There is no mention made of a possible conflict of values encountered in the process of selection of the one final and best value principle.

Chapter three centers around the contention that an axiological explanation need not be purposive, where purpose may be said to relate to human interests. While admitting his final causality of value to be a form of teleology, Rescher desires that the Axiological Principle should be entirely impersonal and one that is altogether distinct from human experience. But almost immediately in chapter four Rescher claims for his system a conceptual idealism capable of being understood by mind-endowed beings. The idealist aspect of the theory is said to depend upon its interpretation by human minds, a mind-involvement without total mind-dependency. The value principle, the mainstay of the theory, is to remain objective and impersonal; it is in no way assumed with Schopenhauer, for example, that this world is my idea, but simply that the nature of the world, however it may be possible to conceive the world, reflects the nature of the human mind. If such is the case, and not forgetting that we are now asking for a mind-interpreted universe which aspires to an idealism, the theory is not as severely and objectively distinct from human experience as we were given to believe in the previous chapter.

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The final chapter can only be described as a disappointing and even a distressing anticlimax affixed to the main body of the essay, detracting from whatever unity might have been achieved in the first chapters. Rescher now appears to turn exclusively to the natural sciences and to mathematical physics in particular in order to provide a methodological prototype in the interests of answering metaphysical inquiries. The coveted protolaws are now to be thought of as fundamental field equations patterned after the general laws of relativity and according to the way in which these laws have been developed in the physical sciences. It is as if nature as found in the physical world makes up the whole of existence and furnishes us with everything that is needed to be explained. Rescher at the start sought an ultimate principle for all existence, but his concern is latterly with principles that embrace only pure science, for his strategy is now one that hinges of the deliverance of science to provide a prototype for his own unique axiological approach to value theory. He is not ready to acknowledge that science, especially the direction taken by science according to its late technological developments, has failed to offer us a life-affirming view of the universe. Rescher does not notice the fact that traditionally the focus of intrinsic value has rested entirely with the individual rather than with the field theories of physics. He very much wants a scientific model but is neglectful of the fact that science itself has up to now been careful to avoid value solutions in its own theorizing.

In his essay Rescher has made no mention of the realm of human morality nor of the world of aesthetic judgment responded to and recognized by sense verification alone, worlds nevertheless having actual existence for the individual concerned. Further, the author does not distinguish between being and existence, a consideration which would be essential in order to

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admit him to a rock–bottom level of metaphysical deliberation dealing as it does with being as being as surely the proper subject matter of metaphysics. We fail to be convinced of the conclusion that the Axiological Principle is self–explanatory, alleged to be so because the role played by value itself can be explained in given value–referential terms. We doubt very much that the essay can pretend to offer any complete metaphysical solution to the problems inherent in existence as such without taking into account a basic ontology of being.

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WHAT IS IT TO UNDERSTAND A DIRECTIVE SPEECH ACT?

In this paper I want to examine the concept of "conditions of fulfilment" or "compliance" or "satisfaction" which have been introduced by some authors in order to provide analyses of meaning which are just as adequate to directive speech acts as truth–conditional semantics are adequate to assertive speech acts. It will be argued that this aim is missed. Most analyses (except those of some primitive cases) will remain throughout *incomplete* as long as they are not supplemented by a specification of *conditions of normative validity*. In the case of several illocutionary verbs they can be substituted by *conditions under which the speaker could make use of sanctions against the hearer.*

In Analytical Philosophy the notion of the truth-conditions of a sentence is frequently taken to be the key of any cogent semantic theory[1]. A theory of meaning for a natural language is claimed[2] to be a theory of truth, i.e.,

> "a set of axioms that entail, for every sentence in the language, a statement of the conditions under which it is true".

But if so, immediately the following problem arises : there are lots of sentences that do not have *any* truth-conditions because they are not even set out to be true or false. The truth–conditional approach only works, as Frege clearly saw, in the case of statements, and questions that can be answered by "Yes" or "No".

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> "Wieviele Arten von Sätzen gibt es aber? Etwa Behauptung, Frage und Befehl? – Es gibt *unzählige* solcher Arten: unzählige verschiedene Arten der Verwendung alles dessen, was wir 'Zeichen', 'Worte', 'Sätze' nennen. Und diese Mannigfaltigkeit ist nichts Festes, ein für allemal Gegebenes, sondern neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andere veralten und werden vergessen."[3]

A truth-conditional approach obviously is too poor in order to do justice to the great variety of language, even though we should not talk, as Wittgenstein was apt to do, about the countless ("unzählige") uses of language.

> "Philosophers will do this when they have listed as many, let us say, as seventeen; but even if there were something like ten thousand uses of language, surely we could list them all in time. This, after all, is no larger than the number of species of beetle that entomologists have taken pains to list."[4]

Peter Strawson, in his "Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics", "Individuals"[5] tries to give an account that allows to save truth-conditional semantics although being suitable for speech acts other than assertives. Strawson starts from the consideration that orders and statements can have the same propositional content. The same referring expressions and the same elements of predication can occur in both. Of course orders cannot be true. But, Strawson argues, just as it is essential to a statement that it can be *true* or *false*, it is essential to an order that it can be *obeyed* or *disobeyed*, and to a promise that it can be *kept* or *broken*. So we may say that a "value of fulfilment" belongs to every proposition: a positive one if the statement, the order, the promise in which the proposition is respectively manifested is

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true, obeyed, or kept respectively, and a negative one if the statement, the order, the promise is false, disobeyed, or broken respectively. In his paper "Meaning and Truth"[6] from 1969 Strawson points out that

> "in almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a substantial core of meaning which is explicable either in terms of truth-conditions or in some related notion quite simply derivable from that of a truth-condition, for example the notion, as we might call it, of a compliance-condition in the case of an imperative sentence or a fulfilment-condition in the case of an optative."

This view has also been accepted by Michael Dummett who says in his article from 1975, "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to Be?"[7], that

> "we know the individual content of an imperative sentence by knowing in what circumstances the command it conveys will have been obeyed, and that we know the individual content of an optative sentence by knowing in what circumstances the wish it expresses will have been fulfilled. In this way we may think of the individual content of a sentence of most of the other categories as being determined by associating with that sentence a certain range of circumstances, the significance of that association depending upon the category in question."

This approach to doing theory of meaning–viz. by stating the conditions of fulfilment, or, as he calls them, of satisfaction–has been worked out in more detail (and, as we will see, already corrected in some points) by John R. Searle.[8] Searle takes the usual first step[9]:

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> " We say, for example, that a statement is true or false, that an order is obeyed or disobeyed, that a promise is kept or broken. In each of these we ascribe success or failure of the illocutionary act *to match reality* in the particular direction of fit provided by the illocutionary point. To have an expression, we might label all of these conditions *' conditions of satisfaction '* or *' conditions of success '*. So we will say that a statement is satisfied if and only if it is *true*, an order is satisfied if and only if it is *obeyed*, a promise is satisfied if and only if it is *kept*, and so on."

So far Searle's approach does not differ from Dummett's, although his whole approach, grounded on a general theory of Intentionality [10], notoriously differs. But for reason of space I will leave all problems connected with Searle's theses that a

> " speech act will be satisfied if and only if the expressed *psychological state* is satisfied, and [that] the conditions of satisfaction of speech act and, psychological state are *identical* " [11]

aside. I shall concentrate on an assumption that is common to Strawson's, Dummett's and Searle's approaches.

Their starting point is that statements, orders, promises &c. have one thing in common – the propositional content –, and that they are distinguished by illocutionary force; in speech acts of the form F(p) the illocutionary force F determines the different modes in which the same propositional content can be presented to the hearer, – indeed, for example, as a statement, order, promise, wish &c. Of course we mustn't think of mode as just some modification that could be left out. On the contrary there is no way that one can just mean that p without meaning it in any illocutionary mode at all. Propositional content after all is just an abstraction. At least as Searle puts it – and I think

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he is right in doing so –, one cannot have a propositional content, even in thought, without some indicator of mood or force (e.g. "*I wonder* if p" or "*I doubt* whether p"). Now the question arises: how does the force operate on the propositional content? What is the F doing to the p? To answer this question Searle introduces the subject of *direction of fit* [12]. Behind this subject there is the idea of *correspondence between sentence and reality* which forms our intuitive idea of *truth*. The difference between statements on the one hand and orders, commands promises &c. on the other is that in the case of the first, correspondence (or "fit" or "match") has to be there when they are uttered, whereas in the case of the latter correspondence (or "fit" or "match") has to be brought about after they have been uttered. They have to be, so to speak, "made true" by realization. And in the case of declaratives their very performance by itself should bring "about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality"[13]. (They alter reality simply by representing it as having been altered.) In each of these cases the *conditions of satisfaction* are fulfilled if and only if there is *correspondence between the propositional content and the facts*. (These may be brute facts, as in the case of many scientific assertions, or institutional facts, as in the case of a declaration[14].)

To understand the argument I want to develop next it is essential to see that the idea of correspondence between sentence and reality – the idea of truth – is behind *all* of these ("obedience –", "fulfilment –" &c.) conditions that are ascribed to sentences that cannot be true or false. Remember that satisfaction – (compliance – /fulfilment – &c.) conditions were introduced in order to achieve analysis that is as adequate to orders, promises &c. as the analysis of truth-conditions is adequate to statements, assertions and questions with a "Yes"/"No"– ans-

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wer. In this paper, I want to take it for granted that truth-conditional analysis is indeed adequate to assertives, but I want to deny that the conditions of satisfaction–analysis is equally adequate to the other kinds of speech acts mentioned above. If we compare truth-conditions with conditions of compliance, fulfilment &c. there is a revealing asymmetry : whether a statement is true *determines* whether it is *valid* (in the strong sense of *universal validity*), but whether an order is complied with *doesn't even say the least bit* about whether it is conventionally in force (for even orders that are in no way conventionally authorized can be complied with), and it is obvious (and follows a fortiori) that it also doesn't say *anything* about the validity of the order in a sense beyond the merely conventional[15]. This manner of speaking may sound a bit strange to English ears for it is no doubt pretty common to say that an *argument* is valid, but neither that a *statement* nor that an *order* is valid. Nevertheless it is justified because in both cases we may ask the Kantian question "quid iuris ?" (as opposed to merely "quid facti ?") and we will have to answer it by reference to evidence of some kind and a chain of argument in the case of the *statement*, and by reference to a normative justification in the case of an *order*. When we ask : *Why* do you, X, suffer from a tooth-ache ?", X can *only* specify the *causes* (if he knows them), e. g. by saying : "*Because of* such and such bacteria damaging my molar." The "why ?" is synonymous with "quid facti ?". But when we ask "*Why* do you give this order ?" or "*Why* do you state that p ?" the X can specify *either causes* – e. g. neuro-physiological events : and these are usually unknown, or, if known, represent a hopelessly goofy level to analyse these speech acts *as* speech acts – *or* he can specify *reasons*, that is : he can produce – valid or invalid – *argument*. (The "why" can be interpreted as either "quid facti ?", or "quid iuris ?" which in this case is the much more interesting question.) Now, *if* the argu-

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ment is valid (in the strict sense, that is *not merely believed* to be valid), I will say in the following that the statement or the order *based on this argument is valid.* And an order is valid, *not* because it is accepted (and therefore complied with) by the hearer, but because it is *right,* just as a statement is valid, not because it is accepted (and therefore believed) by the hearer, but because it is *true.*

" Conditions of satisfaction " are just, as it could be seen from our quotation from " Intentionality ", the *conditions of correspondence between proposition and facts,* and as philosophers we are allowed to be pedantic and call them like this. In the case of a statement these are plain identical with the conditions under which a statement is valid (because even if a statement is rude or misplaced : if it represents reality as it is, it's valid), so it *seems* useless to distinguish these two types of conditions. But, as we have just seen, they are *not* identical in the case of directives (and the same holds for commissives and declaratives),– therefore we should draw this distinction, although there is no point to it in the case of assertives :

	conditions	
illocutionary categories [16]	conditions of validity fulfilled [17]	conditions of correspondence between proposition and reality fulfilled
ASSERTIVES (e. g. state, predict)	true	true
DIRECTIVES (e. g. order, forbid)	(morally/legally) right	complied with by the hearer

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conditions

illocutionary categories	conditions of validity fulfilled	conditions of correspondence between proposition and reality fulfilled
COMMISSIVES (e. g. promise, contract)	(morally/legally) right	kept by the speaker, observed by the contracting parties
DECLARATIVES (e. g. excommunicate, degrade in military rank)	(morally/legally) right	successfully achieved

Truth–conditions have been the paradigm for all the other Strawson–Dummett–Searlian " fulfilment–conditions ". For this very reason they are the *right* concept for analysing–to continue the manner of speaking introduced above – the validity of *statements,* though they are *wrong* concept for analysing the validity of *orders, commands, promises, declarations* &c. But then the question arises whether the latter is *neccessary at all* within a theory of meaning and understanding. To answer this question–which is indeed the crucial one–we first have to step back in order to see *how much is achieved by " conditions of satisfaction "*. As we know they give us the conditions under which a request would be *complied with* or an order would be *obeyed* or a command would be *followed* or a promise would be *kept* respectively. Now doubtlessly this *is part* of understanding the meaning of a request or an order or a command or a promise respectively. There is no disagreement about that. The point I want to make is this : these are *not the whole story* about understanding requests, orders, commands, promises.

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To make the argument for this thesis we have to clarify the notion of "*understanding*". A hearer shows his understanding of a speech act by his reply to it : by accepting it or reserving judgement ("I cannot decide this at the moment") or rejecting it in a certain form. This is *not* tantamount to the opinion that meaning and understanding have to be defined in terms of hearer's reactions. The intended effect of *meaning* is *not*, as Grice put it falsely, *a hearer's reaction*, that is : a *perlocutionary* effect. If someone says "It's raining" and means it, he does *not necessarily* intend to produce in the hearer the *belief* that it is raining. Altough the *perlocutionary* aim of *convincing* the hearer may very often be connected with statements, it is, as I take it, *not* part of a definition of meaning. Both are not internally connected, as, on the contrary, *meaning and understanding* are internally connected. *Understanding* is the knowledge of what speech act a speaker is performing, that is : a knowledge of its propositional content and its force.

I do *not* advance the thesis that only hearers which react by "yes" / "no"–answers, connected eventually with reasons understand statements or orders. On the contrary it seems to me thoroughly possible that a hearer understands a statement or even an order and nevertheless (or even therefore ? !) ignores it. He may reply nothing at all, turn around and go away, although he has understood pretty well. *If he has understood*, then turning around and going away would be characteristically equivalent to a (n unfounded) *rejection* in the case of essentially hearer-directed speech acts (such as orders, commands &c.), whereas we would not know how to interpret this behaviour in the case of *not* essentially hearer–directed speech acts (i.e., assertives and expressives). But at *all* events, *if* the speaker's bevaviour *is* like this, he cannot–that's crucial–*show* unmistakably whether he has understood or not. Therefore the speaker will

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not know whether he has achieved uptake. To summarize this point : trivially, a speaker *can* understand without performing a speech act in response, but all the same, since the achievement of uptake cannot always be made out by observation of the hearer's physiognomy, it becomes definitely accessible if there is some reply like acceptance or explicit reserve from judgement or rejection.

What I have said so far was by way of a *preliminary remark* to an *argument*. The *argument* is this : *There is a series of ways of rejecting an order which are at least as " I'm not going to do it " = " the propositional content will not be satisfied "*. One can say, e. g. : " You are not the boss here " or " You are the boss but you are not authorized to give me any command you like, e. g. not the command to lick the floor of this room " or " You are the boss here but the command you gave me is inconsistent with the penal code, and that's the higher authority " or " You are the boss here but the performance of the action you told me to do is morally not justifiable " or " You are the boss but that whole principle of hierarchical organisation is incompatible with the principle of equal rights ". So if we think of what it is to give a command as opposed to a simple expression of a wish, we see that there are all kinds of features on a morally / legally relevant speech act that have *nothing* to do with conditions of satisfaction and the dimension of correspondence to the fact. Rather, *why* – this means : *for which reasons* – the speaker can expect the hearer to perform the action ordered or commanded, seems to be *part of the understanding* of an order or a command. This even holds for simple imperatives – the gunman shouting " Hands up " is also giving a reason for obeying his order : it is the gun that will normally function as a reason for the hearer to do the thing he was ordered to do.

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Now one might remark on these considerations : all this is quite nice but it's a point about *pragmatics* rather than about semantics. But, I want to say : So what ? This doesn't show that my point is irrelevant but rather that pragmatics then have to be integrated into a general theory of meaning and understanding : the semantics of propositions obviously is *not* the only thing that matters in a theory of meaning.

Now if we adopt the approach proposed in this paper we can see there really *is* an analogy between assertives and directives, but that it does *not* consist in the circumstance that understanding them *is the same as* understanding their correspondence to the facts (truth in the case of assertives, obedience in the case of directives &c.) – on the contrary, that's wrong – but rather *that there is an internal connection between meaning and validity in both cases* : between truth and meaning in the case of assertives, between normative validity and meaning in the case of directives. In both cases we have to know the conditions of possible *validity* and, of course, the *conditions of possible correspondence between proposition and reality,* as I want to call them precisely. Now these two sorts of conditions *converge* in the case of *assertives,* because a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts. This convergence is the reason why some people just forget about the conditions of validity in the case of directives, commissives, and declaratives. But that is a mistake, because in the case of the latter these two sorts of conditions *diverge.* (The reason for this divergence is the noted difference between " Is " and " Ought ".)

In order to understand the whole illocutionary meaning of a speech act F(p), where F has got the force of a directive, commissive, or declarative, it is *necessary, but not sufficient* for the hearer to understand the conditions of fulfilment for p. The mistaken view, that these are *sufficient,* can be refuted as follows

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the request that you do A, the command that you do A, even the perlocutionary act of exhorting you to do A all have *the same* propositional content and *the same* direction of fit ("hearer-based world-to-mind", to speak with Searle), hence they have *the same* conditions of fulfilment : so there wouldn't be any difference in understanding these quite different acts–and this cannot be correct. Within the class of directives there is a wide variety of cases ranging between requesting, asking, urging, requiring, demanding, commanding, ordering, forbidding, prohibiting, enjoining, permitting, advising, recommending, begging, supplicating, entreating, beseeching, imploring, praying &c. – and they have all different sorts of features, some of which are essentially normative. Discriminating these is obviously relevant to getting the meaning right. Therefore Searle is correct in *rejecting* the view that *all* that matters to meaning are the *conditions of satisfaction* determined by *illocutionary point* [18] : according to his recent analysis [19] it is *hardly ever* the case that *all* we have to understand is the *propositional content* with a *direction of fit*, though the grasp of these two of course *is* a *minimum* requirement. (As Searle puts it, illocutionary *point* is *just one* of *seven* components of illocutionary *force* [20] such as degree of strength... – I won't list them here.)

In the case of an imperative the speaker must *at least* understand what he is supposed to do in order to bring about the state of affairs desired by the speaker. But this is *not enough* in order to understand the illocutionary force of the imperative. The hearer must in addition understand why the speaker expects that he can successfully impose his will on him. Searle gets close to this point when he argues that different "modes of achievement" [21] :

> "a speaker who issuess a command from a position of authority does more than someone who makes a request.

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> Both utterances have the same illocutionary point, but the command achieves that illocutionary point by way of invoking the position of authority of the speaker. In order that the utterance be a successful command the speaker must not only be in a position of authority, he must be using or invoking his authority in issuing the utterance."

And already in "Speech Acts" [22] Searle introduced the notion of *preparatory conditions* as internal conditions on the performance of directives and declaratives. Fulfilment of these should consist in the speaker's being the authorized person or being otherwise in the position to perform the speech act. It is an internal criticism of the command "I command you to pull down St. Peter's Church" or the declaration "I hereby excommunicate you", to say: "You cannot do that, you are not the Pope."

Still there are cases that differ from these two. Searle tends to deal with the question of normative rightness as if it were *only* a matter of *institutional facts,* or whether the speaker was *in fact in a position of authority over the hearer* – at least he does-not go into any other examples. However, *there are cases* where it is *not at all* a matter of social facts, but which would *have to be* included into a general and complete theory of meaning and understanding for directives. If someone wants to understand the "Categorical Imperative" he is certainly *not* confronted with the question whether Kant was in fact in a position of authority to command people as follows :

> "Handle so, daß du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden andern, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchest." [23]

The question whether Kant was "in a position" to utter this imperative comes down to the issue : could he present sufficient *reasons* to convince people that they ought to act like this and

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not otherwise? (And although I do *not* propose to *define* directives by reference to a dominant "normative rightness claim" on which Habermas tries to base the classification – implausibly, because there is quite a lot of directives where there is no such thing internal –, we may also call into question the Searlian approach. According to the latter it is the illocutionary point of *any* imperative *whatever* "to try to get other people to do things"[24]: such that the "other people" serve as a means to achieve an end viz. the state of affairs in the world that is specified in the propositional content. But *obviously* this is *not* the illocutionary point of the Kantian imperative just cited. Furthermore a definition of the *illocutionary* point in terms of tried achievement of a *perlocutionary* effect – "getting other people to do things" - must be wrong.)

To put the chain of argument presented more systematically[25]: In the case of a directive a speaker's pretension is *either* backed by reasons (that's the case of a rational moral justification: Kant), *or* by some institutionalized authority (that's the case of a lieutenant gives commands), *or* by potential sanctions (that's the case of the robber's "Hands up!"), *or* by some combination of these (that's the case of many judicial systems today where reasons are given during the debate before legislation, where there is an institutionalized authority and thirdly punishment as a permanent threat to all those which are apt to violate the law).

Therefore knowledge of conditions of satisfaction has to be supplemented by knowledge of conditions for the possible agreement with an imperative. A hearer understands an imperative,

(1) if he knows the conditions under which he would bring about the desired state, *and*

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(2) if he knows the conditions under which the speaker would have convincing reasons to regard an imperative as either

(a) *valid* (that means: *normatively justified*) or

(b) *efficient* (that means: supported by potential sanctions sufficiently deterring from disobedience).

Of course the robber's gun *itself* is *external* to the performance of his speech act "Hands up!", but it is *not* external to the performance of such a speech act *that the speaker is able to give a reason of some kind* why people should raise their hands; and the only recognizable reason in this case is the gun which provides, as a possible sanction, the efficiency of the imperative, (Instead of sanctions there may be also baits and lures in favour of the hearer.) The same holds for normative reasons. The military rank of, let's say, the lieutenant which provides the legal basis for his giving commands *itself* is not internal to his giving commands; – however, *a reference to a legal authority of some kind* which functions as a reason for the hearer to do what he is commanded to do *is lexicalized* in the illocutionary verb "to command"[26]. (The ability of giving reasons of some sort *needn't* be a preparatory condition to *all* directives, but it certainly is a preparatory condition to all exacting demands which cause the hearer trouble of some kind. I will come back to this point.)

One of the preparatory conditions to issue a directive consists in the speaker's being either in a position of *authority* or in a position of *power* over the hearer. We ought to be struck by the fact that the normative rightness claim can be *substituted* (or complemented) by a claim to power supported by reference to sanctions which will be executed in the case of the hearer's contravention There is *no analogy* to this in the case of *assertives*,– there is *no way* I can *substitute* the conditions of validity of the Pythagorean theorem by anything else, e.g. a reference to my

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power or to sanctions of which I dispose. However, as soon as I perform a speech act of the directive kind, like "Explain the Pythagorean theorem !" or "Repeat the Pythagorean theorem !" or "Assent to the Pythagorean theorem !" I have the *option* to add *either* " ..., because that 's the right thing to do " *or* " ..., otherwise I will blow your brains out". In the case of an *assertion*, if there is doubt whether it is true, I can *not* say "Well, I don't say that p is true, nevertheless I assert it. " By way of contrast, if there is doubt whether an *imperative* is legally right, the robber may say without *any* pragmatic inconsistency "Well, I don 't say it is right, nevertheless I tell you to do it " or " Right or not, all the same you have to do what I want, otherwise I will blow your brains out !". The "true"–" false " – dimension of assessment is internal to *all* assertives, whereas the "legally right"–" legally wrong "– dimension of assessment is external to at least *some* directives. *It is internal only if the speaker himself has (implicitly) claimed* to be legally justified like the lieutenant *commanding* his troops or the judge sentencing someone to five years in prison. If the claim wasn't raised *by the speaker* (implicitly or explicitly), but just by some other people (e.g. legislators and judges), there is *no way* to identify a performative self–contradiction. A claim to legal rightness can be external even if the speaker *is aware* that it *will by all known odds be applied to* his act (as crooks usually are). This is true of any external feature whatever : I may *be aware* with certainty that criteria of relevance or inteligence *will be applied to* what I'm saying, nevertheless there is *no internal* commitment to relevance or intelligence in what I'm saying, because " saying something" is *not constituted by* or *defined as* " saying something *relevant* and *intelligent* " in the first place. There may be *external* commitments to say solely intelligent and relevant things (e.g. if the speaker is a member of a learned society); likewise there may be *external* commitments to direct people only if it is normatively

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justified, because *trivially* it is *always* possible to *connect* a claim to legal / moral rightness with a directive, e.g. by saying "In the name of law I order you to do A". This of course is possible with every aspect you like. I might claim that all I say is relevant or noisy–and up from this moment it has *become* an internal criticism to say "That's irrelevant" or "That wasn't noisy". But exactly this shows that claims of this sort originally were external : that there isn't any necessary conceptual link between "saying something" on the one hand and "saying something relevant" or "saying it noisily" (that is : not only at a certain loudness level, but really at the top of my voice) on the other. It shows that they were external because, as distinct from this case, it's *impossible* to make an assertion and then, to *connect, as an extra,* a *truth claim* with the assertion. It's possible to utter imperatives with or *without* a claim to normative validity, or to make assertions with or without a claim to relevance – but it is *impossible* to make assertions *without* a *truth claim. By* making an assertion I *have already* raised a truth claim – if I want to avoid the truth claim I have to avoid the assertion. There is no *option* if I would *like* to *connect* a truth claim with my assertion for the very reason that the truth claim is a claim *constitutive of* speech acts of the assertive mood.

Only internal features of a speech act can be *part of its meaning.* Or, if we start from the viewpoint of the hearer : *only* by an *internal* criticism or by an acceptance motivated by reasons that were *implied* in the *speaker's* utterance a hearer shows his understanding of *the particular speech acts under consideration* in an unmistakable way. (Trivially, also someone who advances an external criticism or no criticism at all can have understood pretty well – this issue has already been discussed.) Our first thesis that understanding a directive consists

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in the knowledge of conditions of satisfaction plus conditions of validity therefore was much *too rough.* Knowledge of the conditions of validity is *only then* part of the meaning, *if* a claim to validity has been–implicitly or explicitly, justly or not–*raised by the speaker.* If he says " Hands up—otherwise I will blow your brains out ", then it's clearly an internal criticism to say " You can't do that, because what you've got in your right hand is just a water pistol ". In terms of what we've said so far : knowledge of the conditions under which the speaker is in a position to *enforce* the hearer to satisfy his perlocutionary intention is part of the understanding of *this* speech act. But it would be an *external* criticism of *this* speech act to say " You mustn't do that, because it is in conflict with § umpteen of the penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany ". Why ? Because *the speaker* did *not* claim that it was in good accordance with the penal code. Knowledge of the conditions of validity is *not* part of the understanding of *this* particular speech act. Therefore a modification in our previous argument about different ways of rejecting an order becomes necessary. In terms of the argument given : *It is constitutive* of the claim to blow the hearers' brains out that the speaker disposes about a weapon of some kind that is *fit* to attain this aim in the case of hearers' contravention, *but it is not constitutive* of this claim that it is or is not in good accordance with penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany (which includes *regulative* rules on acts of different sorts). We are inclined to confuse meaning-constitutive rules and other regulative rules imposed on the speech act performed in such a case because in order to live a social existence it is never sufficient to understand *only* the *one* speech act that has *just* been performed. We have to understand speech acts that are performed by robbers *and* speech acts that are included in the penal code, and we have to *combine* our knowledge of both. But we mustn't draw false consequences from this necessity. It is

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by no means part of the *sentence-meaning* of "Hands up–otherwise I will blow your brains out!" that the performance of this speech act is in particular circumstances in conflict with § umpteen of the penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany. This simply doesn't follow. (And the *avoidance* of *this* absurdity does *not* bring on consequently the alternativc absurdity that a hearer can understand *one and only one* sentence. I think Searle is right in stating that the concept of the literal meaning of a sentence is perfectly compatible with holism, i.e., with the thesis that literal meaning only functions against what he calls "the network" and "the background"[27]).

To summarize the approach developed so far: To understand a directive is to know the conditions under which it is complied with *plus* the conditions under which it is valid (if there are such) *or* the conditions by which conditions of validity can be *substituted. Either* the speaker does by his order appeal to the validity of some norms in the background shared by him and the hearer – these may be conventional ones like an office, a military rank, positive law or, at least in their pretension, superconventional ones like a moral principle – (= 2a), *or* he appeals to the conditions under which he will make use of particular sanctions of which he disposes (like the gunman) (= 2b), *or* both (like the penal code appealing to its – conventional – validity and to the punishment laid down in the law). In *each* of these cases the speaker – for short we may speak of the legislator as a speaker as well – wants *more* to be recognized than just his *intention*, i.e., how he would like the world to be or what state of affairs must be brought about: he wants the hearer also to recognize either the *legitimacy* (= 2a) or the *efficiency* (= 2b) of the order or both. He raises a *claim to validity* (= 2a)) or a *claim to power* (= 2b) which has to be understood in order to understand a directive speech act (– just as

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the claim to validity, i.e., to truth which is internal to an assertive speech act has to be understood in the case of, e.g., a statement). So the conditions under which the command would be *legitimate* or *efficient* have to be *added* to the conditions under which the command would be *satisfied* (conditions of correspondence between proposition and reality) in order to get a *complete* analysis.

This will be necessary at least for many directives, though, as already suggested, presumably *not for all*. Indeed it does make sense to *call upon* somebody by reference to pure subjective arbitrariness, although it does *not* make sense to *state* anything by reference to pure subjective arbitrariness: You can *not* say "2 + 2 = 4 for the only reason that I want it so", but you *can* say "Give me a light for the only reason that I want it so." We might think of an example where the speaker and the hearer are not bound by any duty to give each other lights, nor is the hearer under an unilateral obligation of this content to the speaker. The speaker is supposed to be much weaker than the hearer, and he is not equipped with any device – as, e.g., a machine–gun – to *enforce* the hearer to give him a light, If we make these (in no way extraordinary) assumptions, then there will be neither any conditions of validity nor any conditions of the speaker's being able to enforce the hearer. The hearer does what the speaker wanted him to do – *if* he does it – *only* because the speaker wanted him to do it. That's so to speak the "*minimum reason*" which comes automatically with the *sincerity rule* (that the speaker *wants* the hearer to do the thing which he asked for). Now one might argue that there may be sometimes other reasons, like the "Golden Rule", and then there will be also "conditions of validity". But that's no objection to the restriction I'm proposing now: that there are *not always internal* conditions of *validity* and that there is *not always*

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the necessity to *substitute* lacking conditions of validity by conditions of the efficiency of sanctions.

Therefore a "dominant claim to normative rightness" (Habermas) *cannot* be the right criterion to classify directive speech acts, because there can be, as in the example given, perfectly correct requests constituted by no internal normative justification claim. The normative justification is in no way "*lacking*", it is *not* a *defective* speech act. The smoker's appetite for a cigarette may well be the *only* reason which he presents to the hearer, and it may be the *only* reason for the hearer to act – there is *nothing* pragmatically inconsistent about this. Hence there *are* directives where it *needn't* be known whether the call is normatively valid or whether the speaker is in a position to enforce the hearer – *because neither of them is claimed at all.* What we called the "minimum reason" is absolutely sufficient in *primitive* cases. Still it has to be *insisted* on the general thesis of this paper that we will *never* reach out with *conditions of satisfaction,* if we are going to analyse the meaning of directives. Rather there will *always* be features *internal* to the speech acts that are *not* plain identical with conditions of fulfilment, such as the *sincerity condition* that the speaker means what he says, the *preparatory conditions* that the hearer is able to do the thing he is directed to do and that the speaker believes the hearer to be able to do the thing he directs him to do, and the *existential presupposition* that there is a certain state of affairs in the world (the one that is to be changed). All these conditions and necessary presuppositions are part of the meaning of a directive speech act. If the claim that X *ought* to do A *entails* the claim that X *can* do A, then it is part of its meaning, and X's assertion that he is *unable* to do A will be an *internal* criticism of the prescription that he ought to do A. There are even more features to *many* other directives – though not to all – like conditions of the *legitimacy,* or conditions of the

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efficiency of sanctions. Knowledge of them will form an *essential* part of understanding their meaning.

Now Strawson might be aware of the whole line of argument advanced against the sufficiency of his conception of " conditions of fulfilment " and nevertheless reject it; for in his article " Austin on ' Locutionary Meaning ' "[28] he attacks Austin's view which is in some details similar to the account presented here. I regard it as the great advantage of Austin's way of dealing with speech acts that the dimension of legal and moral validity of "rightness", as we may say – does not drop out of his approach. In his lectures " How to do things with words "[29] Austin points to the circumstance that advice can be " good or bad " (and, as we may perhaps add, not merely followed or not followed) as being relevant to the " locutionary meaning ". Strawson is right in referring to this very passage, for Austin in this lecture (the XI th) develops a thesis about the similarity of the procedures of practical and theorerical reason, and the inadequacy of the traditional fact–value–distinction that is quite exciting. Austin insists on the analogous role of *reasons* with practical and theoretical discourse; he points out that the truth, as an attribute of sentences, yet entirely our way of *finding out* that is true is *not simply* a matter of brute facts accessible without (linguistic) mediation, but of facts in the light of a *worded* interpretation, that is of *reasons* :

> " Consider also for a moment whether the question of truth and falsity is so very objective. We ask : ' Is it a *fair* statement ?', and are the good reasons and good evidence for stating and saying so very different from the good reasons and evidence for performative acts like arguing, warning and judging ?" [30]

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In all these cases there exist rational methods of finding out what is true and right, and there are internal standards of criticism and justification Austin, as Strawson puts it,

> "wants us to join him in refusing to draw any sharp line between saying that an announcement, accusation, or surmise was true, and saying, that a request, a piece of advice, or a command was warranted or justified." [31]

According to Strawson "the theorist of the proposition (...) must reject the assimilation." The only thing he accepts are the conditions of fulfilment relative to the facts[32] : "If he is impressed by an analogy between constatives and imperatives, it will be a different analogy." (Differrent, we may add, also from the analogy I have emphasized here : that both have got canditions of validity.) "He will be impressed by the fact that just as constatives are (just or more or less) *true* or not, so imperatives can be (just or more or less) *complied with* or not. He may even be prepared to assimilate them to each other (for some purposes) on this ground, the ground, we might say, of the possibility of common (propositional) content. But of course this ground is *totally different* from that proposed by Austin." That's true. 'But", Strawson concludes, "is the theorist of the proposition justified as against Austin? Surely he is."[33] Well, I don't think he is. As I have shown above, it is a shortcoming, and leads to an incomplete analysis of meaning and understanding, if the aspect of validity can be specified *only* for sentences that are set out to be true or false.

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NOTES

1. Cf. P. M. S. Hacker, G. P. Baker : Languge, Sense & Nonsense, Oxford 1984. p. 11. E. g. it is argued by D. Davidson (Truth and Meaning. In : Synthese 17/1967, p. 310) that " to give truth-conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence. "
2. D. Davidson : Semantics for Natural Languages. In : B. Visentini (ed.) : Linguaggi nelle Societa' e nella Tecnica. Milano 1970. p. 178
3. L. Wittgenstein : Philosophische Untersuchungen § 23.
4. J. L. Austin : Performative Utterances. In : Philosophical Papers. Oxford 1961. p. 221
5. I have given an English paraphrase of the German translation (Stuttgart 1972) of this book, because the original edition wasn't available at Frankfurt. The paraphrased passage can be found in the chapter before the last (German translation p. 313 f.).
6. In : Logico-Linguistic Papers, London, 1971. p. 178
7. In : Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, Ma. 1978. p. 449
8. Intentionality. Cambridge 1983
9. *Ibid.*, p. 10
10. The concept of ' satisfaction " is genuinely Intentionalistic : desires and wishes can be " satisfied ", " fulfilled " &c. In general Searle argues " that the philosophy of language, is a branch of the philosophy of mind " (ibid., p. vii), wheras Dummett regards philosophy of language, as introduced by Frege, as First Philosophy.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 10f. These are discussed by K.-O. Apel : Läßt sich sprachliche Bedeutung auf Intentionalität reduzieren ? forthcoming in an omnibus volume ed. by M. Benedikt and R. Burger, Wien 1987.
12. Expression and Meaning, Cambridge, 1979. p. 3–29
13. *Ibid.*, p. 16f.
14. J. R. Searle : Speech Acts, Cambridge, 1969. p. 50–53
15. Of course we can hardly say that a *law* is " in force " or " effective " or " in operation ", *that it is " valid " in the weak sense of being an institutional fact*, if it is *not observed by anybody at all*. But, at least according to Kant, the validity of the principle of *morals* is *not* affected adversely by the assumption that *none ever* acted purely " aus Pflicht ", and not merely " pflichtmäßig ".
16. Cf. Searle (see note 12). Expressives, like declaring love, are left out in the following diagram, because they in general have got *neither* conditions of correspondence between proposition and facts (which Searle

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indicates by a ϕ) *nor* conditions of validity. J. Habermas in his writings suggests that "Wahrhaftigkeit" (sincerity) has also to be regarded as a sort of validity. If this were true, we would have to add :

	conditions of validity fulfilled	conditions of correspondence between proposition and reality fulfilled
expression of a feeling	sincere	ϕ ("empty" – direction of fit)

But I think that's the wrong way to put it. We can justify our manners of speaking "A statement is valid, if it is true" or "An order is valid if it is right", but it would be absurd to maintain that the expression of a feeling is "*valid*", if it is sincere. We can ask : What's the *argument* for your statement and your claim that it is true ? or "What's the *argument* for your *order* and your claim that it is right ?" But in the case of an expressive we are not equally entitled to insist on a rational justification. Quite on the contrary it generally *won't* make sense to ask "What's the *argument* for your expression of a feeling and your claim that it is sincere ?" The answer "There isn't any *argument !*" will be perfectly all right. If we adopt the aesthetics of expressionism sincerity of expression might be a reason for aesthetic appraisal. The criterion of the quality of a work of art is then whether it is a sincere expression of the artist's feelings or not. I regard this kind of aesthetics as *hopelessly inadequate*, but *even if it wasn't*, it would not justify us in talking of sincerity as "*validity*" with regard to speech acts.

17. The concept of "conditions of validity" ("Bedingungen der Gültigkeit") is due to K.-O. Apel (see Note 11).

18. According to Searle's taxonomy which is (at least in the result, not without exception in the definitions of the categories) quite plausible, there are five and only five illocutionary points : assertive, directive, commissive, declarative, and expressive.

19. Together with D. Vanderveken Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge 1985. p. 12–20.

20. Searle's conception is that illocutionary point is the primary component and that the F gets its particular characteristics by adding on to the illocutionary point.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 15f.

22. See Note 14, p. 60–67. Cf. Foundations... (see Note 19), p. 16–18.

23. *Grundlegung der Metaphysik* der Sitten. BA 66f.

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24. Foundations...(see Note 19). p. 37
25. Some of the following points are due to a lecture delivered by Jürgen Habermas at Frankfurt University.
26. Speech Acts (see Note 14), p. 66: "order and command have additional preparatory rule that [the] S[peaker] must be in a position of authority over [the] H[earer]." An internal legal rightness claim is characteristically built into these directives, as distinguished from simple imperatives.
27. Intentionality (see Note 8) p. 141–159.
28. In: I. Berlin (ed.): Essays on J. L. Austin, Oxford 1973. p. 46–68.
29. Oxford 1962. p. 141.
30. *Ibid.*
31. See Note 28, p. 66.
32. The *first* aim of Strawson's article is to clarify the notion of "locutionary meaning"; he does this by introducing the concept of conditions of fulfilment (ibid., p. 54): "the very same content may sometimes be dressed as a verdict, and sometimes delivered only as an opinion, [...] the very same content may sometimes figure in a request or an order or a piece of advice as well as in a prediction; and we observe that, however it figures and however it is dressed, we may raise the question whether *the facts and it correspond to one another in the way in which they do so correspond, alike when a predicted act is performed and when a command or counselled act is performed. This content*, then, we look for in *every* utterance in which we can find it and declare, when found, to be the *locutionary meaning of that utterance* and its constative aspect, the aspect associated with *truth and falsity*, with the *dimension of correspondence with the facts.*" – The *second* aim of Strawson's article is to give an exegesis of "How to Do Things with Words"; but then Strawson detects that the analysis in terms of conditions of fulfilment does not only fail to be an Austin-interpretation, but that it is even in contradiction to Austin's intentions, and "though we might find thus [by the correspondence-with-the-facts-approach] a relatively clear [...] notion of locutionary meaning, it can hardly be said to be clearly the correct one" (ibid.) in the sense of an interpretation of Austin's lectures.
33. Ibid., p. 66. – One could argue that Strawson had a much smaller fish to fry, because he was looking for the "*locutionary* meaning", whereas this paper presented a tentative analysis of the "*illocutionary* meaning". That's right, but what Strawson presents as the "locutionary meaning" is in fact just a *defective* and *incomplete illocutionary* meaning, a hybrid of locutionary and illocutionary meaning: it includes the meaning of the propositional content and of *one* component of the *illocutionary* force. viz. (to use Searle's jargon) of "illocutionary point", although *excluding* all the other components.

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REVIEW OF W. DILTHEY'S CONCEPT OF UNDERSTANDING AS A METHOD IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

The purpose of this paper is to bring out the limitations of Wilhelm Dilthey's approach to understanding human action and then to stipulate the notion of understanding in a more radical fashion. To a great extent Dilthey's Philosophy of Cultural Sciences is responsible for creating an anti-naturalistic and antipositivistic stance among the methodologists of social sciences, although it could not make a complete departure from positivistic norms and categories. As the recent debate over the method of understanding owes a great deal to Dilthey, shortcomings of his philosophy have obviously staggered it to take a radical turn. This paper attempts to show this path through a critical assessmen of Dilthey's contribution to the movement. The ground of this critique is the ground of communion – the reality *between* man and man.

The concept of understanding (*verstehen*) is an outcome of search on the part of social scientists to devise a method that may be appropriate to explain human action. The nature of goals and the character and limitations of explanations in the social sciences has been a major point of controversy among the philosopheres of social sciences and the social scientists themselves. One side there are those who believe in a unity of the scientific method and thus envisage the social sciences to be basically no different from the natural sciences. Underlying this approach there is a conception of society as the *second nature* –

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as independent of human experience and interference as the physical nature is. As Peter L. Berger says :

> In terms of social scientific method, one is faced with a way of thinking that assumes *a priori* that the human world is a causally closed system. The method would not be scientific if it thought otherwise. Freedom as a special kind of cause is excluded from this system *a priori*.[1]

From this standpoint, social facts are considered to be a par with the physical facts. They are real, empirical and measurable; they are capable of producing the same kinds of law-like propositions and explanatory coverage that are believed to be present in the natural sciences. Against this positivistic – naturalistic trend, there are humanistic – culturalistic camps. They argue in favour of basic distinctions between physical events which are the focus of attention in natural sciences, and man's social actions which are focus of attention in social sciences. From the latter view-point, man's social actions are 'meaningful', and they are so not only to the scientist-observer, but also to the subject-actors themselves. Their meaningfulness can not be grasped by sheer cause-and-effect relationship or S–R psychology, but by an empathetic involvement in the perspective under investigation. Thus, a social scientist, from this point of view, does not remain a scientist-observer, but becomes a participant observer. This trend originated largely from the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey. He is the central figure in the history of the concept of 'understanding' (*Verstehen*). He called the process by which we comprehend the meaning of an expression 'understanding'. Thus it is a technical term. The meaning of it can be grasped better if we bear in mind that it is significantly different from any other form of knowing, such as perceptual awareness. As Rickmam puts it :

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> Understanding as a distinctive approach to human beings is necessry because the human world is pervaded by meaning in a way in which the physical world is not ... human actions are accomponied by consciousness and prompted by purposes. They spring from the interpretation of situations and the appreciation of values. Behind the actions of a historical figure, the ritual dances of a primitive tribe the practices of trade unionists or the twitches of a neurotic lie ideas, beliefs and feelings which make the behaviour meaningful. The task of the historian, sociologist, social anthropologist or psychologist does not end when he has described this behaviour; he can also discover its meaning by the process of understanding. Ultimately this is based on the fact that we ourselves experience *how* feelings and thoughts give rise to actions.[2]

The particular function of human knowledge or the specific form of human awareness that is emphasized here has reference to human studies alone. ' Understanding ' consists in a tendency to bring the overt aspects of human phenomena back into their inner dimensions. Dilthey says :

> This tendency makes use of every expression of life in order to understand the mental content from which it arises. In history we read of economic activities, settlements, wars and the creating of states. They fill our souls with great images and tell us about the historical world which surrounds us; but what moves us, above all, in these accounts is what is inaccessible to the senses and can only be experienced inwardly; this is inherent in the outer events which originate from it and, in its turn, is affected by them. The tendency I am speaking of does not depend on looking at life from the outside but is based on life itself.[3]

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The above passage indicates the specific way human studies are related to humanity. This is clearly different from the way natural sciences are related to natural phenomena as well as human phenomena. The tendency in the latter is just the opposite. It tends to relegate human phenomena which consist in meaningfulness, purposiveness, and are open to understanding, to physical objects. In the context of philosophy of life, epistemology, philosophy of history and philosophy of man, Dilthey rejects this tendency as arising out of scientism. Because of its own premises, scientism can not go beyond explanation.

The understanding that takes place in a scientistic framework may at most be called 'explanatory understanding' (in Weberian sense). At this level of understanding there is no intimacy in terms of subject's participation where man's social actions are involved. We can talk about explanation and explanation alone of social actions when they are reduced to mere *behaviour*. Durkheim says :

> I consider extremely fruitful this idea that social life should be explained, not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness, and I think also that these causes are to be sought mainly in the manner according to which the associated individuals are grouped. Only in this way, it seems, can history become a science, and sociology itself exists.[4]

As against this approach, the distinction is made between *behaviour* and *action;* and the form of awareness in human situation is annouced as characteristically different form that in natural science. It is 'expression-meaning-agent-oriented'. Thus, the issue is joined in the methodological debate. The antinaturalistic tradition in human sciences may therefore be regarded as having its origins in Dilthey.

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The history of the concept of understanding from Dilthey through Weber to Winch has sharpened this concept in opposition to a non intimate approach in terms of explanation alone. The uniqueness of the concept, according to Dilthey, lies in that it is rooted in a 'lived world'. A ' lived world ' is a world which we ' live through ' without making it an object. It consists of human expressions that are meaningful. 'Expression' and 'meaning' go hand in hand. This may be elucidated in the following way. According to Dilthey, our knowledge of minds including that of our own ones, depends on the ways they express themselves The basic feature of human mental life is to express or ' objectify ' itself. So far as man's self-knowledge is concerned, introspection has its limitations. It is not possible to get a stable view of what is going on in ourselves in a flux of psychic events unless they are brought out and organized into forms of expressions. To hold any such event before the mind for a manageable length of time is to put it into a form of expression. This is introspection aided by expression. Direct introspection or introspection unaided by expression amounts to a seeing experience which passes into its successor immediately without waiting for its examination, analysis, classification or even description by the knowing subject. So far as our knowledge of other persons is concerned, introspection is of no help because the mental life of others is not directly accessible to me unless it is conveyed by some expression. Overt expression of an experience in someone's mind has the power to evoke a corresponding experience in the observer's mind. It comes alive in observer's mind as a reproduction of itself (*Nachbild*). This is the foundation of our knowledge of the other person. His lived–experience is externalized in the form of an expression, it is again internalized as a *Nachbild* by the observer.

Understanding apprehends the meaning of an expression. For Dilthey, meaning is simply a relation between a sign or experes-

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sion and what it signifies or expresses, and understanding is the deciphering of it. Alternatively it indicates a living unity consisting in placing a fragment of mental life in the whole of mental life, the part within the whole. But these are the two aspects of the same concept "meaning", and these two are closely related. As Hodges points out :

> The "meaning" of a word from one point of view may be the object to which it refers; from another it may equally lie in the part which the word plays in the development of the sentence, its relation to what comes before and after. It is safe to say that the ambiguity in Dilthey's use of the words 'understanding' and 'meaning' testifies a real unity between the two facts, the fact of expression and the fact of living unity, which are distinct but are not found apart. To "understand" the "meaning" of an expression is also to "understand" the "meaning" (in a different sense of both words) of a fragement of mental life.[5]

Thus an expression is meaningful in either of these two senses of "meaning" or more accurately speaking, in both senses because they two are inseparable. An expression consists in an 'objectification of mind' and its meaningfulness then follows in terms of the relation between rhis expression and what it expresses in the context of a totality. This totality consists in a "teleological' or vital unity maintained by the structural relations and processes in the life of an individual mind or of a group.[6]

What follows is that objectification is a necessary condition for our knowledge of man in the philosophical sense. Dilthey's characterization of human studies as *descriptive* and opposed to *explanatory* disciplines is grounded on his emphasis on mental facts along with their relations and interactions, as consciously lived through and perceived by the students of humanities. For

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him, we do not need to provide explanation of such facts by going behind them to types of entity and process other than the ones we perceive. Dilthey points to a presuppositionless approach towards human phenomena. On the other hand the procedure that is fundamental in natural sciences consists in "accounting for observed facts in terms of factors whose number and nature is determined not by descriptive analysis of the observed facts, but by the requirements of a methodological assumption e.g. accounting for physical processes in terms of entities not observable and possessing only primary qualities, or accounting for memory in terms of physical traces or "engrans" in the brain".[7] But while Dilthey avoids presuppositions from beyond his own conceptual framework, he presupposes certain notions like "lived experience", (*Das Erleben, Das Erlebnis*), 'meaning', 'significance', sense' (*Bedeutung, Bedeutsamkeit, Sinn*) etc. from within his own framework as necessary to describe mental facts. These mental facts lead to the construction of an 'objective mind' vis., "that body of expressions of mental life which are not momentary and transient, but in various ways permanent and enduring, and which constitute a most important factor in our environment".[8] Works of art, books of all kinds, systems of ideas, habits and customs, social and cultural institutions are included within it.

> "I understand by it the manifold forms in which the common background subsisting among various individuals has objectified itself in the sensible world. In this objective mind the past is for us a permanent enduring present. Its realm extends from the style of life and the forms of economic intercourse to the whole system of ends which society, has formed for itself, morality, law, the state, religion, art, science and philosophy. For the work of genius too rep-

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resents a common stock of ideas, mental life, and ideals at a particular time and in a particular environment. From earliest childhood our self receives its nourishment from this world of objective mind. It is also the medium in which the understanding of other persons and their expressions takes place. For everything in which the mind has objectified itself contains in itself a factor common to the I and the Thou."[9]

This formulation of the concept of objective mind has a distinct positivistic flavour. In spite of a subjectivistic and personalistic overtone of the passage quoted above, it does no' sound very different from Karl Popper's conception of 'world 3t which is "the world of the logical *contents* of books, libraries, computer memories" etc.[10] As a result for Popper 'understanding' in humanities is similar to 'understanding' in natural sciences. Popper finds at least four similarities :

(1) As we understand other people owing to our shared humanity, we may understand nature because we are part of it.

(2) As we understand men in virtue of some rationality of their thoughts and actions, so we may understand the laws of nature because of some kind of rationality or understandable necessity inherent in them...

(3) The reference to God in Einstein 's letter* indicates another sense shared with the humanities-the attempt to understand the world of nature in the way we understand a work of art : as a creation.

And 4) There is in the natural sciences that consciousness of an ultimate failure of all our attempts to understand which has been much discussed by students of humanities and which has been attributed to the 'otherness' of other

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> people, the impossibility of any real self-understanding and the inevitability of over-simplification which is inherent in any attempt to understand anything unique and real.[10]

The question is not of finding out the similarities or dissimilarities between scientific and humanistic understanding. Understanding at the interhuman level is marked by a mutuality which, as Michael Polanyi holds, "prevails to such an extent here that the logical category of an observer facing an object placed on a lower logical level becomes altogether inaplicable". At this level, "The I-it situation has been gradually transformed into an I-Thou relation,"[11]

Understanding in the sense of Dilthey is understanding of that which is meant. Hence, it is 'understanding' of object. But human action involves both human agent and his world which thrives with the fecundity of his expressions, his culture, society and history. In short 'human action' signifies a human continuum which cannot be snapped through facts or objects – mental or non-mental. This is a dynamic that exerts power in human life The first requisite for a social scientist is to be conscious of this dynamic and then to participate in it through direct and face-to-face relation with his subjects i. e. the other human persons. This amounts to invoking the 'Thou' in the other.

It is not always possible to understand a social life in terms of a given objective life-world as the only background of it. If the purpose of social science is to understand a monological pattern of life then the presupposition of it—an ontological unity of the society/community to be studied – may serve as a necessary condition to generate the same understanding. The result of this type of social inquiry is in a way confirmation of what is already presupposed. A concept of unified process of socialisation underlies this approach. To learn the process would amount to an

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understanding of human life and individual actions within that purview. But the purpose of social sciences is to look for unique patterns too. Freedom, which is not there in a closed system, may be found in deviants' activities or in the form of religious sects and cults which are technically known as 'subcultures' as also in people's urge for utopian fulfilments. Habermas says :

> ... Society is not just a system of self-preservation. There is also a restless urge, present as a libide in the individual, which has unharnessed itself from the functions of self-preservation and presses toward utopian fulfilment.'[12]

A complete understanding of a social life, and a wholesome approach to human activities which constitute that social life can be best accomplished by invoking the *Thou*. The point is not merely to participate in the consciousness of the people whom the social scientist has gone to survey, but also to make them participate in his own consciousness. Knowledge of language spoken in a community, and of its customs, habits and religion may indeed be considered to be a pre-requisite to our understanding of a social life. But it is far from being the sufficient condition for the acquisition of such understanding, because, invoking the *Thou* is an even more fundamentally necessary condition for it. The centrality of the concept of society lies in the concept of *Thou*. Without this a lived-world is impossible. While maintaining that 'Robinson Crusoe' would never think : 'There is no community and I belong to none : I am alone in the world' Max Scheler speaks of 'the general evidence for the *Thou* : He says :

> ...Crusoe's evidence of the existence of a Thou and of his own membership of the community is not merely a contingent, observational, inductive 'experience', but is certainly *a priori* in both an object and a subjective sense and has a definite *intuitive basis*, namely a specific and well-defined consciousness of *emptiness* or absence (as compared with

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> the presence of some genuine entity already there), in respect of emotional acts as represented, for instance, by the authentic type of love for other people. In the case of conative acts one might also refer to the consciousness of 'something lacking' or of 'non-fulfilment' which would invariably and necessarily be felt by our Crusoe when engaged in intellectual or emotional acts which can only constitute an objective unity of meaning *in conjunction with* the possibility of a social *response*. From these necessarily specific and unmistakable blanks, as it were, where his intentional actions miss their mark he would, in our opinion, derive a most positive intuition and idea of something *present to him as the sphere of the Thou, of which he is merely unacquainted with any particular instance.*[13]

Acceptance of a given 'objective mind' and knowledge of man being based on a constant approximation to it (as held by Dilthey) results in a very narrow conception of philosophical anthropology. The dynamic that exerts power in human life owes to the *Thou*, to man as a dialoguing being.

The concept of understanding needs to be more radical. Acceptance of a given "objective mind" and knowledge of man being based on a constant approximation to it (as held by Dilthey) results in a very narrow conception of Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Social Sciences. Social scientists need a soil of communion beneath their feet where divergent world-views meet and understanding develops through dialogue. When both the 'observer' and the 'observed' come to agree upon the observer's mode of conceptualization with regard to the class of exprientially events under study only then can the understanding be said to be complete. Such an agreement would be a mutually acceptable evidence that the observer has been able to penetrate through the concepts to the experiential flux and has been able to reconceptualize it in his own framework; and also

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that the subject has done similarly with reference to the understanding of the observer. To give an example, an observer who has no grasp of the notion of 'sacred' (in non-reductive terms) can never understand any member of the whole class of sacred objects or experiences. That means that the observer should grant the ultimate irreducibility of certain fundamental categories in which alone a certain experience can be articulated. The translation of such categories into what the observer believes independently to be its equivalents in *his* framework constitutes a methodological absolutism which can never be justified as an endeavour towards understanding.

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NOTES

1. Peter L. Berger : *Invitation to Sociology*, U. S. A., Penguin Books, 1966, PP. 143-144.
2. H. P. Rickman : *Understanding and The Human Studies*, London, Heinemann Education Books Ltd., 1967, P. XV.
3. Wilhelm Dilthey : *Selected Writings*, edited by H. P. Rickman, Cambridge University Press, 1976, P. 172,
4. Quoted by Peter Winch in his *The Idea of a Social Science*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, PP. 23-24.
5. H. A. Hodges : *Wilhelm Dilthey : An Introduction*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1944, P. 21.
6. See *Wilhelm Dilthey : An Introduction*, P. 15.
7. *Ibid.*, P. 31.
8. *Ibid.*, P. 118.
9. See Karl Popper's *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford, 1979, P. 74.
10. *Ibid.*, P. 184.
11. *Personal Knowledge*, P. 346.
12. Jurgen Habermas : 'Knowledge and Interest', in *Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis*, (eds.) by D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre, Macmillan, 1970, PP. 36-54.
13. Max Scheler : *The Nature of Sympathy*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954, P. 235.

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FORMULATIONS OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

In this paper I would be considering the inter-relationship between the various formulations of Kant's categorical imperative and would be examining some modern attempts to understand Kant's ethics. This I shall do with reference to a passage in Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals.*

In the *Metaphysics of Morals* in proposition 63 Kant writes : "The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have been adduced are at bottom only so many formulas of the very same law, and each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a difference in them; but it is rather subjectively than objectively practical, intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy), and thereby nearer to feeling. All maxims, in fact, have–

1. A *form*, consisting in universality, and in this view the formula of the moral imperative is expressed, thus, that the maxims must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of nature.
2. A *matter*, namely, an end, and here the formula says that the rational being, as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end in itself, must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends.
3. A *complete characterization* of all maxims by means of that formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature (67). There is a progress here in

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> the order of the categories of *unity* of the form of the will (its universality), *plurality* of the matter (the objects, i.e. the ends), and *totality* of the system of these. In forming our moral *judgement* of actions it is better to proceed always on the strict method, and start from the general formula of the categorical imperative : *Act according to maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law.* If however, we wish to gain an *entrance* for the moral law, it is useful to bring one and the same action under three specified conceptions, and thereby as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition ".[1]

Here we shall consider three problems. First, we shall find out how different formulations of the categorical imperative are expressions of the same law. Secondly, we shall consider as to how any of the formulas involves rest of them. Thirdly, we shall examine whether the maxims are only subjectively practical and not objectively so.[2]

When Kant suggests that they are so many formulas of the very same law, a question arises namely, what is the same law, of which they are variant expressions ? Are they expressions of any one of the formulations or are they experessions of a particular formulation ? Or, are they different expressions of something different from them ? It does not seem that they are expressions of any particular formulation amongst themselves, because otherwise Kant would have said so. But they also do not appear to be versions of something that is totally different and not implied in the different formulations as Kant talks of them as formulations of the same law. Hence, there has to be something common which is applicable to all of them. It seems that Kant never clearly mentions or explains what that law is of which these imperatives are formulae. This may be because the formulae under consideration are the logical expressions of the

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law which itself may refer to a law which is logical in nature.[3] Or else, the relation between the different imperatives and the law may be a logical relation. Even in this situation the name of that law could have been given but that also is not given by by Kant, perhaps because the law may be such that it is more than an abstract principle. The only thing that one can comprehend is its incomprehensibility. That one can comprehend this but cannot name it signifies the extreme limit of moral inquiry. With the result, only the form of that law could be given and not the content of it.

Moreover, Kant does not seem to be primarily concerned with the actual practice of morality but rather with the form of moral law and thus considered, irrespective of whether a particular formulation of the law states universalizability or autonomy, each one seems to bring forth the same result. That is, each one seems to be oriented towards the same goal; and the goal is explanation of the moral action. Hence the moral law which Kant talks of is already implied in the formulation. Therefore, all the formulations are interrelated. They have to be considered together. Universalizabilty, humanity, kingdom of ends are different aspects of moral action and when we consider them together, then only we realize that in order to do a moral action we have to follow all of them. So even if any one of them is a law, the result would be the same.

The way this is so could be seen if one knows how each of them involves the others. If any maxim does not satisfy the first formulation, for example the principle of universalizability, it also would not satisfy other formulations viz., the principle of dignity of human being and the principle autonomy. As a matter of fact they are interrelated because each one of them follows from the sense of duty. It is the sense duty that subsumes the

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principles of universalizability, autonomy and the membership of a kingdom of ends under it.

The first formulation is as follows : *"Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature"*.[4] This principle suggests that any action worth the name must be such that it should be done by any moral being placed under the same (similar) situation. It is important, however, to note that something is followed or practised by everybody does not in itself determine the morality of the action under consideration. Thus, exploitation or dishonesty could become a universal phenomenon but threby they cannot become a moral principle, since they cannot be said to emerge out of the sense of duty, which in addition to univeralizability, includes certain other elements like autonomy or dignity of human being.

The second formulation is as follows : *"So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only"*.[5] To treat oneself as an end and also others although Kant does not seem to explain as to what it is to treat oneself and others as ends !) will be practicable only when it is supplemented by other principles. If one were to treat oneself an end, it seems odd if not impossible not to treat others as ends. Similarly, if one were to treat others as ends, having their own dignity and self respect, one also could not treat oneself but as a human being who has self respect and dignity. So treating oneself as an end necessitates universalizability of that principle. It is only when all the members of the human race are willingly committed to the principle that all human beings are equally free, will there be a possibility of human treatment being accorded to everybody. One should know that just as he is free he also has a responsibility not tn encroach upon the freedom of others. It is the awareness of being a member of society that would bestow the sense of responsibility due to

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which adoption of the second principle becomes not only possible but inevitable as well. Actually, the second principle involves two different and yet closely related principles : that of the dignity of human beings and of freedom or autonomy.[6] Both of them seem to preserve the moral character of the second principle.

The third and the last formulation is as follows : Kant writes "Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with the universal practical reason. viz., the idea of *the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will*",[7] and "this conception leads to another which depends on it and yet is very fruitful, namely, that of a *kingdom of ends*".[8]

By kingdom Kant understands the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws. The ends are determined by laws and Kant says that by abstraction from personal differences of rational beings as also from the different content of their private ends it is possible to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole. Here also, the very conception of kingdom of ends seems to rest on the principle of dignity of human beings, universalizatbility and autonomy. Unless one is aware of one's own position in the context of a certain framework, true application to humanity at large is very difficult and any such application of it would obviously involve universalizability.

In this manner, all the principles seem really to be different versions of the moral law. Practising any one of them necessarily seems to mean practising only and hence all of them, so much so that one cannot conceive any one of them in isolation of the rest of them. One formulation involves the others.

But what is meant by saying that the maxims are subjectively rather than objectively practical ? Kant seems to suggest that even though universalizability may stand for the unity of the

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form of will, the ends may apparently at least be different in different contexts so that certain maxims are subjectively practical rather than objectively so. This means that even though they are formulations of the same law, the particular formulation to be followed may depend upon the person concerned.

Nevertheless, the subjective practicability of the principle under consideration does not mean that the principle itself is subjective. It rather means that the use of the principle is itself subjective. It is possible to practise certain principle but not the other. It is practical from the point of view of the agent or the subject.

Now, if the choice of the particular principle of action is made by a person concerned and not on the ground of something else, a question can be raised as to why we can't have many formulations of the law. If the formulations are different on the level of maxims or subjective principles of action why not have as many formulations as possible ?

This is not possible because all these are ultimate versions of the same law and in so far as they are so, they are one. They are oriented towards the same goal. Any of them may be in use and still the result will be the same. With the result, the maxims are not practical objectively. At the most, one can talk about the different elements like for example the will, the agent, the consequences of a moral act.[9]

Yet, these elements do not refer to different kinds of moral acts. The different aspects are felt by subjects or agents. Thus the issue about the number of formulations is not all that important because whatever number of principles one can conceive of they are ultimately principles that lead to the same law. Whether you follow this or that formulation of the categorical imperative

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does not objectively make any difference, it is a matter of subjective choice.

One thing should be made clear that though these various formulations are at bottom one it does not mean that they could be reduced to any one of them. Each one of the formulations illuminates a different aspect of moral act. The principle of universality may suggest that one is not only a member of a natural world but there is in him the awareness that one is capable of acknowledging the order in the universe and also capable of creating similar order in one's own life. This principle suggests the possibility that any moral principle must be such that it could in principle be adopted by every rational human being.

The second principle, the end in itself, implies that morality is not only an individual or a personal matter but it necessarily involves reference to other human beings and hence it precludes the possibility of coercion and exploitation. And, in so far as every human being is free, moral law is not something enforced on man but it is man who freely opts for a moral life and hence creates laws for maintaining the individual and social good. Thus, freedom and awareness of the dignity of others go together. Freedom ultimately is transformed into binding oneself willingly to social life.

The last principle involves reference to an ideal community which is a systematic unity of different rational beings under common laws. It suggests the truely democratic form of life wherein people rationally evolve common laws and obey them because laws are made by them and not forced upon them. The morality of an action consists in relation of that act to the making of a law.

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All these formulations are descriptive of the different aspects or elements of the moral action and as such are necessarily distinct, irreducible to one another. They are also irreducible to some other different aspect which is not mentioned in the formulations under consideration but that they are in this way irreducible does not imply that they are unrelated or disjoint. They are necessarily related in the sense that one involves the other. Granted that they are so related, the next issue that needs attention is why and how does Kant speak of the form, the matter and the complete characterisation of maxims by the principle of kingdom of ends. What does he mean by form and matter of all maxims ?

When he refers to the content, he refers to the form of the content and not the actual content itself, and that is why what it is to be end in itself is never made clear. The maxim of 'end in itself' does not state the content but the form of the content. To treat oneself or the other person as an end is to be aware that everyone has dignity as a human being. But one cannot define dignity because dignity is expressed differently in different contexts. In the political context it is expressed through the idea of individual liberty. In the social context it is exemplified through humane treatment. There could be infinite ways of degrading human dignity but still it is very difficult to give the contents of human dignity. The contents will vary according to the time, place and other circumstances but the form of human dignity will remain the same. The same thing can be said about the other maxims. Only the form of maxim can be given, the actual details of the maxims can never be given specifically and once for all.

Similarly, when he refers to maxims having a form, he is referring to the necessity of universalizability of that form. In other words, he suggests that a certain kind of form should be

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universalized. So that, given a formal criterion or standard one can decide whether the maxim is a moral principle or not.

Lastly, he speaks of complete characterizability of all maxims by means of the last formula of the kingdom of ends. This characterization is also a formal characterization or standard by which only the form of such a kingdom of ends could be given. The content or details of what it is to be the kingdom of ends is not explicitly stated. It is with the help of such characterization that the unity of form of will and the plurality of of the ends is brought under the notion of moral law.

If this way of understanding the categorical imperatives is right then it is also necessary to point out that some of the modern attempts to raise certain issues about the categorical imperative seem to be misleading and inappropriate. It is not my purpose to take note of all such possible accounts. But for the sake of illustration we can refer to some of them.[10] One such attempt is to hold that one formulation is fundamental and others are derived. For example, it is suggested that one formula of universalizability is fundamental and the rest of them could be deduced or derived from the principle of universalizability.[11]

Now. granted that all the formulations are interrelated and one involves the other, no formulation can be said to be more fundamental and no formulation can be said to be derived from any other. For, following any one of them is tantamount to following any other of them. All of them are formulations of the same law and hence related but not in terms of hierarchy. All of them are equally important and significant.

It also seems that Kant has never raised such an issue of some formula being held to be more fundamental and others

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being derivative. And he is right in not raising such issues at all.

Another such account is to treat them as only anthropological illustrations (to treat them as less precise anthropological formulations) of the moral law.

This amounts to reformulating the moral law from the standpoint of the sensuous agent. Thus understood, the formula of end in itself or the kingdom of ends turns out to be the outcome of a subjective understanding on the part of man and every such formulation would perhaps suggest a different kind of understanding of the moral law.

Even this attempt is needless. For, Kant himself says that various formulations are *subjetively practical*. This does not mean that they are *sabjective*; nor does it mean that they are understood subjectively. What is suggested is that their *use* is subjectively determined; determined by an agent. So, what is different is the *use* and not the *substance* of the moral law.

The last problem is to find out whether the categorical imperative suggests an exercise in analysis or whether Kant really wanted to give moral advice. The same old problem of form and content of the moral seems to reappear in a different manner – whether it suggests a criterion for any moral rule. Apparently it suggests a negative criterion, but in terms of the nature of act Kant does give a general idea of the nature of a moral act. He does refer to autonomy, humanity and such other principles. Unless one has the general idea of the nature of moral act one cannot act morally. How this general idea is put into concrete is not shown, but the importance of ends is certainly emphasised.

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Thus to conclude, different formulations of the categorical imperative are expressions of the same moral law and each formulation involves the others. Although their use is different and subjective, the formulations are not themselves subjective. Hence all such modern attempts to read some kind of subjective anthropology in Kant's ethics or to label him merely to be a deontologist seem to be misleading and hence untenable.[12]

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NOTES

1. Abbott T. K.; *Kant's Criticque of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics.* Translated by Thomas Kinprill Abbott. Sixth edition. Longmans, Green and Co.

2. A maxim is a subjective principle of action and is distinguished from the objective principle i. e. law. It contains the practical rule set by reason. It is the principle on which the subject acts.

3. The law is not covered by formulae. It is also not deduced or derived from them either singly or collectively. The formulae are *logical* in the sense they provide a ground for the law. In a way any instance of formulae of the law is enough to give us an idea of moral law and the law may be logical in the sense it provides the ground of the possibility of moral action.

4. Abbott T. K.; *Kant's Criticque of Practical Reason and Other Works* (tr.) p. 39.

5. Ibid. p. 47.

6. Prof. Paton speaks about four versions of categorical imperative – (1) The formula of the law of nature. (2) The formula of the end in itself. (3) The formula of autonomy and (4) The formula of the

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kingdom of ends. Prof. Abbott on the other hand speaks of three formulations – (1) The formula of law of nature. (2) The formula of end in itself which includes human dignity and autonomy or freedom and (3) The formula of the kingdom of ends.

7. Abbott T. K.; *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works* translated by Abbott, p. 49.

8. Ibid, p. 51.

9. Here, Kant seems to be incorrect. He talks of different motives of an action and presumes as it were self-inclinati on and sense of duty may not go together. Different motives do not hint at different kinds of actions.

10. For all such attempts one may refer to *Contemporary Philosophy : A New Survey* edited by Guttorm Floistad. Vol. III, *Philosophy of Action*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague / Boston / London, 1982. See especially Rosevaer, " Kant's Practical Philosopy. "

11. Sometimes the various formulations are called transcendental reformulations of the formula of universalizability.

12. I am thankful to Prof. K. J. Shah for discussing some points with me.

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CONCEPT OF ALIENATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE THOUGHT OF KARL MARX

The purpose of the present paper is to analyse the concept of alienation in order to delineate the main characteristics of alienation. In doing so, an attempt has been made to make a distinction between separation, objectification and alienation. Secondly, in this article the concept of alienation has been discussed with reference to the thought of Karl Marx. Marx had referred to four kinds of alienation in his work *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1944*. I have attempted to analyse them and see whether the four kinds of alienation can be seen as aspects of self-alienation or not.

The available literature on alienation is so vast that it is difficult to merge the different, specific analyses of the term into a single conception of alienation. Nevertheless, in order to seek the essential characteristics of the concept of alienation, we can say that alienation is a state of mind in which man feels, estranged or dissociated from either external nature, other men, himself or world at large. In other words, alienation is a relational concept which presupposes a situation in which there are at least two entities involved (person and an object, person and other persons, person as an essence and person as existence). For it would be an incomplete statement to say that A is alienated unless we specify as to what A is alienated from.

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The important point however is that the carrier of the feeling of estrangement has to be a person, though from what the person is alienated need not always be a person. It may be an object, an institution, a group etc. While reflecting upon the concept of alienation, consciousness seems to be an essential necessary feature of the one who is estranged. It is for this reason perhaps that we can meaningfully talk about the concept of alienation only with reference to human beings.

An inanimate thing or an animal cannot be alienated from itself or from objects. Alienation is peculiar to human beings only. Since man is a conscious being, he has the power to identify, classify, and distinguish himself from others. He has the capacity to plan, will, anticipate, create space between himself and the object of his perception. It is because of man's power of conceptualisation that he can make the blue–print in his mind before actually proceeding to make anything. Through conceptualisation he can link his present, past and future. He can imagine himself in a situation in which he is not and in which he could be. He has the power of conceiving contrafactua situations which are different from the actual situation obtainingl in the world.

Alienation denotes a relationship between man's essential nature and his existence, whether we take the theological view point where man is taken to be alienated from himself when he does not conform to the will of God, or whether, it is the existentialists viewpoint, where man's essentiality lies in his consciousness or freedom and alienation is seen as man's inauthenticity and bad–faith when he does not conform to his freedom and does not own up his responsibility, or whether we take the Marxian viewpoint, where man is seen as a social, conscious, free productive being and is alienated to the extent that he does not fulfil these potentialities.

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In all these views of man and of alienation, one common feature is discernible i.e., there is a separation between the essential nature of man and his actuality or actual existence. It should be pointed out that all forms of separation or gap cannot be termed as alienation. There can be a separateness between myself and my table or between me and another object or a person. But this cannot be characterized as alienation. The reason for this is that if I do not desire myself to be wedded into unity with an object, or a person then, the question of alienation does not arise. Valued separation or desirable disunion are not cases of alienation. Alienation results when one aspires for solidarity yet fails to do so. Thus, alienation is a negative state which needs to be overcome.

Within a social framework, alienation can be referred to as a lack of solidarity, an inadequate adjustment in social relationships. Alienation is a possible consequence of a situation in which there is an apriori assumption of some sort of reciprocal relationship and solidarity, as for example, between a person who is alienated and another person from whom he is alienated. To take an instance, a black man is alienated from his white master in the sense that he feels deprived of conditions which can set him at par with the white man. As a social being, the black man ought to be an equal but he perceives the white man as exerting an adverse influence on his status and image. If the black man remains neutral i.e., indifferent or apathetic, he is not acting consciously, if he acts consciously, he becomes alienated.

Speaking within the framework of capitalist society Marx believed that in this class society, worker is alienated because he feels deprived of the conditions which can set him at par with the bourgeoisie. Marx's approach to the problem of alienation was a practical one. His starting point was not the concept of

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alienation itself but his practical observation of the misery of the workers under capitalism. He focussed his attention more on the identification of the manifestations of alienation than on pure analysis of the concept itself. He said, "In the real practical world self-estrangement can only become manifest through the real practical relationship to other man."[1]

Infact Marx detached the problem of man, alienation, and freedom from the theological cobwebs and placed man at the root of man. Instead of painting man in transcendental colours Marx viewed man as a natural being, who could be described in terms of his powers[2] and needs.[3] Taking the Aristotelian vitalistic view of nature, Marx held that a man not only has certain powers but also that he strikes to realise them, for example, a being with eyes cannot only see but also wants to see and feels frustrated when prevented from seeing. Marx believed that man by his very constitution is continually impelled into activity, in order to express his powers and satisfy his needs. Man cannot relinquish the realisation of his capacities as that would mean relinquishing of man himself.[4]

In his work *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx speaks of man's alienation from (1) the activity, (2) species nature, (3) other men, (4) the product. It would be relevant to examine whether these four kinds of alienation can be explained by reference to self–alienation alone or are they different in some sense.

A careful reading of Marx shows that he conceived man as a conscious, productive, species being. It seems to me that in his thought all the three are inseparably linked. For Marx, productive activity, which is the distinguishing feature of mankind is a conscious and social activity. Human being creates for a whole of the humanity. In the words of Marx,

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> Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just because of this that that he is a species being. Or it is only because he is a species being. that he is a conscious Being...[5]

Marx believed that while engaging in productive, creative activity, man proves himself to be conscious species being. Marx compared man's creative activity with artistic activity[6] in order to highlight the point that labour activity gives happiness to the labourer as artistic activity gives to the artist. But unfortunately, artistic type of labour, is distorted under capitalism. The aim of the labour becomes the satisfaction of merely biological needs. Activity becomes a slave to crude needs. Hence in a capitalistic society, man makes his productive activity, his *essential* being merely a *means to his survival* and there occurs a schism between man's essence and his existence. Marx believed that since labour is coerced under capitalism it denies and kills man's intrinsic nature.

Man is alienated from his species' nature. Though Marx does not define this term yet from his writings it is clear what it means. It refers to man's consciousness of being a social being and not of being an isolated individual. Man creates and enjoys as a member of humanity. The object of thought and action of man is not merely his individuality but his sociality. Unlike the animals, man is conscious of himself as belonging to a species and creating for a species.[7]

Man is said to be alienated from his species nature to the extent that his productive labour activity instead of satisfying whole of humanity, limits its aim to the satisfaction of his individual existence. In Marx's thought man's essence consists in his life-activity, the free, conscious, activity. But this life activity is turned into merely a way of surviving. This means that Marx

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conceived of man and his activity as inseparably connected. Regarding the third kind of alienation i.e. alienation from other men, Marx said :

> An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life–activity, from his species being is the *estrangement of man from man.* If a man is confronted by himself, he is confronted by *other* man.... Infact, the proposition that man's species nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's essential nature.[8] (Italics in original)

Since for Marx man's essential nature is a social or species nature which can be best expressed through his conscious, creative activity, it is evident that for Marx alienation from others is but a form of self–alienation.

Alienation from one's activity, alienation from species nature and alienation from others can, thus, be perhaps taken as different forms of expressing the self–alienation of man. But one wonders how Marx thinks man to be alienated from his product. Is this a form of self–alienation as other three seem to be ? Does Marx preach a primitive society devoid of industrialization? After all under all industrial societies, there is bound to be a division of labour and commodity production and the product will be separated from labourer.

It seems that Marx spoke of alienation from prodnct not keeping in view merely division of labour and industrialisation but also that in a class society there is a compulsory division of labour. The class which owns the means of production manages to rule in every sphere. Since the worker has no choice (without the means of production) but to work in order to survive, his work negates his essential creativity.

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Alienation from the product for Marx refers to not only a separation of the product from its producer but it also signifies the independence and autonomy of a product because of the impersonal laws of market economy, wherein the product has a life of its own and it controls the dimensions of the workers, activity.

Here it will be significant to say that there is difference between objectification and alienation and Marx did maintain this distinction. He said :

> Labour's realisation is its objectification. In the conditions dealt with by political economy this realisation appears as loss of reality for the workers.. objectification as loss of the object... appropriation as estrangement, as alienation. [9]

In other words, objectification refers to man embodying his capacities in an outward form or an object. It means duplicating oneself and contemplating oneself in a world that man himself has created. Hence objectification refers to a positive, desirable externalisation of man's potentialities; on the other hand, it dominates or rules over man. It emerges as something which instead of embodying the capacities of the worker thwarts his potentialities.

While concluding I may say that in Marx's view, minimization of alienation is linked with the maximization of need fulfilment and power realisation. A person is alienated to the extent that he is unable to realise his essential nature.

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NOTES

1. Marx, Karl, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1944* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), p. 79. Henceforth to be quoted as E. P. M.

2. By power he meant the ability to act and produce certain consequences The equivalents of power as used by Marx are faculty, ability and capacity.

3. Need refers to the lack one feels for something which is not available. Need is always attached to power in Marx's writings as the means through which man becomes aware of the latter's existence.

4. It should be mentioned here that Marx did not limit these needs and powers to biological ones only but extends them to the striving of arts and sciences as well. Infact, he included all that which constitutes the domain of whatsoever is produced by human creative consciousness.

5. *E. P. M.*, p. 75.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

7. Species being (Gattungswesen) – this term Marx borrowed from Feuerbach. The following passage from Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* and quoted in the *E. P. M.* can help us to understand the meaning of the term species-being "Consciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought. ... The brute is indeed conscious of himself as an individual ... but not as a species ... Man ... can put himself in the place of another, for this reason, that to him his species, his essential nature and not merely his individuality is an object of thought ... *E. P. M.*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 76–77.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

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THE LOGIC OF OUR TALK ABOUT THE ARTIST'S INTENTION

This note attempts to formulate a few critical remarks on the aesthetical problem concerning the concept of intention in art. In what follows, I shall attempt (1) a reformulation and examination of the general anti-intentionalist position; and, (2) an enquiry into the nature of "intended meaning". I wish to argue that the distinction commonly drawn between the artist's intention and artistic meaning is a spurious one. And, I shall seek to outline here a sense in which to talk of the artistic meaning is the same as to talk of the artist's intention.

I may begin by outlining the problem. Critical talk about works of art often make references to the artist's intention. E.g., in understanding a poem we may want to know the poet's intended meaning of a word(s), phrase(s), or the whole poem[1]. That is, instead of discussing the *poem's* meaning we might talk about the *poet's* intended meaning. The problem arising out of such a situation has often been brought out in terms of the following general question : Are such references relevant to our appreciation, interpretation and evaluation of art works ? The significance of this question, it has been claimed, may be made clear by indicating the implications that would seem to follow from such critical practices : (i) If a work of art is understood or interpreted in terms of what is not *directly* given in it, are we not guilty of shifting our attention away from the work ? (ii) If a work of art is evaluated by the consideration as to whether it has successfully fulfilled the artist's intentions, are we not invoking a criterion which is extraneous to the work ? The

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general apprehension underlying such questions is that in our attempt to interpret or/and evaluate the work of art in terms of the artist's intention we are always giong away from the work itself.

It is worthwhile to clarify here that philosophers who raise such questions insist upon a distinction being drawn between the work *itself* on the one hand and the meaning or significance of it as *intended* by the artist, on the other. The latter, it has been suggested, raises irresolvable issues, such as : (a) how do we know what is the artist's intention ? (b) Is what is stated by the artist as his intention verifiable ? (c) What is the last court of appeal in the event of doubt, disagreement etc. ? The aforesaid questions are self-explanatory. On such grounds some aestheticians, particularly of the analytic persuation (Beardsley et al) have concluded that to interpret and evaluate a work of art with reference to "intention" is to commit a "fallacy" [2]

The basic premise of the anti–intentionalist position regards the artist's intention in some sense *separable* from the poem or the work of art. Wimsatt Jr. and Beardsley in their article "The Intentional Fallacy" clearly state : "Intention is design or plan in the author's mind". [3] From this it is but a step only to argue about the critic's inaccessibility to knowledge of what allegedly remains buried in the author's mind. The argument takes the following form :

(p) If x is the intention of the artist then (i) either x is given in the work or (ii) it is not.

(q) If (i), then attribution of x to the artist's mind is irrelevant and unnecessary.

(r) If (ii), then it is not worthwhile to make such attributions at all.

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A few general comments may be in order here : Beardsley can talk in terms of a disjunction of (i) and (ii), because on their own ground it is possible to say that something is an intention in the mind of the artist and does not form part of his work. Clearly, there is a divide between the work and what the artist intended *before* making it. An obvious question here would be : What is the relation between the work and the artist ? It is acknowledged on all hands that an artistic work is not to be treated as a product of chance Considering that some of the things the artist thought did not get into the work, some atleast *did* get into it; or else, the work would not be made. For some quality or effect found in the work praise or blame goes to the artist. Further, it remains an unquestionably valid practice for the critic to point up effect or quality in the work made *intentionally* by the artist which however might escape the viewer's attention. In such cases it is only reasonable that the critic refers the quality to the artist's intention. In the preceding argument we would disagree with the disjunctive form set out in (p), as (ii) is not under consideration at all. The critic in discussing the work is not referring to what might have been but what *is* ; and what is not separable from the artist's intention. I shall revert to this point later.

However, the argument against intentionalism needs to be examined carefully. To do so we may bring out clearly the main assumptions underlying the argument :

(a') If x is the intention of the artist, x stands for some mental state given prior to the act of making the work;

(a'') mental states being "private" or opaque are not open to verification by others;

(a''') the question "what is x ?" is meaningful if only a *conclusive* answer is possible / forthcoming, in principle.

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Critics of anti-intentionalism have rightly argued that if intention is identified with the artist's mental state, then any reference to *prior* intentions and *statements* made about them by the artist may well be suspect. Colin Lyas clarifies the point neatly by distinguishing several anti-intentionalist thesis :

"This first thesis rules out only the need for knowledge of and reference to *statements* of prior intention. It does not establish the dispensability of knowledge of prior intentions where this knowledge is gained in ways other than by study of *explicit* statements of intention. A second, stroger, thesis might therefore be offered. According to this thesis, knowledge of intentions had by the artist prior to producing the work, however this knowledge is obtained, is unnecessary in criticism. At best such knowledge can suggest to us things we should look for in the work ... This second, stronger, thesis would, if true, show only the dispensability of knowledge and reference to *prior* intentions. It does not, as such, rule out reference to our knowledge of the fact that the work and some of its effects are *intentional*. For, as we have seen, this knowledge may not involve reference to prior intentions at all." [4]

The point that deserves emphasis here is this. Indeed, the artist may hatch many a plan about his work, but what might finally be shaped out by him need have no definite relationship with such "preconceptions". Artistic creation would be very much a drab affair if the artist were merely to translate into his medium what he had conceived of in a cool and clinical manner. The work would be a surrogate. Equating the artist's intention with some special mental state is wrought with implications which neither accord with prevalent creative practices nor auger well with the demands of wellgrounded critical practices. The force of anti-intentionalist argument is felt to the extent (a′) and (a″) are treated as comprehensive. It should be pointed out here

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that the staunch critic of the intentionalist position would much rather (a′) read as follows :

(a'_1) for x to qualify as the intention of the artist it must *always* stand for some mental state given prior to the making of the work.

For him, there is but only one sense of "intention" viz., some mental state which precedes the creative process. Thus, it is not difficult to see that "intention" so construed readily fuels the flames of (a′″). The question "what is x ?" (where x stands for the alleged intention) at once becomes a sitting duck for the criticism that it is to raise a question in the face of what has been shown as not susceptible of a logical enquiry. In other words, because of the comprehensive nature of (a′) and (a″) questions of the sort "what is x ?" fall foul of a legitimate enquiry.

Colin Lyas makes an attempt to show that the anti-intentionalist argument is quite inconclusive. He argues that the talk of intention gets vitiated if we construe it to be identified with some mental state. But surely, intention can have *other* senses For Lyas, (a'_1) is quite unwarranted as one can continue of artistic intention without implying that it is a mental state which occured to the artist before making the work of art. One can speak of the artist's intention to the knowledge of which even the artist himself may not claim any priviledge access. We may, here briefly consider the position.

Lyas begins by distinguishing the "weak" and "strong" senses of the anti-intentionalist thesis. He argues that Beardsley's position conforms to a "weak" sense of the thesis. That is, Lyas suggests, we can hold the view that *some* references to the artist's intention are "dispensable" – those that are construed in terms as (a′)and (a″). However, from this it does not follow that *all* such references are dispensable or eliminable.

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> "To assert the strongest form of anti-intentionalism would ... constitute a total elimination of reference to intention from critical talk about art and would have an interesting consequence. For since the only difference I can see between a work of art and natural object stem from the fact that intentional human activity is involved in the making of art, so to deny the relevance of any knowledge of intention would be to deny the relevance of knowledge that one is dealing with art." [5]

The key point of the argument makes a massive place of the counter intuitive nature af a work of art denied to have been by someone *intentionally*. To drive home the point that a comprehensive anti-intentionalist thesis is untenable, Lyas distinguishes between two different senses of the term "intention": (d_1) the sense in which we talk of something buried in the mind (i.e., a mental state), and (d_2) the sense in which it is possible to distinguish between objects made intentionally and those that are products of chance or accident.[6] Further, he draws support from (d_2) and presses forward with the point that art objects being intentionally made are quite amenable to our understanding in terms of the artist's intentions. The main thrust of his argument is that for something to be intentionally made it does not *presuppose* a prior act of intention. He goes on to defend the practice of attributing to works of art "personal qualities" such as responsible, mature, intelligent, witty, poised, simple-minded, shallow, diffuse, glib etc. on the argument that such attributions are possible only if works of art are regarded as intentionally made objects. As for Lyas's claim that the ascription of such personal qualities *presupposes* knowledge of and reference to the artist and his intention, Joseph Margolis clearly has reservations : "Certainly, this sometimes obtains - but not always. It shows the aesthetic relevance of biographical

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and intentional considerations; but, sometimes, an inspection of a given work supports their *ascription* – from which, therefore, we may draw inferences regarding the artist."[7] It seems to me that Margolis's point is rather well taken; it shows that the legitimacy of (d_2) does not preclude the possibility of asking questions with regard to (d_1). Something may well *seem* to be intentionally made, but whether it *really* is the case is still a sensible question. I think that the relation between (d_1) and (d_2) is rather complex. In some cases, (d_2) may provide a clue about (d_1), but atleast in some cases (d_2) will have to draw support from (d_1). It is only because in some cases the *real* intention can also become evident that it makes sense to talk of what *seems* to be rather than what *really* is. In everyday context of human interaction such a distinction is drawn very commonly. Mental states are not always correctly borne out by outward features or symptoms. For example, a smiling or a long face is not a conclusive evidence as to whether the person is really happpy or unhappy. In all such cases, the *seems–is* distinction is clearly understood.

However, Lyas's attempt to rehabilitate the concept of intention in art can at best be termed as partial. The implication of his view, it seems to me, is that it is proper and relevant to ask questions of the sort, (w_1) whether some of the effects in the work were intentionally put there by the artist? and not questions of the sort, (w_2) *what* is the intention of the artist? Let us see what this really means. If w_1 is relevant to something being considered an art object, could we say the same for w_2? This does not seem to follow from what Lyas says : " However even if prior intentions could not be known from the work, it does not follow that knowledge that the work and some of its effects are intentional, knowledge needed for the critically relevant attribution of personal qualities to the work, cannot be had ...5

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from the work itself. Intention can be revealed in the work equally as well as in any other piece of human behaviour."[8]

I would like to respond to Lyas thus : True, most of our actions in everyday life are not preceded by any definite *prior* intention. But it still makes sense to talk of carefully hindden or concealed intetions or discovering one's real intention. This is also true of art. *Monalisa's* smile was painted the way it looks quite intentionally by Leonardo Da Vinci. But it is quite sensible to ask what the artist intended the smile to be taken for. As in this case, no conclusive answer may be forthcoming to such question That is to say, (w_2) is a far more specific question which is neither contained in (w_1), nor warranted by it

However, (w_2) is the critic's natural choice. In critical practice, the most crucial but divergent references to the artist's intention in respect of a work may be provoked by (w_2), notwithstanding the convergence of a common consent on (w_1). We may readily cite some references concerning the works of Jasper Johns who painted a series on some very common place subjects like the target, the American flag, numbers etc. The repeated use of such subjects in a large number of his works has evoked speculations as to the real intention of the artist. For example, it has been suggested by some of his critics that Johns chose the common place subjects for his works to make them ' disappear" altogether. The explanation goes that at the sight of a familiar and commonplace object the spectator would cease to think about it. But as Steinberg points out, the same works are capable of sustaining and supporting the contrary interpretation that the subjects like the flag, the target etc., in Johns's paintings look "more visible" than they do in their familiar context. " We thus have a critical situation in which some believe that the subjects were chosen to make them more visible, others, that they were chosen to become altogether invisible. It is the sort of discrepancy that becomes

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a heuristic event. It sends you back to the paintings with a more potent question : What in the work, you ask, invites contrariness ? It then turns out that the work is such as to vindicate both groups of critics For John's pictures are situations wherein the subjects are constantly found and lost, submerged and recovered." [9]

Such situations are intriguing enough, more so because nobody can claim to be the arbiter of what should count as the artist's real intention. The rival claims of the critics seem to inject a subjectivist approach in to the whole matter relating to the interpretation of the work. Yet, the work seems richer in content and perhaps would have lost something of its value if it had not been susceptible of a certain range of possibilities. For the anti-intentionalist, the inconclusive nature of such speculation regarding the artist's intention provides a chink in his armour. To steer clear of the tangle, Davies, in a recent paper, works out distinction between intention and intentionality : "Our interest in art rests on a recognition of its intentionality, but not necessarily as a result of a recognition of the artist's intentions. With the distinction between intention and intentionality in mind, the key point might be made as follows : Of course we are interested in what an artist has 'to say' in his work of art but that may be different from and more interesting than that which he is able to avow as his intention. After all, the artist is in the same position as anyone else when it comes to paraphrasing or describing the work of art." [10] Let me clarify. Davies uses the terms "intention" and the artist's "avowal" of it almost interchangeably. The implication seems to be that we often get waylaid by (w_2), and therefore, one had better not be talked into it. The distinction clearly lies between what the artist has "to say" *in* his work and what he says or avows *about* his work. Obviously, the letter can always be looked upon suspiciously.

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But the more important point is, how do we ensure that what is said *in* the work does not escape the viewer. Arguing in the limited context of representational painting, say a portrait, Davies maintains : "Painters frequently intend to represent individuals who actually exist or have existed. Inevitably then, an interest in that which a painting represents will sometimes involve a concern with a reference. An aesthetic interest in paintings is, it would generally be accepted, indifferent to the existence of the represented subject. Had more importance been attached to the painter's intentions, so that those intentions, so that those intentions determined the nature of aesthetic understanding and appreciation, it would have been necessary to admit that, often an aesthetic interest would concern itself with the referential use of art. However, an interest in the representational character of art pays no regerd to such intentions or to a possibility of pictures' havings representational character which may be distinguished from what they represent as determined by the painters' intentions." [11]

I may rejoin as follows. First, Davies considers only a limited context in which a concern with the existence of the represented subject could claim to be subsumed under the wider sense of intention. Even in the case of a representational painting a more interesting question for the critic would be *why* the painter chose the subject he did. For example, the paintings of Jasper Johns we considered earlier – the target series, the flag series etc. – may well seem to be representational in character. But the point of concern, there, was *why* he made use of such commonplace subjects. Second, as in everyday life so in art the question about intention is raised only when one is not clear about it or has doubt or suspicion as to its real nature. Consider, for example, everyday life situations where we may intend to convey our feeling of anger or displeasure through disguised talk or action. Sometimes, we may even want to conceal our intentions.

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On such occasions it is quite natural for others to seek some clue to our real intention. Needless to say that the *talk* of intention would not be relevant to cases where the intentions are manifestly clear. Works of art do not often fall under this category.

However, for Davies as much as for Lyas it is only (w_1) which appears to be relevant. I suspect that the move to make (w_1) appear more crucial to the issue is based on a tacit approval of (a'''). I think that a more plausible model of explanation may be construed in support of (w_2) if we discard (a'''); and that, even if *no* conclusive answer seems forthcoming in respect of (w_2) such a question is relevant and meaningful as it helps enrich our aesthetic experience of the object. To put the matter slightly differently, an anti-intentionalist thesis in the "strong" sense parasitises mainly on (a'''); and further, (w_2) will gain relevance if it is disconnected from (a''').

The point I have tried to stress so far is that the talk about the artist's intention is quite legitimate and may well provide a necessary clue to our understanding of the work. The anti-intentionalist, in my view, makes a logical muddle by assuming that since (w_2) cannot be answered conclusively it must remain outside the domain of our critical talk. Such a move is vitiated by the charge that it is not responsive to the prevalent critical practice. Often, much of what the critic says or has to say emanates from his readiness to consider one or the other possibility for (w_2). True, the question of verifiability of such statement about the purported intention of the artist must remain unresolved. The question "How do we know what *really* is the artist's intention?" can become as much a subject matter of debate as, for example, the question whether the man who gives money to the needy does it out of a sense of charity or some other selfish motive. One might say that in most cases whether

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an action is done intentionally or otherwise is not so much in most cases whether an action is done intentionally or otherwise is not so much in doubt though there may not be an hard evidence to support such a conclusion As for the intention of the artist once we acknowledge that the work is an intentionally made object the responsibility for which is to be placed on the astist we cannot stall around (w_2) for long. *How* we answer (w_2) is crucial to the identity of the work. The work of art can be no other than what the artist intended it to be. It may seem somewhat convoluted that even though no conclusive answer is forthcoming in response to (w_2) all the various possibilities may be regarded as what may have been intended by the artist.

I suggest that a work of art may sustain – and a good work often does – a host of different interpretations. However, this also presupposes the viewer's ability and willingness to "see" various possibilities, what is experienced within an aesthetic mode is not the self-same single "object"; the range of possibilities add to the complexity and richness of experience.[12] I am saying that a work of art W_{p_1} may be seen as W_{p_1}, W_{p_2}, W_{p_3} ... W_{Pn} where p_1, p_2, p_5, .. p_n stand for different possibilities. Obviously, this talk of possibilities is quite opposed to the dogma of the work of art *itself*. Now, in considering p_3, p_2, $p_5 \cdots p_n$ some of them may be aesthetically more rewarding than others. Take, for example, Johns's work which lends itself to several interpretations. Here, to ask (w_2) is quite relevant provided that we grant *any* of the possible meaning was intended by the artist. Further, I suggest, that in the absence of a conclusive answer to (w_2), W_p may be seen as given in the mode of a tension-pattern resulting from competing possibilities – each of p_1, p_2, $p_3 \cdots p_n$ being taken for the artist's possible intended meaning. Rather than demanding a conclusive answer, (w_2) keeps alive our interest in the work. That is, (w_2) is compatible with not

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inimical to, the doctrine that a successful work should evoke and sustain an abiding interest in the details of the work. The critic by referring to the artist's intention in terms of (w_2) does not legislate on the meaning and status of Wp. Nor does he necessarily take us away from the focus of aesthetic contemplation. It is more plausible to maintain that such practices may well be integrated with the aesthetic mode of viewing works of art.

Briefly then, I have argued that to ask the question "What is the artist's intention?" is to invite the perceptive attention to several possibilities the presence of all of which makes the work of art seem richer in content It will, thus, be a wrong move to give up on this question *even if* no conclusive answer to it is forthcoming. Further, contrary possibilities with regard to the interpretation of the same work may well set up a tension-pattern which will be conducive to a heightened aesthetic experience.

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NOTES

1. Frank Cioffi refers to the heterogeneity or the contexts in which questions of interpretation arise : " Even within the same kind of context the author's intention will vary in relevance depending on the kind of question involved, whether it concerns the meaning of a word or the tone of a passage, the view to be taken of a character or a situation or the general moral of an entire work. "
   Cioffi in " Intention and Interpretation in Criticism " *Journal of Aristotelian Society*, 1963–64, p. 93.
2. W. K. Wimsatt Jr., and M. C. Beardsley in " The Intentional Fallacy " in W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., " *The Verbal Icon* " (Lexington : University of Kentucky Press.)
3. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
4. Colin Lyas in " Personal Qualities and the Intentional Fallacy ", *Philosophy and the Arts* (Royal Institute in Philosophy, Vol 6, 1971–72) (New York : St. Martin's Press), p. 196.
5. *Ibid*, p. 197.
6. This distinction was earlier suggested by R. Kuhns in " Criticism and the Problem of Intention ", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LVII No. 1, 1960.
7. Joseph Margolis, " *Art and Philosophy : Conceptual Issues in Aesthetics* ", (The Harvester Press, 1980), p. 181.
8. Colin Lyas, *Ibid*, p. 206.
9. Leo Steinberg, " *Other Criteria : Confrontation with Twentieth-Century Art* ", (Oxford University Press, 1972) p. 25.
10. Stephen Davies in " The Aesthetic Relevance of Authors' and Painters' Intentions ", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Fall, 1982, p. 66.
11. *Ibid*, p. 75.
12. I have, here, in mind the notion of " concretion " developed by Roman Ingarden with regard to aesthetic viewing of a work of art :
    " The work of art then, is the product of the intentional activities of an artist : the *concretion* of the work is not only the reconstruction thanks to the activity of an observer of what was effectively present in the work, but also a completion of the work and the actualization of its moments of potentiality. It is thus in a way the common product of artist and observer. "
    Roman Ingarden in " Artistic and Aesthetic Values ", in Harold Osborne (ed), *Aesthetics* (Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 40.

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THE ROLE OF REASON IN HUMAN ACTION

Ethics as a Philosophical inquiry seeks to understand human action and relate it to the human predicament. The problem of norms of human action is as perennial as the human communities themselves. Ever since human beings started reflecting on their identity they also started deliberating on their relationship with others and consequently on the parameters of their freedom. With the recognition of freedom arose all questions concerning norms and values. For man recognized the distinction between the natural and the normative orders and understood the irreducibility of one to the other. Behind the origin of all imperatives lies the possibility of the visualization of contrafactuals.

The complicated structures of hunan interactions have led to the development of intricate social institutions and the enforcement of their norms in terms of legal apparati governed by different state machineries. Behind these laws, created and reiterated by state machineries are certain moral presuppositions which have varied from time to time and have consequently brought changes in the legal systems adhered to by different communities.

Let us go deeper into the moral norms. All moral norms explicitly or implicitly presuppose a vision of man and human nature. If we look back at the history of the western ethical tradition we find a great diversity in the various attempts at the intellectual articulation of the nature of value. These attempts vary because of the status and role accorded to reason in the epistemology of value and its internalization by the different

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moral agents. Before going into these let us first analyse the nature of 'reason'. The term reason has had such varied interpretations in different philosophical traditions that it is difficult to lay down a set of essential features which it would connote in all contexts. It varies from being treated as contrasted with faith (and thus embracing in it all attempts at knowing) to regarding it as a quest of universals and self evident truths. There is yet another sense of reason which is different from all these usages (which, inspite their diversity, are essentially concerned with epistemological problems) and that is what, after Kant has come to be known as practical reason. It is with this dimension of reason that we are concerned at the moment. Practical reason can be understood in the following three senses :

a) as contrasted with impulses and instincts it is reflective and thus is the product of deliberation;

b) as that which reiterates the autonomy of the agent; and lastly

c) as that which is in principle universalizable.

Since the idea of being an agent implies being different and irreducible to the natural order which follows predictable patterns based on natural laws, human agency can be understood only if we presume its autonomy. It is this autonomy of man which Kant highlighted when he held that a rational agent is not one who slavishly follows his appetites and impulses. Consequently while natural events have causes human action is the product of deliberation and reflection and thus carries within it a universalizability on principle. These are the three major formal conditions for branding any action rational or irrational in the history of ethical traditions. Moral thinkers have upheld the pursuit of either some or all the three of the above mentioned norms to characterize an ideal human agent. Although Kant may treat them as moral maxims but we must recognize

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that these principles lay down only the formal conditions for the possibility of action and do not guide us in our concrete historicity. From time to time philosophers have been vexed at the praxiological emptiness of these maxims. One may recall here the allusion that Sartre has made in *Existentialism and Humanism* to his student who was torn between his duty for his ailing mother and the loyalty towards his enemy-occupied country. Sartre contends that in such moments of crisis no moral philosophy could help this young man to make his choice, he had to choose in total loneliness and despair. It must be seen here that the poverty (highlighted by Sartre) does not lie in the concept of reason because of its inability to account for the practical situations in their multiple nuances; the logic of the reason shows it does not have any necessary and sufficient characteristics. This insufficiency is because of two reasons.

1) Every decisive and crucial choice involves a hierarchy of values. Since there is a plurality of values involving different hierarchies at different moments, the ultimate decision lies with the agent.

2) The agent is not alone in the world; every action that he performs has three perspectives – that of the agent; that of his fellow beings towards whom the action is directed and that of the onlookers who are uninvolved spectators of that action. We should henceforth refer to these three perspectives as the first, second and third person accounts respectively.

Let us go into these two reasons in greater detail. We said that a crucial human choice is characterized by a plurality of values both cherished by the individual but posed as mutually exclusive alternatives to the agent in a given moment. The crisis is created because of the finitude of human existence and the situational limitations in which every agent exercises his choice.

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Consequently it leads to a perennial regret and remorse on the part of the agent. For whatever he may choose, he knows that he can choose only one of the alternatives both equally cherished by him. Take for instance such choices like those between compassion and truthfulness or between benevolence and freedom. One can realize how torn the agent becomes when pushed to make exclusive choices between these values. Practical reason cannot resolve these crises. Only the agent would have to decide which particular value to hold supreme at a certain moment. However, this does not mean that the pursuit of value is private to the individual, the crisis situation is created precisely because both the values are universalizable and there is no single paradigm of value hierarchy which can be held absolute. All models are equally universalizable and are pursued at different moments of time by different individuals following their particular goals and intentions in different periods of their lives. Thus the question is not of either opting for universality or relativism. This variation in the order of values emerges from the very nature of human consciousness which is perpetually belying any static essence However, to deny any static essence should not be taken as a rejection of coherence and consistency which is the very condition of personhood. An individual in the course of his life is coherently and consistently putting into action his avowed attitudes, beliefs and intentions. Does this amount to saying that rational action is simply coherently and consistently translating one's avowed beliefs and attitudes into action ? If this be so then morality would become simply an institutional practice within a certain community and the terms 'reason' and 'rational' would become vacuous. For they, would be equated to the mores and customs of a given social group. It may be argued that since social communities of the world do not have uniform mores, all coherent systems of beliefs, attitudes and actions are equally rational. For instance from a belief in the *home hierarchicus*

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would coherently (and thus rationally) follow a treatment of certain sections of society as subservient to others. But we must remember that questioning of the justifiability of certain beliefs and attitudes is an equally important moral concern. And in assessing the justifiability of beliefs and attitudes we must once again turn to the three formal conditions of rationality. It does not suffice to follow any one of these but all the three conditions must be fulfilled. If we recognize that the autonomy of agents is a pre-condition for the operation of the principle of rationality then it would be clear that all beliefs cannot be rational. And despite its internal coherence a system based upon irrational beliefs will be irrational. Thus modification and rejection of beliefs and attitudes is a constant moral exercise of self-conscious agent. In this venture the situations one lives through and the persons one interacts with play an important role. To mention all this is not to say that the situations and other fellow beings hold the key to one's personhood but it is to say that like the changing situations that surround one, persons too are not static entities. They keep growing like a *raga* which slowly unfolds through various tonal forms. However, there is a 'commanding form' (in Susanne Langer's sense) which reverberates in the flux of tonal imagery. It is this commanding form which marks the identity of persons, which – unless there is a crisis which impels one to reframe and restructure one's total prespective – remains relatively constant despite the episodic variations. It is this constancy and consistency which enables us to 'know' other minds, to predict, with more or less reasonable accuracy, their reactions to different situations. However, we must also recognize that just as none of our modes of knowing about ourselves are infallible similarly none af our attempts at knowing the intentions and beliefs of others are free from the possibility of error.

This brings us to our second point about the three-dimensional perspective of all action. Every action, we said, can be

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seen from the first, second and third person's vantage point. In physical terms an action may be describable in terms of passing of certain currency notes from Y to X. Y may characterize it by saying that he gave money to X because he thought that X needed it and since he is in a social position of superiority over him he would hesitate asking for money from him for fear of being misunderstood that he is exploiting his position. X may think that Y gave him that money to prove to others that he is a generous man and A, B, C & Z (the onlookers) think that Y gave money because he wanted to bribe X. In each of the individual's action and interpretation of action percolate the social practices. mores and values which he imbibes during the course of his growing up and maturation. These practices and mores are paracitical both upon the economic realities and the sex to which he belongs. The former have been amply underlined by the Marxists to need repetition here but it is the latter which we wish to reiterate. The fact of being a man or a woman quite inadvertantly percolates into our decision making process. For, in spite of being unique individuals human agents encapsule within themselves the entire historicity of their particular reference frame. Being born in the Hindu cultural milieu in each woman's psyche percolates the ethos of *sati* – of undaunted devotion to man. A *practico inert* which each woman born in a Hindu family will have to self-consciously transcend if she wants to grow to become a person. The fact that it is possible to transcend these socially and culturally foisted identities shows that in principle it is possible to be free. But all these complexities of one's historicity would make the convergence of perspectives an extremely difficult task. Usually one would say that assuming the coherence and consistency of persons it will be in principle possible to resolve such problems arising out of the multiplicity of perspectives be verifying the facts related to each case and then arriving at a convergence. But does this not have

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the following two assumptions ? :

a) that we always mean what we say, and

b) if we have acted in a certain way for a certain number of times we will continue to act only in that particular way in all similar situations ? Would not the two of these implications drag us into the Spinoziast or Hegelian dispositions and potentialities, the vicious circle of which we shall never be able to break ? The freedom of human existence lies in this very possibility of effacing the past at any given moment. As Sartre says, " my future is virgin; everything is allowed to me " (*Being and Nothingness,* p. 78). If we hold that human beings are free, would we not be forced to recognize that even if X may have acted ten times in a certain way, the eleventh time he can reject all his preceding choices and act afresh. It is this peculiar freedom of persons that generates the multiplicity of interpretations and consequently one faces a perennial regret and remorse at the threat of being misunderstood. Like the hero of Sartre's *Wall* in different periods of our lives we live at the brink of this tragic irony where " we laugh so hard that we cry " (A quote from Sartre's *Wall*).

If this is the destiny of man–to be in perpetual anguish generated by the perennial possibility of being misunderstood and to be totally alone in the moment of choice, is there no hope for him, cannot reason help to solve such enigmas ? The answer would have to be a 'no', we will have to admit that reason can only provide us with a formal framework of action. In the concrete situation it can at best help one to be more self-critica by evaluating the degree of coherence between one's avowed beliefs and intentions with one's actions. It can help one see more clearly the hiatus between one's theory and practice by reviewing one's action from multiple reference–frames and arri-

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ving at a possible convergence between them. For, inspite of the multiplicity of interpretations of an action each interpretation will have to carry with it its supporting reasons. If X believes in the equality of sexes than he will be obliged to translate this belief into actions. In such cases it shall be (in principle) possible to bring a concord of his perspective with that of his female associates. For a belief and an intention are not private to the individual but recognizable in terms of his actions. However, confusion in interpretation of actions may arise if after years of male chauvinism he 'suddenly' starts treating women as equals. And also because each one of us in different moments of our lives is tempted to live in bad faith or cheat and pretend to others How can one decide which interpretation of an action is the most appropriate one? One may say that in such cases one can only make retrospective interpretation. As Sartre would say that only when a man has died can we say decisively whether he was authentic or inauthentic, for as long he was alive, possibilities were open before him. But even when he is dead we can still not deny the possibility of a plurality of interpretations. The complexity involved in our understanding of historical facts is well known to us to make us aware of this problem.

By highlighting this ambiguity in the interpretation of human action may it not be understood that we are supporting a moral nihilism. We may be asked–if the notion of authenticity is ultimately ambiguous why should we be moral? The question has been answered right from the time of Socrates in the *Republic*, when he says injustice (is) fatal when existing in a single person... rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself' (*The Republic* No. 362).

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CONCEPT OF MEANING

In the beginning of twentieth century there arose a strong reaction against speculative metaphysics. It gave rise to two important trends in philosophy such as positivism and analytic philosophy. Idealists of the past were charged that they were using words without proper meaning. The terms such as substance, thing, phenomenon, object, truth meaning, validity were used ambiguously. This objection is worth considering and there should be conscious thinking over the terms employed in philosophising. Stuart Chase wrote in his " Tyrrany of words " and expressed to the effect that words which have no correspondence in experience and the world are meaningless and therefore they should not be used in philosophy. In this context I should like to discuss in the present essay that although ambiguity is to be avoided yet significant assertions can be adequately thought and meaning required to be fulfilled in concrete situation. Words cannot altogether be dismissed but their significance and context ought to be properly cognized. This seems to be the proper import of Wittgensteinian aphorism that " Don't ask for meaning, ask for use ". In the earnest zeal of defending positions philosophers have ignored the question of thinking consciously over the criterion of meaning in its significant assertive aspect and with reference to concrete situation and experience.

It is true to say that there are misleading similarities between grammatical and logical statements as " Martyrs exist " and " God exists ", 'I think' and ' I exist '. But such similarities cannot prevent one to think about the possible meaning and

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understanding of term 'existence'. By analysing the term 'existence' and substituting by symbols it cannot be said that term 'existence' is altogether removed. Theory of description indicates the symbolic representative value of the person designated. In its abstractive capacity of symbolisation it does not take away the potentiality and possibility of its happening and would be existing. Concrete situation can be abstracted and at times reduced to symbolic designation. It does not, however, make it devoid of possible happening. Analysts have overlooked the point of significant becoming of individual and event provided they are meaningful. The task of philosophical analysis by reduction and showing the new role of words and language does not end in verbal recommendation but it is supposed to orient the relationship between proposition and object, meaning and fulfilment.

To elucidate the abovesaid objective of orientation in the first instance, a distinction between significant and non-significant meaning of proposition is necessary. To show significance is to bring out the truth-value of proposition. Of course it should be pointed out that proposition and assertion are not the same. Assertion is the truth-claim in a proposition with reference to external concrete situation. When it is said that "Tobacco causes cancer", this proposition is significant because there is not only the sense of causal connection but the future possibility of its being true. A proposition may be provisionally true provided that there is no inconsistency or a formal contradiction between subject and predicate of the proposition. But to speak that 'Saturday is in bed' does not make sense because 'Saturday' and 'bed' refer to different objects not coinciding in natural and concrete situation. Here meaning is frustrated. Object of significant meaning and meaningful proposition is to find fruition in objective situation.

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It should be borne in mind that to express significant proposition is not attributing to it its entire logical value. Logical value is beyond the grammatical determination. For instance while estimating logical value of proposition, "The present king of France is bald-headed" it is essential to take into consideration whether such a king is at present existing. In absence of such a king this proposition loses its logical value. For the important point to judge the truth-value of the proposition rests upon how such a proposition can be known properly. Such a proposition distinctly differs from "present Queen of England is married". Consideration of the problem of logical value of meaning of proposition brings before us the question of conditions of knowing the meaning. Herein it would be recognised that criterion of meaning is concerned with not only concrete situation but with what 'could have been' the meaning of the proposition.

While considering the nature of criterion of meaning it is at times supposed that it is concerned with referring to some phenomenon, event or denoting an individual. This is partly true. Question of reference and denotation leads one to think about what is actually so and what is its possible status in objective world. To know the meaning is not to describe the meaning only, it is to evaluate it in the light of objectivity. Therefore it is not proper to hold that meaning is devoid of object. Logical value of meaning is related with possible or actual object. Moreover such a value takes into consideration the procedure of adequately knowing the object of meaning. At times the symbolic, representative, emotive and reflective ways of knowing and articulating the meaning are maintained but these views do not explain the import of meaning fully. To hold that meaning is just symbolic or that it represents some phenomenon and event is not to express it for reduction to either speech, its key or to designation which may be evidently indicative. Fot instance, in

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chemical combination a compound is symbolised by letters or keys. It, however, does not mean that original phenomena and 'things' are removed. Meanings do not cancel the objects and phenomena which they symbolise and represent.

Meaning is an intrinsic part of epistemological framework, for to fix a criterion of meaning is to understand not only the content, entire proposition but to examine the logical truth which I have called 'value' previously. Emotive meaning as maintained in Odgen's work *Meaning of Meaning* is insufficient in view of the absence of criterion of truth-value. Truth or falsity is not merely an ejaculative response in nervous system. It is related with the decision and criterion of truth of spoken word and expressed proposition. Just as there are definite conditions of hearing and understanding words and phrases of referred sentence, similarly there are knowing condltions of knower. In case of perception the perceiver is supposed to consider the possibility of mistake, illusion and hallucination in perceiving the the object. Similarly, while understanding and appreciating the object possibility of conceiving its meaning ought to be considered. Epistemic conditions have an important role to play in framing the criterion of meaning. These conditions attempt to appreciate and reflect not only the phenomenon as it is but also the way it is felt, said and understood to be by the knower. It is a mistake to believe that meaning is just 'given' as words and phrases are given in sentence. It is not proper to have a fixed list of categories and classification of words and objects in the scheme of knowledge and phenomena. Truth-claim of proposition is judged in context of specific situation. Its logical value is determined after resolving error.

Objects and phenomena appear to have been given directly to our perceptual understanding. But there is a distance between the object and judging mind. Without adequate criterion

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of knowing there is a failure in covering the distance. I am not holding, as Descartes did, that there is a curtain of mind between proposition and will. What I am holding is that criterion of meaning is not single but there are plural criteria of determining the meaning. Although there are plural criteria this does not mean that there could be just abstract, fanciful and dream–objects. Of course this is not to say that they are entirely sense-less. They are significant but they are not real. With regard to proposition " space and time attend horse–race " the question of fulfilling the criterion does not arise as space and time are not the objects to attend the race. But there could be criterion to decide that ' there is life on the Moon ' or ' Earth is flat ' although they may turn out to have no truth–value. One of the criterion for bridging the distance between object and judging mind is non–contradiction. The rule of non–contradiction is not just formal but it is concrete in the sense that what is false or partially true is to be rejected on the basis of sublation and correction. Meaning is a link between knower and known. As Husserl says that it is the intention which connects and gives meaning to the object of perception. But it should be noted that intention is liable to be false. This can be recognised by truer perception and inward correction. For instance, in case of rats perceived by a drunkard the meaning is significant as they could be perceived under certain abnormal psychological condition. It can, however, be corrected by veredical perception in the presence of external stimulation. Here it is pointed out that false rats cannot be regarded as meaningful relationship between knower and known. What is false is rejected on the basis of proper concrete condition.

The above clarification would show that there are epistemological conditions necessary to build up the relationship between knower and known. I have shown one criterion of meaning to

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point out that the relation is not immediate as it appears to be. There is likelihood of distortion and misapprehension in grasping the meaning of object.

In the task of analysis of phrases and sentences undertaken to show that meaning is grammatically determined it is overlooked that there are epistemological conditions which correct and evaluate the 'given' object. Of course I have said previously that object is not 'given' as 'it is' understood at times. As soon as the object seems to be given it is instantly interpreted which creates distance between object and the knower.

Owing to the dependence of meaning upon context of situation and understanding of the knower, meaning does not become fanciful and subjective. Context and intentional understanding orient our interpretation. Logical value needs to includes and take cognisance of physical object on the one hand and understanding intention on the other hand.

In the context of meaning it is essential to explicate logical value. Logical value needs to take into cognisance the objective concrete situation and the knowing conditions supposed by the knower. Cognisance of truth–value needs to admit the shades of distinction between sentence and proposition, sense-data and physical object, phenomenon and assertion.

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SOME REFLECTIONS ON SOCIAL PROGRESS

That the society is undergoing extensive change and massive modifications, both structurally and functionally in multidimensional directions is a phenomenon hardly disputed by anybody engaged in sociological studies. Change or mutation is a cosmic phenomenon and society being a part of the cosmos does not enjoy immunity from this cosmic law. Evidently the manner in which changes sweep the physical world are characteristically different from the social change. Man is not the handmaid of the blind forces and circumstances, but the maker of his own destiny. So social changes to a great extent bear the imprint of human urges and initiative. Social change takes place in various intensities in different localities at different points of time. In view of the pervasive nature of social change and its tremendous implications, the social scientists and philosophers make persistent effort to identify the nature and pattern of social change. The concepts of 'Social Evolution' (SE), 'Social Development' (SD) and 'Social Progress' (SP) are employed often as interchangeable terms to explain the changing pattern of society. Although all the scholars are not equally guilty of committing such a confusion, some of them are inclined to treat them as 'logically related terms'. This has, however, been contested by others. The main objective of this paper is to take a fresh look at the concept of *SP* vis-a-vis *SE*.

Since the days of Darwin and Huxley, the notion of 'evolution' exerted some sort of magical charm and the scientists hailed it as the most intelligible scientific concept, "the grand

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key to the comprehension of change". Evolutionary approach to social change is a remarkable feature of the sociological thoughts of a galaxy of social scientists like Comte, Spencer, Tylor, Marx, Max Weber, Ward, Giddings, Hobhouse, Westermarck, Ginsberg, Mclver and others. Of these thinkers, Spencer, Ward and R. T. Lapiere in particular not only extended the notion of evolution to characterise social change, but also identified *SE* with the organic evolution. For Spencer, *SE* is a super-organic evolution, for according to him, the similarities between the two are glaring and significant. As he observes "A social organism is like an individual organism in three essential traits: that it grows, that while growing it becomes more complex, its parts acquire increasing mutual dependence, that its life is immense in length compared with the lives of its component units ..that in both cases there is increasing heterogenlity".[1] Furthermore, Spencer identified *SE* with *SP*, every change found in society is invariably evolutionary and this evolutionary change is necessarily progressive. As social organisation evolves, there is progress towards greater size, coherence, multiformity and definiteness'. In every stage of *SE*, Society, he argues, advances towards the ideal of perfection and happiness. Like Spencer, R. T. Lapiere also holds *SE* to be analogous to biological evolution. In his view, new modes of human behaviour develop in course of *SE* which are oriented towards effective adjustment to envirenmental condition. It leads to the state approximating to social equilibrium.[2] Among the other eminent sociologists, Ward and Giddings by and large lent support to Spencerian line of thought. Giddings traces the process of historical evolution through following stages: zoogenic, anthropogenic, enthogenic and demogenic.

In modern times, R. M. Mclver is a vocal exponent of SE. In his language "Whenever in the history of society we find an

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increasing specialisation of organs or units within the system or serving the life of the whole, we can speak of SE ".[3] The essence of evolution, he further explains, consists in the procees of differentiation which manifests itself by (a) a greater division of labour to greater co-operation and also "a more intricate nexus of functional relationship among the individuals of the group (b) an increase of the number and variety of functional association and institutions" (c) a "greater diversity and refinement in the instruments of social communication".[4] Undoubtedly, the principle of evolution is an important clue to the understanding of social change. but how far it can adequately explain the ongoing of society in its widespread ramifications is a question which deserves close scrutiny.

Unlike the physical world, plant kingdom and infra-rationa beings, society is a complex web of myriad social relationships of rational, value-seeking beings, whose activities when rightly comprehended seem to be predominantly goal-oriented. And for this, social change does not fit well in the framework of the organic evolution. The latter is a part of the cosmic evolution guided rather deterministically by the inherent potencies leaving no room for personal initiative, motivated action and self-directed endeavours. As social beings, men in addition to certain inherited dispositions and tendencies employ different cultural aids, which they have come to acquire from outside, i.e., from social and cultural environment and not evolved from within to satisfy their numerous needs, desires and aspirations. V. Gordon Childe rightly observes "It is essential not to lose sight of the significant distinctions between historical process and organic evolution, between human culture and the animal's bodily equipment, between social heritage and the biological inheritance".[5] This apart, Spencer is guilty of confusing *SE* with *SP*. Obviously society does not necessarily progress in every

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turn of evolution, which, as we know, results from the collective effort of the people. L. T. Hobhouse along with some other social scientists have not, therefore, overlooked the distinction between the SE and SP. In his language, "By evolution, I mean any sort of growth; by SP, the growth of social life in respect of those qualities to which human beings attach, or can rationally attach value".[6] Maintaining distinction between *SE* and *SP*, Hobhouse introduces the notion of 'development' in order to afford a better account of the process of historical change. Social Development (*SD*) by which he understands, 'development of man in their mutual relations' indicates advancement of the community in scale, efficiency and mutuality of service. Hobhouse makes a thorough investigation into the factors of *SD* and rightly emphasizes that development of human mind is a vital factor of *SD*. His keenly-argued thesis is supported and strengthened by his prudent use of historical and anthropological data and psychological analysis of natural impulses and desires of man. On final analysis, Hobhouse's exposition of *SD* stands in between the notions of 'evolution' and 'progress', for he maintains that society is progressively advancing towards such desirable ends as scale, efficiency, freedom and mutuality. Admittedly Hobhouse highlights certain significant factors and aspects of social evolutionism hitherto not adequately investigated into by others. Nevertheless, in recent years his explanation of social change failed to evoke wide recognition on account of its strong teleological flavour.

SP is another significant expression employed to describe social transformation. While consideing *SP*, it should be borne in mind that we cannot speak of progress in any ultimate sense ignoring the time and place qualifications, for we cannot visualise what changes will sweep society, say, a five thousand years hence. So in our discourse on *SP*, we wish to formulate

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an idea of progress taking into account the past history of human civilization, the present concern and commitments of mankind, the psychical constitution of man, his beliefs, aspirations and value-conceptions. Since the beginning of the present century, the majority of the social scientists deliberately avoided all reference to the idea of progress in their discourses on social change. Their main contention is that 'progress' has an ethical implication and while ascertaining whether any particular social change indicates progression or not, valuational judgment can not be avoided. Again value-judgment presupposes certain norms or standards, but universal agreement, it is argued, can never be achieved in this matter. Extremely relative and variable character of the norms renders the valuational activity problematic. In their earnest effort to make sociology a value-neutral positive science, the 20th century social scientists are unwilling to consider *SP* an appropriate subject which merits serious sociological study.

To many, 'progress' is an ethical concept, but we think that the concept 'progress' by itself is not so, unless it is preceded by an adjective 'moral'. Progress implies a forward movement – an advancement from a lower strata to a higher one having a retrospective and a prospective reference. In our common parlance and also in intellectual discourse the expression 'scientific progress' for example, carries definite meaning and no ethical implication is attached to it. In this case determination of progress in scientific sphere by using proper objective measuring stick presents no difficulty. In other words, if we endeavour to determine the state of society in terms of material conditions – agricultural, economic, industrial, technological, scientific achievements we encounter no serious difficulty, for there is nothing subjective about our valuation. But as soon as we try to characterise social change as progressive, certain difficulties seem to manifest themselves.

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Some social scientists argue that ethical relativism vitiates value judgment. In view of the relative and variable character of values, all attempts to arrive at any definite idea about what progress is–invite intricate complexities. McIver and Page do not feel inclined to accept 'Progress' to be a scientific concept.[7] To decide howfar McIver is acceptable, we should seek answers to the following issues : (a) significatory implication of 'scientific concept' (b) subjectivity of values. Some sort of intellectual detachment or non–committal attitude is an essential pre-condition for developing any scientific concept, which however is not always easy to achieve. In the process of socialization, man comes to inherit certain ideas, beliefs and attitudes which shape his mode of viewing things and events and this accounts for the difficulty in achieving intellectual detachment. This difficulty is more seriously felt in studying social phenomena. It goes without saying that a scientific concept must be precise, objective and universal. Objectivity is said to be an antithesis of subjectivity – having existence outside the mind uninfluenced by personal feelings and opinions, likes and dislikes. In case positive physical objects and events, no difficulty is experienced in ascertaining their objectivity and for that matter, their universality. But when we are called upon to identify an objective social condition or phenomenon, the exercise does not always appear to be very smooth, as for example in the case of *SP*. However, this difficulty can be overcome to a great extent if it can be shown that there had been a marked improvement in the ways of life and thought, beliefs and behaviour and also in respect of social structure group–attitude and mental qualities of the members of the society. In other words, for ascertaining the objectivity of *SP* we must show that at least there exists a general agreement about the fact of *SP*. In case of 'physical facts' objectivity indicates their universality, whereas in case of 'social facts', universality of a greement suggests their objectivity.

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Evidently it is not at all difficult to discern at least general agreement as regards the fact that society has moved forward both structurally and functionally and also in respect of material and mental attainments. Many scholars are tempted to call the process evolutionary, instead of calling it progressive. But we feel that 'progression' is a better concept because social change signifies, besides social mobility, the goal–oriented activities of the creative–appreciative beings. Dissension voiced here and there, then and now can be ignored being distorted view of the myopic vision or a partial account based on inadequate perception of the total perspective of the historical movement. Progressive movement, therefore, seems to be a well–founded fact and if this is so, should we not accept the concept of *SP* a scientific one being sufficiently precise and also on account of general agreement?

The problem of value is supposed to have direct bearing on the question of *SP*. It is contended that we cannot speak of progress without inference to values or standards. And values are said to be eminently subjective and without resorting to value–judgment, we cannot determine *SP*. Values, it should be noted at the outset, are not fictitious or mysterious concepts. On the contrary, these are the best possible ideas conceived by the creative persons. Values are unique and living in the sense of their novelty and originality. Subjectivity of the values, it is alleged, subverts any attempt at arriving any definite idea about what progress is. But is this difficulty so insurmountable as has been made out to be? A close study of the histories and the ethnological monographs in search of values affords convincing proofs that there are certain fundamental principles of morality acknowledged by mankind inspite of the fluctuations of time and place, though the evolutionists controvert it by arguing that people of the earlier strata of the evolutionary movement had a 'mental or moral configuration' much different from and even

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inferior to that of a modern man. In modern times, a fairly exhaustive and objective investigations conducted by the eminent anthropologists and sociologists like Lowie, Goldenwisher, Paul Rodin, W. Schmit, Westermark, Boas, Evan Pritchard, Molnowski and others have discerned the existence of a " body of basic rules of morality " in all societies irrespective of racial difference and cultural variations. In the language of Prof. Ginsberg, " Indeed recent ethnological work has shown that the most primitive peoples, those who live by gathering and hunting, have codes of morals which in some respects compare favourably with those found among otherwise more advanced peoples ".[8] ' No man is wholly destitute of moral feeling ' and it is his commitment to certain values that distinguishes a man from other infra-rational beings. Now the values about which people of different stages of *SE* agreed upon should be identified and for this, a consensus of opinion might be of great help. But it might be objected that consensus of opinion is also likely to be inconsistent for it is also open to subjective influences. But for having a consensus of opinion we need not arrange some sort of opinion poll, even if this is at all feasible. All that is needed is to closely survey the recorded cultural histories of human races so as to identify those common values which were considered valuable by them. This will enable us to have an idea of the essential core of the concept of ' progress '.

The extent and significance of *SP* can only be fully comprehended keeping in view the ontological nature of man. Man is not the disease of life as preached in the panromantic teachings or a whole of libido (Freud) or an economic being (Marx) or a complex whole of reflexes (Behaviourism), but a value-seeking being having a definite tendency towards transcending his present existence. As Heideggar holds "A man is a possibility, he has power to be,"[9] or in Sri Aurobindo's vision "It is in his

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human nature, in all human, nature to exceed itself by conscious evolution, to climb beyond what he is".[10] Man's capacity of self-transcending suggests that he is not simply a food-procuring and pleasure-seeking being and therefore while considering *SP* we must take into consideration both objective and subjective conditions, i.e., both material prosperity and mental and moral attainments and excellence.

Material prosperity in terms of abundant supply of food, drink, health and shelter which are essential for the preservation of physical existence of man are the important objective conditios of *SP*. However, availability of food, drink and shelter in abundance i.e., economic prosperity is not all; there must be appropriate machinery for the equitable distribution of economic benefits among the members of the society irrespective of caste, creed and status. Modern socio-economic changes involving social organisations and institutions, along with scientific and technological achievments bear definite marks of advancement with reference to stone age or iron age. In a progressive society there must not be any economic exploitation and obnoxious political regimentation which subvert and impede the spontaneous growth of human personality.

Through an exclusively economic interpretation of human history, the Marxian theory of social change argues that economic factors, the mode of production of the material objects in general dominates the development of social, political, intellectual, moral, aesthetic life. Marxism exhorts man to recast the economic structure of society in order that social life may move forward in the right direction. Certain theoretical assumptions, such as dialectical movement of society, materialistic conception of history, the concept of class struggle are basal to the Marxian explanatory model of social change. Admittedly these basic principles of Marxian theory of social change have been subjected

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to close scrutiny both by the adherents and the opponents. Few observations only in outlines, even at the risk of treading the oft-beaten track, seem quite relevant here. The dialectical movement of the society as envisaged by Hegel and Marx in terms of triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis is an account which, we think, seeks to inrerpret the dynamics of social change rather dogmatically and mechanically. Social change, whether evolutionary or progressive cannot adhere mechanically to this triadic formula. In the intellectual sphere, reason might exhibit dialectic movement, but can it be shown that social change being a very pervasive phenomenon encompassing within itself structural, functional, relational aspects of the society respond exactly in a point to point manner to Marxian dialectics ? It might be held that an element of subjectism cannot be avoided in conceiving a particular social system as the antithesis of another and their real synthesis in a higher state. Dr. B. N. Seal's comment on Hegelian dialectics, which is equally relevant in respect of Marxian dialectics, runs as follows, "The triadic rythm makes a fine musical appeal, no doubt, but ours is a hard world, too hard to be put under musical scheme".[11] Moreover, Marxist theory maintains enigmatic silence as to why the force of dialectics becomes inoperative when the society steps in the stage of communism. Communism is supposed to usher in an era of liberty – a society free from all sorts of exploitation and oppression as a result of the abolition of classes and class struggle. The 'material forces' which so long exercised complete control over social transformation appear to become ineffective and human beings become " the masters of themselves ". But no cogent reason has been put forward in support this shifting of locus of the prime mover of social transformation. If man is the maker of his social destiny, then the importance attached to 'economic factors' as the principal agents of social transformation becomes absolutely pointless. In this connection, we must seek

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answers to the following questions. Will social evolution reach its zenith with the emergence of communism ? In that case, will it not be tantamount to the falsification of cardinal principle of evolution ? Does it not amount to mystification of the notion of *SP* ? Has Marx not become a perfectionist in his delineation of *SP* ?

The all-too-famous Marxian proposition that 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle' has proved to be a debatable one and its plausibility is challenged excluding those who feel emotionally commited to it, on the ground that the formulation is based on defective psychology and this also suffers from the fallacy of oversimplification of the complex class-structure of the society and social relationships. A non-commital view of human history testified that both conflict and co-operation, contradiction and cohesion constitute a single stream of social relationship. In other words, in normal conditions, a well-demarcated fissure between two conflicting classes engaged in acrimonious class struggle is not what history teaches. Moreover, in recent years, some tangible reforms introduced by the welfare states, which coupled with massive scientific, industrial and technological developments have further complicated the already complex class structure. In industrially advanced countries, the industrial labourers have turned into a privileged class and have become conformists, supporters of establishment and not the vanguards of Revolution. Never in history of mankind, human race was divided into two distinct classes, i.e., proletariat and bourgeoisie. This apart, historical reconstruction of pre-historic and primitive stages of human society is the product of creative imagination and constructive interpretation which is supposed to be supported by evidences, though such evidences are not always plenty and forthright. And in the matter of interpretation, an element of subjectivity might

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unconsciously infiltrate. Individual proclavities might induce an individual to ignore the significant and magnify the insignificant.

Our primary concern here of course is not to undertake a full-lengh critique of Marxian theory of social explanation. All that we wish to suggest is that any theory of *SP* nourished by over-materialism, economism and class-conflict is neither theoretically convincing nor ethically satisfying.

As man is neither wholy a biological being nor an economic being, the desirable level of his progress must be traced much above the plane of animality. And as a matter of fact, a great part of the progress of humanity has definitely been due to psychical factors rather than merely biological ones. In other words, material progress can never be an end in itself. Material progress and social progress are not synonymous. We feel that with material progress, there must be corresponding mental and moral progress so that material progress can be meaningful. In modern times, there had been considerable progress in the spheres of industry, science and technology which has considerably changed almost every aspect of life such as farming and manufacturing, communication and transportation, health and hygiene. The technological revolution has pervaded the whole world. Space travel and man's voyage to moon has been possible and this has considerably enhanced the prestige of scientific knowledge. It seems that modern age has reached a material zenith. But this has not been simultaneously reciprocated by a mental zenith. Depression, tension, frustration and fear-psychosis are the common experiences of our life. Inter-personal relationships are vitiated by mutual distrust, hatred, ill-will, group rivalry. Clashes of interest, ugly rivalry among the nations for political supremacy, tendency towards domination of one nation by another through economic and military assistance (a newtype of exploitation in a subtle manner employed by the developed

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countries including the states wedded to Socialism), ever-preparedness for embarking upon warfare are some of unique features of present-day international relations. All this shows that mere economic prosperity, industrial and technological advancements are not the indicatives of *SP*. To achieve *SP* what is needed is an inner change and enrichment along with external adjustment, an 'equilibrium between the inside and the outside'.

Evidently, for the proper development of mental qualities and moral excellence, a social environment is an essential precondition, for this will facilitate flowering of the latent capacities and potentialities of man. A man can exert his creative faculties for the enrichment of culture and accelerating progress only in a social environment where there exists freedom of thought and action. Admittedly creative freedom is the highest freedom of all the different types of freedom and the entire human race down the ages has been persistently aspiring after creative freedom. So for the progress of entire humanity, freedom of thought, life and action is the pre-requisite. If man's freedom of action is subverted by compulsory State programme or compulsorily enforced manual labour, he finds no time or urge for any creative or innovative enterprise. Similarly if man is forced to think in the same and similar fashion according to particular dogma or doctrine and if there is systematic political indoctrination or brain washing through State Machinery or party organ, intellectual – artistic creativity becomes the first casualty. What we need is creativity and not cultural slavery and political hegemony. Often some political fanatics resent de-politicalisation of social relationships and every value – based understanding of social phenomena, as 'liberal bourgeois deception and diversion'. Obviously to characterise a point of view in the above manner is no logic, nothing more than an emotional outpouring of an an agitated mind.

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Now, let us endeavour to identify workable specifications of the positive content of progress on the basis of which we can decide, though not as accurately as in mathematical measurement, at which level a particular society stands in the scale of progression. In a progressive society certain social ideals find actualisation in the intellectual, emotional and volitional life of the majority members of a community. It cannot be expected that all the members of a community will be inspired by these social ideals and will be tempted to emulate them. Nevertheless, if a conscious recognition of these ideals is perceived in the ways of life, belief and conduct of the members of the society, its claim as a progressive one with reference to another where this is absent, is found to be quite legitimate and warranted. The art, creative literature, the socio–political system, intersubjective relationships, group attitude etc., will reflect the extent of the commitment to these ideals. Admittedly the task of evaluation will be a delicate one and the results thereof cannot be expressed in sufficiently accurate manner as we can do in case of other positive sciences. And perhaps we shall have to remain contended with this type of results expeessed in abstract terms in our studies of most of the social sciences. But this does not in any way render the entire exercise futile and unproductive.

Let us now proceed to enumerate some of the social ideals which, we think, are the subjective factors of *SP* signifying the height of the mental development of the social beings.

(1) Development of social consciousness is the cementing force of the social life-the basis of social co-operation and social relationships characterised by reciprocity, mutual understanding and co-operation. Man has learnt to live, not in isolation and conflict, but in mutual trust and co-operation. Admittedly, pursuit and promotion of self–interest is natural to man's biological existence, but man's developed consciousness has made him to

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believe that he lives more meaningfully through expansion–through exetending the area of love, sympathy and sacrifice. To make them the permanent traits of man's personality, constructive educational programme might play a significant role. A progressive society must testify that its members are inspired by true social consciousness.

(2) Recognition of other people's right to live and enjoy those material and social benefits as are available to him. By implication none should be permitted to enjoy special privileges on account of birth and/or social status. 'Live and let others live with equal rights and opprotunities' should be the cardinal maxim.

(3) Psychical refinement on the basis of truth, love, justice, equality indicates the level of progression. Modern world history confirms that many well thought-out socio-political reforms and developmental programmes failed to produce desired results because people were not sufficiently mentally equipped and enlightened. Psychical refinement embraces both mental and moral enrichment in fairly well-recognised values. Value-consciousness and value-based conduct are what make life more meaningful. A proper utilisation of the material resources of the society depends to a great extent on the mental and moral qualities of the people. Some people imagine that political revolution having no corresponding psychological revolution is the sine qua non of the social progress. But events of history have belied their hope. Hence a radical transformation in the deepest levels of mind–a new and fresh turn of mind–and heart by which we can control and humanise our conduct is of supreme importance.

(4) Sanity and mental health of the members of the society indicate that it is better one in comparison to the primitive and

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medieval. The sanity of the progressive society is revealed in the sustained efforts on the parts of the individuals to adjust themselves to one another which spontaneously generate mutual trust, goodwill and loving relations with all members of the society. In a healthy society an individual enjoys adequate opportunity for working creatively. An individual be treated not as a means to an end, he enjoys dignity of personality, he can hold his head high. Development of social character and a sane and sober attitude to life and its affairs are undoubtedly the marks of *SP*.

(5) Man in his civilized existence attaches great importance to the development of intelligence and rational conduct. Intelligence and rational conduct are complementary and not antagonistic. It might be that intelligence is the fountainhead of rational conduct. To live intelligently in a social world and to deal effectively the pressing problems which a social being encounters all through his social existence is certainly a sign of progress, having both individual and social significance. Individually, an intelligent being is more inclined to social adjustment and therefore less likely to be a victim of mental imbalance or disorder. And his balanced conduct is unlikely to produce much complications for the society. Most of our social ills and evils which endanger social security and social solidarity, such as communal riots, civil wars, racial and caste prejudices are the products of irrationality and under-developed mentality. In a progressive society, superstitions and prejudices, whims and caprices do not find a fertile ground. So a progressive society is one "where the clear steam of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert of dead habit" (Tagore).[12]

SP is multinational. It is not always steady and continuous; there may be occasional setbacks or ups and downs, "a rythm of alternate darkness and light", "but both day and night help to foster progress". The Marxian principle of linear progress

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seems to be untenable. Again *SP* is a dynamic concept. Society can never fully appropriate the ideal of progress it cherishes. After some definite and significant steps torwards the approximation of progress, society perceives that something more is left unrealised and in this way the idea of progress recedes back to an untrodden horizon inviting and alluring people to move farther for greater and fuller realisation. And perhaps this is how civilization moves. Some people, though not quite unreasonably, often voice scepticism about *SP* in view of their experiences of two world wars and recent piling up of sophisticated war materials and also their unpleasant experiences of the functionings of totalitarian regimes in certain parts of the globe. Evidently, these distressing phenomena indicate retrogression. But the picture is not so gloomy all around. The inauguration of various international movements and emergence of several international forums for putting an end to strife and tension and for fostering peace, understanding and co-operation go to show that man has not taken those phenomena to be the ultimate destiny of mankind. Attempts to overcome these tragedies and to make the world a better place for human habitation bear testimony of man's sincere and deep–rooted commitment to *SP*. Mclver admitted that man could not " get rid of the concept of progress " which is " ineradicable from the creative strivings of life " but his conclusion that it is a vital myth " and " we are of course entitled to deny the reality of progress "[13] does not sound quite convincing. It is often contended that we cannot scientifically demonstrate the fact of *SP*. And perhaps this will not be feasible; because social causation seems to operate in such ways not always amenable to clear observation and examination. In conclusion, it needs to be reiterated that unlike evolutionary movement, *SP* is not automatic and mechanical. By the collective wisdom and efforts of the saner section of mankind

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the stepping towards progress is destined to lead humanity to a brighter future.

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WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF AN ELEMENTARY PROPOSITION IN THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

This paper discusses Wittgenstein's thesis about determining the logical structure of an elementrary proposition i.e., the logical structure of an elementary proposition is determined by determining the sense of an elementary proposition, and not by analyzing it. It also discusses why the sense of an elementary proposition cannot picture a state of affair.

Wittgenstein construes an elementary proposition as a function of an expression contained in it.

TLP 3.318 Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expression contained in it.

TLP 4.24 Names are simple symbols : I indicate them by single letters ('x' 'y', 'z'). I write elementary propositions as funcrion of names so that they have form 'fx', Q (x, y). etc.

Although like Frege and Russsll, Wittgenstein construes an elementary proposition as a function of the expression contained in it, but unlike them his notion of a 'function of an expression' is a consequence of his representational theory of language. Frege rejects the idea that the logical structure of a proposition can be determined through its grammatical structure. He claims that the subject – predicate distinction is irrelevant to the expression of a thought or a sense of a proposition. He demonstrates it by showing that although the following two propositions

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(1) Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea

(2) The Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea.

have different grammatical structure but they express the same sense : even if a slight difference of sense is discernible, the agreement in sense is preponderant.[1] Frege is wrong in saying that the grammatical structure of a sentence is irrelevant to the expression of a sense or thought. However he is right in saying that the same sense or thought can be expressed through another type of logical structure of a sentence or a proposition. Frege claims that the logical structure of a proposition can be determined by spliting up a proposition in two parts : function and an argument of a function. He explains the difference in function and an argument of a function as follows :

> "Suppose that a simple or complex symbol occurs in one or more places in an expression (whose content need not be a possible content of judgment). If we imagine this symbol as replaceable by another (the same one each time) at one or more of its occurances, then the part of the expession that shows itself invarient under such replacement is called the function; and the replaceable part, the argument of the function" [2]

Frege demonstrates this distinction by showing that in the expression 'Hydrogen is lighter than Carbondioxide', 'Hydrogen can be replaced by 'Oxygen' or 'Nitrogen' and 'lighter than Carbondioxide' stays invariant. So '–lighter than Carbondioxide' is a function and 'Hydrogen' 'oxygen and 'Nitrogen are the arguments. The value of an argument is the result of completing the function with an argument. Frege adds further that the distinction between function and an argument of a function has nothing to do with the thought or sense of a proposition. 'It concerns only with our way of looking at it.[3] He adds that if, either the function or the argument of the function is indeter-

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minate then the distinction between the function and the argument of the function is relevant to the thought or the sense of a proposition. Wittgenstein disagrees with Frege that an analysis of an elementary proposition into a function and an argument of a function is just one way of looking at the thought of a propositlon : that parts and relations are not so much determined by the physical nature of a proposition, as by the way a proposition is analyzed and interpreted by the users, only relative to a particular way of analyzing the proposition : proposition does have parts, and relation between parts. Wittgenstein holds that the distinction between the function and the argument of a function represent the distinction between the state – of – affairs and the element in the state – of – affairs (*TLP* 3.21) ; a proposition has parts which denote parts of what it represents, properties of, and relations between parts of a proposition represent properties of and relations between the things denoted Wittgenstein also rejects Russell's way of analyzing a proposition. Russell suggests that propositions stating monadic facts like "This white" would be formal type 'a', and propositions stating dyadic facts like "This next that" would be of the form R (a, b). The difference in the type of symbols is intended to indicate whether the symbol named a component or a constituent (Russell called the universal element in a fact component of that fact and a particular element he called the constituent of a fact); ordinary lower case letter standing for constituents and the capital 'R' and the Greek letter for components. In Russell's view every proposition must contain one symbol for at least each type and every fact must atleast contain one component and one constitutent.[4] Wittgenstein disagrees with Russell's notion of a particular or a constituent (a shade of a colour for example) because object itself has no colour (*TLP* 2.0232), with the colour you get a fact. Wittgenstein also rejects Russell's idea that the function of an argument denotes a property of, and relation

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between, of things. He supports the idea that proposition through its logical form shows the properties of, and relation between the properties of things (*TLP* 4.124): the idea that follows from his theory of representation.

Wittgenstein's thesis about determining the logical structure of an elementary proposition is that the logical structure of an elementary proposition is determined by determining the sense of an elementary proposition, and not by analyzing it. An elementary proposition that is a function of an expression contained in it connot be analyzed because an expression and a function of an expression are inseparable elements of an elementary proposition : a function according to Wittgenstein signifies a formal concept and is represented in a conceptual notation by a variable, not by function (*TLP* 4.1272).[5] Understanding how the sense of a proposition is determined depends on understanding the notion of an 'expression'. An expression, Wittgenstein states, is any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense :

TLP 3.31 I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol)

Wittgenstein suggests further that an expression (symbol) should be distinguished from a sign because it is not the sign that characterized its sense :

TLP 3.32 A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol. In order to clear the distinction between sign and a symbol (or an expression), Wittgenstein makes a grammatical analysis of the proposition ' Green in green '. He makes this analysis only to illustrate the point, otherwise he does not believe that the logical structure of a proposition can be determined by determining the grammatical structure of proposition. He says :

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TLP 3.323 ... (In the proposition ' Green is green '–where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective—these words do not merely have different meanings : they are *different symbols*).

Wittgenstein wants to illustrate the point that the first ' Green ' and the second ' green ' are different symbols : that they are different symbols is shown from grammatical places they take in the proposition. It is grammatical place, in which a sign occurs that determiness a sign's symbolic form or sense. Wittgenstein here means to suggest that in the same way, the sense of an elementary proposition should be determined. It is the expression contained in a function, that characterizes the sense of a proposition. For example it is 'x' in 'f' that *characterises the sense* of a proposition i. e., by providing a logical place where a logical object can occur :

TLP 3.41 The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates that is the logical place

TLP 3.411 In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility something can exist in it.

By substituting 'a' in place of 'x' in 'fx' we get 'fa'. That *determines the sense* of a proposition.

There is a problem here. Wittgenstein fails to distinguish the essential logical categories of a proposition. If 'x' in 'fx' is a variable and a general name for a concept (*TLP* 4.1271), then 'a' substitute in place of 'x' in 'fx' cannot be used as a name of an object as such even if the object is an object in a state–of–affairs. 'a' in 'fa' has to be a name for an instance of the concept that 'x' 'fx' names or signifies (do not denote). If 'x' in 'fx' is a variable name for objects for those which share the property indicated by 'f' only then 'a' substituted for 'x' in 'fx' can name an

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object having that property. Also if 'x' in 'fx' is a variable and a general name for a concept then the occurring of 'a' in place of 'x' in 'fx' can only show the instance of 'x' in 'fx', that would not be a name of an object but of an instance. The problem with Wittgenstein's notion of a proposition is that he uses only one logical place for two logical categories i. e., name of an object and name for the property of an object; one logical function for two logical categories, even when the logical categories have to perform two different functions. Wittgenstein's reason for holding such a notion of proposition is that a proposition is to express an internal property of an object and that should be expressed in a proposition in such a way that it should show that it is an internal property of an object. He does so by representing the object and expressing its property through one logical space. Wittgenstein also believes that the internal property of an object is a function of an object (" It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of a state-of-affairs." *TLP* 2.011) so the function of an object can be represented through the function of a name. However this is not a good reason : if an object and its internal property are not identical, although necessarily related in the sense that the property is an internal and necessary property, this difference between the object and its property should be represented or shown through the logical structure of a proposition. When we say that an internal property is a function of an object, it really does not mean that an object and its property are identical, but it shows that an object and its property have a certain relation i. e., an internal property is a function of an object. If an object and its properties are not separately determinable, i. e., an object is determinable only through its internal property, then how can an object and its property be represented through two different logical categories If an object in itself cannot be named, and cannot be determined through the logical category

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of a name, as a real object can be determined through the logical category of a name, then we can suggest that if the object is hypothetical then it can be determined through the category of hypothetical name. For example, let us say we write an elementary proposition as follows :

$$O\ (P)$$

'O' indicating a logical category for an object. A logical function of 'O' is to name an object, so it can be replaced by a name of an object. 'P' indicating a logical category for a property. A logical relation between 'O' and 'P' in the proposition 'O (P)' is that 'P' is a description of an object 'O'. To differentiate a logical category of name from the logical category of a hypothetical name, we can add 'H' before 'O' in 'O (P)', and thus get 'HO (P)'.

Wittgenstein's failure to distinguish clearly between the essential logical categories of an elementary proposition leads him to adopt inadequate method for determining the sense of a proposition. As mentioned earlier if 'x' in 'fx' is a variable, and is a general name for a concept then 'a' substituted in place of 'x' in 'fx' cannot be used as a name of an object as such, even if the object is an object in a state of affairs 'a' in 'fa' to be a name of an instance of the concept that 'x' in 'fx' names or signifies (does not denote). In the same way if 'x' in 'fx' characterizes the sense of an elementary proposition, and 'a' that can be substituted for 'x' in 'fx' cannot be the name of an object as such, then only the instance of 'x' in 'fx', i.e., 'fa' can determine the sense of a proposition 'fa' then it may name an instance i.e., a state of affairs, but it cannot name an object as such. However, a state of affair according to Wittgenstein is not to be named by an elementary proposition like 'fa', it is only to be shown through the form of a proposition. Again as mentioned earlier, if 'x' in 'fx' is a variable name for objects which share the property

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indicated by 'f' in 'fx' only then 'a' substituted for 'x' in 'fx' can name an object having that property. In the same way if 'f' in 'fx' characterized the sense of a proposition and 'x' in 'fx' is a variable name for objects which share the sense characterized by 'f' in 'fx' only then 'a' occuring in place of 'x' in 'fx' can determine the sense of proposition 'fa', and at the same time 'a' can name an object in a state-of-affairs and 'fa' can show how an object can occur in a state of affairs. Further more if Wittgenstein writes an elementary proposition as HO (P) due to reason mentioned in the preceeding paragraph then the sense of a proposition can be characterized by the sense of both 'HO' and 'P' in 'HO (P)': 'HO' in 'HO(P)' indicates a logical category of hypothetical objects and 'P' in 'HO(P)' indicates a logical category of a property that can be attributed to a hypothetical object. By taking a name for a hypothetical object, let us say HO 1, and by substituting HO 1 for 'HO' in 'HO (P)' the sense of a proposition can be determined : 'HO 1' in HO 1 (P)' must represent a hypothetical object in a state of affairs and 'P' in 'HO 1 (P)' must show or describe the property P of HO 1.

In the preceeding section of this essay it has been concluded that the logical structure of an elementary proposition is determined by determining the sense of a proposition; the sense of an elementary proposition is first characterized by an expression in a function of an expression by providing a logical place where a name can occur, and by signifying a concept (not denoting); the sense of proposition is determined by the name that occurs in place of an expression in 'the function of an expression', that name must represent an object in a state of affairs. If logical structure of a proposition is determined by characterizing and determining the sense of a proposition and if a logical structure of an elementary proposition pictures the logical structure of

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reality (*TLP* 2.18), then possibly the logical structure of reality – a fact or state of affairs is also determined by characterizing and determining the structure of fact or a state of affairs. Therefore, the discussion of Wittgenstein's claims that the logical structure of a proposition pictures the logical structure of reality shall be undertaken from two aspects :

(a) How does the characterizing of a sense of a proposition picture the logical structure of reality or characterizing of logical structure of a state of affairs ?

(b) How does determining of a sense of a proposition picture the determining of a state af affairs ?

(a) Let us say that characterizing of a sense of a proposition can picture the characterizing of structure of a state of affairs : a logical structure of an elementary proposition can share or picture the logical structure of a state of affairs because the structure of a fact or a state of affairs is characterized the same way as the logical structure of a proposition. The first 'logical' thing Wittgenstein tells in the *Tractatus* about a fact or a state of affairs is that the facts in logical space are the world (*TLP*-1.13). So first of all there is logical space. Then a logical place (a place is a possibility such that something can exist in it stet *TLP* 3.411) is determined out of logical space e.g. a proposition determines a place in logical space is guarranteed by the existence of a proposition with a sense (*TLP* 3.4). In the same way the possibility of a state of affairs is that something can occur or exist in it (*TLP* 2.012) that means the possibility of a state of affairs provides a logical place in which something can exist. However possibility of a state of affairs must be written in the thing itself (*TLP* 2.012). So a proposition through an expression in a 'function of an expression' can show that a state of affairs like an expression provides a logical place in which an object can

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occur; an object can occur in a state of affairs, as a name can occur in place of an expression, by its internal nature. Thus, we may say that the characterizing of a sense of a proposition can picture the characterizing of the structure of a fact or a state of affairs because the structure of a fact or a state of affairs is determined the same way as the sense of a proposition. However there is a problem. The expression in 'the function of an expression' does not just occur in the logical place provided by the function, where it can be substituted by a simple name, it also signifies a concept, whereas a state of affairs merely provides a logical place where an object can occur. Thus the sense of a proposition is not characterized the same way as the structure of a state of affairs. The sense of a picture possibly is characterized the same way as the structure of a state of affairs; a picture like a state of affairs provides a logical place where an object can occur. Characterizing the sense of a picture, can picture the characterizing of the structure of a state of affairs because the sense of a picture and the structure of a state of affairs are characterized the same way. Although characterizing the sense of a proposition cannot picture the characterizing of a structure of a state of affairs as the characterizing of rhe sense of a picture can However, characterizing the sense of a proposition can describe the characterizing of structure of a state of affairs, through the description of the concept.

(b) It has been concluded earlier that the sense of a proposition is determined by the occuring of a name in place of the expression in 'function of an expression' and the name must represent an object in a state of affairs. Now it shall be discussed how the determining of a sense of a proposition pictures the determining of a state of affairs. Wittgenstein's position is that the determinate sense of a proposition can picture the determinate structure of a state of affairs because of the following two

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reasons (i) the form or structure of a state of affairs is determined the same way as the sense of a proposition :

TLP 2.14 what constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

TLP 4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.
∴ What constitutes a proposition is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

TLP 2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represent that things are related to one another in the same way.

TLP 2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.

There is a problem here again. Although the structure of a state of affairs is determined the same way as the sense of a picture, but the sense of an elementary proposition is not determined the way the structure of a state of affairs is determined. When a name occurs in place of an expression in a 'function of an expression', that expression signifies a concept, then that name becomes determinate in two senses : (a) that a name falls under the class of formal concept (b) name becomes a particular name : it becomes a name of an object. On the other hand when an object occurs in a logical place in a state of affairs, it does not fall under any other logical place, it just occurs in that logical place. The relationship between the logical place of a state of affairs and the object occuring in that place is not that of the relation between the general and the particular, like the relation between an 'expression' and a 'name' occurring in a function. However, in a picture the elements of a picture become determinate the same way as the objects in a state of affairs : elements

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of a picture thus occur in logical space in the picture and make it determinate; the elements of a picture stand in relation to the logical place in the picture the same way as the objects of a state of affairs stand in relation to the logical place in a state of affairs. The structure of a state of affairs and the structure of a picture are determined the same way; so it is possible for a picture to share its pictorial form with the form (structure) of a state-of-affairs. The structre of state-of-affairs and the sense of a proposition are not determined the same way, so the determinate sense of a proposition cannot picture the structure of a state of affairs. However, (ii) the determinate sense of a proposition can communicate about the determinate form of state of affairs, not through picturing but through describing and referring. The substitution of a name in place of an expression that signifies a concept ascribes those conceptual properties to that name and that name through naming an object in a sate of affairs describes the properties of that object.

Wittgenstein fails to distinguish the essential logical categories of a state of affairs as he fails to distinguish the essential logical categories of an elementry proposition. An object, before it occurs in a state of affairs, is subsistent (*TLP* 2.0271). Wittgenstein also speaks of objects' subsistence as of hypothetical necessity : 'There must be objects if the world is to have unalterable form' (*TLP* 2.026). It is after an object occurs in a state of affairs that its logical form is determined. One must note that it is the logical form of an object that is determined and not the object itself. Thus a name in a proposition that is substituted in place of an expression can name only the logical form of an object and not the object itself. However, under such circumstances if we write a proposition as 'HO_1 (P)', then the form of the proposition i. e., 'HO (P)' can show that the name 'HO_1' substituted for the variable name 'HO', can name a

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hypothetical object and 'P' either shows or describes the logical form or structure of a proposition that can be attributed to the name substituted for 'HO' in HO(P), and the property described by 'P' can be attributed to the hypothetical object named by 'HO'.

Conclusion :

In this paper I have maintained the following points : (1) Logical structure of a proposition according to wittgenstein is determined through determining the sense of a proposition and not through the logical analysis of a proposition. (2) The sense of a proposition is characterised by an expression in 'the function of an expression' (a) by providing a logical place (argument) where a name can occur, and (b) by signifying a concept. The sense of a proposition is determined by the name that occurs in place of the expression in 'the function of an expression' while the name must name an object in a state of affairs. (3) Wittgenstein fails to distinguish the essential logical categories of an elementary proposition that in consequence leads him to adopt inadequate method for determining the sense of a proposition. (4) characterizing of a sense of a proposition cannot picture the characterizing of a structure or form of a state of affairs. However characterizing of a sense of a proposition can describe the characterizing of structure of a state of affairs. (5) The determining of a sense of a proposition cannot picture the determining of a structure of a proposition : Determining of a sense of a proposition can describe, or refer to, determining of a structure of a state of affairs. (6) Wittgenstein fails to distinguish the essential logical categories of a state of affairs as he fails to distinguish the essential logical categories of a proposition. (7) A suggestion has been made that Wittgenstein could have constructed the logical structure of a proposition as

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'HO(P)' where 'HO' stands for a hypothetical object and 'P' for a property that can be attributed to 'HO'.

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NOTES

1. *Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.* Edited by Peter Geach and Max Black. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1960, p. 3.
2. *Ibid* p. 13.
3. *Ibid* p. 12.
4. J. O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis*, 1966.
5. Wittgenstein's use of the word function is not very clear. The multiple ambiguity of 'function', 'functional' etc. has been widely ruled by other philosophies too. e. g. see W. G. Lycon 'Form, Function and Fact' in the *Journal of Philosophy* vol Lxxvii, no. 1, January' 81.

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BOOK-REVIEW

Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism.
By Michael Slote. Routledge and Kegan Paul pp. ix+157.
Price : £14.95. 1985.

Shortly before closing his discussion in this closely argued short book the author reveals that when he began to think about the problems he has discussed in it he hoped to be able to defend common-sense morality against consequentialism. The comparison between the two that he is in reality able to make is termed by him as 'a process of attrition', so that he is forced in the concluding sentence to recognise that there might be some advantage in turning once again to Kantian moral theory or, even, to Greek ethics with its emphasis on character (and the virtues) rather than acts. But despite Professor Slote's generally careful sorting out of alternative possibilities there is an asymmetry in this list of moralities. While consequentialism can be charactetised in terms of how it is put forward and criticised, as indeed are the latter two alternatives, common-sense morality, supposed to be what most of us live by, is by comparison nothing very definite. Indeed if it is the morality which is implicit in how 'ordinary people treat people' (p. 7), as he seems to suggest early in the book, then it cannot be something with a firm and settled identity of its own, but a very variable and uncertain thing. Not only does moral practice vary from community to community, and even within the same community at different times, if there are deeper underlying principles which are stable and unvarying they can hardly be capable of being

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delineated merely by a critical appraisal of our moral practices or by some process of moral intuition as Slote to a certain extent seems with Sidgwick, whose *The Methods of Ethics* he greatly admires, to think.

The truth is that the term 'common-sense morality' hides a profound difficulty. Since we cannot understand by it the current *mores* of a society, which would merely be of sociological interest, there would seem to be need for distinguishing something whose reference includes not only prevailing practices but also the deeper source of moral insight and inspiration to which most of us have some degree of access. How is such a morality to be described ? The strategy adopted by Slote makes no mention whatever of the possibility that such a rich area of moral understanding exists. Had Slote moved in this direction he might have seen that there exists a category of morality which, unlike the varieties of consequentialism distinguished by him, does not purport to be a complete determinant of right conduct, i.e. of what is enjoined or forbidden and what is merely permitted, and is not to be faulted for that reason. And in doing this he might have also seen that this incompleteness of ordinary morality, while it poses agonising problems for us, is remediable in a fascinating variety of ways, depending on how the human situation is described.

Slote's way out of the difficulty of identifying something of fundamental interest in what seems inescapable, confused and indefinitely variable consists in giving a spurious ready distinguishability by a process of underdescription to certain features which the *mores* of our own society seem to share with other societies. From these I shall select two for special comment in this review. There is, first, what Slote calls the 'self-other asymmetry' which allows us to harm ourselves, or deny ourselves some personal benefit, in ways that are not permitted in respect

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of others that are clearly unacceptable to the consequentialist. And, in a different category from the difficulties which utilitarians generally raise against ordinary morality, there is the problem of what has attracted special attention in the recent literature of academic ethics, namely the problem of 'moral luck', described by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in an Aristotelian Society symposium in 1976, which raises questions which Slote frankly admits to be beyond the present capacity of ethics fully to handle. I shall deal with the two successively.

What seems to be undoubtedly true about the asymmetry of self and other is that a moral failure to meet the claims of others is judged more stringently than a failure to benefit ourselves in what are otherwise similar circumstances; self-neglect does not seem morally to be so bad as neglect of or injury to others, and at times even appears to be wholly innocent But what Slote sees as a contrast of exoneration and blame is more in the nature of a contrast between appraisal in terms of virtues and vices (some of which are clearly moral in nature) and blame for wrong doing. Thus a man may neglect his own material comfort from an admirable disposition of simplicity while feeling that he would not be justified in contributing to the involuntary poverty of others (On the other hand, he might neglect himself to impress others from a feeling of vanity). Though Slote rightly claims against Williams that it is not agent-integrity which underlies the special claims we make for our own projects but the more fundamental notion of moral autonomy, he fails to see that the latter notion covers much more than innocent non-optimisticness. And this in turn suggests the possibility that an agent may be morally innocent to the extent that no one we know would be justified in finding fault with him, but not in the sense that no one *could* justly make an unfavourable moral appraisal of how he has acted.

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Slote does not have anything new to say about deontological constraints against bringing about intrinsically worthwhile results by wronging the innocent that are recognised by most of us, nor, again, about our natural preference for kith and kin even when much greater good can be achieved by acting on the Utilitarian duty of optimal conduct. Since it seems to me that ordinary morality is not at any greater disadvantage than the consequentialist in these well-worn areas of controversy, I shall pass on to the so-called question of moral luck which specially exercises Slote and is seen by him to pose seemingly insuperable difficulties for the morality of common-sense. Roughly speaking, the phenomenon of moral luck arises because we tend not to blame, or to blame less strongly, when a likely evil does not come to follow upon a certain kind of behaviour emanating from us. Thus an attempted murder may not succeed or a piece of rash driving have no untoward consequences. We may ask, why is this kind of good fortune a reason for being regarded as less blameworthy than when the worst does come to pass? Slote sees common-sense to be caught here in an inextricable difficulty: " ...common-sense morality, having denied, in its deontological 'part', that acts should be entirely ruled by consequences, seems in another of its 'parts' to place an unreasonable and unjustfiable emphasis *precisely on* consequences" (p. 134, italics author's). But significant help towards finding a way out of the difficulty we are here in becomes available if we follow a clue provided by Slote himself when he observes that we have a reluctance to sit beside a murderer which we do not feel when we are with some one whose attempt to murder someone has failed. We need to distinguish between moral feelings which tend to arise in us spontaneously and such of our actual moral judgements which we come to make when we have given some attention to a question of right and wrong. The undeniable fact is that we see men not only as agents who do good and bad deeds but also as

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possible loci of good and evil. And the transition from possible to actual evil is a major transition, whatever the place of this category in our moral experience, bringing into being something that we may have to live with.

The strength of ordinary morality will be seen if we consider the sceptical extensions of the argument from moral luck which Nagel makes (See especially the rewritten version of his paper in *Mortal Questions*, ch. 3). Thus we praise people for what has its origin in qualities of character and mind with which their genetic inheritance has endowed them or are such as the result partially at least of what was done by others for them, and it is difficult to see how this could be wholly just when others who through no fault of theirs are lacking in them are subjected to criticism. But this line of attack by which moral scepticism attempts to move to the centre of moral judgement cannot succeed. Only a moral cynic would deny that the possibility of high moral praise is sometimes open even to men of ordinary endowments and that such praise may be given with full certainy and some would even say, as would the present reviewer, that capacity for moral heroism is not a prerogative only of a select few. Thus if the centre of moral judgement is immune against this form of doubt only the periphery can at worst be threatened. And since a form of doubt which can succeed only peripherally cannot be considered to be a form of scepticism but at the most as raising certain problems we have here only a source of difficulty for ordinary morality. But we know that ordinary morality abounds in difficulties, and the moral philosopher's essential task is to look for guidelines for dealing with them. In the present case our difficulties will perhaps be best dealt with by a fresh examination of the Kantian idea that all men are equal in respect of the moral dignity they can achieve. On the other hand act-consequentialism, which also among the varieties of conse-

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quentialism is in Slote's view fully consequentialist, threatens the very category of moral appraisal as a way of bestowing praise or blame on the moral agent, as distinct from assessing the good or bad that causally issues from them. As the committed act-consequentialist J. J. C. Smart recognises, following a moral rule has for someone in such a position no intrinsic merit but can at best earn praise only to the extent to which such praise is productive of further good.

Given thus that so much of the criticism that Slote sees common-sense morality to be subject to is due to an underdescription (or misdescription) of it the question inevitably arises whether he has, like so many others who talk of common-sense morality, identified something which stands as a genuine alternative to utilitarianism (which for Slote is the form of consequentialism which ignores considerations of justice and concerns itself only with the totality of good that may be attained) or is only a caricature of ordinary morality, of which the Kantian and Greek moralities are descriptions which do compel respectful attention. In other words we have to decide whether the latter three are simply possible versions of something to be identified in descriptivist terms only and which utilitarianism alone seeks to replace. The difference between mistaking the real nature of something already available and creating something new is too important to be obscured : since a description cannot be a theory, what is described under that rubric cannot be a rival to what can only be a theory, as utilitarianism needs must be. Slote has done too little to show that the alternative I have just suggested deserves to be rejected.

Instead of surveying what is, within its terms, a well articulated argument, I have in this review chosen to highlight with comments of my own some of the features of this book which are likely to be of special interest to someone from a tradition

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outside the world of Anglo-Saxon ethics. At present utilitarianism seems to be in ascendency in this world and it would be churlish not to acknowledge that in certain respects contributions to it are being made both by way of clarification and also constructively. Its major influence has however been, and continues to be, in the areas of legislation and economics (As Sidgwick says towards the end of his *Methods*, a sincere utilitarian would be a keen politician). But real significance of its influence is a matter of further enquiry in some depth, which I cannot undertake here. I shall however in conclusion mention a notion of considerable interest for ethics which Slote takes over from economic theory and develops much further. This is the notion of what he calls 'satisfying consequetialism' as opposed to the customary notion of optimising consequentialism which has hitherto all but defined consequentialism (or utilitarianism as this term is generally understood). Economists are familiar with the idea of a choice in which something profitable or advantageous is opted for rather than the best that may be obtainable because in practical terms that is what is really convenient (because, say, the agent wants to avoid uncertainty or the trouble of working out what would be the best), Slote extends the notion of such a choice by introducing the notion of a 'satisfying' choice, made by someone who is by nature or temperament content to aim at what is good enough, or even very good, but lacks a strong desire to optimise. Thus a doctor who wants to help mankind might for reasons of a personal nature choose India for his work, rather than the country where the greatest contribution is likely to be made. We would praise such a doctor, even though by the usual standards of consequentialism he is to be blamed for making less than an optimific choice. Undoubtedly such an alternative would help us escape from what is an element of tyranny in traditional utlli-tarianism. Slote gives several examples and is perhaps right in regarding this notion as the contribution he can be most confi-

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dent of. I shall make only one comment. It seems to me that this notion is in need of supplementation by that of an appropriate choice. Often we are justified in aiming at doing a good, not the best, deed, and yet are saved from arbitrariness only because we are also at the same time choosing what is fitting or appropriate and not merely good to a degree that would seem to do. In his example of the hotel manager who gives shelter to and feeds a poor family this notion clearly has application. Slote describes his choice to provide a wholesome and enjoyable meal, and not the best that he would be allowed to by the rules of his employment, as worthy of unqualified praise. But suppose, counterfactually, this family, though now poor, are of aristocratic lineage would a meal that is simply nourishing and enjoyable be still what he should provide ? If this makes no difference to what he should do this can only be because we think that it would be inappropriate to give weight to the question of origin in such circumstance. If on the other hand it does then also would we be concerning ourselves with the question of appropriateness There is here a clear gap in Slote's argument.

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गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय

DEONTIC LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING.*

Following Von Wright's analysis of the formal aspects of normative discourse significant amount of effort has been devoted to explorations of methods by which norm and action related discourse can be formalized. All such explorations, however, have two things in common : they either base themselves on modal logic or construe models which are analogous; and they are, by and large, extensional. Logic of norms and actions is now generally called deontic logic. The ambit of deontic logic is evidently wide : it includes moral, legal, religious and political discourse. By extension one may also encompass the logic of imperatives and perferences within it. In this paper, however, I will discuss denotic logic mainly with reference to legal discourse, in a manner which characterizes the requirements of legal logic in particular but consequently draws inferences about deontic logic in general.

In my view there are some serious foundational problems in the type of deontic logic presently being done. This becomes evident when we consider legal logic, specially of the type Ilmar Tammello and others have proposed. This paper is an attempt to explain these foundational issues and the possible alternatives.

There are two approaches to the study of formal relations in normative discourse or social actions. One way is to accept some basic principles of ordinary or modal logic and then attempt to derive the basic formal principles concerning norms or actions as a sub-set of these more general modal or ordinary logical

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principles. The other way would be to begin by actually observing the phenomena of normative discourse or social actions in some detail, without any preconception about what formal principles could (or do) obtain, and then attempt to inductively infer the types of basic formal principles that in fact obtain in such phenomena.

Deontic logic, the study of basic formal principles concerning norms or actions, has unfortunately witnessed mainly the first type of approach, by and large. It is unfortunate because, as I will try to show, one need not assume that both deductive and inductive approaches to the study lead to similar conclusions.

The first type of approach – of deducing deontic logic from modal logic, has usually been the peroccupation of philosophers–mostly those influenced by Logicism, Formalism or more generally Logical Positivism, in one way or another. The second type of approach has been the domain of the lawyers, who seem to be more at home with the details of the normative discourse and social actions, but at a distance from the abstract formalism of logicians. "The life of law is experience, not logic", said Holmes. However, this does not preclude the possibility of the jurist drawing logical inferences from their experiences. To do so would be to follow the second approach mentioned above. A leading jurist who did this, as we know, was W. N. Hohfeld. He did not attempt to derive his principles from more basic principles, but simply formalize the intuitions he had gained in experience. However, as compared to the numerous philosophers who have sought the deductive method of systematizing deontic relations, on the inductive side one can perhaps point only to Hohfeld as one who succeeded in enlightening us in some original ways.

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The point is not about the number of people to be found on the deductive or inductive side of the camp. What is important to note is the qualitatively different type of analysis and consequent discussions offered by the Hohfeldians as campared to those of formalists. Hohfeld too, it must be remembered, is attempting to explicate the relationships of necessity, entailment, implication, etc, between deontic notions such as obligations (duties) and rights, and privileges, etc., just as the formalists seek to establish the relationships between obligations and permissions, or commitment and prohibition. The assertions that 'every duty entails a right', or that 'every right necessitates a corresponding duty' — which a Hohfeldian may make, are as much expressions of deontic logic as the corresponding assertions of the formalists, such as 'every duty entails permission' (whatever is obligatory is permissible).

If the subject matter of the study for both the Hohfeldians and the formalists, such as Von Wright and Ilmar Tammelo, is the same i.e., if both are seeking to eventually explicate the formal relations that obtain between concepts, propositions or actions in the normative realm one must ask why is there such a major difference in the nature of the analysis they offer, and the type of enterprise they engage in? Is this merely a matter of differences in style and emphasis or are deeper issues at stake? Clearly, in so far as the deontic logicians' enterprise is meant to be of some use to the jurists, the hiatus between the philosophical endeavour and the jurisprudential one is intolerable. It cannot be simply passed off as differences in style or emphasis – given that the subject matter for both is the same. But how is one to reconcile the differences and to make the one bear upon the other?

To my understanding, the differences in the two approaches are not *prima facie*. They relate to some basic intuitions on both

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sides. These intuitions or assumptions need to be made explicit if we are to understand the problems at the deeper level. The best way to do this, perhaps, would be to observe the manner in which deontic logic has historically evolved.

Deontic logic derives its life from modal logic. Modal syllogistic seems to have been Aristotle's last major contribution to logic. It is to be found in his *Prior Analytics* (chps. 3 and 8–22, Book–I). Some elementary discussions are also to be found in *De Interpretatione* (chps. 12 & 13). In general terms, Aristotle's modal logic involves the study of notions such as necessity, impossibility, possibility and contingency. He laid down that a proposition is possible if and only if its negation is not necessary. Similary, a proposition is said to be necessary if and only if its negation is not possible. The notion of contingency is treated in *De Interpretatione* as synonymous with that of possibility, but in the *Prior Analytics* it is defined to imply that a proposition is contingent if and only if it is neither necessary nor impossible. These definitions lead to various problems, but the important fact to note here is that the Aristotelian conception of the difference between necessity and contingency clearly presupposes a particular metaphysics, namely that the real nature of a thing is its essence. In Aristotle's view absolutely necessary truths express insights into the nature of its being. There are analogous senses of 'possible'. In so far as one is concerned with a world in which things are more than their essences one may say that some features of the things are merely possible (contingent) since those particular features are not entailed by the essence of the things in question. A contingent proposition for Aristotle would hence be one whose truth is not determined simply by the essence of the things about which it is asserted.

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When in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century philosophers such as Leibniz and Hume moved the realm of necessary truths to the relation between ideas or concepts, the proposition opposed to the necessary truth became not those which are merely possible but contingent truths, i.e., propositions which are not true in themselves. The rejection of the Aristotelian scheme of essences eliminated absolutely necessary truths about the world, only contingent ones remained. Similarly, since the theory about essences was replaced by theory about concepts, the necessary relationship between concepts came to be identified with impossibility or absolute possibility (logical possibility). It must be remembered, however, that the necessary – possible distinction is equivalent to the essential – contingent distinction only if the former categories are taken in their absolute sense. The rejection of essences allowed the opposition of necessary to contingent *simpliciter*. The next step of characterizing necessary relationships between concepts as analytic and subsequently in terms of apriority occurs in the works of Leibniz and Kant and becomes explicit in those of the logical positivists. Such identifications assume that the things do not have essences, or at least that we cannot know them. The logical consequence of eliminating essence is to reduce all our knowledge of the world to a knowledge of accidental properties. It is important to note here that both in the earlier and in this century these various developments concerning the modal notions have occurred in a context of epistemology which is concerned mainly with formalism in mathematics and natural sciences, not in context of normative discourse. How does this bear upon the development of deontic logic ?

In the middle ages it was realized that the logic of the permissible and the obligatory in some ways paralled that of the possible and the necessary, and could be regarded as falling under modal

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logic in a broad sense. Systematic treatment of modal logic in modern times, therefore, naturally led to exploit this analogy to its logical consequences, *i.e.*, to handle deontic logic in the manner of modal logic and base the former on the letter; this is evident in the works of E. Mally (1926) and Kurt Grelling and Karl Reach in the late 1930s.[1] This major development, however, completely ignored the reorientation in metaphysics and the consequent change in the meanings of 'necessity', 'possibility', *etc.*, that occurred in the course of the evolution of logical positivism. It, therefore, did not introspect whether the epistemological context in which the modal notions had received their new meanings was actually appropriate for the normative context of the social realm, whether the sorts of 'necessity' and possibilities' that obtain in social actions are similar to those concerning the physical or the mathematical realm.

Typical principles of modal logic are : whatever is necessary is possible, that what is impossible is necessarily false and *vice versa*, and that what is necessitated by something necessary is itself necessary. Analogously, it would seem that one can construe deontic logical principles of the type : whatever is obligatory is permissible, that what is forbidden (not permissible) we are obliged not to do and *vice versa*, and that what we are committed to by something obligatory is itself obligatory. On the face of it, thus, the structure of deontic logic appears to be like that of a fragement of modal logic, and a simple way of presenting it formally would be to take some system of modal logic, replace " It is necessarily the case that..." by " It ought to be the case that..." and " It can be the case that .." by " It is permissible that...", and omit those laws that fail to remain valid after this transformation. Studies by G. H. Von Wright (1951) has stimulated extensive research in this direction.[2] Numerous attempts have been made, following Von Wright's work, to

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fruitfully enlarge the deontic system to accommodate as many principles of modal logic as possible. But before we begin to discuss these developments it will be important to return to the basic notions of ' necessity ' and ' possibility ' and inquire whether the shift from modal logic to deontic logic is well grounded, that is, whether these basic modal notions can be employed in deontic logic without creating some basic semantical confusions about the meaning of the terms.

To begin with, let us scrutinize the meaning of a fundamental modal principle : whatever is necessary is possible. In what sense of necessity and possibility is the relation being asserted ? Is it merely conceptual (logical), or *de dicto* (between sentences), or *de re* (essential or metaphysical) ? It is not inconceivable that some one may argue that in actual life all that is necessary is not possible. For example, although it is necessary to be compassionate or loving to all, given human nature or the nature of social life, it is not possible. Or similarly, although it is necessary to be always honest, given the nature of social contingencies it is not possible. Bradley argued that it is impossible to be just in an unjust society. It may even be argued that some social ideals, such as of equality or autonomy are impossible although necessary. These arguments are not meaningless nor are they self-evidently false. What they in fact appeal to is a sense of necessity which goes beyond the merely logical. If one were to characterise this as an appeal to the nature of things or state of affairs then one may say the sense of necessity invoked is that of metaphysical or essential (*de re*) necessity. The 'necessity' in question is not lagical or *de dicto*. The argument then simply is : the existential quantifier 'whatever', in the modal principle 'whatever is necessary is possible', does not hold true for the deontic realm; deontically : 'some things which are necessary are possible' and 'some (other) things which are necessary are

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impossible', both propositions are true. More fundamentally the argument amounts to the assertion that with respect to actions and norms the syntax is not independent of the semantics, the semantics involves ontology, therefore the deontologised syntactical rules of modal logic just cannot form the basis of deontic logic, nor can the latter be derived from the former.

A typical example of how adoption of assumedly self evident modal rules as deontic rules leads to strange conclusions is Hintikka's 'paradox'.[3] Like other deontic logicians Jaakko Hintikka assumes 'whatever is necessary is possible' or its deontic equivalent 'whatever is obligatory is impossible', and hence its opposite 'whatever is impossible is not obligatory'. From this he goes on to show that 'whatever is impossible is forbidden', in the following way : it seems clear that

(1) to do something which cannot be done withotu something wrong being done would itself be wrong to do, but

(2) the impossible cannot be done with or without something wrong being done;

(3) but by (1) if Y is wrong and doing X – but – not – Y is impossible, it is wrong to do X;

(4) therefore : if it is impossible to do X, it is wrong to do it.

This 'paradox' is puzzling as it is, but it becomes more dubious if one realizes that from Hintikka's principle, together with the principle that what is wrong to do it is wrong to attempt, it would follow that it is wrong even to attempt the impossible. Numerous arguments have been advanced to resolve Hintikka's paradox. They revolve mostly round the notion of 'impossible actions', attempting to show that the notion is meaningless. The absurdity of the conclusion, however, arises due to the unquestioned assumption of the very first premises :

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'whatever is necessary (obligatory) is possible', or its opposite 'whatever is impossible is not obligatory'. Deontically it would not be false or meaningless to say that many things which are presently impossible are nonetheless obligatory, for example being always honest or truthful. It is hence perhaps that Kant said "Act *as if* you are a member of the kingdom of Ends", (even if presently you are not); only in a kingdom of Ends, presumably, all that is necessary (obligatory) will be possible and all impossible actions not obligatory.[4]

There are good reasons to believe that moral or legal necessity or (obligation) is radically different from conceptual necessity. Contemporary deontic logic, which has neither paid attention to the Aristotelian analysis nor to the details of the way relationships of duties and its correlates actually work in legal or moral affairs, is evidently belabouring with conceptios and rules which are inherently inapplicable to the deontic realm. Major efforts have thus sought either to simplify deontic logic to fit the modal paradigm or to interpret the grammar of obligation statements in ways which are conducive to this paradigm. Thus for example A. R. Anderson proposes to simplify obligation statements (imperatives) as conditional indicatives–a scheme in which "you ought to do X" would mean "If X is not done then necessarily some sanction or penalty will be applied."[5] Although such an interpretation of an imperative may simplify deontic logic it would not do justice to either moral obligations (since not all moral actions involve the application of some sanction or penalty), nor to legal obligations (since not all legal obligations are contractual, e.g. : the duty to vote), beside there are varieties of legal obligations coming under strict liability, vicarious–liability, etc., all of which do not involve sanctions or penalties in the same way.

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To argue that deontic logic cannot be tailored to fit the requirements of modal logic is not to suggest that all inquiries into the grammar of obligation statements are without significance, issues such as whether deontic operators attach to propositions or action create genuine puzzlements. Here works such as of Robert Nozick, Richard Routley, Von Wright, R. M. Hare H. N. Castaneda and others constitute valuable explorations into depth grammar.[6] They also provide fruitful insights into transformational grammar, *vis a vis* normative discourse; for example the transformational rules concering 'better than' sentence (preferences), those concerning transformation of imperatives into indicatives, *etc.* These analyses, however, pertain to the English language only – *i.e.* the manner in which 'obligations' 'preferences' 'requirements', *etc.*, are expressed in English. In another language the depth grammar would be different. For example, there is no equivalent of the English 'ought' in Hindi. The Hindi equivalent of 'you ought to do thus' is '*Tumhen aisa karna chahiye*' the word-to-word translation of which would be 'you thus to do should want' the locutionary force of which can be rendered as 'you should by yourself want to do thus'. If one were to do deontic logic in Hindi, questions such as whether 'ought' is a deontic operator and whether it attaches to propositions or actions would just not arise. Perhaps one would naturally be led to the logic of preferences (in terms of wants or desires). The questions about whether or not deontic operators attach to actions, or to something else, would also not arise in the same way in Hindi and other languages derived from Sanskrit, for another reason. Whereas English grammar is descriptive, the Paninian Sanskrit grammar (on which Hindi grammar is also based) is generative. In Sanskrit language each term reveals its genetic relationship (its roots) in relation to other terms. For example, while the term 'obligation' does not tell by itself, what is refers to, the Sanskrit (and Hindi) term '*Kartavya*' at

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once tells that it refers to action, since the genetic root of the term is *Kṛ* (to do/act) and the term is derived from this verb root.

Linguistic specificity, *i.e.*, the depth grammar of English, should not be mistaken for deontic logic. What is required here, evidently, is a detailed study of the transformational and generative grammar of various languages in relation to how obligations, preferences, rights, permissions, prohibitions *etc.*, are expressed in them, so that one may be able to distinguish genuine deontic rules from mere linguistic ones. Evidently what the deontic logician wants is trans-linguistic rules, that is, rules which apply to all languages. But this cannot be comprehended unless one also simultaneously comprehends what is language specific.

In the absence of this what one may end up with is formal abstractions of the type which Ilmar Tammelo advocates for law. Besides invoking the usual modal principles Tammelo brings with some specific ' closure rules ' or ' sealing principles ', which are assumed to be the most basic formal deontic principles at the boundaries of legal discourse, that is, these principles are assumed to be limiting rules for intelligible legal discourse.[7] Among such closure rules which Tammelo and other deontic logicians assert are : ' whatever is not prohibited is permitted ', and its opposite, ' whatever is not permitted is prohibited '. Now are these rules principles of deontic logic or statements of legal or political conditions specific to a particular society ? On the face of it they may seem to be basic deontic principles, but if we carefully look at the semantics of the terms ' prohibition ' or ' permission ', as they occur in various legal systems, it would become evident that the actual conditions under which prohibitions and permissions occur differ from system to system. Moreover the truth conditions for a statement ' X is prohibited ' is very different from that of ' X is permitted '. The two cannot be

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equated. In non-totalitatian or non-dictatorial political societies the fact that people are free to act as they wish and that they would generally act in accordance with law, is something already presupposed by the law. The *granting* of freedom *i.e.*, of permission to do something, can only arise in very special circumstances in law. There seem to be two such special conditions: first, when there has been a verdict to the effect that someone's freedom is to be curbed for some reason, such as when a criminal is put behind bars. Permission is required in such cases to allow some special favours to the convict. The second arises when special circumstances require acting in contradiction to the generally established law, such as when one needs to look into someone's personal belongings–in the way the police needs legal permission (warrant) to search someone's house. Similarly, prohibition by law also occurrs in very special circumstances. It is required, for example, when the public has to be prevented from incurring some personal harm, such as when one needs to prevent people from driving over a weak bridge, swim in dangerous waters, refrain from smoking, or not go near nuclear dumps, *etc.* The arbitrary deontic claim that ' *whatever* is not prohibited is permitted ' is legally false. In a democracy there are many actions which are not prohibited but it does not make sense to ask whether there are rules permitting these actions unless one has special reasons to do so. As noted, permitting a non–prohibited action, such as taking a morning walk or your bed tea, requires extra–ordinary circumstances. The historical roots of the assertion that ' every action that is not prohibited is permitted ' seems to lie in the assumption that the general freedom to act, stands in need of permission by the sovereign, or that one works and lives in the jurisdiction by the grace of the rule maker. This is a residue of a feudal mentality where the monarch owned everything (including perhaps people's lives) and gave permission to work and be free.

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The basic principles which have been assumed to be deontic principles are therefore not morally neutral. Even the expression that 'whatever is obligatory is possible', is in fact the expression of a moral hope – the way people would want society to be, not as it is. By expressing them in formal languages, as Von Wright or Tammelo do, one does not get away from expressing morally questionable principles.

One may assume that if deontic logic cannot be derived from modal logic (or whatever one may assume modal logic to be) it must at least be in conformity with the principles of ordinary logic. This too, however, does not seem to be the case.

In ordinary logic p and not–p cannot be said of the same object without asserting a false self-contradictory statement. In the deontic realm, however, it would not be false to say, for example, that an action is both just and unjust. It can be just with respect to a set of reasons or group of people and unjust with respect to another. For example, with respect to the judge's action in the *slum-dwellers' case*[8] In India, in which many people living on road pavements in Bombay were asked to vacate, it can be said that the judgement is just from the point of view of town–planning and development of Bombay, but unjust from the point of view of the slum-dwellers. Similarly, with respect to the *Doon Vally case*,[9] in which the court ordered cessation of mining in all environmentally sensitive areas, the ju .ge's verdict can be said to be just from an ecological point of view – in terms of the fact that mining had to be stopped to protect the hills for future generations and for the saftey of the local people, but it can also be said to be unjust from the point of view of the labourers who have now been unemployed. Many actions in the social realm can be ascribed contradictory predicates simultaneously if one assumes different frames of references, purposes or priorities. The logical principles of self-identity and self-

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contradiction (that p.~p is necessarily false) cannot be applied to deontic logic without creating serious confusions, leave alone deriving deontic rules from those of ordinary logic. The fact that the principle of excluded middle : (p. ~p is false) does not hold for deontic logic becomes more evident if we carefully look at other concepts correlated with the concept of self-contradiction, such as that of consistency and completeness. The deontic conception of consistency or completeness is not the same as that of ordinary logic as applied in axiomatic theories.

The desire for formal completeness seems to be grounded in the possibility of obtaining a system which contains all its logica consequences. This rational requirement of ideal completeness[1] applies to all deductively correlated systems of propositions, whether they be mathematics, physics, biology or law. The epistemological requirement of our reason, however, is one thing, the ontological structure of the world another. From the legitimacy of the requirements for completeness one cannot jump to the conclusion that any normative system is or can be complete. With respect to the normative realm specifically, one can never be sure that one has completely individuated or classified all objects that belong to its ontological realm; moreover there is always room for novel types of entities. Hence one can never be sure whether the set of normative propositions one is dealing with completly describes the set of objects it is meant to describe. Such problems of individuation and classification are very common in law. In normative discourse, therefore, when one talks of completeness one cannot be talking of it in the formal sense– a system containing all its consequences, even in principle. There is a more significant reason, however, why the notion of normative completeness is different from the usual formal one. It is desirable, for instance, that law be complete for the basic reason that it must apply to all cases, but the desire to apply it to all

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cases is itself grounded in the reason that we want to protect everyone from injustice. Law is intended to be complete in the sense that all socially relevant circumstances are correlated to at least same legal norm so that these norms may be applied to these circumstances to protect people from being treated unjustly. Such a sense of completeness, clearly, is not merely a formal sense. Law is also intended to be *morally* complete. As noted, various thinkers have nonetheless discussed the question of legal completeness in terms of 'closure rules' as if this were a matter of more formal consideration. [10]

One may similarly note the different sense of 'consistency' in legal discourse. Since the discourse is a system of deductively correlated propositions its basic and derivative propositions must be consistent with each other so that there is an overall consistency in the system. In such a system both p and not-p would not be true for any q, otherwise one would derive any q from it. Legal propositions are characteristically applied in the settlement of disputes so that every sub-set of the basic propositions must consist only of propositions which can be applied together. Evidently this requires more than formal consistency. It involves the notion that such an application be possible in a way that the joint use of the members of the sub-set does not frustrate the intentions of any of the component units. If these conditions were to be violated for some members, those members can be rejected or replaced and were, evidently, wrongly accepted as members. The real members of the system are some other related propositions, specified in part by the conditions for rejection of incompatible members and partly by the end that is intended to be achieved by the introduction of the new members. The possibility of removing the inconsistencies in this way requires a knowledge of the systematic juristic aims. A mere knowledge of the ways incompatibilities formally arise is not enough for being able to replace the inconsistent propositions by consistent ones. The

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possibility of making law a consistent system requires a knowledge of its systematic ends, its goals or what is otherwise called the 'spirit of law'. Since the basic ends of law are moral ones, the notion of consistency in application already entails the notion of such ends. Of course, sometimes law is falsely perceived to be merely mechanical, *i.e.*, the judges have to be merely consistent with the legislated laws and precedence. Law, as any practitioner knows, is not such a mechanical enterprise. It is a dynamic process of continuous law making and unmaking. The principle of precedence, however, does not by itself make law mechanical, for the question what makes precedence consistent would always remain – making the explanation regressive.[11]

What is true of the notions of completeness and consistency is also true of their opposites : incompletness and inconsistency. The role that these notions play in normative discourse cannot be captured by their defiinitions of the kind given in formal logic.[12]

In the light of this discussion it should be evident why deontic logic of the type developed by contemporary thinkers is far from being of any use to lawyers, jurists or those who wish to understand the formal aspects of the actual normative discourses. Unless some radical rethinking is done in this field, formalization of such discourse will remain far from satisfactory.

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NOTES

1. See : Kürt Grelling, " Zur Logik der Sollsatze ", in *Unity of Science Forum* (January, 1939) pp. 44-47; and Karel Reach, " Some Comments on Grelling's paper 'Zur Logik der Sollsatze, '' in *Unity of Science Forum* (April, 1939. p. 72).

2. G. H. von Wright's significant contributions are in *An Essay in Modal Logic* (Amsterdam, 1951), Ch. 5., and *Norms and Action* (London, 1963).

3. Jaakko Hintikka. " The Modes of Modality ", *Acta Philosophica Fennica.* Fascicule 16 (1963). 65-82.

4. For details see Leslie Armour and Chhatrapati Singh : ' Kingdom of Ends in Laws and Morals ', in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Jan. 1986.

5. A. R. Anderson : *The Formal Analysis of Normative Systems.* Technical Report No. 2. U. S. Office of Naval Research, Contract No : SAR/ Nonr-609 (16) (1956).

6. Robert Nozick and Richard Routley, " Escaping the good Samaritan Paradox, " in *Mind* Vol. 71 (1962) 377-382. H. N. Castaneda, " Un sistema general de logical normativa. " in *Dianoia.* Vol. 3 (1957) 303-333.

7. Ilmar Tammelo, *Outlines of Modern Legal Logic.* Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag. GMBH. 1969.

8. *Olga Tellis.* v. *Municipality of Bombay*, A. I. R. 1985 SC. 945.

9. *Rural Litigation Entitlement Kendra Dehradun & Others.* v. *State of U. P.* A. I. R. 1985. SC. 652.

10. For a more detailed discussion of related issues see : Chhatrapati Singh. *Law from Anarchy to Utopia.* Oxford University Press, Delhi. 1985, pp. 13-36.

11. For a more detailed study of the nature of legal proposition see : Leslie Armour, Chhatrapati Singh; ' Constitutional Law and the Nature of Basic Legal Propositions ', *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research.* Vol. II, No. 2. Spring 1985.

12. For a discussion of the rules of recognition concerning inconsistencies, and incompleteness in law, see : Chhatrapati Singh, *Law from Anarchy to Utopia.* pp. 17-32.

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FREE WILL AND NON-ATTACHMENT IN THE *BHAGAVAD GĪTA*

In this paper I shall attempt to prove that, when the teaching of the *Bhagavad Gītā* (hereafter cited as BG) is viewed from the absolute perspective of Kṛṣṇa (Viṣṇu) as Brahman, i.e. Ultimate Reality, then, in *no* sense is there room for determinism in the *Gītā*. I will argue that in its highest philosophical form the BG holds an *impartial indeterminism.* This may sound untenable and unwarranted, at first, without textual support. In fact, my above stated thesis statement may appear to contradict the traditional view that the BG holds a moderate stance on free will and determinism. The "moderate stance" or traditional scholarly perspective, on the BG, holds that there is a vein of determinism or Divine pre-determinism found therein. This "moderate stance" is held in varying degrees by different scholars, however, it always entails at least one of the following three causes or forms of determinism. Some scholars, e.g. E. Deutsch hold all three forms. The three are as follows : 1) the nature of the lower *Prakṛti*, i.e. the physical world, is constituted by the three *guṇas*, and their (physical) intreraction is a necessary one, i.e. empirical–material-determinism; 2) given the spacio–temporal-causal nexus of the material world, the embodied soul (*Puruṣa*) must act (*karma*) to maintain life and these acts (*karmas*) cause future impelling acts (*karmic* effects) to necessarily occur, i e. *karmic*–impelling–determinism; finally, 3) it is held that the *Gītā* maintains a Divine pre–determinism. As P. T. Raju states, "The Supreme Person is the controller of this process." (Raju, p. 213).* In the course of this paper,

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I will examine these three forms of determinism more closely, but I must state from the outset that I will *not* attempt to refute this view of "moderate determinism". I, personally, do not think that it can be refuted, for it is valid from its own perspective. I will attempt to point out that "moderate determinism" is limited in its relative perspective. Therefore, I shall attempt to prove that from the Ultimate perspective (*nirguṇa Brahman*), there is an impartial indeterminism in the BG when one understands that nature (*Prakṛti*), is a manifestation of the divine (*Puruṣa*), is the field in which all potential actions or ethical choices occur.

I will also attempt to show that this impartial indeterminism can only be understood from the perspective of non-attachment or detachment, i. e. that is something like *tyaj* a cutting of the bonds (*bandha*) of the ego-centric perspective. It seems to me that with the attitude of non-attachment, as it is taught in the BG, applied to knowledge (*jñāna*) especially knowledge of how *prakṛti* functions, action and its impelling effects (*karma*), and devotion (*bhakti*) to a personal god, one can then and only then *realize* that there is no determinism in nature, actions and their impelling effects, nor the "Supreme Person" (*Puruṣa* or *Brahman* as a personal god). I contend that what appears to be deterministic in the BG, are but the underlying conditions in and through which free ethical choices can be made. For example, I will attempt to show how detached devotion (*bhakti-yoga*) leads the devotee to relinquish her/his ego and the ego-desires for a protecting personal god. Thus, the devotee of *bhakti-yoga* should *realize* that ultimately his personal god (Iśvara) is an impersonal absolute one (c. f. no-thing. absolute, *nir-guṇa*) without attributes, and as such *it* cannot be said to control or pre-determine the world. Since the absolute is existence (*sat*), with qualification one may say, then, that the

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Absolute provides the "field" for actions within which ethical choices are made. Of course, if this "field" for action is seen as an *attribute*, it will not apply to the Absolute. Thus, my thesis of "impartial indeterminism" is a limiting concept in itself, and it too must be surpassed or overcome in the process of realization and/or emancipation. Ultimately, one can only point toward the absolute, freedom, ethics, and so on, for they are in themselves ineffable.

Since the concept of a "free will" presupposes that of *freedom*, I could restate my thesis of "impartial indeterminism" as an attempt to prove that freedom is a necessary condition for the ethics of the BG, and these ethics are based on detachment. To substantiate these two claims of 1) necessary freedom, and 2) detachment, I will begin by defining "detachment". I will then discuss some of the underlying concepts of the BG which have a strong bearing on the topic of freedom and determinism. I will point out that the BG assumes many of the social conventions presented in the *Code of Manu*, e. g. the four *āśramas* or "stages of life", the four *puruṣārthas* or "goals of life," and the four *varṇas* or social castes. Although the *Code of Manu* is dated to the third to second centuries B. C., and the BG assumes many of its doctrines, nevertheless the germinal ideas of these three concepts are found in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature; thus we cannot say that the BG only dates to the second or third centuries B. C. based on the dating of the *Code of Manu*. The dating of the BG is beyond the scope of the paper. What is important here is that these four divisions of "life" and the "goals of Life" and "society" appear to present a theory of social determinism. However, I will show that when these concepts are rightly understood in the context of the BG, i. e. the setting of *war*, then and only then can one recognize that the "freedom of choice to participate in the social–

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life-cycle-structure" is always presupposed. As such this "social determinism" is no determinism since it is based on the idea of freedom of choice. I will then return to the above discussion of reinterpreting the traditional three forms of "moderate determinism" via *Prakṛti, Karma*, and Divine pre-determinism. In conclusion, I hope to show that from the Ulitmate perspective of the teaching of the BG that freedom is a necessary condition for the ethics of the *Gītā*, and thus an "impartial indeterminism" or a concept of complete freedom is the real ethical basis of the *Gītā*. I will now turn to a brief discussion of the meaning of non-attachment or detachment in the BG.

I must point out at the out set that the concept of detachment or equanimity, as it is taught in the BG, is a unique one. Professor Upadhyaya has stressed this unique concept or rather practice; he states, "Unlike Buddhism according to which detachment or renunciation should be both inner and outer, the B. G. seems to lay exclusive emphasis on inner detachment." (Upadhyaya, p. 458). Above all else then, detachment or renunciation is an *attitude* one assumes toward the world. To assume or practice this attitude has a twofold consequence for my argument of properly understanding "free will" in the BG. First, the state of detachment implies free will in that the practice of the attitude of detachment must be done by a "free" moral agent. That is to say that regardless of the necessary causal interactions of the three *guṇas*, i. e. *sattva, rajas,* and *tamas,* the impelling effects of *karma,* and any restraints imposed by the divine power of "creation" (*māyā*), still the moral agent (mankind) is absolutely free to choose to live by the attitude of "inner detachment" to all possessions and in all actions. Second, the attitude of renunciation or detachment if taken seriously, then it tells us to reject the empirical perspective on material and causal, i. e., *prakṛti* and *karma* determinism. That is to say that

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the BG preaches a hierarchy of self-control or detachment. That is, to control the body (matter) one must control the sense, and to control the sense one must control the mind, and to control the mind one must control the intellect, and to control the intellect one must control the spirit. Thus the BG states, "*indriyārtheṣu vairāgyam . etaj jñānam* , i. e. to be wise... turn away from what the senses tell you..." (BG 13.8; Bolle, p. 155 & p. 300). The concept of *vairāgyam* or *vairāgya* is that of detachment or renunciation or turning away from the defective causes of ignorance, i. e., sense data and the theoretical stance derived from sense data—empiricism. Thus the freedom of the spirit to assume or practice the attitude of non-attachment or detachment (*vairāgya*–equanimity of mind or inner renunciation) provides the main synthesis in the thought of the BG. As Professor Upadhyaya states, "Desireless or disinterested action (*niṣkāma karma*) is thus made the central point in which all the paths are shown to converge. This is how B. G. tries to establish unity amidst diversity." (p. 471). Thus it is little wonder that detachment or non-attachment serves as the basis from which we can best understand the role of absolute freedom in the BG.

I must point out that the BG does not maintain a constant use of only one term to discuss detachment or renunciation; rather, it uses a number of terms to discuss and describe this attitude. Some of these terms are as follows: 1) *Vairāgya* or the ascetic practice (BG, 6.35) or turning away from the senses (as discussed above, BG, 13.8 & 18.52); 2) *tyāga* or abandonment or renunciation (BG, 12.12, 16.2, 18.1, 4, & 9); 3) *tyaj* or to cast off or (to do) with detachment (BG, 2.3 & 2.41; 4) *sangam tyaktvā* without attachment (BG, 5 11) and various other terms are used, (Bolle, p. 300). Further the one who practices this attitude of non-attachment is given various titles, e.g.

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saṁnyāsin, tapasvin, yogin (a person of discipline) and so on. The important point here is that the BG does stress the concept of detachment, not as a unique ideal only attainable by super-humans, as a goal which is attainable by mankind as men contain the absolutely free spirit (*puruṣa*) which can exercise self-control or self-restraint on the "lower" nature (*prakṛti*).

To really show that this doctrine of absolute freedom does serve as the foundation of the *Gītā's* system of ethics, I must briefly discuss some of the cultural presuppositions of the BG. In particular, I would like to direct our attention to the four *varṇas* or the "caste system" and the four *puruṣārthas* or "goals of life." From the Western perspective the division of society into rigid castes and the prescription of exact *aims* which correspond to the four stages of life (the *āśramas*) would be viewed as a form of social determinism. However, if these concepts are understood from the Indian perspetive, they do not imply determinism; rather this strict system implies the free choice of the individuals who make up the society at large, and some do choose to go against the system. In fact, the very setting of the BG, i.e. the battle field (of life) shows that some will choose the ultimate evil of working against the spirit (*puruṣa*) by following ego-centered desires to the extent of wanting to kill others to fulfil those desires. The BG explicitly seems to support the four *varṇas* (see 4.13 and other places). The BG affirms the doctrine of the four goals of life in a more indirect manner. The four goals of life are: 1) *dharma*, 2) *kāma*, 3) *artha*, 4) *mokṣa*. The BG states again and again that duty for duty's sake (*karmayoga*) is the way to complete freedom or emancipation (*mokṣa*), and this doctrine is reinforced by giving a special emphasis to *dharma* or social duty, and this is to emphasise the concept of "specific duty" or *svadharma*. (Upadhyaya, pp. 470-471). As the *Gītā* states, "*śreyān svadharmo viguṇaḥ paradha-*

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rmāt svanuṣṭhitāt..., i.e. One's own duty in its imperfections is better than someone else's duty well performed." (BG, 18.47, Bolle, pp. 206–207). Furthermore in various places, the BG discusses the two "lower" goals of life, *kāma* and *artha*, as those ego-centered desires which maintain attachments, especially inner attachments, and the cycle of rebirths (*saṁsāra*). As I stated above, from the Western point of view the four *varṇas* and the four *puruṣārthas* present a form of social determinism. Thus, many western scholars stress some form of determinism based on *dharma*. For example, although E. Deutsch does not use the term "social determinism" nevertheless he does associate *dharma* with determinism in that one's *dharma* or social duty is determined via the impelling effects of one's past actions (*karma*). (Deutsch, p. 183). However, such a perspective completely overlooks the facts that the moral agent must choose to fulfil his *dharma*, and to make such a choice implies that the moral agent has a free will to make such a choice. The spirit or *puruṣa* is the eternally free moral agent. It alone is responsible for life and the evolution toward complete freedom or self-realization (*mokṣa*). Although the caste system and the four goals of life are taken for granted in the BG, still one must keep in mind the general setting of the BG. In this respect, I am especially thinking of the fact that context of this *Gītā* is twofold. First and foremost it is a story of the *Avatāra* of Viṣnu, Kṛṣṇa, teaching his disciple Arjuna, and secondly it is taking place on a battle field. The first aspect of the story is symbolic of the absolutely good free will. The second aspect is symbolic of the absolutely evil free will. The question, "How can evil arise in a world determined by nature or god?" seems to point toward the impartial indeterminism of the *Gītā*, *viz* the moral agent is free to choose evil to appease its desires (*kāma*) or for material gain (*artha*). Furthermore, the *fact* of the *Avatāra* shows that the moral agent, the spirit, even the supreme *puruṣa* or *nirguṇa Brahman*, is also free

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to choose to do good, viz 1) to maintain life, 2) to maintain the evolution toward *mokṣa* and when necessary to 3) remove hindrances to this goal especially evil. The ethics of the BG is based on the distinction of good and evil or liberation and bondage; both men and gods are confronted with the ethical choice. Thus, the twofold nature of BG, i.e, the *Avatāra* and the war, respectively show the choice between good and evil. The choice between good and evil implies that there is a free moral agent. That the *puruṣa* can ever "begin" (in a logical sense and not the temporal) to generate *karma* and the impelling effects either negative, toward evil and bondage, or positive toward good and liberation, stands as evidence that the moral agent, at least, is absolutely free in making ethical choices. This is to say that ethical choices are compelling events. Thus, given the relative history of an embodied spirit (*jīva*) the particular "place" one finds oneself at is based on the impelling effects of past choices, i.e., actions (*karma*); however, one is always free to alter one's present lot by making positive choices, i.e. compelling one toward *mokṣa*.

In discussing detachment, I pointed out that it is the main path to achieve *mokṣa*. I also showed how free will was implied in the ablity to take on the attitude of detachment. In the preceding discussion, I showed that what might appear to the Western reader as a form of social determinism actually implies the free choice of the moral agent participating in the social-life-cycle-structure. I also showed how the main theme of the BG, i.e., the *Avatāra* as war consultant or the choice between good and evil also implies the free will of the moral agent. I would now return to a discussion of the view of "moderate determinism".

As I stated in the introduction to this paper, the traditional scholarly stance on the BG is to hold, at least one of the following three froms of determinism, i.e., determinism in the lower

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prakṛti, determinism via the impelling effects of *karma* and divine pre–determinism. I would now like to examine each of these three forms of determinism to see if in fact they can actually be said to be deterministic in the context of the BG. I must, however, reiterate that I do not beleive that these three forms of determinism can be argued against or refuted, for from the empirical stance they are present and true. I am contending that by applying the higher perspective of the *yogin* in practice, what appeared as determinism or pre–determinism comes to be seen as the ethical context in which action are made. First, allow me to examine the stance on pre-determinism.

Some scholars, e. g., Raju and Deutsch, hold that there is a doctrine of Divine pre–determinism in the BG. Furthermore, there is some strong textual support for this view. For example in chapter eleven sections thirty–two to thirty–three, Kṛṣṇa claims to be time itself and the destroyer of the human world instructing Arjuna to be an instrument (*nimitta*) of the divine plan. Or in chapter eighteen section sixty–one where it is said that it is the magical power (*māyā*) of the Lord that maitains the universe. It must be kept in mind that from the relative perspective (*saguṇa*), it does appear that the Lord creates and controls the activities of the world. However, one must not forget that an entire chapter of the BG is devoted to giving a symbolic expression to the ineffable and absolute (*nirguṇa*) nature of the Lord. As I stated above (page 376), *bhakti–mārga* or the way of devotion when combined with detachment becomes *bhakti–yoga*. The devotee of *bhakti–yoga* in its pures practice, cannot be said to be practicing devotion to a personal god. In a sense, chapter eleven, where Kṛṣṇa presents his absolute formlessness in a symbolic fashion so that Arjuna's limited sense modalities can preceive him, as the direct immediate experience of the *nirguṇa Brahman*, is the ultimate goal of the

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yogin or devotee of *bhakti-yoga*. Thus, it is not too surprising that one also finds passages in the BG which directly contradict the above notion of a Divine pre-determinism. For example, chapter nine section nine present the lord as a detached onlooker amidst the process of change. Furthermore, to say that the *Gītā* necessarily presents a form of divine pre-determinism would appear to go against the grain of the entire theme of the BG. If the world were completely divinely pre-determined, then one would have to say that evil was divinely caused. But if evil was truly caused by the divine will, then why would the divine incarnate to prevent evil from dominating mankind? Of course, at this point, the discussion must come to an end, for to attempt to assume "rational behavior" on the part of the absolute is a meaningless task. I shall now turn to a discussion of the second from of determinism attributed to the BG.

I must point out, at the out set, that Professor Upadhyaya has emphasised time and again that both *karma* and *prakṛti* are deterministic *only* in an impelling sense (*Ibid.*, p. 525). Upadhyaya has shown that *prakṛti* does not compell one to act; we do have the freedom to "...curb the influence of *prakṛti*..." (*Ibid.* p. 522). As regards the impelling effects of *karma*, Upadhyaya has shown that, of the five necessary conditions or responsible factors for carrying out an *act*, destiny (*daiva*) is but one of conditions, and furthermore, effort or endeavour (*ceṣṭā*=will power?) is another of the responsible factors for an action to occur (*Ibid.*, p. 525). I would like to modify Dr. Upadhyaya's view that the *Gītā* holds a partial determinism, by taking a non-empirical-material perspective which stresses the freedom of the higher nature or spirit (*puruṣa*); such that the spirit is seen as ultimately free *from* the material conditions of nature, and it is free *to* choose its future actions—particularly those actions that will lead it toward *mokṣa*. This is what I

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mean by " impartial indeterminism." Some scholars hold that *karma* is a binding determinism, and it is developed via one's *dharma*. For example, "... (man) is bound by his own past actions (*karma*) as this crystalizes into a law (*dharma*) of his own nature; ..." (Deutsch, p. 183). Now it is surely Arjuna's *dharma* (both as his personal nature and his social nature) to be a warrior and to fight; however, if the BG held the view that *dharma* based on *karma* was deterministic, then chapter one, i. e., Arjuna's despondency could not arise, could not be written. On the contrary, as the troops make ready for war, Arjuna at first picks up his bow, but then he reflects on the events at hand, and he then casts away his bow (BG, 1.20 & 47). The point is that Arjuna as a highly developed spirit *is free* to make ethical decisions : the impelling effects of his past *karmas* and the conditions of his inner and social law (*dharma*) do not automatically compell Arjuna to fight like some blood thirsty creature.

Moreover, P. T. Raju has pointed out that the doctrine of *karmayoga*, duty for duty's sake, has a twofold aim, *viz* 1) to maintain the process of the human world, and 2) to teach a way toward salvation (Raju, p. 215 & 216). Under first point, Raju shows that to live is to act, that even Brahman must *act* as it were via the Avatār. (Ibid., p. 216) As the *Gitā* says, " ... *śarīrayātrāpi ca te na prasiddhyed akarmaṇaḥ*, i.e., without action, the body would stop functioning." (Bolle, p. 40 &41). In this respect, even the satisfaction of desires (*kāma*) is permissible (Raju, p. 216). In this sense, that all life is activity, can we really see the lower nature (*prakṛti*) and the impelling effects of past actions as deterministic ? I personally think not; for under these circumstances the impelling effects (*karma*) and nature (*prakṛti*) provide the conditions for the continuation of life. They provide the "field" as it is described in chapter thirteen

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in which ethical actions occur. *Karmayoga* or duty for duty's sake, again it implies action without a concern or attachment for the fruits of the labour, also teaches a means to attain salvation. This salvation is attained when the *yogin* realizes that his actions are actually the interactions of the three strands (*guṇas*) as the manifestation of Brahman maintaining human life (Raju, 217). As the *Gītā* puts it, "Whoever does not turn with the wheel...he is of evil intent ..." (Bolle, p. 43, BG. 3.16). Since *karma* does contain the way to liberation, I contend that it should not be seen as a determining force, but rather, *karma*, especially when done with detachment, supplies the form or mode through which actions and *realizations* occur.

Turning now to the form of determinism first mentioned above, i.e., that of the lower nature (*prakṛti*) composed of the three *guṇas* or strands, I would again say that taken at face value this view cannot actually be refuted· however I would like to reinterpret it. Above, in discussing how *karma* can be seen as the "field" for all potential actions, I also interpreted the concept of *prakṛti*. Therefore I will only discuss very briefly how prakṛti can be seen as the "field" or underlying conditions for actions and ethical choices. In this respect, chapter thirteen titled, "The yoga of the distinction between the Field and the Field-Knower" serves to support my claim that in its highest philosophical sense the *Gītā* maintains absolute freedom for ethical choices. The field appears to determine one's actions from the relative plane of existence, but those who know, in an active sense (*jñānayoga*), the distinction between the field or *prakṛti* and the freedom of beings; they can attain liberation (BG, 13.34).Thus, *prakṛti* may be seen as setting the conditions for life and activity, but it is not a determining factor over the free will of men and gods.

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The BG appears to stress the transcendence of the three *guṇas* to attain pure liberation. To gain release one must go beyond the three *guṇas* (BG, 14.20). One must sit apart from the merry-go-round of life unmoved and unshaken (BG, 14.23). In passing beyond the three *guṇas* one then attains union with *Brahman* (BG, 14.26). Furthermore Indian Philosophy, in general, and the BG, in particular, appear to stress the reality of the Cosmic will over and above the personal will (Edgerton, pp. 114–119). Thus, it might appear that free will is only an illusion until one transcends the relative plane of existence; but we must keep in mind that there is no "transcendental gap" in Indian Philosophy. Transcendence is *immanent*. Thus, the Cosmic free will is attainable by men. Therefore, I have attempted to show that the BG does hold a doctrine of absolute freedom. This freedom is embodied in action for action's sake, but always it is done with detachment (*karmayoa*) :

> You are entitled to work,
> but not at all to the results.
> The results of work should not be your motive,
> Nor should you abstain from work.
> Follow Discipline, perform your work
> with detachment, Pursuer of Wealth,
> Equal-minded to success or failure.
> Discipline means equanimity. (Bolle p. 31; with my modification, BG, 2.45).

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NOTES

* In this paper I will avail myself of the most modern style of citing sources by giving the author and page number in the text: please, see the Bibliography for the complete citation information.

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SANKARA : SOME LOGICAL REFLECTIONS

In this paper I have tried to point out certain inconsistencies in Śaṅkar's philosophy. As his philosophy is taken to be well known among scholars, I have not given the exposition of his views in details. I have explained his views within a few lines only and have, then, come to the inconsistencies concerned directly.

I

In his Commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, while criticising Yogācāra Buddhism, Śaṅkara quotes the line 'Yadantarjñeya rūpaṁ tad bahirvad avabhāsate' from Diṅnaga's *Ālaṁbana Parikṣā* and says that the position of Yogācārins that the ideas appear like the external objects does not stand because it is impossible to feel and to say that ideas appear like the external objects unless and until the very existence of external objects is accepted. The criticism is a sound one. But what seems to me is that, while maintaining his own position on the problem of causation, he himself cannot escape from the clutches of this criticism.

After criticising the theory of *pariṇāmavāda* he says that there is not real change, the so called changes are merely apparent. There is no *pariṇāma vikāra* (i.e., real change) in the cause when it takes the form of effect. The cause simply seems to be the effect. Thus he maintains the theory of apparent causation. Here Śaṅkara commits the same mistake for which he himself criticises Yogācārins because cause cannot appear to be the effect

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unless the existence of the effect (i.e. real effect) is already accepted. That is to say, that the concept of apparent cause presupposes the concept of real cause. So the theory of apparent causation (*vivartavāda*) too presupposes the theory of real causation (*pariṇāmavāda*). The paradox of the situation precisely consists in the fact that Śaṅkara, after criticising *pariṇāmavāda*, gives the theory of *vivartavāda* by way of an improvement but this theory of *vivartavāda* is such that it cannot be accepted unless and until the theory of *pariṇāmvāda* is already accepted.

II

Again in his Commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, while criticising Yogācāra Buddhism, he, under the Sūtra '*Vaidharmyād ca na svapnādivat*' says that *jagat* or world is not like dreams and illusions because *jagat* and dreams etc. (i.e., illusions) are of different nature. But I think here again Śaṅkara is inconsistent because both authority and reasoning go to prove that in his philosophy *jagat* has been taken to be similar to dream and illusion.

Taking authority first, we see that the 56th sloka[1] of his *Aparokṣānubhūti* clearly shows that *jagat* is like a dream. The same conclusion is strengthened when we consider his explanation on the *sūtra* '*māyāmātraṁ tu Kārtsnyenānabhivyakta svarūpatvāt*'[2] in his Commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* The same is again established by the implications of his *adhyāsa bhāṣya* which has been inserted in his Commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* with the purpose of giving clues to explain the problem *jagat* or *vyavahāra* (i.e., empirical practice of the world) on the lines of illusion.[3] This is again confirmed when an advaitin Ānanda Bodha Bhaṭṭāraka in his *Nyāya Makaranda* says that the world is illusory because of inertness and objectness like the

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objects perceived in dreams and nacre–silver.[4] The same (i.e., world is like dream and illusion) is accepted by Madhusūdana Sarasvati also when he in his *Advaita Siddhi* says that *jagat* is *mihtyā* like nacre–silver.[5]

Now we come to show how reasoning goes to prove that in Śaṅkara's philosophy *jagat* or world is taken to be similar to dream and illusion. Śaṅkara's philosophy being non–dualism cannot accept both *Brahman* and *jagat* to be true. Keeping in view the practical considerations it cannot be said that *jagat* is utterly false. Now the only alternative to explain Śaṅkara's non-dualism and at the same time to account for the practical life is to accept the status of *jagat* at par with that of illusion. Though Śaṅkara has all these in mind yet while criticising Yogācārins he quite cunningly says that *jagat* is not similar to dream and illusion.

One may point out here that Śaṅkar meets this situation by taking resort to his concept of empirical reality or vyāvahārika sattā. But to me it seems that this would not be a solution to the problem because the very classification of reality into *pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika* is logically untenable. The term *prātibhāsika Sattā* is a contradiction in terms because a thing cannot be both a *pratibhāsa* and a *sattā*. And as belief in the *vyāvahārika sattā* is to be discorded on the dawn of higher knowledge, *vyāvahārika sattā* also is in a way *prātibhāasika sattā*. So *vyāvahārika sattā* also, like *prātibhāsika* one, happens to be something contradictory. Thus *vyavahāra* or *jagat* is not better than *pratibhāsa* or illusion and therefore both are on the same level.

One may again say that though *jagat* is similar to illusion yet it is different from illusion because illusion is contradicted within very short time whereas *jagat* is not contradicted so shortly. To this my reply is that the length of the duration of illusion

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makes no difference to its nature. An illusion lasting for ten minutes is not different in nature from the other one lasting for fifty years.

Another reasoning to show that *jagat–Brahma* illusion is not different in nature from snake-rope illusion can be given out of the very replies of advaitins. Advaitins, while facing the objection that *jagat* it real because is serves the practical purposes, say that simply on the ground of serving practical purposes *jagat* cannot be said to be real because unreal things, e.g. illusion and dream, also can serve the practical purposes. A dream can incapacitate the actual physical organs of a man and a snake in the rope can cause fear etc. Thus world-illusion is at par with the ordinary illusion.

Therefore according to the spirit of his philosophy Śaṅkara cannot say that *jagat* is not similar to illusion.

III

In his Commentary on the *Brahma–Sūtras* Śaṅkra declares '*Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithya jīvo Brahmaiva nāparaḥ*'. In order to interpret this statement correctly one has to be quite sure about the exact meaning (as taken in Śaṅkara's philosophy) of the term '*mithyā*'. Now my contention is that the interpretation of this statement leads to absurdity irrespective of meanings assigned to the term '*mithyā*'. Here we would interpret the statement in the light of the meanings normally assigned to the term '*mithyā*' and then come to show that the statement goes against the fundamentals of Śaṅkara's philosophy.

In the Advaitavāda of Śaṅkara normally there seem to be three meanings of the term '*mithyā*'. They are : 1. *Anṛtam nāma mithyā* 2. *Jñāna bādhyatvaṁ mithyātvam* 3. *Sadasadvilakṣaṇatvaṁ mithyātvam*. Here the second meaning happens to be a

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form of the first one. So we will try to interpret the statement '*Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā*', first in the light of the meaning of the term '*mithyā*' in the sense of *anṛta* or falsity and then in the light of the meaning of the term '*mithyā*' in the sense of *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. Now if the *jagat* is *mithyā* or *anṛta* or false then the statement '*Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā*' is also false because this statement also is in the *jagat*. So its denial i. e., – (*Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā*), or – (p ∧ q) would be true. It means that either '*Brahma satyaṁ*' is false or '*jaganmithyā*' is false. That is to say that either *Brahma* is false or *jagat* is true. This is the very denial of Śaṅkara's theory.

Similarly taking the meaning of the term '*mithyā*' in the sense of *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* we see that the situation does not improve. If *jagat* is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* then the proposition '*Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā*' also happens to be *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* i. e., it is neither true nor false. But a proposition is either true or false So '*Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā*' is not a proposition or a meaningful statement but a mere ejaculation. And therefore it cannot be truly said that *Brahma* is *satya* and *jagat* is *mithyā*.

Even if we accept the statement '*Brahma satyaṁ jaganmithyā*' without going into its interpretation, the difficulties are not over. A non-Śaṅkarite or a man of ordinary tool of reasoning may question the very truth or falsity of this *jaganmithyātva*. I will consider this problem in the light of both the meanings of the *mithyā* in the sense of *anṛta* or falsity and in the sense of *sadasadavilakṣaṇatva*. Now taking *mithyā* and so *mithyātva* too in the sense of *anṛta* or falsity we see that if this *jaganmithyātva* is true then the doctrine of non-dualism is gone because there would be two entities, the one *Brahman* and the other *jagat*

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Now we will consider the issue by taking the terms *'mithyā'* and *'mithyātva'* in the sense of *sadasadavilakṣaṇatva*. If *jaganmithyātva* (i. e., *sadasadavilakṣaṇatva* of *jagat)* is true then the non-dualism falls down because there would be two realities, the one *Brahman* and the other *sadasadavilakṣaṇatva* of *jagat*. And if this *sadasadavilakṣaṇatva* of *jagat* is false then it is true that *jagat* is either true or false because the negation of 'neither true nor false' is 'either true or false' i.e. $-(-p \wedge -q) = p \vee q$. Again if *jagat* is true then the same difficulty will arise i.e., there would be two entities. And if *jagat* is false then the very falsity of *jagat* will also be false. So *jagat* will again happen to be true by the inference rule of double negation.

Thus there is no escape from the difficulties if we accept Śaṅkara's declaration that *Brahma* is *satya* and *jagat* is *mithyā*.

IV

In his Commentary on the *Bṛhadāranyak, Upaniṣad,* while interpreting the *mahāvākya 'Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi'*, Śaṅkara maintains that there is unqualified identity between the individual soul and the Brahman. In fact what he really means here is that the soul viewed apart from the conditions which differentiate it from pure consciousness is identical with Brahman viewed apart from the attributes that differentiate it from pure consciousness. To me it seems that this indentity cannot be reasonably held. Here I go not only against Śaṅkara but also against the upaniṣadic *mahāvakya 'Ahaṁ Brhmāsmi'*. Now my contention is that at the very moment of feeling this unqualified identity between itself and the Brahman, the individual soul cannot attribute 'I' to itself because if it does so then it means that even at thevery moment of feeling that identity it was under bondage in some or the other way. That is to say that if at the time of feeling identity the individual soul attributes 'I' to itself then it lands itself into contradiction

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because if it feels identity then it cannot be under bondage at that time and if it is in bondage then it cannot feel identity.

This absurdity can be shown in another way also. Even if it is supposed that at the very time of feeling that identity the individual soul may attribute 'I' to itself, the so-called indentity is not established. As the individual soul asserts that he is *Brahman* it means that at the time of feeling that indentity he is conscious of himself and of *Brahman* also. That is to say that at the time of feeling that identity the duality of knower and known is there. So actually there is no identity between the individual soul and the *Brahman* and thus the very concept of liberation according to Śaṅkara falls down.

Thus it seems to me that Śaṅkara's views, as found in his own writings, have not been so consistent as they have been taken to be by the majority of the modern authors who have explained his views in English.

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NOTES

1. *Anubhūtopi loko'yam vyavahāraksamo'pi san āsadrūpo yathā svapna uttarakṣaṇabādhataḥ.*
2. *Brahma-Sūtras*, 3. 2. 4.
3. *Tametamavidyākhyamātmānātmnoḥ itatetarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārāḥ.....*
4. *Svapna-bheda-avabhāsanavat.*
5. *Jagannmithyā dṛsyatvāt, jaḍatvāt, paricchinnatvāt, śuktirūpyavat.*
6. As in Sankara's philosophy ultimate reality is indescribable i.e., language fails to describe it, language is confined to empirical or wordly life alone according to him. In this connection it is also to be noted that accotding to him *pramāṇas* also are limited to worldly life only.

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SOME REFLECTIONS ON UNIVERSE AND NULL CLASSES

This paper attempts to examine some logical properties of the Universe and null classes in relation to one another from the point of view of extension instead of intension.

The Logic of algebra is generally characterized as the logic of classes. Classes are interpreted in two different ways : (i) in terms of intension and (ii) in terms of extension The intension of a class is called its meaning and the extension is called its range of application or exemplification. Both extension and intension are, thus, regarded as two different aspects of the class. The laws of intension and extension do not apply to the same class in the same way since both intension and extension do not always go together. They vary with regard to certain classes. It is quite possible that two classes which have identical extension may not have identical intension. Take, for instance, the classes 'unicorn' and 'centaur'. These two classes have identical extension since they have no members or exemplifications and all classes that have no members or exemplifications are, by definition, identical. Such classes are called null classes. But in respect of intension null classes differ from each other. The concept of unicorn (or its meaning) is not identical with the concept of centaur (or its meaning). In other words, the meaning of one is different from the meaning of another.

When classes are interpreted in extension, it is said, they exhibit different relations to one another which their mere intensional interpretations do not exhibit. Relations which any two

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classes exhibit to one another are usually characterized as class inclusions or class membership [1]. When it is said that one class is included in another class, that simply means that the members of one class are also the members of another class.

The universe class is the class of all members and the null class is the class with no members. Both these classes, when interpreted in extensional sense, exhibit different relations to one another which their intensional interpretations do not reveal Relations which they exhibit to one another are the following :

i) The universe class, 1 and the null class, 0 are each other's complements.

This follows from the very definitions. The universe class is equal to the negation of the null class $(1=-0)$ and the null class is equal to the negation of the universe class $(0=-1)$. Since one class is the negation of another, any one of them can be taken as primitive and the other can be introduced by definition.

ii) The universe class and the null class divide the universe of discourse exhaustively.

Since the universe class and the null class are each other's complements and all complementary classes divide the universe of discourse between them exhaustively, this becomes a logical truth.

iii) The universe class and the null class are mutually exclusive.

The universe class and the null class are mutually exclusive since they have no members in common. What is included in one class is excluded from another class. This is consistent with their definitions.

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iv) The null class is included in every class.

From this it follows that the null class is included in the universe class. $(0<1)$.

v) The universe class includes every class

From this it follows that the universe class includes the null class in it. To say that the universe class includes the null class is to say the same thing that the null class is included in the universe class. This shows that both (iv) and (v) laws are mutually consistent. There is nothing in one which debars another from being true.

vi) The product of the universe class and the null class is null $(1\times0=0)$.

This follows since both classes are each other's complements.

vii) The sum of the universe class and the null class is the universe class $(1+0=1)$.

viii) The universe class and the null class are not mutually inclusive or identical $(1\neq0)$.

This follows from the (i) and (iii) laws.

ix) The null class is the class of all incompatible properties, that is, it is the product (or conjunction) of two complementary classes $(A\times-A=0)$.

x) The sum of two complementary classes is equal to the universe class $(A+-A=1)$.

From this it follows that the universe class includes complementary classes as its sub-classes. This also is obvious from the (vii) law.

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xi) The universe and null classes include themselves ($1 \subset 1$, $0 \subset 0$)[2].

The above mentioned laws exhibit different logical relations between the classes of universe and null in relation to one another. It is worth noting that all these laws are not fundamental laws. Some of them are fundamental laws and some of them are derived laws. Since for the present purpose this distinction is irrelevant, I shall not pursue it further.

Now let us examine the listed laws in relation to one another in order to get a better understanding about the classes of universe and null. Take the laws from (i) to (iii). These laws are perfectly consistent with one another. There is nothing in one which prevents the other from being valid. They jointly assert that the universe class and the null class are not only each other's complements but also divide the universe of discourse[3] exclusively and exhaustively. The advantage of these laws is that they allow us to turn positive statements into negative and negative statements into positive. They function, thus, like quantifier negation rules. This is possible because complementary classes not only divide the universe of discourse between them but also are exclusive and exhaustive. But when we take these laws, that is, (i), (ii) and (iii) in relation to the laws of (iv) and (v), we find that they generate logical problem. Because, if we hold the validity of the laws from (i) to (iii) that is, the universe and null classes are not only each other's complements but also divide K between them exclusively and exhaustively then thereby we are compelled to maintain the view that the null class is neither included in the universe class nor the universe class includes it. But to maintain this view leads us to reject the validity of the (iv) and (v) laws since what they jointly assert is negated by the laws from (i) to (iii), that is, the null class

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is neither included in the universe class nor the universe class includes it. And, suppose, if we hold the validity of the laws (iv) and (v) then again on the same ground we are led to reject the validity of the laws of (i), (ii) and (iii); that is, the universe and null classes are neither each other's complements nor do they divide K between them exclusively and exhaustively. Besides this, we also are led to reject their defining forms (i.e., $1 = -0$, $0 = -1$). From the above discussion, thus, it is clear that the laws from (i) to (v) are not mutually compatible laws since the acceptance of the laws from (i) to (iii) implies the rejection of the (iv) and (v) laws: and also conversely.

There is another difficulty. If the laws from (i) to (iii) are held to be valid then thereby it follows that the sum of two complementary classes in the universe class is a complementary class of the null class since the sum of two complementary classes in the universe class forms the universe class exclusively and exhaustively (i.e., $A + -A = 1$). This follows from the very definition of the term "complement". If it is so, none of the sub-classes of the universe class includes the null class. In other words, the null class is the class which is not included in any other class, since all non-empty classes are included in the universe class. But to accept this thesis means to reject the validity of the (iv) and (v) laws since they assert that the null is included in the universe class and the universe class includes it. The same thesis can also be established on this ground too : Every class has its complement. The greatest class is said to be the universe class. It's complementary class is the null class. Within the universe class two classes may be each other's complements (i.e., $A + -A = 1$). But the sum of the complementary classes in the universe class is not equal to that universe of discourse of which both universe and null classes are elements, since they differ in regard to their universe of discourse. The former's uni-

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verse of discourse is the universe class of which A and – A are two elements whereas the latter's universe of discourse is not itself a class; but instead is the entire domain, K of which 1 and 0 are two elements. Further, in the former case the universe class, 1 coincides with K whereas in the latter case the universe class is not K, but is one of the elements in K. Now, if A and – A together form the universe class exclusively and exhaustively, and the universe class is a complementary class of the null class, then by the definition of word "complement" it follows that the null class is neither included in A nor–A as it is asserted by the (iv) and (v) laws. And if we accept the validity of the (iv) and (v) laws then there by we are compelled to maintain the view that the laws (i) and (iii) are invalid since what is asserted by them is negated by the former laws; and also conversely. In other words, the acceptance of the validity of the former laws debar the latter laws from their being valid which proves that they are incompatible laws in relation to one another.

Let us consider the laws (iv) and (v) in relation to the laws (vi) and (ix). The (iv) and (v) laws jointly assert that the null class is included in the universe class and the universe class includes the null class. What they do not assert is this that the universe class is included in the null class or the null class includes the universe class. So far the laws (vi) and (ix) are concerned, they assert one and the same thing, that is, the null class is the class of incompatible properties. It is the class of things which, for instance, are both cats and not cats or everything and nothing. When these laws are taken separately they are perfectly alright. They do not generate difficulty. But the moment we relate them with each other they generate difficulty. For example, if we accept that the null class is the class of all incompatible properties along with the law that it is included in every class then it implies that all classes are the classes

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of incompatible properties If it is so, no propositions which express relations among classes will ever be true. Rather they will always be false since they assert incompatible properties and all propositions asserting incompatible properties are always false according to the law of contradiction.

But it must be noted that the above argument holds good only in those cases where the null class is the product (or conjunction) of complementary classes. It fails in those cases where the null class happens not to be the class of incompatible properties. A class owes incompatible properties only in relation to classes, for instance, as it is the case with the product null class, O of two complementary classes A and – A respectively. From the above discussion, thus, it is evident that when we say a class is a null class, this does not necessarily mean that it is a class of incompatible properties since it is quite possible for a class to be null class without standing for incompatible properties. Of course, it fails provided that we take 'incompatibility' as a defining characteristic of 'null' class. Since as a matter of fact 'incompatibility' is not taken as a defining characteristic (or property) of 'null' class, the property of incompatibility does not follow from a class being a null class. What follows from a class being treated as a null class is that it has no members; it is a class of 'nothing'. This happens because 'null' class is defined in terms of a 'class of no members'. But if we take incompatibility as a difining property of null class along with the law that it is included in every class then thereby we are led to commit that no propositions which express relations among classes can ever be true. And, if we maintain the thesis in the restricted sense, that is, only the product null class of two complementary classes has the properties of incompatibility then we are not compelled to maintain the view that " No propositions which experess relati-

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ons among classes can ever be true" since it holds good only in those cases where the null class is the product of two complementary classes. It must be guarded that such propositions are always false not on any other ground except that they assert the conjunction of incompatible properties which fails to hold good in those cases where the null classes do not possess the properties of incompatibility.

Again, there is another difficulty. A proposition whose subject term happens to be null class, cannot, in the strict sense, be characterized as either true or false since the subject term of the proposition being a null class contains no members; and as a result the predication fails, that is in other words, neither affirmation nor negation of any property is admissible. Consider, for example, the sentences "The unicorns are animals" and "The unicorns are not animals". In both sentences the subject term stands for null class, that is, the class of unicorns. Since the class of unicorns is such a class which has no members in it, therefore, we cannot predicate the property of 'being animals' or 'not being animals' to them from the logical point of view. No predication of any sort is admissible. We can neither say that the unicorns are animals nor can we say that the unicorns are not animals. Nothing can be asserted. In regard to the unicorns the question of their being animals or not being animals does not arise at all since there are no unicorns. Since the sentences in which the term 'unicorns' occupies the position of the subject do not assert anything, positively or negatively, they do not express genuine propositions at all and consequently cannot be characterized as either true or false. This difficulty does not arise in those cases where the subject term happens to be non-empty term. In fact, the question of truth and falsity can legitimately be raised in the cases of those sentences whose subject term stands for null class only

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when we grant the ontological existence of the non-existent entities like unicorns. But to maintain this view goes against the defining forms of the universe and null clesses, that is, $1 = -0$ and $0 = -1$. We can neither introduce one class by negating another class nor can we can turn positive statements into negative or negative statements into positive. Hence, instead of admitting the existence of non-existent entities, it is better to admit that propositions whose subject term stands for null class are not genuine proposition. They cannot be charaterized as either true or false. They transcend the categories of truth values.

Now let us consider the (vii) law in relation to the laws (i), (ii) and (iii). The (vii) law asserts that the sum of the universe class and the null class is equal to the universe class $(1+0=1)$. The operator sum, + used here can have two possible interpretations : inclusive and exclusive. If we interpret the operator '+' in the inclusive sense of the word 'or' then what the (vii) law asserts does hold good. But the acceptance of this kinds interpretation compels us to reject the validity of the (i), (ii) and (iii) laws since what is asserted by the (i), (ii) and (iii) laws is negated by the (vii) law, provided we interpret the inserted operator '+' between 1 and 0 in the inclusive sense. Not only this, inclusive interpretation also compels us to reject the defining forms of the universe and null classes, that is, $1 = -0$, $0 = -1$. We can neither define 1 by negating 0 nor 0 by negating 1. Its disadvantage would be that we cannot turn positive propositions into negative or negative propositions into positive which the (i), (ii) and (iii) laws permit. And, suppose, if we go by the second interpretation, that is, if we interpret the symbol '+' in the exclusive sense of the word 'or' then thereby we are compelled to reject the validity of the (vii) law that the sum of the universe class and the null class is the uni-

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verse class. The exclusive interpretation of the symbol '+' inserted between 1 and 0 implies that their product class is a wider class than the class of universe, 1 of which both 1 and 0 are two different elements (It is worth noting here that logicians do not denote the sum of 1 and 0 as a separate class in the exclusive interpretation. It is rather called the universe of discourse, K of which 1 is an element). This follows on the ground that complementary classes form another class different from them (i.e., $A + -A = 1$) which is violated in the case of the universe and null classes (i.e. $1 + 0 = 1$). The sum of A and -A cannot be equal to 1 unless the operator + inserted between them is interpreted in the exclusive sense of the word 'or'. Not only this, both A and -A cannot be each other's complements unless they stand in exclusive relationship with one another. From the above discussion, thus it is clear that the (i), (ii), (iii) and (vii) laws are not mutually compatible laws. We cannot maintain the thesis that the laws from (i) to (iii) are valid unless we reject the validity of the (vii) law in either of the interpretation of the symbol, '+'. It also holds good conversely.

A critical reflection on the (v) law reveals that the universe class is the greatest class among all the classes since it includes every class. If this is so, all classes other than the universe class are the sub-classes of the universe class. But to admit this view implies that the universe class is such a class which has no complementary class since no sub-classes of a class can legitimately be its complementary class and all classes other than the universe class are sub-classes of the universe class which rejects the validity of the laws from (i) to (iii). And, if we accept the validity of the laws from (i) to (iii), then thereby we are compelled not to accept the validity of the (v) and (vii) laws since they assert that the universe class includes the null class and

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what is included cannot be complementary to that class in which it is included. From the above discussion, thus, it follows that the (i), (ii), (iii), (v) and (vii) laws are not mutually compatible laws. Because the acceptance of the laws from (i) to (iii) implies the rejection of the laws of (v) and (vii). It also is true vice-versa.

In short we can, thus, conclude that the properties of the universe and null classes, as exhibited by the laws from (i) to (x), are not compatible properties in relation to one another.

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NOTES

1. Logicians generally denote 'class inclusion' by the symbol '$\prec$' or '$\subset$' and 'Class membership' by the symbol '$\in$'.
2. The symbol $\prec$ has not been used here in the sense of 'less than'. It is rather in the sense of identity or total reflexivity.
3. It must be noted that the universe of discourse is different from the universe class. The universe of discourse is not by itself a class like the universe class. It rather stands for the entire domain (or context) of discourse under which both universe and null classes are formed. The universe of discourse, thus, is one of which both universe and null classes are elements. Logicians usually denote it by the letter K. The ground of their error is that we ignore the distinction between classifying individuals and relating classes to one another. In the domain K of individuals, the greatest class, 1 which can form out of these individuals happens to coincide with K and as a result it generates confusion. But when we relate classes to one another, the greatest class, 1 is not K; but is an element in K like O.

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AGENT-CAUSATION AND EVENT-CAUSATION

Intentional actions necessarily involve a reference to agents who cause them. To be specific, intentional actions mostly have a component which may be termed 'basic action', and this 'basic action' is explicable only in terms of a conscious agent who causes such an action. There are, on the other hand, event-causalists who, enamoured by the concept of a monistic ontology and the concept of uniformity of explanation in all sciences including the social ones, argue that the notion of agent is incapable of explaining the bringing about of actions. Following the Humean tradition, these philosophers contend that whatever explanatory force the statement of a causal episode has, it has it because of the fact that such an episode ultimately refers to pairs of *events* causally connected. It does not make much sense to assign causal explanatory roles to objects or conscious subjects by depicting them as the antecedents of causal sequences (consider, for example, the lack of explanatory force of the statement, "Whenever Smith, then ... ...".) We often, it must be admitted, assign causal roles to objects in our common parlance. But such talks are really about, according to event-causalists, *events* involving such objects that cause some consequent events.

Some proponents of event-causalism even go to the extent of claiming that the concert of agents causing basic actions either involves an absurdity, or is simply superfluous, as far as explanation of actions are concerned. In our opinion, however, the explanation of human actions irreducibly involves the concept of

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an agent causing actions. Although the concept of agent-causation is not exclusive of event-causation, event-causation does not, in our view, suffice, by itself, as a causal explanation. The task before us, therefore, is two-fold, Firstly, we shall have to answer the charges levelled against the theory of agent-causation by the proponents of event-causation. Next, we shall have to establish our claim that only the concept of an agent-cause can ultimately provide a proper explanation of intentional actions. But, before we proceed to our eventual tasks we must, as a necessary preamble, attempt an explanation of two important concepts viz. intentional actions and ' basic ' actions.

I

Intentional Actions and ' Basic ' Actions

1. Inientional Actions :

Intentional action is an action that an agent wants to perform or aims at performing. When an agent wants to perform or aims at performing an action, the action may be a ' primitive ' or ' basic ' one, and the agent does it directly. But this is very rarely the case. Most of the actions we aim at *are not* ' basic '. They are rather actions we aim at performing by doing some other action or actions that we believe will generate them. The belief that an action has the capacity to generate another action (or action-type) is thus a basic constituent of a ' non-basic ' intentional action. For example, my raising of my hand in the course of a lecture I am attending is intentional if I believe that my doing so will attract the attention of the lecturer, and I am aiming at attracting the latter's attention. In the case of a ' basic ' action my action is intentional if I believe that my performing it is an act-token which will exemplify the act-type of which it is a token. For example, my act of feeding myself with a spoon is an intentional act because I believe that it, a

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basic act-token, will exemplify the act-type of eating (which may be exemplified either by manipulating the food with fingers or with a spoon).

2. *'Basic' Actions*

The necessary condition of an action's being 'basic' is that besides being an action aimed at or desired, it is a sort of action that is exemplified at will. In other words, an action is 'basic' provided that it is true that if the subject wanted to exemplify it at a particular time, he would do so at that particular time. For example, an act of pedalling, performed with circular movement of the legs, is a 'basic' action because the agent can, whenever he wants to exemplify it, exemplify it. Of course, this naturally implies that there is no external constraint present which will prevent the agent from exemplifying a 'basic' action at his repartoire. For instance if his legs were tied or there was no room for the circular movement of the legs, then the agent could not exemplify it even if he wanted to do so.

Another intrinsic feature of 'basic' actions is that they are such that the agent who performs them does not have to know of any other actions which have to be performed in order to bring them about. Performance of a 'non–basic' action like riding a bicycle requires knowledge of other actions like pedalling, keeping balance etc which have to be performed in order to ride the bicycle. If one wants to perform a 'basic' action, no selection of a *means* is necessary. One simply does this directly without having to do this *by* doing something else.

II

Event–Causation Versus Agent–Causation

Nearly all intentional actions have, as we have seen, a component known as 'basic' action. Event–causalists and agent–causalists argue about the way such a 'basic' action is brought

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about. A ' basic ' action, as the agent-causalist understands it, is a direct and intentional bringing about, by an agent, of certain bodily movements. Event-causalists, on the other hand, contend that such a bringing about of intentional actions can be explained solely in terms of certain events like intending, wanting, believing, without reference to some ontological entity called ' agent ' who intends, wants and believes.

The question now arises, how do the event-causalists establish their hypothesis ? Do they do so by a direct appeal to intuition and reasoning about the way intentional actions are brought about ? It is hardly likely that they do so. In fact, event-causalists admit that *the precise way in which intentions bring about 'basic' actions* is not known to them. Event-causalists like Davidson readily acknowledge that although causal sequences as a rule involve covering law explanations, yet such explanations are not forthcoming in cases of actions caused by antecedent intentions, wants etc. In his early essay, entitled 'Actions, Reasons and Causes,' Davidson concedes that it is hard to convert intentional explanations into covering law explanations containing precise laws. Yet, he argues that this is not a serious handicap for the event-causalist. In his opinion, one has enough justification to believe that a singular causal relation obtains between intention and behaviour provided one believes that *there is a law* which covers this relation, even though *one does not know what that law is.* However, by the time he came to write 'psychology and philosophy', Davidson seems to have given up the attempt to convert intentional explanatioas into coverning law explanations.[1] That he does so is obvious from the observation, *" the desire and belief work to cause action must meet further, and unspecified conditions"*. The advantage of this mode of explanations is clear. "we can explain behaviour *without having to know too much about how it was caused* ..... we cannot turn this mode

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of explanation into something more like science."[2] Not only does Davidson concede that it is hard to subsume singular causal relations under covering laws, he also acknowledges that we cannot show precisely how desire and belief cause intentional behaviour.

Davidson's inability to provide a *precise analysis* of how intentions cause intentional actions is also mainfest in his treatment of cases which are in the technical parlance of recent philosophy of action, known as 'wayward causal chains'. These are the cases where the beliefs and intentions of a person result in the person 's committing some actions, yet no one in his senses can call them intentional actions. Roderick Chisholm, for example, cites the instance of a man who believes that if he kills his uncle he will inherit a fortune. This desire and belief may agitate him and cause him to drive in such a way that he accidentally kills a man who happens to be his uncle.[3] Yet, in spite of his belief and desire causally determining his action, it will be wrong to say that *the man intentionally kills* his uncle. The strange thing is that although this is not a case of intentional action, it has enough similarity with a case where the belief and intention cause a man to commit an action and where we readily accede that the man acted intentionally. What then is the difference between the two cases ? The agent–causalist would reply by saying that in the case of intentional action the *agent himself* carries out his intentions. The event–causalist will not, however, appeal to the concept of agency. He will, in that case, have to contend that the required difference lies in *the specific way* the relevant intentions cause the relevent actions. Yet, the event–causalist seems unable, when pressed, to spell our *precisely how the intention causes such an act* to be produced which will make us readily grant that the action concerned is a genuine intentional action. All he can do is to insist that in formulating the

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definition of intentional action he can introduce some clauses which will ensure that there is no wayward causal chain between intention and action.

It is evident that the event-causalist cannot prove his hypothesis by a direct analysis of intentional actions. He therefore tries to prove event-causation by exposing the unintelligibility and absurdity of the concept of agency.

Event-Causalist Criticism of Agent-Causal Hypothesis

In his article, " Agency ", Davidson points out the inanity of the agent-causal theory in the following way.

He asks what, according to the theory of agent-causation, is the exact nature of the relation between the agent and his action? Granting that the agent causes the basic action, the question is : how does the agent cause ? Davidson maintains that there is a dilemma involved in the answer. There are two possibilities here. The first possibility is that the agent's causing his action is an event discrete from the ' primitive ' or 'basic' action.

In that case the agent's causing of his action is either itself an action, or it is not. If the former, then the 'primitive' action the agent is supposed to cause will, in that case, fail to be a 'primitive' action. If, however, the agent's causing is *not* an action, then the expression ' the agent *causes* his basic action ' is unintelligible. (How does the agent cause anything if he remains inactive ?) A proponent of agent-causation will, in that case, be charged with trying to explain agency by appeal to a more obscure notion, " that of a causing that is not doing, "[4] Let us turn to the other alternative, namely the agent's causing is identical with the action itself. In that case, the expression, ' the agent *causes* his action' is identical with, 'the agent acts', This being the case, the latter expression is hardly an analysis of the former. It happens merely to be a circumlocution for the former

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We have not offiered an explanation of the expression, ' an agent causes. ' We have only stated the same expression, ' the agent causes ' with the help of some other words.

Ways of Handling the Objection Against Agent-Causal Hypothesis.

A ' basic ' intentional action is, as the agent-causalists rightly point out, really a *relation* whose subject is the agent and whose object is certain relevant bodily movements.[5] As is evident in the case of a particular 'basic' intentional action, an agent directly *causes* something. Now, undoubtedly, every case of something *causing* something else is a case of relation. Relations obviously need at least two terms between which they hold. Hence an agent causalist may legitimately claim that a basic intentional action consists of a relation connecting an agent to some bodily movements he intentionally and directly brings about.

We have seen that the subject of the relation mentioned above is the agent. What then is its object ? It can hardly be the ' basic ' intentional action. What *constitutes* a 'basic' intentional action *is,* as proper analysis reveals, the *obtaining of the agent–causal relation.* Hence the intentional action itself cannot be the object of this relation. If it is, then relation would be reduced to one of its terms. The object of the relation then, turns out to be typical movements of the body which are intrinsic to the intentional action. It is to be noted here that bodily movements are not, contrary to what we unreflectively believe 'basic' intentional acts themselves. Bodily movements are undoubtedly *essential components* of intentional actions, yet they are not intentional actions themselves. Just as the movements of the relevant muscles of the mouth are intrinsic to eating, but not themselves equivalent to eating, in the same way typical movements of the body are intrinsic to intentional action, but do not hemselves count as intentional actions. The agent thus directly

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and intentionlly brings about the typical movements of the body which turn out to be objects of the agent-causal relation.

Davidson's demonstration of the dilemma involved in our understanding of the notion of agent-causation depends, the agent-causalist suggests, really upon a wrong identification of bodily movements with 'basic' actions. Keeping in mind this mistaken identification, *and* proceeding with a clear conception of what constitutes a 'basic' intentional action, we may recast Davidson's question as : how does the idea of agent-causation account for the relation between an agent and his *bodily movement ?*' Recast in this form, the first horn of the dilemma loses its strength. For, we can give a negative reply to the question, 'is the agent's causing his movements distinct from his intentional action ?' We can insist that the agent's causing his typical movements is *not distinct* from his intentional action. The agent's causing his typical bodily movements *constitutes* the agent's acting intentionally. Yet, the second horn of the dilemma seems still to continue to haunt us, althugh in a slightly new form. If we suggest that the 'agent's causing his relevant bodily movements' *is* 'his acting intentionally', then the latter expression can hardly be said to be an analysis of the former. We have no way of understanding what it is for 'the agent to cause anything' apart from understanding what it is for the 'agent to act intentionally.' Identical facts are stated with the help of two different expressions, (i) 'the agent causes x' and (ii) 'the agent acts intentionally.' We are consequently guilty of the charge of circumlocution.

Yet, the second horn here draws whatever strength it has, from the misconception that the agent-causalist is in favour of offering a definition of basic intentional action in terms of the notion of the 'agent causing something'. No attempt is, however, being made here to *define* intentional action in terms of agent-

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causal relation. What the agent–causalist is suggesting here is only pointing out that the irreducible logical structure of 'basic' intentional actions consists in agent–causal relation. An analogous case can be cited here. Take the concepts of family and family resemblance. We can justifiably argue that the irreducible logical structure of a family consists of a kind of resemblance between the members. Yet this argument does not, by any means, amount to *defining* a family in terms of family resemblance between the members of the family.

We are now, at this stage, required to answer a question of considerable importance, if we are to provide a convincing account of agent–causality. Granted that the logical structure of intentional actions implies an agent–causal relation, the question is, what exactly is meant by agent–causation? Let us now concentrate on the answer to this question.

Explication of the Concept of Agent–Causation

We will not, however, attempt a definition of agent–causality. We will rather try to delineate some essential fertures of agent–causation.[6]

The concept of agent, as the proponents of the agency theory are wont to point out, inevitably carries in its fold the notion of power. The notion of efficacious power has indeed, through out the ages, been associated with the notion of agency. The agent is the locus of several powers. Amongst these powers the power of carrying out 'proximate intentions' and the power of making practical inferences form the essential core of the notion of agency. The power of executing 'proximate intentions' implies the ability to perform 'basic' intentional actions (within an agent's repartoire) without a considerable time lapse between having the intentions and translating them into 'basic' actions. The power to make practical inferences includes practi-

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cal inference of intentions from other intentions and beliefs. The agent-causalists point out in this connection that the notion of an agent's exercising his powers is a primitive notion. How exactly the agent exercises his powers cannot be analysed further, just as much as the notions of different basic tastes cannot be analysed further in terms of some other notions. Sweetness, for example, cannot be analysed in terms of some other tastes or colours or any other thing.

A proper understanding of the agent's having efficacious power is however incomplete without understanding some of the conditions under which one is entitled to hold that the agent has performed an intentional action (as opposed to an action which has the semblance of being intentional, but is not really intentional in character).

Evidently, for an agent to do a particular action intentionally he must have the intention to do it and he must act in a way which qualifies as an action of the intentional sort. But this is not enough. The agent must, *himself, carry out his* intention to do that particular action.

Under what conditions then can it be admitted that the *agent himself* carried out his intention to do that particular action? In the first place, the particular act–type must belong to the agent's repartoire of basic actions at a time when he is supposed to be committing that action. Secondly, the agent's opportunity to carry out his proximate intention should not be pre-empted by some conditions which are both (i) causally sufficient for the agent's exhibiting the particular type of intended action and (ii) are independent of his proximate intention. The fulfilment of these conditions will ensure that the agent himself has acted intentionally. A proper understanding of these conditions will help us see why a wayward causal chain case cannot be treated

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as a case of intentional action inspite of its resembling the latter to some extent.

Let us consider a case of wayward causal chain cited by Davidson. Davidson cites the example of a climber holding a fellow climber on a rope. At a certain stage of his climbing he might " want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a rope and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold and yet it might be the case that he never *chose* to loosen his hold nor did he do it intentionally."[7]

Such a case as this is not a case of intentional action owing to the fact that the *agent himself* has not carried out his proximate intention. It is true that the intention of the climber did cause him to act in that particular way that he did. Yet the climber is not the agent here, because his opportunity to carry out his proximate intention is pre–empted. The opportunity was pre–empted by a set of causally sufficient antecedent conditions. Among these conditions are included the agent's state of nervousness. The climber is not, in that case, the originator of his bodily movements. What happend on the contrary is that the climber lost control over his bodily movements, viz. that of holding his grip on the rope. And what caused the climber to loosen his grip is his state of nervousness caused by his particular belief and intention These considerations help us see why the climber is not supposed to have acted intentionally, in spite of the fact that his belief and intention are supposed to have caused his so–called action of letting the rope go. The talk of having or losing control is meaningful only against a background of an agent who is capable of controlling his movements. In the circumstance

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under dispute the climber is supposed to be capable of controlling his grip. But he is not the agent here because he failed to exercise that control.

It is obvious from the above discussion that supporters of agent–causation would like the distinction between a genuine intentional action and its fake semblance to be based on the notion of an agent. But the supporters of event–causation would like the distinction to be made on some other grounds. According to these supporters, like Davidson, the causal route from intention to behaviour is highly complex. An exact analysis of how intentions cause matching behaviour in the case of genuine intentional actions cannot, according to them, be made available.[8] Nevertheless, they point out, that there are some intermediate stages of this causal chain which sometimes produce cases of wayward causal chain. In their opinion, a proper analysis of intentional action could be made complete just by introducing a clause in their analysis which excludes these intermediate stages and safeguards a case of genuine intentional from going deviant. It is not incumbent on him to show exactly what characteristics of these intermediate stages make a case of wayward causal chain. He considers his task of analysing intentional actions to be adequately fulfilled if he can, by introducing some additional clause in his analysis, make provision for a way of excluding the intermediate stages that are responsible for wayward causal chain. But, in our view, such a consideration on his part is not justified.

In our opinion the notion of a deviant case is really parasitic on that of what happens in the normal case. The concept of making an incorrect calculation is parasitic on that of making a correct calculation. The explanation of a deviant case of intentional action must therefore make reference to the concept of the cases of genuine intentional actions. And since these latter

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cases inevitably refer, as we have seen, to the notion of the *agent* himself executing his intention, the deviant cases are also obliged to refer to agents in control of their actions. It thus seems quite likely that the event–causalist's notion of the characteristics of the intermediate stages of the causal chain which introduce deviant cases is itself drawn from our grasp of the notion of the agent exercising his efficacious powers in intentional actions. Thus the event–causalist's attempt to analyse a genuine intentional action, simply by inserting a clause excluding the intermediate stages of a causal chain which makes a chain deviant, is really quite a weak attempt. In as much as the notion of a wayward causal chain inevitably has an agent–causal presupposition, it can hardly be introduced in the explanation of a genuine intentional action produced by event–causes like intentions.

We have maintained a little while ago that an agent is the locus of powers including that of carrying out his proximate intention, and of making practical inferences. But a question arises at this stage. We grant that intentions and beliefs play causal roles in the production of intentional actions. But the question is, is the concept of an agent being the cause of intentional actions not incompatible with the notion of beliefs and intentions also being causally involved in the production of intentional behaviour ?

Agent causalists argue that both the (i) agent himself and (ii) his beliefs and intentions are causally responsible for the agent's performance of intentional actions. Yet the causal roles of these two are not incompatible. We can present the agent causalist's view on this matter, by referring directly to the argument of John Bishop, as presented in his article, 'Agent–

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causation' published in volume XCII of *Mind*, 1983, in the following way :

In Bishop's view the agent himself is directly making an inference in the case of practical inferences essential for an intentional action. It is also the agent himself who carries out his proximate intentions in the case of intentional behaviour. (How the agent actually makes these inferences and carries out proximate intentions cannot be answered with the help of some other notions. These are primitive notions.) Now practical inferences involve inferring of new intentions from other intentions and beliefs. Carrying out of proximate intentions are also impossible without intentions to be carried out. As being essential parts of practical inferrings and carrying out of proximate intentions, beliefs and intentions must thus also be causally involved in the bringing about of intentional actions. Yet, the causal roles of intentions and beliefe are different in nature from the causal roles of agents. While the existence of agents exercising causal powers are sufficient for bringing about of intentional actions, intentions and beliefs are necessary factors for the sufficient's being causally efficacious. In Birhop's view the causal roles of intentions and beliefs in the production of actions are comparable to the roles which beliefs that the premises of an argument are true, have in the production of the believer's belief in the entailed conclusion. Suppose I infer that Socrates is mortal from beliefs that, (i) All men are mortal and (ii) Socrates is a man. It cannot be held here that these two beliefs of mine are jointly causally sufficient for my believing that Socrates is mortal. I came to believe in the new conclusion only on the basis of certain things *I myself do* besides believing the two premises. It is possible that though I do believe that (i) all men are mortal and that (ii) Socrates is a man, I never come to connect the two beliefs of mine and hence fail to see their mutual rele-

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vance. When I conclude that Socrates is mortal, I consider the contents of two beliefs of mine in the two premises, recognise their mutual relevance, and reason it out that Socrates is mortal. We do not deny here that the beliefs in the premises play some causal role in my arriving at the conclusion. It is undoubtely the agent who makes the inference, and so he is the cause of his belief in the entailed conclusion. But he plays this causal role only because of holding the premise beliefs to be true.

Let us now look at the causal roles of intentions and beliefes in practical inferences and in carrying out of proximate intentions. In the case of a practical inference the agent infers a new intention to do something on the basis of his belief that doing it then is instrumental to producing some other event which he intends to make happen. Intention and belief have causal roles here. They are intrinsic to and hence necessary conditions for the agent's bringing about of new proximate intention. If the agent did not have these intentional states and beliefs, he could not have performed that act of practical inference. The causal role of the agent's proximate intention in producing intentional behaviour is to be understood in a similar manner. If the agent did not have the proximate intention he could not have performed matching behaviour in acting intentionally. Thus, we see that the intentional 'doings' of the agency have as a necessary condition of their occurence that the agent should take into account the contents of some beliefs and intentions. "Accordingly, beliefs and intentions do not themselves causally suffice for intentional action, but they are necessary to what does causally suffice for it. Agent causalism then, does allow a causal role to the agent's intentional states". [9]

Remarks About Some Basic Misconceptions of Event-Causalists :

Before we draw the present discussion to a close we would like to point out some basic misconceptions of event–causalists.

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Davidson :

A proponent of event-causalism like Davidson suffers from the wrong notion that a proper explanation of intentional action is possible on the assumption that (i) mere bodily movements are intentional actions and that (ii) basic actions are the only actions performed by the agent. The rest is up to nature to complete. The queen in Hamlet is required only to move her hand in a certain way causing the poison to be poured in the king's ear. That is the only intentional act she ever performed. The eventual dying of the king has strictly speaking hardly anything to do with an action of the queen. The king's death is, in his opinion, just a natural effect of the event of the hand's moving in a particular way. The so-called 'killing' is not in other words an action to be performed in addition to and subsequent to the queen's moving her hand in a particular way.

Davidson has a specific advantage in making these assumptions. These two assumptions are intended to make the hypothesis of an agent a superfluous one. In the case of bodily movements, for instance, we have just a brief way of mentioning a person and an event, and yet leaving open the question whether he was the *agent*. This is amply illustrated in the descriptions of bodily movements like : Smith fell down, Smith blinked, Smith shuddered. So, if a basic intentional action is restricted to the mere bodily movements there is no further need for the introduction of the agent. On the other hand, the supporters of agent-causalism make the introduction of the agent necessary by extending the action of the agent beyond 'basic' actions They have to "go beyond mere movements of the body and dwell on the consequences of what the agent has wrought in the world beyond his skin."[10] They point out that the agent is responsible, not only for the bodily movement, but also for the 'non-basic' actions which bring about some changes in the

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world around Yet, if the event-causalist succeeds in proving that *action is limited to bodily* movements then he no longer needs an agent who will own responsibility for the changes his bodily movements bring about in the world beyond his skin. There changes are then mere mechanical physical effects of certain changes in the body.

In our opinion, however, both these assumptions mentioned above are results of short–sightedness on the part of Davidson. We have already argued at length against the first assumption that bodily movements themselves are equivalent to intentional actions. Bodily movements are really objects of the relation constituting intentional actions. If mere bodily movements caused by intentions are considered as intentional actions, then even in cases of wayward causation we have discussed above the nervous bodily movements of the nephew on the steering, gear etc. can be said to be an intentioaal action of killing his uncle. As a matter of fact, this is not an intentional action precisely because the driver here has no control over his movements. A genuine 'basic' intentional action is one where the agent himself, on the basis of intention and belief, brings about some bodily movements. The agent here is in full control of the situation. Bodily movements, by themselves, are not capable of giving sufficient explanation of intentional actions.

If bodily movements were the only actions then, a man can, for example, exonerate himself from the charge of killing where the victim of his shooting dies a little later as a result of loss of oxygen supply to his brain. The killer may plead that he only made certain characteristic movements of his fingers. The victim *would not have died* if loss of oxygen was not brought about eventually by a sequence of natural events each caused by the previous ones. Unless we grant that the killer intended to produce the non–basic action of causing the victims ' death by

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'basic' action involving a relation between the agent and his bodily movements (e.g. pulling the trigger), we cannot say that he is responsible for the murder.

Davidson is thus not justified in claiming that bodily movements are the only actions performed, and that the rest can be explained as natural consequences of an event. In our opinion there are 'non-basic' actions in addition to the 'basic' actions performed by the agent. 'Non-basic' actions are 'non-basic' in the sense that their performance depends on knowledge of how to do some 'basic' acts. Consider the case of the reading of words and reading of alphabets. Although the reading of words is not an action to be performed *subsequently to* the successful act of reading of alphabets, it is however, an action *in addition to* that of reading of alphabets. When an educated person reads words the action which he intends to, and actually performs, is not complete by reading of alphabets– it stretches to a further action of which the latter is just a necessary means.

In the same way, performance of a 'non-basic' action like riding a bicycle is dependent on knowledge of how to perform 'basic' acts like pedalling which involve moving legs in a circular manner, keeping balance (which involve certain other bodily movements) etc. It is not the case, contrary to what Davidson would like us to admit, that *after* performing 'basic' actions like pedalling and keeping balance the cyclist performs some other actions which count as riding the bicycle. But, as a matter of fact, the 'basic' actions are intertwined into the 'non-basic' action of cycling. In this way when the agent sets about cycling he starts the action of cycling *at the same moment* that he starts pedalling and balancing (which involve certain bodily movements).

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An action is individuated by reference to the intended result. A 'non–basic' action like riding a bicycle must thus necessarily refer to the final intended result It is consequently absurd to suggest that moving legs and hands in a particular way constitute a complete action in the case of riding the bike. The action, in the case of a 'non–basic' action, must refer to the final intended result.

The whole point in calling an action 'basic' lies in the fact that although in itself it is an action with its own *immediate* result, it is nevertheless considered as an 'incomplete' or 'unsaturated' action. It is 'incomplete' in as much as it serves as a means to the performance of a higher 'non–basic' action. In some contexts, however, its immediate result may be considered an end in itself. But in that case we do not refer to it as a 'basic' action– we simply refer to it as an 'action'. Being considered as an 'incomplete' action or the 'partial fulfilment' of a whole 'non–basic' action, the 'basic' action is not supposed to have a beginning separate from that of the 'non–basic'. It really starts at the same time as the 'non–basic' action. It is thus wrong to suppose, as Davidson would like us to, that 'non–basic' action is an action *performed after* the successful performance of the 'basic action'.

But a question remains to be answered here. If the 'basic' and 'non–basic' actions have an identical beginning, in what sense can we call them two separate actions ? In answer we can make the following remark :

A partial fulfilment of an action is also an action, although of a differed sort, from the completed action. As a partical fulfilment of a 'non–basic' action, a 'basic' action is thus as much an action as the 'non–basic' action. It is not of course the same action as the 'non basic' action of which it is considered

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an instrument. It is nevertheless an action with its immediate result. Comparable is the case where the failure to perform an action counts nevertheless as an action. A miscalculation is also a calculation, although not the original correct calculation which it was intended to be. Considered in this way as an 'incomplete action' or a 'partial fulfilment' of a contemplated 'non–basic' complete action, a 'basic' action begins at the same time as the 'non–basic' action. Nonetheless it is an action separate from the 'basic' action. A number of stitchings made on a dress at several times is a combination of several actions. Together they contribute to the final sewing of the dress. The different stitchings do not have any beginning separate from that of sewing of the dress. Yet, they are acts separate from the act of sewing the dress.

Goldmann

Alvin Goldmann objeets to agent–causal theory in the following way in his book, *A theory of Human Action.*

In his opinion, the theory of agent–causation, as introduced by Taylor, Chisholm and Campbell,[11] requires that "agents cause acts without any state or event of the agent being an event-cause of these acts." [12] But if the agent acts in such a way, then, in Goldmann's opinion, it will be hard to distinguigh a case of intentional action from a mere unintentional happening. For example, it will be hard to distinguigh a case of grimacing done intentionally from grimacing which occurs as a mere reflex, unless, in Goldmann's opinion, we admit that the agent's wanting to grimace precedes the intentional action, but does not precede the mere reflex. In the circumstances, Goldmann argues, "the notion of event–causation *unconnected* with ogent–causation is bound to be a mysterious and obscure notion" [13]

In my view, however, Goldmann's objection rests upon a misunderstanding of the position of the agent–causalists. Chis-

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holm, for example, does not really seem to entertain the idea of an agent causing an intentional action without an episode in the life of an agent being an event-cause. Chisholm, for example, talks of 'undertaking to do X' in the context of intentional actions. Now this 'undertaking' is clearly different from 'doing X', and it definitely has intentional overtones. Inasmuch as forming an intention is clearly an *event,* Chisholm does not really seem to be in a mood to indroduce the notion of agent-causation *unconnected* with event-causation.

In addition, Chisholm, in introducing the notion of an agent causing a 'basic' action, speaks of the agent's 'making happen' certain changes in his brain and muscles. These events happening in his brain are supposed to cause the agent's 'basic' actions like raising his hand. Thus prior to the agent's raising his hand intentionally he 'makes happen' these neurophysiological events. Although these neurophysiological events are not to be counted as intentional actions committed by the agents, they are nevertheless necessarily involved in the agent's committing of intentional actions. On the basis of the reasons noted so far we can justifiably argue that Chisholm does not seem to advocate an agent-causal theory *unconnected* with event Causalism.

Let us also consider the view of John Bishop in this context. In Bishop's opinion, as we have already seen, the making of a practical inference plays a vital role in the agent's committing an intentional action. The practical inference requires that the agent forms a new proximate intention from other intentions and beliefs. The agent is also necessitated, as we have already seen, to carry out his proximate intentions himself. It is thus evident that forming and executing intentions and framing of beliefs, which are necessarily events, constitute the necessary conditions of the agent's causing his basic actions. Goldmann's

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remark that agent-causalists are committed to a theory of agent-causality unconnected with event-causation does not thus appear to be founded on sufficient evidence. We are not, however, it must be remembered, maintaining that the agent-cause and his intentions and beliefs play some causal roles in producing intentional actions. While the agent-cause acts as a sufficient condition here, the other factors play only the role of necessary conditions in this context.

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NOTES

1. See *Essay on Actions and Events*, D. Davidson, Oxford, 1980, pp. 229-244.
2. *Ibid*, p. 233. Italics ours.
3. See 'Freedom and Action' by R. Chisholm, in *Freedom and Action*, ed. K. Lehrer. Humanities Press, New Jersey, U. S. A., 1976, p. 30.
4. 'Agency' by D. Davidson, in *Essays on Actions and Events*, p. 52.
5. 'Agent-causation' by John Bishop, *Mind*, 1983, vol XCII, pp. 71-72.
6. We would like to record here our heavy indebtedness to John Bishop's article, 'Agent-causation' *Mind*, volume XCII, 1983, pp. 61-79.
7. Davidson, 'Freedom to Act', reprinted in *Essays on Actions and Events*, p. 79.
8. *Ibid*, See pp. 6-7.
9. J. Bishop, 'Agent-causation' *Mind*, vol. XCII, 1983. p. 78.
10. Davidson, *op cit*, p. 55.
11. a. *Action and Purpose*, Richard Taylor, pp. 111f.
    b. 'Freedom and Action' by Chisholm, in *Freedom and Determinism* ed. by Keith Lehrer
    c. 'Is Free Will a Pseudo Problem?' Campbell, *Mind*, Vol. LX (1951), pp. 446-65.
12. *Alvin* Goldmann, *A Theory of Human Action*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p. 84.
13. See, R. Chisholm's "Freedom and Action" in K. Lehrer edited *Freedom and Determinism*, pp. 37-38.

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POPPER'S 'CLOSED SOCIETY' RECONSIDERED

1. Introduction

1.1 Karl Popper's work *The open Society and its Enemies* is widely read but it seems to have not generated much philosophical research. Whatever attention it has drawn mainly consists of (i) fragmentary accounts or criticisms in philosophical journals and books and (ii) the defence by some philosophers of thinkers like Plato, Hegel and Marx who were attacked by Popper. John Wild (1953) and Richard Robinson (1951) defend Plato, Walter Kaufmann (1951) defends Hegel and Maurice Cornforth (1976) defends Marx. These defences, however, fail to see other issues involved within his political philosophy.

This paper attempts to discuss some of these issues. In doing so, we do not propose to criticise the overall thrust of Popper, nor do we seek to belittle his remarkable exposure of the great systems which are capable of committing 'great' mistakes. Neverthless, we maintain that while many of his claims are in general tenable they require reassessment particularly keeping in view some recent studies.

1.2 Popper in *The Open Society and its Enemies,* while discussing totalitarianism, makes a distinction between 'open' and 'closed' societies. His study of the nature of closed societies has brought into focus the socio–politico–philosophical issues underlying the totalitarian theories that cut across the vast temporal gaps. His analysis of Greek as well as modern forms

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of closed societies draws our attention to a continuous tendency whereby a particular theory of social organization inevitably leads to the pernicious political order which suppresses individual liberty and the creative role of various social institutions in the name of efficiency and justice.

The general philosophical stand of Popper can be summarized as follows : He is against all eternal truths – whether they are the Platonic theory of Ideas, the Hegelian Absolute Idea or the Marxian classless society. His principal reason for this is that these absolute truths are claimed to be self-evidently true, i.e., they are not subject to falsification. They exclude any discussion regarding their validity and do not allow any deviation from the laws which are already postulated. They try to origanise all experience with reference to these laws. They do not learn from mistakes. As opposed to this essentialism and historicism, Popper seems to be arguing for the possibility of pluralities in future.

Regarding the phenomena of social change, Popper appears to hold that the closed societies are characterised by the presence of some definite ends. To realise these ends, society has to be totally reconstructed and controlled. Any deviation from this is to be curbed. This total reconstruction of society has been termed by Popper as 'utopian social engineering'. Utopian social engineering attempts at total change. This is different from the one he suggests as a method of change, characterised as 'piece-meal social engineering'. Piece-meal social engineering attends to specific social problems, and attempts only at reforms. It is from the point of view of his method of falsification that he examines various social systems and lists the totalitarian elements in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx.

1.3 In what follows we propose to discuss two Popperian generalisations as they appear in his *The Open Society and its*

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Enemies. The first one is Popper's inference that Plato and Aristotle are closed minds We find, however, that such a generalisation is not based on a proper discussion of Aristotle. In fact, it entirely rests on the discussion of Aristotle in the context of Plato with an emphasis on common features between the two, such as essentialism or inequality. Our attempt here is to show the significant aspects on which they have differences. Concepts like 'unity of State' and 'plurarity of Society', provide ample ground for such an attempt, and enable us to counter Popper's generalisations and prove it otherwise.

The second generalisation of Popper in this context is his thesis that Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx are totalitarians. On the contrary, we find that totalitarianism has its roots in the seventeenth century assumptions of contract philosophers. By showing the structural differences between totalitarian and non-totalitarian closed societies (with the help of J. L. Talmon and H. Arendt), we are able to point out that totalitarian governments function by the rule of few, but with the support of the masses whereas dictatorship is characterised by the rule of the few with the intentional ignorance or suppression of the masses. In this context, we can state that Plato can be called a non-totalitarian closed mind; and hence may counter Popper's judgement of Plato as a totalitarian.

2. *Plato and Aristotle*

2.1 Popper elaborately discusses plato. Aristotle is referred to only in the context of Plato. Popper offers two different reasons for not discussing Aristotle. The first is a practical but non-intellectual one namely, space limit of the book. Secondly, since Aristotelian theory is basically platonic, it does not need to be elaborately discusssd. He offers the second reason in the context of consoling his readers who may think that not discus-

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sing Aristotle may cause a serious loss. Here our contention is not against these reasons as much as about the inconsistencies between the reasons and what follows froms them. To state it clearly, we think that Popper's criticism of Aristotle without properly discussing his philosophy but only referring to it in the context of Plato is not being fair to Aristotle. If there is not space then one would expect him to be content with Plato only. But he draws generalizations on both Plato and Aristotle without properly discussing the latter.

By way of a supplement, we make the following note. Here it is not the case that Popper is mainly concerned with Plato and Aristotle is referred to only in passing. He draws conclusions eqally for both. He carries the conclusion that Aristotle is a closed mind and totalitarian to the later arguments, particularly when he discusses Hegel in the second volume of the book. As a matter of fact, it is in the beginning of this volume where he sets out to discuss Hegel and Marx that he feels the need to give some reasons regarding Aristotle. According to him Aristotle's version of 'Plato's essentialism ... influenced the historicism of Hegel, and thereby that of Marx' (1966, Vol. II p. 1). We are making this point only to show how definite and conclusive Popper is about Aristotle. And we want to point out that this conclusiveness is not preceded by a proper discussion.

Soon after giving the limitation of space as a reason for not discussing Aristotle we suddenly see him consoling his readers by saying that this ' does not, however, create as serious a loss as one might fear at first sight '. (1966, Vol. II p. 1) because Aristotelian theory is basically dominated by Plato's ideas. This second reason may be said to make sense because he offers lack of basic differences between Aristotle and Plato as the reason for not discussing the former. But here it is to be seen that this

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is not a conclusion drawn but an off hand justification given in support of the practical limitations.

Of course, he acknowledges some differences between them, namely, Aristotle's interest in systematizing knowledge, in empirical and biological problems (1966, Vol. II p. 1) and his endorsement of theory of forms with the difference that they do not exist apart from sensible things. (1966, Vol. II p. 1). To him these differences are not basic. And he sees striking similarities between them. It is on the basis of these similarities that he seems to justify his not discussing Aristotle, and treating him on par with Plato. In this Popper seems to be arbitrary, because he merely states the common assumptions judging them as primary and declares the acnowledged differences to be secondary. He does not properly establish the importance of common assumptions by discussing them against their differences.

This non–establishing the primacy of common features makes his position vulnerable before those who in their works treat the differences as basic. For instance, Gilbert Ryle's *Plato's Progress (1966)* is one such work. According to Ryle there seems to have existed some powerful non–Platonic formative influences upon the young Aristotle and the formative influences of Plato on Aristotle seem to have been 'slighter and patchier' (1966, p. 4). He goes to the extent of suggesting that "Aristotle seems almost to begin his philosophical life fully equipped with an elaborate apparatus of categories" (1966, p. 4). (From this we do not rule out the possibility that though both Plato and Aristotle started separately they might have come up with the same results. Even if it is so, our point still stands because we are complaining about the procedures adopted not about the end results). From the point of view of this work and various arguments provided in support of this point of view one can work out some important bearings it has on Popper's position.

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This is because Popper does not establish why the common features between Aristotle and Plato are basic

2.2 Nisbet's *The Social Philosophers* is another work which, while discussing various communities, points out some basic differences between Plato and Aristotle concerning certain ideas like 'unity' and 'plurality'. In what follows we will discuss Nisbet's idea to show that some of the basic differences between Plato and Aristotle militate against Popper's generalization regarding these two thinkers.

Unlike Popper who takes historicism and essentialism as criteria of closed minds, Nisbet discusses various western communities from the institutional point of view presenting different understanding of Aristotle. He distinguishes various communities as military, political, religious revolutionary, ecological and plural. Two amongst these which are relevant to our present purpose are political communities and plural communities. Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau are the exponents of political communities. These communities are endowed with only one form of existence i.e., political existence under one centralized authority. It discards all intermediary social institutions such as family, local communities, church or charities, from social reality.

On the other hand there are plural communities which are characterized by plurality, autonomy, decentralization, hierarchy tradition or localism. The plural communities though independent of each other and even of the state for their origin and existence, are not completely insulated from each other. Each one is related to the others in variohs ways. They are of course coordinated and governed by a single state. This state does not have a uniform social existence. The intermediary institutions are not the creations of state (like the so called intermediary organizations such as trade unions in Soviet Russia). They are

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natural institutions. The state consists of pluralities of these natural intermediary institutions. Man participates in social and political activities through these institutions. They not only make different levels of social existence possible but will not allow centralization. Nisbet treats Asistotle, Althusius, Bonald, Hegel and Tocqueville as the proponents of plural communities.

In discussing Aristotle, unlike Popper, Nisbet particularly refers to his differences with Plato regarding the idea of unity. Platonic unity is unity devoid of diversities. Aristotelian unity is unity of diversities. Plato's conception of unity accepts only one level of existence though of a superior level. The unity in Aristotle supposes various intermediary levels, coordinated at a higher level. It is this which makes him oppose Plato's conception of unity of state even if it is possible, and recognize the significance of natural institutions such as family. Nisbet quotes Aristotle, who says,

> It is not obvious, that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state – since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and intending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more one than the state, and the invidiual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. (Aristotle in Nisbet, 1974, p. 393).

According to Nisbet it is Plato's insistence on unity which makes Republic an advocate of political community leading to centralization of power and it is Aristotle's insistence on diversity that makes Asistotle's view of society decentralized and plural. To Aristotle the error of Socrates is his notion of unity

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devoid of diversities. Not completely denying the place of unity and romanticising diversitives, Aristotle says that there should be unity, say unity between family (the basic unity of society) and state. This unity should be restricted to some aspects only. Beyond that it is not possible; even if it is possible it is not desirable, because that would make the state "no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, *like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot*". (Aristotle in Nisbet 1974, p.393). Here we can observe Aristotle's comprehension of reality from different levels, going from lower to higher levels and back, unlike Plato who looks only ahead and upward. The former's recognition of concrete intermediary institutions such as family, private property, legitimate associations and social classes etc., propel him to hold the view that as long as these institutions remain strong it does not matter much what kind of government one has. Nisbet says,

> "From Aristotle's view point... almost any form of political government was good if it preserved the all-important spheres of autonomy to which each of the major groups and institutions was entitled within the social order" (1974, p, 396).

When we refer to centralization or totalitarianism one of the important aspects is power. When power is delegated to the intermediary institutions or organizations and their autonomy is recognised the tyranny of the central organizations such as state will not become possible. Even if it becomes possible, it would be easier with the help of the intermediary associations to check it and in their presence it would not be very much felt. But the insistence of 'political communities' is the removal of these intermediary associations. Following Aristotle, Nisbet in another work observes that totalitarian and centralized societies become

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powerful not by taking away individual liberties but by virtue of what it takes from the spiritual and social associations which compete with it for men's devotions (1962, p. 163).

Keeping the points discussed above in mind – we maintain that society in so far as it consists of various institutions, whether its direction is towards centralization or decentralization, its structure – open or closed, its basic units – individuals or collectives, largely depends upon how institutions are placed or treated. So that centralized societies can be seen not only from the point of view of essentialism, racism, fatalism or historicism, like Popper but it can also be seen in the light of institutional criteria.

Plato's *Republic* can be said to represent a centralized community. But Aristotle who insists on plurality of social institutions, cannot be said to advocate closed society. Hence Popper's treatment of Aristotle on par with Plato is untenable.

3. *Closed Society : Totalitarian and Non–totalitarian*

3.1 In the preceding section we have shown the baselessness of one of Popper's generalizations regarding Aristotle. We argued that Aristotle cannot be treated as advocating closed society like Plato. We did not say much about Plato though we implicitly agreed with Popper that the *Republic* idealizes a closed society. This difference, however, is not recognized by Popper.

Concepts such as 'closed society', 'totalitarianism' 'dictatorship' 'authoritarianism' are used by Popper as synonymous without recognizing the distinctions involved in them. Recent literature on totalitarianism, while discussing its various facts, comes up with new discoveries raising controversies. These studies make it necessary to reassess these notions in Popper's work. It is necessary not only to avoid ambiguity but it is also relevant as they lead to different consequences.

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Granting that the modern form of totalitarianism and Plato's Republic are both closed societies in so far as they share some common assumptions, the question arises 'Are they both totalitarian?' Popper's answer is 'yes' because for him they are synonymous. It is from this belief that he attempts to trace the antecedent conditions of the modern totalitarianism to the Greeks. But there are studies which seem to implicitly maintain that closed society does not always mean totalitarian society because there also exist non-totalitarian closed societies. We will discuss them in the following section.

3.2 J. L. Talmon seems to maintain that there is a structural difference between the two forms of closed societies, totalitarian and non-totalitarian such as despotic rules, dictatorship, autocracy etc. That is, the structure of non-totalitarian forms of closed society seems to be that a few (minority) rule the majority by keeping them under intentional ignorance or suppression. Whereas the totalitarian governments, though ruled by a few (minority), are supported by the majority. But these two modes of social organization are often treated as the same and have been treated as synonymous both by Popper and his critics. In a sense both these forms of social organization may be taken to be alike as far as concentration of power is concerned. This in itself may not be sufficient to conclude their sameness. The sources of this power may vary. We will discuss this later. Let us briefly eloborate on the distinction made above,

In discussing the curious phenomenon 'totalitarianism' which is backed by the support of the majority Arendt says that the 'social automization' and 'extreme individualization' (which are the accepted assumptions of seventeenth-century) – which constitutes what is called as mass phenomena – is the pre-condition for the possibility of totalitarianism. To quote her : "Totalitarian movements are possible whenever masses for one reason

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or another have acquired the appetite for political organization" (1958, p. 311). Unlike non-totalitarian governments, totalitarian governments are backed by the popular enthusiasm of the masses who are in majority. This is not a false enthusiasm nor is it induced by totalitarian leaders through false propaganda "over ignorance and stupidity" of people." The propaganda of totalitarian movements which precedes and accompany totalitarian regimes is invariably as frank as is mendacious..." 1958, p. 307). As a matrer of fact totalitarian rulers begin political career by boasting about their past crimes and hinting at future ones. The worst crimes committed by Hitler and Stalin could not have been done by them "if they had not the confidence of the masses". She adds, "Neither the Moscow trials nor the liquidation of the Rohm faction would have been possible if these masses had not supported Stalin and Hitler" (1958, p. 306). (For further details see Arendt, 1958).

The background of traditional non-totalitarian closed societies is institutional way of life where the subjects do not elect their rules. Since people do not participate in political activity and rulers are not elected by them it is understandable that despotic or dictatorial governments are oppressive and tyrannical. But the curious thing is that the background of totalitarian governments is individualism and peoples support their rulers.

Talmon coined a paradoxical term 'totalitarian democracy' to denote this paradoxical phenomenon. He contrasts totalitarianism or totalitarian democracy as he calls it, with traditional forms of closed societies. He says :

> Modern totalitarian democracy is a dictatorship resting on popular enthusiasm, and is thus completely different from absolute power wielded by a divine-right king, or by a usurping tyrant. (1966, p. 3).

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The difference stated above is an important one particularly because Popper has assimilated all closed societies under one category, possessing similar features. But there are different kinds of closed societies. Some are totalitarian and others non-totalitarian. They seem to belong to different historical periods. In the following section we shall briefly discuss the origins of totalitarianism.

3.3 Acceptence of the above distinction further makes us raise the question whether both forms of closed societies have the same origin. If the answer is 'yes', then what made them different ? If the answer is 'no', then where did they rise from ?

Talmon in the same book attributes the origins of the totalitarian democracy in the 'second part of the eighteenth century' to the writings of men like Rousseau, Diderot, Mably, Saint-Just and Bownarroti. He discusses three important stages from the beginning viz., eighteenth century postulates, the Jacobian improvization and Babouvirt crystallization before it culminated in the twentieth century totalitarian democracy. Without going into the details discussed by Talmon, let us briefly state the presuppositions from where totalitarian phenomena seem to have emerged.

There appears a serious discontinuity in Western thought during the renaissance, from where totalitarianism seems to have risen. It may be significant to note that the modern political philosophy (starting from contract philosophers) is based on entirely different assumptions namely the hypothetical man and contracted society of the contract philosophers. This resulted in a serious break with, or a 'paradigm shift' in Kuhnian terminology from, traditional theories. This paradigm shift in social thought of man can be compared in essentials to the Copernican revolution in astronomy, in the sense that the Copernican theory

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brought the sun to the centre of the universe and the renaissance brought man to the centre of social reality.

It is for the first time that in human history man is given this status of centrality. This man is not a real man in society but the hypothetical man of the contract philosophers belonging to pre–societal state. Indeed the contract philosophers like Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke have some sharply opposed views but the opposition is regarding the attributes of this pre–societal man. The concept of pre–societal man is common to all of them.

The pre–societal man of the contract philosophers, we are given to understand, is one who chooses what is good to him and he may have chosen sovereignty as his political alternative. This itself would not make the sovereign totolitarian. As it is of his own creation and choice, it cannot be said to harm him. But these collectivities are not the conclusions arrived at by people. At the same time, they are not externally imposed because they spring from the concept of the pre–societal man. This results in a dilemma where we see that on the one hand the sovereignty is not arrived at by people and on the other hand they are not external institutions. This dilemma as rightly pointed out by Talmon is solved by inducing 'general will' as latent in the pre–societal man – who is taken not as he is, but as he is meant to be and would be given proper conditions (1966, p. 3). This latent feature controls his choice, and he definitely chooses the sovereign as a mode of social existence. This innate feature is not external to him but is in him. So we cannot accuse the contract philosophers for indoctrinating man. The collectivities emerge out of these latent featurer. Collectivities in Rousseau, for instance, are not arrived at through consent of all people or even of majority. According to Talmon the collectivities in Rousseau are Cartesian truths which "Every member of het

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Rousseau's sovereign is bound to will..." (1966, p. 29). And those who do not confirm to the general will should be coerced or intimidated into conformity to it, because according to Rousseau, "left to themselves, the people always desire the good, but left to themselves they do not always know where that good lies. The general will is always right, but the judgement guiding it is not always well informed. It must be made to see things as they are, sometimes as they ought to appear to them" (Rousseau in Talmon, 1966, pp. 47–65).

With this trick of 'objectivity' they made people believe that the sovereignty or state is their own creation which they have to obey. In the functioning of modern socialism it is not the individual choices which are taken into consideration but the objective truths in deciding what is to be done.

The point we are trying to make is that though the basis of modern collectivities is said to be man, this basis has to be understood in the above mentioned way. The modern totalitarians by making people believe that they are the authors of the policies, make them support the collectivities and/or the people by believing that it is their own creation, support them. This phenomenon seems to have been based on contract philosophers' assumptions of man and society.

Popper's failure in distinguishing the two forms of closed societies seems to be due to his not recognising the difference between the assumptions of the modern philosophy and the pre-modern or traditional political philosophy. It amounts to not recognising the historical developments.* The reason for this discontinuity in modern political philosophy is based on a different assumption namely 'man'. Unless this difference is recognised, we are likely to superimpose the modern categories on the pre-modern thought or read modern features in the pre-modern theories. In the light of these differences we may have to disti-

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nguish among the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. From the above discussion concerning the differences between totalitarian and non-totalitarian closed societies it appears to follow that it is proper to consider Hegel and Marx as totalitarians, in so for as their theories are rooted in modern assumptions. But this is not so with Plato.

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE NAURE OF DECISION, VALUE AND PERSONAL-IDENTITY

The present paper aims at phenomenological analysis of decision and its roots in personal-identity. Since man is not to be explained in terms of a fixed theory, he is to be characterised in terms of decisions, choices and actions. There is nothing like 'I am' or my intrinsic 'being' over and above what I do in the course of my existence-striving. In this existential striving, there is a fusion of person, decision and value. Though these three terms are distinct (conceptually), yet are inseparable in the phenomenon they designate. The paper attempts to show the interdependence of value and decision. Decision involves value both prospectively and retrospectively i.e., as a ground for taking decision and evaluating it. The function of value in decision-making is constitutive, regulative and directive. Value is not a theoretical construction, it is manifested and realised through decisions. The act of taking any decision has got to be unique, discrete, monadic and historical but its justifying grounds have to be universally convincing. This interdependence of value and decision bridges the gulf between the universal and the specific conditions of human individuation.

In order to illustrate the above points, the nature of decision must be clarified. Decision is an interplay of subjective and objective factors i.e., inner projections and external situations. It is based on the fittingness of the following elements :

1. Needs : Human needs have their origin in the physiology and biochemistry of human organism and are considered to be

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causal conditions of the individual. But they are not merely physical constraints like tropism and homeostasis. They are not mere instinctual drives or blind forces but undergo considerable modification through acculturation. There is a shift from mere biosphere to socio-cultural sphere. Needs are differentiated and classified through language. They are continuously being re-fashioned in the crucible of culture and are related to self-individuation which is distinctive of historic element of an agent i.e., self-articulation of organism to its own nexus in nature and with others in solidarity of human-kind.

2. Situations : Objects and other agents constitude my world.

3. Technical Knowledge : A strategy of manipulating the situations. It includes knowledge of means-ends relationships, knowledge of the relation of intended action and their consequences. What is the best way of achieving the end-in-view in the reckonable given circumstances, which are by definition assumed to be tractable.

4. Assurance that the action when undertaken and satisfactorily performed exclusively embodies the intrinsic values. Any other action in the given circumstances would not embody the values in the same degree i.e., the given action is the optimal realisation of the value in question.

It is to be noted that decision is not a logical consequence of the above mentioned elements. It appears that given the needs, situations and technical knowledge, decision can be demonstrated. However, what we need to specifically note here is that what follows is not the conclusion of a syllogism but in this deliberation we arrive at *an imperative*. The end-product of decision is not a deduction from the given conditions or statements of premises. The given conditions are not self-enforcing, they in themselves are vague, uncertain, indeterminate; the deci-

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sion of the individual articulates these conditions in fact, and is not wholly a discursive imaging. The relationship between the constitutive elements and the end-product is not conceptual but involves existential commitment. Decision is not a mere discursive knowledge of the circumstances or an entailed conclusion from the set of premises. One is bothered about the desirability rather than content of the necessary notions involved in the description of the situation. Given the knowledge of the regularities of the situation, decision appears to be predictable. I project myself into the future action to be done. This future temporal dimension is to be distinguished from that of prediction. The ground of decision can neither be deduced by way of a causal regularity nor can it even be logically analysable. Further, I can express certainty about my intention and decision but I cannot express certainty about the outcome. The external contingencies may affect the total performance. There can be a gap between my attempt and the success. Unlike a proposition, decision cannot be true or false. What are good reasons of my choice ? The good reasons are not merely based on rational knowledge of the circumstances but are the results of one's commitment to values. Decision is characterised in terms of my lived uniqueness and the specificity of my world. In the seemingly identical circumstances, different individuals are known to take different decision. The reason being that the meaning of the situation is constituted by the agent and not fixed and can be interpreted or decoded in alternative ways by the very same individual in differeut moments. Situation is not a simple aggregate of things and persons but is also mediated by a sequence of involuted interactions. In the process of interaction both the person and his situation get transformed.

Phenomenological perspective rejects the naive realistic approach towards 'the situation'. The world is structured manifestation of the 'posits'. The term world as used in phenomenology needs

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to be understood in the sense in which it stands in their noetic elaboration of the entities of severally 'intended world'. Our familiar commonsense view is only a naive unreflective dogmatism. The world and consciousness cannot be separated. Phenomenological analysis is neither pure scientific analysis in terms of objectivity nor is idealistic analysis in terms of metaphysical essences. Meaning is generated in the interaction between consciousness and the world. The fact–world is turned into the world of meaning by the experimental acts of consciousness. This point is emphasised by Husserl who holds, "...this world is not there for me as a mere *world of facts and affairs,* but with the same immediacy, as a *world of values,* a *world of goods,* a *practical world.* Without further effort on my part I find the things before me furnished not only with the qualities that befit their positive nature, but with value–characters such a beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, and so forth."[1] The individual does not passively receive things from outside but he interprets them and gives a new meaning to their reality. In the act of experience, the individual constitutes the reality. Thus there is a shift from naive attitude to reflective attilude, reality is constituted through an intended perspective i.e., world is not to be taken as simply there (bare existent) but is to be viewed as intentional objectivity of consciousness. World is constituted by a subject's intentional orientation rather than by spatial location. It is constituted by radical awareness of lived experience.

The situation is transfigured and seen in a new light. The individual's decision is not a stereotyped standard response to the situation. Every new step is a unique step, it is a new embodiment of one's own self awareness. Self is not a passive outcome of happenings but is constituted through active striving. It cannot be viewed either as a thing or a substance but to be understood in terms of intentional acts. The non–empirical and non–meta-

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physical approach relates temporal historicity and normative transcendence. The self–projective resolute being is called by Heidegger as *Dasein. Dasein* is inseparably linked with the world constituting of things and other persons. To live as *Dasein* is to posit oneself as a person, to place oneself in conscious relationship to the world. There is a difference between the modalities of presence of things in the world and that of *Dasein.*[2] The table cannot relate itself to itself and to other thing. It is not a possibility but an actuality. On the other hand, *Dasein* is a possible being and is always 'ahead–of–itself'.[3] Unlike a manufactured tool, the person is not fixed once for all. He decides every moment about his being, he is to be characterised in terms of 'mineness'[4]. To quote Heidegger, "... when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being... Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things are present–at-hand... in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine (je meines)... In each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just a property (eigenschaftlich), as something present–at–hand would... it *can*, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so."[5] Self–reflective noetic acts constitute the individuality of *Dasein.* Thus man's attitude towrds the situation is not adaptive and mechnical but is critical and reflective. The individual disentangles himself from a passive involvement in the 'here and now'. The transcendence of man is in his ability to project beyond 'here and now' and to separate himself from a purely physical involvement by anticipating the things that will be. There is a shift from the exterior to the interior, from episodicity to dispositionality. A decision is neither determined by one's own nature (it is not a matter of personal

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taste) nor by external factors. It is free from determination by the complex of factors present in the primitive situation exclusively; it depends upon the attitude and the mode of internalisation one could adopt while being fully conscious of the possible alternatives. The subjective response cannot be accounted in terms of causality. The scientific analysis of decision reducing its occurence to factors and causality is not an account of the origination of decision but of event in which the decision took shape. Decision as an event must be distinguished from decison as a value. The individual may take into account all the factors and still can decide against them or what they might rocommend. As the individual is characterised in terms of positing attitudes, the situation is not simply there but is the result of the decisions of the subject.

No doubt the individual is rooted in the situation yet he is not completely submerged in the totaiity of nature and the surrounding world. This point is also highlighted by Jaspers who maintains that situation is an object of the intentionality of consciousness. He analyses the meaning of situation as follows : " What we call a situation is not just a reality governed by natural laws. It is a *sense-related reality*–neither psychological nor physical, but both in one. It is the concrete reality which means advantage or detriment, opportunity or obstacle, to my existence... Situations exist by *changing*. There comes a moment when they no longer exist. I have to put up with them as given, not as definitely given; there remains a chance of transforming them even in the sense that I can calculate and bring about situations in which I am going to act as given henceforth... my *consciousuess* of them is a *new factor* that goes into the making of the situation. "[6] There is a transition from factuality to a perspective. Consciousness is directed towards objects, it is also directed towards itself which constitutes its self–identity. Like

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Heidegger, Jaspers characterises the nature of self as transcendence without mystifying it into a substance or soul. It is not to go beyond the world to the realm of supersensible realities, transcendence acquires significance in and through temporality. It is only by living in the world that one can go beyond it. Temporality is not to be understood, in the naive way; it is not a mere absorption in the present, it is 'ekstatie' and contra-factual in nature. The individual reflects over his past and visualises future projects. 'Now' is the fusion of past and future. The individual is not to be explained merely by what he is but also by what he is 'no more' as well he is 'yet-to-be'. This is implied by saying that he is a potential being. To quote Jaspers, "An existential choice does not result from a struggle of motives, which would be an objective occurence. It is not a decision in which I merely seem to decide after performing a calculation, so to speak, that has yielded the correct result–this would be cogent, and I could do nothing but admit its evidence and act accordingly. Nor is it obedience to an objectively phrased imperative... In this choice I *resolve* to be myself in existence ..Resolution is what comes to my will, as the gift that in willing I can really be— it is what I can will *out of,* without being able to will it ..what manifests my resolution is my concrete choice ... Resolution and self-being are one."[7]

Decision is to be arrived through intention, deliberation and resolution. Intention is not to be confused with naturalistic explanation of things It implies the attempt on the part of the individual. Desires and wishes occur, they are not chosen *per se.* I take a decision when I make an attempt to change them. It is through rational faculty one regulates one's chaotic impulses and passions. Process of deliberation involves the consideration ...7

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of reasons for and against different courses of action with a view to decide what is best and most desirable. When deliberations end up in an imperative, it is called a decision. Decision is implemented through resolution. Jaspers maintains, " In regard to time, the import of resolution is that once I have made a choice I will unconditionally *stick to it*... My resolution starts the *movement* that can give my life a self–based continuity in the diffusion of existence .. What the word " choice " expresses is that in my free decision I am not only conscious of acting in the world but of creating my own being in historic continuity. I know that I not only exist, that I not only am the way I am and therefore act in that way, but that as I act and decide I originate both my actions and the way I am. My resolution makes me feel the freedom in which I no longer merely decide about things but about myself, the freedom in which I can no longer separate the choice and me because *I am this free choice*. "[8] Thus Jaspers argues that the individual is constituted in and through his choices, decisions and actions.

From the foregoing discussion it emerges that needs, situations and technical knowledge are necessary conditions but are not sufficient to produce values. Value is neither a mechanical configuration of these elements nor can it be deduced from needs or situations or to be realised through technical methods. Can blind striving for survival be called a value? What is the difference between 'I am a body' and 'I have a body'? Can the being of person be reduced to one dimensional impulse of bodily needs and desires? Is man merely the product of the given circumstances? Is value possible without creativity? Values are generated out of the critical reflection on one's needs and situations. Man not only lives but seeks meaning and fulfilment in his life. Mere technical knowledge produces standard results and leads to scientific objectivity. It is through values

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that scientific objectivity is turned into phenomenological exploration into the nature of being. The individual is not a victim of needs and circumstances but is capable of seeing them in the totality of the nexus of self and regulate his own person in terms of his own ideas.

Needs are basic conditions for the realisation of any kind of ideal but in terms of evaluation, they are not very high. They are prerequisites of intrinsic values in the sense that they must be satisfied in order one strives to attain intrinsic values. Thus intrinsic values are parasitical on the basic values. Survival (which includes food, clothing, shelter, etc.), rationality (objectivity, identity, consistency, plausibility), freedom (used in the negative sense as absence of constraint and determination by the pre-existing structure) are foundational values and are preconditions of all other axiological endeavours. The perpetuation of life is a necessary condition for the realisation of any pursuit. Unless one is rational, consistent and free, one cannot be open to constitute intrinsic value. Elimination of the foundational values means impossibility of taking any decision and that would mean absence of any effort to realise any value. The non-fulfilment of basic needs is of greater disvalue then non-realisation of intrinsic values. This point is well understood by the social philosophers like Gandhi, Marx, Lenin and Maotsetung. They made it as the cardinal point for various social and political reforms in their historical writings. They held that there cannot be a possibility of any axiological effort unless there is a liberation from poverty, insecurity, unreason, determinism, injustice and inequality.

There is an asymmetry of values and disvalues in respect of their realisation and non-realisation. The absence of basic values makes more difference than their presence. It is a real axiological puzzle that non-realisation of the most universal but

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trivial values has greater compulsive force of disvalue than the failure of embodiment of any intrinsic value. But in terms of realisation of values, the relation is reversed. Realisation of basic values is not much of an achievement. Altruim, self-sacrifice, charity, creativity, high intelligence are supremely valued. The fulfilment of these values makes the individual stronger than the realisation of basic values. In fact for the sake of these, one is willing to sacrifice even foundational universal values like money, recognition and comforts etc. A martyr forsakes his life for what he is convinced are higher pursuits. In this traumatic experience, others see in his creativity much higher axiological value than obligation to ensure mundane survival. One is convinced of the legitimisation of martyr's decision to be of highest value. This is extraordinary reconstruction of a new value experience—a condition of profound creativity setting a new paradigm. The worthfulness of a martyr's self-sacrifice is appreciated and recognised by others too. The martyr's action is paradigmatic which is to be distinguished from idiosyncratic arbitrariness. This shows that value is potentially universalisable and communicable. Though value originates in the consciousness of the person, yet it is not tied to him, it becomes meaningful to others too.

The martyr chooses intrinsic value over and above the foundational value. His action is supererogatory; in the self-sacrifice he realises the highest good. The crucial problem arises when there is a conflict between two intrinsic values. As all the values cannot be simultaneously realised, one has to face the intense axiological dilemmas; collaterally these are innermost discords. For instance there can be a conflict between the values of charity and justice. Is it possible to have a standard hierarchy of intrinsic values ? Can there be a scale of preference ? It should be noted that there is no conflict in the intrinsic values *per se* but the conflict is contextual i.e., it arises in the finite situations

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in which a man has to exist (not accidentally but essentially). An agent is always faced with a unique and complex situation, he must make a finite decision relevant to it. In the given circumstances, he himself has to make the 'decision' whether he should be just or charitable. As the situations and experiences of the different individuals are different, there can be no unchanging coincident hierarchy of values or unfailing rules of decision–making. It reveals the plurality, atomicity and autonomy of persons and non–monotonic character of axiological or practical deliberations. The solution therefore cannot be logical, if one looks simple deductive, predictable model of decision–making alone as logical.

It has been shown in the paper that the existential striving is an interlinkage of person, decision and value. These three terms are distinct but are inseparable (to what they apply). A decision is monadic and historic but its ground is universal. A person is the synthesis of historicity and transcendence. His being cannot be exhausted in terms of positing attitudes. A value is dispositional and it is to be concretised by the person in his choices, decisions and actions. The medium of individuation of a person, a value or a decision is non–material, it is not either an object or a configuration of objects or a property of such configuration of individual objects. No straightforward body of objects or their classes could lead to specification of any of the three. They are representations (forms) of transcendental consciousness. But they are distinct in their modalities. Each decision is constituted singularly. A person is not identical with any one decision, he has a whole sequence of decisions in his life. Similarly a value is not confined to one self or a self is not confined to any one value. All decisions do not involve values. There are technical, coerced decisions which are born of ecology, bodily needs etc. as well. In other words, the whole of value is not decision and

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the whole of decision is not value. Value can be used both prospectively and retrospectively, whereas the process of taking decision is prospective, it posits value as an ideal to be achieved. Value is not a part of nature, it is projected by consciousness. While values are transcendental paradigms which our decisions conform to and would not be intelligible before one could have the assurance that we are capable of living upto norms; but norms themselves are not decisions. However, neither norms nor decisions could have any meaning except for the foundational human consciousness which can come only through the reflective being of man. The reflective being is not be identified with value but it entertains timeless paradigms which are manifested through concrete enactments. Thus the bridge between the monadic historic decisions and value paradigms which are a-historical universal patterns are synchronised in the reflection of the agent who constitutes the duality of historical immanence and transcendental projection.

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NOTES

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DISCUSSION

This is to express my sincerest appreciation of the paper "Towards a Living Culture" published in IPQ, Vol. XIV No. 2. The learned author describes this paper as a note, but it's definitely more than a note. In fact, some of the issues raised by Shri Sahu deserve further detailed discussion. I intend to place before the concerned some observations of my own regarding his overall idea of a "living culture".

Shri Sahu is very rightly keen on "counterposing a just culture against an unjust one" in free India (p. 160) Nietzsche, however, reminded us once that "The removal of God from the world deprives the idea of all meaning".[1] This is perhaps so because justice is a value which like any other value has very little, if any, rational basis or justification. Coming to think of it, justice is no more rational than injustice; and yet, we tend to consider justice *rational* because *rational* too has lately acquired high *value* due to the spread of scientific outlook. The unspoken dictate of our time is : "Human beings must be rational". This hidden "must" stands for the *value*-identity of *rational. Rational* is thus preferred to *irrational* not only because the former stands for expediency but also because it is considered right, proper and respectable. Because rationality is made valuable, we tend to believe that it is rational to be just. Value-laden words tend to get clustered in making a nearly total world-view which gradually acquires some kind of sacred power over human minds. Shri Sahu decries this magic power in the interest of a living culture. A living culture is indeed marked by its urge to and

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capacity for change. The idea of sacredness is a threat to change. Science considers nothing as sacred – excepting, of course, the scientific spirit.

The scientific spirit in human beings urges us to look for the meaning of our social forms and mores much of which is yet to be disclosed. Even this basic urge to look for meaning and systematic interpretation is also to be looked into. Once we begin doing that (as behavioural scientists and anthropologists have already begun), we cannot avoid taking note of persistent recurrence of the idea of *sacred* and *profane* in a variety of cultures. Any attempt to banish these words from cultural usage in the interest of keeping the culture alive and free from "superstitions" (p. 163 IPQ) may involve us in acting against the true spirit of scientific inquiry. A science of culture cannot thrive scientifically if culture is placed on an idealised pedestal where human beings cannot function spontaneously.

The trouble about human functioning and spontaneity arises largely from the fact that the readiness to act comes much ahead of man's proper comprehension of human conditions and/or natural surroundings. To cope with the immediate situation calling for action, human beings are made to evolve constructs of reality many of which can be seen later as defunct or superstitious. Had we been offered a chance to live in a group where all individuals were similar in disposition and equal in age and competence, we would have been free to fashion a different cultural mould. As human affairs now stand, human groups anywhere at any given time are marked by some degree of variety and, admitted or hidden, inequality. The interesting part of the story of natural groups is that there is a steady stream of new entrants (e.g. newborn babies) unaware of prevailing modes of evaluation requiring initiation. These aliens keep on reinterpreting, thereby restucturing, the code of the given culture in

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terms of their level of understanding and felt need. The significance of this natural social process may not be overlooked.

Children's world–view, of course, may look very inadequate, perhaps superstitious too, to the adults belonging to the same *living culture*. But it is a requirement that living cultures provide enough space for children's imagination and activities. This I mention only to point out that in all cultures, different sub-cultures (such as the one of children's) are present making room for slight alterations in norms and imperative dictates, thus keeping the cultures free from stagnation. A careful study of this process is likely to give us a clue to a proper understanding of the emergence of values.

A hard line of formal reasoning makes us believe very firmly that nothing can be both "a" and "not–a". The presence of children in society offers us a refreshing digression. Children, in fact, concretely illustrate being both "children" and "not–children". Every moment they are outgrowing themselves. Since remaining "children" is not the goal of childhood, they continue to reach out for what they are not i.e., adults. This involves tension without which, of course, there could be no growth and no development of *values*. The child's yearning *to be what it is not* provides the basis for original value–experience of mankind. Apparently, there is nothing supernatural about it, but it can be viewed as something spiritual–meaning non–mundane. This yearning is unnecessary to maintain the status quo of *a child as a child*. In other words, *values* acquire a certain intrinsic quality because human beings, in the process of their attainment of full–blown individuality, need to reach out for things and ideas not required to maintain a status quo (but for the sake of the *idea of having it*). Significant individuals in human communities keep on enriching themselves by their capacity of outgrowing their earlier, limited ego. We know

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a great man like Gautama Buddha as great because he could discard his identity as a prince and attain a new identity worthy of emulation. The process of evolution may be seen here at work. We can observe that human beings are yet to assume full human stature. So, the principle of evolution and the principle of spirituality can be seen as merging to support a living and morally engaging world-view. This *seeing* or vision is likely to emerge if a proper search was directed by us just as the principle of evolution was *seen* (discovered) by scientists through a painstaking research. No living culture can afford to lose sight of this scientific vision. On the other hand, no culture worth its name would throw away the vision of a seer. Much *knowledge* is stored in the form of myths, fantasy and old tales in ancient cultures. We would be in a position of enriching a living culture if we could decode hidden human messages contained in the body of those materials with the aid of evolving scientific tools. It is expected of the scientists that they would not only analyse but also synthesise the past with the future of mankind keeping the connecting link alive through the present.

Finally, a word about welcoming "noble thoughts from every side". Noble thoughts as well as significant visions are likely to arouse us, adults, to take a fresh look at our culture and, therefore, are welcome. Many adults, however, tend to lose balance under culture shock as they have neither the flexibility nor imagination necessary for the construction of a new model suitable for themselves. KCB's warning against "the surrender of our individuality" (quote : p. 168 IPQ) is meant for this group of adults easily taken in by *other* modes of living. Obviously, "noble thoughts" can ennoble only thinking selves. Self-identity is a basic issue in any cultural context. *Others* acquire meaning vis-a-vis Self; it would be a confused state of affairs if it were to happen the other way round. In our eagerness to emphasise

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universality of culture, it is unnecessary to lose sight of the fact that cultural identity of any given group emerges with specific patterns of value–orientation. Universal values can indeed be best observed and appreciated through a careful and scientific observation and appreciation of these specific expressions.

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NOTE

1. Quoted by R. K. Mukherjee, *The Dynamics of Morals*, p. 121. Macmillan & Co., 1950.

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The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharya

Proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, the book contains a critical appraisal of various aspects of the late **Kalidas Bhattacharya's** philosophical thought; and includes his own final formulation of his philosophical position.

Edited by **Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, P. K. Srivastava (et al).**

The book includes contributions from **K. L. Sharma** (A Step Beyond K. C. Bhattacharya), **Daya Krishna** (Kalidas Bhattacharya and the Logic of Alternation). **S. K. Chattopadhyaya** (Professor Bhattacharya's "Alternative Standpoints" of Philosophy), **K. Bagchi** (Subjective and Objective' Attitudes as Alternatives : A study of professor Kalidas Bhattacharya's view of Knowledge-Object Unity), **N. K. Sharma** (Kalidas Bhattacharya's Philosophy : Alternative Absolutes), **R. S. Bhatnagar** (Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy : Study of a Fundamental Dichotomy in Kalidas Bhattacharya's thought), **Mrs. Yogesh Gupta** (Pre-suppositions of Science and Philosophy : A Critical Study), **Mrinal Kanti Bhadra** (Kalidas Bhattacharya's View of Freedom and Existentialist Thought), **Rajendra Prasad** Freedom and Existential Thought), **Rajendra Prasad Pandey** (Kalidas Bhattachrya on the Indian Concept of Man), **K. J. Shah** (Religion—Sophisticated and Unsophisticated), **J. N. Mohanty** (Kalidas Bhattacharya as Metaphysician).

1/8 Demy, Pages 239. Price Rs. 60/-

Contact : Organising Editor,
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Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XIV, No. 4
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BOOK REVIEW

Francis Burke Drohan, *Jesus Who?*, New York, Philosophical Library Inc., 1985, pp. 256, US $ 24.25

This hard–hitting effort of Francis Drohan brings insights to bear upon the writings of the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible, conclusions that the very liberal biblical interpreter will rejoice to hear. At the same time it offers little comfort to the traditionalist who would simply like to overlook many of the scriptural inconsistencies the author is at pains to unearth. More Dionysian than Apollonian in his presentation, Drohan, a researcher in the humanities of history, hopes that his findings may make a significant difference in the understanding of the true origins of Christianity, although he thinks these same findings will have no great effect on Christian practices nor will they render the general Christian position insecure. It is readily admitted that any shift of emphasis in respect to the origins of Christianity as a religion could never serve to obliterate the kerygmatic gospel message preached openly by Jesus of Nazareth during his ministry in the early years of the first century A. D.

Ye'shua Bar Joseph, he who is known to us as Jesus, at approximately thirty years of age became an itinerant preacher, a moralist, a Jewish rabbi and a radical among the Pharisees of his day. His strict Essenic training and his subsequent teaching, which included the doctrine of forgiveness and personal salvation, was decidedly inimical to the high–ranking Jewry of his day and considered to be subversive by the Temple establishment.

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As teacher and prophet he was eventually indicted and put to torture largely because of warnings of impending doom which he brought against his own people. As well, Jesus of Nazareth also has suffered due to the specious arguments attempting to convince the world of his divinity, making him the Son of God, the awaited Messiah and the Christ of the Gentile world. Yet the personage of Jesus, it is claimed, has formed the necessary but unintended bridge to the birth of a new and radical movement destined to become one of the great religions of the West, a movement that Jesus himself neither envisaged nor would have sanctioned and one that was perpetrated by men he never met. A new humanistic religion initially designed to find favour among the Gentile elite and commoner alike was made possible through the universal Christ connection instituted by one Saul of Tarsus, soon to become St. Paul the Apostle.

Drohan demolishes many of the shibboleths of religious utterance uncritically accepted by Christian believers over the centuries. For example, in New Testament times there existed no word, either in Hebrew or Greek, that had the same meaning we give to our word for church. "Moses" and also "Joshua" were Egyptian names. Moses spoke the language of the Egyptians rather than Hebrew and it was Moses and not Abram (Abraham) who was the true founder of Judaism. In fact the designation Hebrew is not of Jewish origin at all, but a distortion of the Egyptian "Habiru" signifying an inferior caste, exactly what the Jews were considered to be during their sojourn in Egypt. The so-called Mosaic law was not original with Moses, but was instead based upon the law of Hammurabi, king of Babylonia in the 18th century B. C. Psalm 104 of the Hebrew Old Testament is almost verbatim a hymn to Aton, the Egyptian sun god.

Jesus of Nazareth may have acted in the role of spiritual Messiah to his Jewish people, but scripture has never shown

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that he aspired to be a *Christos* to or for the Gentiles, a mantle declaring for deity and the title claimed for him by St. Paul. Jesus was never recognized, much less accepted as the awaited Jewish Messiah in the royal Davidic tradition by his own people nor has he been to this day. Since there were not yet any Christian converts during the lifetime of Jesus, it could hardly be said that he was in any sense an awaited Christian Messiah either. It was the gospel writers themselves, it is alleged, more so than the events of the day about which they wrote, who were instrumental in bringing to fruition the prophecies from the Old Testament to which they made convenient reference. The Gospel writers were Gentiles who never witnessed the events to which they gave voice and and yet were obviously concerned to substantiate the claims of St. Paul in proclaiming the universal Christos, the man-god designed to serve the needs of the Gentile Greek and Roman world. Drohan believes that the Old Testament prophecies that have been claimed for Jesus have nothing whatever to do with the person Jesus who lived seven hundred years following their utterance. Specifically, Drohan gives an instance where the authors of Matthew, the first Gospel take the prophecy concerning a Nazarite and write the word as Nazarene instead. The reader is thus led entirely astray, for the Nazarites were an ascetic cult first mentioned in the old Testament book of Numbers.

Jesus of Nazareth (or more accurately of Caperngum, since that was his chosen hometown) never referred to himself as the Christ in the Pauline sense and possibly never was conversant with the Greek term "Christos" or the Latin term "Christus", the literal Greek and Latin translations respectively for the Hebrew "Mashiah". The translated terms were made current by St Paul and his Gentile converts several years after the death of Jesus such that the Christos became a Gentile and not a

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Jewish deity. Under the aegis of the translated term "Christos" and by virtue of what may be called the accident of semantical indeterminism, Paul was able nonetheless to claim a universal connotation for the term "Messiah" much wider indeed than the meaning originally intended for it in the original Hebrew scriptures. It may be said that St. Paul deified not so much the man Jesus as the Jewish title "Mashiah", a crown which Jesus never quite inherited.

The salient fact stands forth that even according to the prophecy of Isaiah, the Hebrew people, although promised a Messiah with a divine mission, were never, or never have been, promised a Deity which could replace Yahweh, the one and sole God they worshipped. Even if Jesus were the awaited Messiah and deserving of Hebrew Messiahship, he still would not be, and certainly could not be, raised to the status of a Deity among the Hebrews, a point that is either overlooked or ignored in the Christology that asks the world to accept the universal divinity of Jesus the Christ. Yet the Christos preached by St. Paul was and remains no less than a Deity uneversalized for Jew and Gentile alike, a god-title which Paul associated with the name of Jesus without real justification for so doing beyond his own dynamic drive to evangelize the Gentile world in its need for a new religious conversion. St. Paul had borrowed the name of Jesus and his Essenic doctrine of salvation as symbols which could be employed in launching the new gospel message upon a Gentile world. Radical views attributed to Jesus concerning baptism fasting, healing, repentance and judgement were possibly gained from Jesus' early association with the Essene ascetics who had their abode in caves alongside the Qumran wadis on the northwestern shore of the Dead Sea. Examination of Qumran pottery and recently discovered scrolls have already

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revealed a great deal concerning the activities and beliefs of the Essenes, a monastic group that flourished from about 135 B.C. to 68 A.D.

After the death of Jesus his doctrines were promoted under the leadership of his brother James by a group that went by various names such as The Way, Zaddik Jews, Apocalyptic Jews or Jerusalem Jews. This Jewish sect regarded St. Paul, who made his headquarter at the Syrian town of Antioch, as an enemy and tried to kill him. To them the name of Christ was anathema and was certainly not recognized. The Christianity instigated by St. Paul strictly never had its beginnings in Jerusalem. It is worth noting that Jesus was arrested under charges of sedition against tradition by his own people, the Jews, who turned him over to their Roman masters for punishment by death in 33 A. D., and St. Paul himself was also later charged with sedition against Jewish tradition and given over to Roman officials to suffer death in Rome in or about 67 A. D.

St. Paul indeed assumed a great deal for the personage of Jesus, who understood and spoke Aramaic, a Hebrew dialect and who never subscribed to Christianity as it later came to be practised in the Gentile world. It was not the Jerusalem Jews, who never preached a resurrected Christ in the decades immediately following the ministry of Jesus who were the first Christians but St. Paul and his followers who, as self–appointed apostles, preached to the nations of the Mediterranean world. If it were not for the preachment of the Christ story under the imprimatur of Jesus as Messiah, the legend of Jesus and his gospel teaching would have ended at Jerusalem. It is St. Paul who is the founder, and perhaps the only founder, of Christianity as it has been subsequently taken up and taught to the western world since around 50 A. D. when Paul first wrote, fifteen years pre-

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vious to the writing of any of the New Testament Gospels. It is St. Paul who is primarily responsible for Christianity in its liturgical form as we know it today. The ministry of St. Paul, amounting to an almost fanatical apostleship, elevated Jesus from practical obscurity in claiming for him a universal Messiahship and it was St. Paul who was the first to write the Easter story depicting Christ as risen Lord, resurrected from the dead. Jesus was deified as the alleged Messiah as a necessary link in support of claims made for the new Christianity which drew upon Gospel themes now to be made more available to a waiting world Later Christianity, in attempting to meet the needs of the times at various points throughout the course of its long history, has glossed over many of these important details and tends to forget that Pauline Christianity was and has been heretical to established Judaism.

As an author Drohan is considerably given to conjecture, numerous instances of which may be found. His book is written certainly from a critical point of view, but it cannot go unnoticed that it is also penned in a more or less racy, uncomplimentary style. With obvious relish the author ferrets out the many discrepancies to be found in the scriptural writings that have come down to us. In the overall view we have a presentation which narrowly averts the serrated edges of cynicism and which for the most part lacks the reverence which a truly religious approach to various Bible themes might have warranted.

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